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Rad Waste Cost/Volume Reduction Using New Monitoring/Decon Techniques, Launderable Items and Recycling - 19297

The use of improved radiation monitoring and decontamination techniques significantly reduces the cost and volume of Canadian radioactive waste via recycling/reuse. Over 2,700 metric tons of scaffolding and tooling have been released for unrestricted use back to the owners or recycled as non-radioactive scrap metal over the last 10 years. Additionally, using reusable launderable items reduces the cost over single use Radiological Personal Protective Equipment (RPPE) and plastic wraps and has eliminated thousands of cubic meters of Canadian station waste each year for over 10 years. The combined effect is the significant volume reduction of radioactive waste in a low risk, cost effective, manner. This paper and presentation will highlight the processes and showcase the types of materials decontaminated. The intent is to make waste generators aware of new processes that could be applied to the waste materials stored in their vaults or generated during a refurbishment/decommissioning project as well as day-to-day power generation operations. (authors)

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Applying understanding of likelihood and consequences to demonstrate post-closure criticality safety of a geological disposal facility - 14377

Radioactive Waste Management (RWM) is responsible for implementing geological disposal of the UK's higher activity wastes. These wastes include significant quantities of fissile nuclides and, therefore, demonstration of criticality safety under disposal conditions forms an important component of RWM's disposal system safety case. At the time of disposal, controls (e.g. fissile material limits and/or water barriers) will ensure that waste packages are sub-critical. These controls, plus the containment provided by the engineered barrier system of a geological disposal facility (GDF) will also ensure that criticality is prevented for a long time after disposal. However, over post-closure timescales conditions in the GDF will evolve, and therefore underpinning knowledge is required to demonstrate: under what conditions criticality could occur; what the likelihood of such conditions developing is; and what the consequences would be if a post-closure criticality did occur. These requirements are set out in the UK environment agencies' Guidance on Requirements for Authorisation of a GDF. This paper discusses the disposal of Pressurised Water Reactor fuel, as an example of a waste type that may require disposal. It briefly selects relevant research to combine and summarise results from three recent RWM research projects. The first 'Likelihood of Criticality' considered under what conditions post-closure criticality could occur, whilst a second 'Modelling of Consequences of Hypothetical Criticality' focused on understanding the local physical consequences (temperature rise, power and rock response) of hypothetical 'what-if' post-closure criticality. The paper then explains how this understanding is applied to make safety arguments as to why post-closure criticality is not a significant concern. This is achieved via a third, stream of work that has considered the effects of a potential criticality on pathways that might give rise to a post-closure risk in the future, such as transport of radionuclides in groundwater. Collectively RWMs post-closure criticality safety work allows us to conclude in our generic environmental safety case that a post closure criticality is a low likelihood event, and even if one of these low likelihood events was to occur its consequences would be insignificant to GDF performance. This paper also serves to give context to two companion UK post-closure criticality safety papers which communicate further information on our modelling development and more detailed results underpinning our demonstration of post-closure criticality safety. (authors)

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Implications of End Points on Remediation - 20476

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being implemented as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The Port Hope Project is the larger of the two and includes the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic waste. The Port Hope Project includes a unique and important component - the remediation of approximately 1,200 private residences and businesses to include both interior and exterior verification of soil and surface-contaminated objects. Planning and consultation for the PHAI clean-up criteria and remediation verification standard operating procedures (RVSOP) were initiated in the early 2000's. The criteria were developed through a cooperative effort involving the PHAI, scientific specialists, federal and provincial government agencies, peer reviewers, the municipalities and members of the public. Subsequent verification procedures which detail the unique systematic methods to verify compliance with the clean-up criteria were developed by CNL in consultation with federal regulators and relevant stakeholders. Now, specifically with the Port Hope Small-Scale Sites project having been underway for a year and approximately 38 properties in some stage of remediation, it has become increasingly evident that the practical application of the clean-up criteria and RVSOP methodology is posing unique challenges that are having direct impact on project execution. The current RVSOP approach is based on discrete sample verification not allowing failure of any one sample. When implemented in the field, particularly at the Small-Scale Sites, it leads to a much more extensive excavation than what was accounted for in the original design, the implications of which are substantial delays in project progress and much more significant impact on the individual properties than originally anticipated. This paper will examine the evolution of PHAI clean-up criteria, subsequent RVSOP methodology and its impact on current project execution and the justification for exploring potential revisions to methods of remediation verification. (authors)

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ITEAM - An international mechanistic approach to modeling glass behavior over geologic time scales - 15527

Vitrification is a common worldwide solution for radioactive waste immobilization. Although the excellent chemical durability of glass has been demonstrated in ancient man-made and natural analogues, the lack of an international consensus on a glass corrosion rate law limits the application of glass in high-level waste repository performance models. The contributions of physical and chemical processes controlling the long-term glass dissolution rate in geologic disposal remain uncertain resulting in this non-consensus. A thorough mechanistic understanding of waste form durability in geologic environments would improve public and regulator confidence. In addition, this understanding could lead to cost savings if it becomes possible to take credit for the true durability of the waste form itself in system evaluations rather than requiring expensive engineered barrier systems. To this end, five nations (US, UK, France, Japan, and Belgium) have joined together to formulate a joint plan for collaborative research into the mechanisms controlling the long-term corrosion of glass. Over the last five years, the coordinated research performed by these countries has produced a new level of understanding about the glass corrosion mechanisms, specifically as they apply to glasses similar in composition to the French R7T7 glass. Some recent results are presented as they relate to several mechanisms that are thought to control glass alteration at long time periods. It is important to understand the effects of each particular mechanism on the overall radionuclide release and the relative importance of each process model to the performance assessment calculation. In addition, a new series of experiments calls out potential sources of error due to the use of irregular shapes (such as crushed glass powder) in dissolution experiments. (authors)

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Sorption Behavior of Iodide Ions on Calcium Silicate Hydrate Formed under the Condition Saturated with Saline Water - 17069

The sorption behavior of iodide ions on calcium-silicate-hydrate (CSH gel) under the condition saturated with saline water was examined by using a Raman spectroscopy and ICP-AES, without drying process. In the sorption experiments, I-127 is a stable isotope was used as an alternative of I-129. CSH gel was synthesized with mixing CaO, SiO{sub 2}, and NaCl solution. The Ca/Si molar ratios of CSH gel were set to 0.4, 0.8, 1.2 and 1.6, and the concentration of NaCl solution was set to 0.6 M for simulating the condition of saline groundwater. The liquid/solid weight ratios of CSH gel were set to 10, 13, 15, 17, and 20, and the total weight of solid phase was 1.5 g. Furthermore, at the preparation of CSH gel, the substance of iodide ions in each sample was adjusted to 15 μmol. The synthesis procedure for all samples was conducted in a glove bag filled with nitrogen gas. The curing period was 7, 14, 30, and 60 days at a room temperature (298 K) with shaking at 120 strokes/min. The results of the sorption experiments, iodide ions adsorbed on CSH gel regardless of the high concentration of NaCl. The concentration of iodide ions in liquid phase was equal to the initial one under all experimental conditions. Moreover, the distribution coefficients, K{sub d}, were kept constant (K{sub d} = 1 mL/g) after 14 days. In the results of Raman analysis, the structure of CSH gel was scarcely influenced by incorporating iodide ions from the viewpoint of the silicate chain. These results suggest that iodide ions will be incorporated into CSH gel with the hydration water without changing its structure. Such effect of CSH gel formed with leaching cementitious constituents around the repository may retard the migration of radionuclide (I-129) in the natural barrier of the radioactive waste disposal system. (authors)

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One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval And Delivery Of The Hanford Tank Wastes For Vitrification In The Waste Treatment Plant

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction ofWTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration & Controls, Front-End Design & Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety & Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH&QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant Foundation-configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan.

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Toward the performance assessment of advanced nuclear waste forms: temperature dependence of lanthanide borosilicate glass dissolution

Lanthanide borosilicate (LaBS) glasses are among the most promising waste forms for the immobilization of high-level radioactive waste generated from advanced nuclear fuel cycles. However, the temperature dependence of their dissolution kinetics remains poorly understood and constrained, limiting the integration of these materials into established performance assessment models. Here, we investigate the dissolution behavior of the legacy AmCm2-19 LaBS glass and the benchmark alkali aluminoborosilicate ISG-1 in deionized water between 50 °C and 250 °C using ASTM C1285 (Product Consistency Test-B) protocols. For AmCm2-19 LaBS glass, normalized elemental release rates for boron and silicon increase with temperature before plateauing near 150 °C, consistent with solubility-limited behavior. From data obtained at 50 °C and 100 °C, Arrhenius analysis yields activation energies of E a (B) = 24.8 ± 0.3 kJ mol⁻¹ and E a (Si) = 14.4 ± 0.2 kJ mol⁻¹, similar or slightly lower than those previously reported for two other compositions of LaBS glasses. No secondary phases or alteration layers were detected by SEM-EDX or pXRD. These results establish one of the first temperature-dependent kinetic datasets for LaBS glass dissolution, providing quantitative parameters to inform mechanistic corrosion models and predictive simulations of glass degradation in geological disposal environments.

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The Enhanced Sealing Project, Monitoring a Full-Scale Shaft Seal at Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (2009-2015) - 16070

A full-scale shaft seal was designed and installed in the 5-m-diameter main shaft at Canada's Underground Research Laboratory (URL) in 2009. Located where the main shaft intersects a water-bearing fracture zone at a depth of approximately 273 m, a 6-m-thick clay component was sandwiched between two 3-m-thick concrete components. The clay component was 40:60 mixture of bentonite and quartz/feldspar sand and spans approximately 1 m beyond the maximum identified vertical extent of the fracture zone. Its purpose is to limit the mixing of saline groundwater from the deeper region with the fresher, near-surface groundwater. Its construction was part of Canada's Nuclear Legacy Liabilities Program (NLLP). The 1. phase of the Enhanced Sealing Project (ESP), a jointly-funded Research, Development and Demonstration (RD and D) project was started in 2009 to monitor the saturation of the shaft seal until the end of 2013. The 2. phase, extended monitoring of the ESP is supported by Posiva (Finland), Andra (France) and CNL (Canada) and this will run until the end of 2016. The slow evolution of the seal and its surroundings and complete removal of the surface facilities at the URL site in 2014, has meant that the ESP monitoring has evolved to a stand-alone, lower frequency data collection program. Information gained from the ESP monitoring is applicable to support the development of sealing technology to safely close a deep geological repository for the permanent disposal of radioactive wastes. (authors)

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Salt Waste Processing Facility project lessons learned: Acquisition through construction - 15518

The Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF), located at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in Aiken, South Carolina, is a multi-billion dollar Liquid Radioactive Waste (LRW) processing facility that represents the keystone for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-EM clean-up mission at SRS. The SWPF facilitates DOE-EM clean-up at SRS by decontaminating the salt waste, which is the dominant volumetric component in the LRW tanks, thereby allowing the cleaned salt waste to be removed from the tanks and stabilized into an approved grout-based final waste form. The small volume of removed radionuclides is sent to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. Emptied LRW storage tanks are then grouted into an approved configuration for final closure. The SWPF project is currently 100% complete with design, 80% complete with construction, and 10% complete with commissioning. To date there have been numerous lessons learned with regard to project acquisition, design, procurement, construction, and quality assurance (QA) approaches (both good practices and mistakes) that are considered to be of significant value in improving the state of major project execution within the DOE-EM clean-up program as well as to the wider DOE enterprise. An overview of the current SWPF project status is provided and key lessons learned in the aforementioned areas are presented relative to improving future DOE major project execution performance. Specific areas to be addressed include strategies to optimize integration of design and nuclear safety, constructability tools for design and construction synchronization, commercial grade dedication (CGD) approaches to mitigate atrophy in the nuclear supply chain, and QA perspectives to facilitate effective and efficient project execution. (authors)

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Clay Generic Disposal System Model - Sensitivity Analysis for 32 PWR Assembly Canisters (+2 associated model files).

The Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), as part of the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy’s (DOE-NE) Fuel Cycle Technology program (FCT) is investigating the disposal of high level radioactive waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuela (SNF) in a variety of geologic media. The feasibility of disposing SNF and HLW in clay media has been investigated and has been shown to be promising [Ref. 1]. In addition the disposal of these wastes in clay media is being investigated in Belgium, France, and Switzerland. Thus, Argillaceous media is one of the environments being considered by UFDC. As identified by researchers at Sandia National Laboratory, potentially suitable formations that may exist in the U.S. include mudstone, clay, shale, and argillite formations [Ref. 1]. These formations encompass a broad range of material properties. In this report, reference to clay media is intended to cover the full range of material properties. This report presents the status of the development of a simulation model for evaluating the performance of generic clay media. The clay Generic Disposal System Model (GDSM) repository performance simulation tool has been developed with the flexibility to evaluate not only different properties, but different waste streams/forms and different repository designs and engineered barrier configurations/ materials that could be used to dispose of these wastes.

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Recovery Act Progress Update: HWCTR Tapping

Closure activity at the half-century old heavy water components reactor. Decommissioning is kicked off with the grouting of the basin to further protect the environment from radioactive waste.

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Safety Aspects of Dry Spent Fuel Storage and Spent Fuel Management - 13559

Dry storage systems are characterized by passive and inherent safety systems ensuring safety even in case of severe incidents or accidents. After the events of Fukushima, the advantages of such passively and inherently safe dry storage systems have become more and more obvious. As with the storage of all radioactive materials, the storage of spent nuclear fuel (SF) and high-level radioactive waste (HLW) must conform to safety requirements. Following safety aspects must be achieved throughout the storage period: - safe enclosure of radioactive materials, - safe removal of decay heat, - securing nuclear criticality safety, - avoidance of unnecessary radiation exposure. The implementation of these safety requirements can be achieved by dry storage of SF and HLW in casks as well as in other systems such as dry vault storage systems or spent fuel pools, where the latter is neither a dry nor a passive system. Furthermore, transport capability must be guaranteed during and after storage as well as limitation and control of radiation exposure. The safe enclosure of radioactive materials in dry storage casks can be achieved by a double-lid sealing system with surveillance of the sealing system. The safe removal of decay heat must be ensured by the design of the storage containers and the storage facility. The safe confinement of radioactive inventory has to be ensured by mechanical integrity of fuel assembly structures. This is guaranteed, e.g. by maintaining the mechanical integrity of the fuel rods or by additional safety measures for defective fuel rods. In order to ensure nuclear critically safety, possible effects of accidents have also to be taken into consideration. In case of dry storage it might be necessary to exclude the re-positioning of fissile material inside the container and/or neutron moderator exclusion might be taken into account. Unnecessary radiation exposure can be avoided by the cask or canister vault system itself. In Germany dry storage of SF in casks fulfills both transport and storage requirements. Mostly, storage facilities are designed as concrete buildings above the ground, but due to regional constraints, one storage facility has also been built as a rock tunnel. The decay heat is always removed by natural air flow; further technical equipment is not needed. The removal of decay heat and shielding had been modeled and calculated by state-of-the-art computer codes before such a facility has been built. TueV and BAM present their long experience in the licensing process for sites and casks and inform about spent nuclear fuel management and issues concerning dry storage of spent nuclear fuel. Different storage systems and facilities in Germany, Europe and world-wide are compared with respect to the safety aspects mentioned above. Initial points are the safety issues of wet storage of SF, and it is shown how dry storage systems can ensure the compliance with the mentioned safety criteria over a long storage period. The German storage concept for dry storage of SF and HLW is presented and discussed. Exemplarily, the process of licensing, erection and operation of selected German dry storage facilities is presented. (authors)

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CEMENTITIOUS BARRIERS PARTNERSHIP ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND RELEVANCE TO THE DOE COMPLEX

The Cementitious Barriers Partnership (CBP) was initiated to reduce risk and uncertainties in the performance assessments that directly impact U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) environmental cleanup and closure programs. The CBP is supported by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) and has been specifically addressing the following critical EM program needs: (i) the long-term performance of cementitious barriers and materials in nuclear waste disposal facilities and (ii) increased understanding of contaminant transport behavior within cementitious barrier systems to support the development and deployment of adequate closure technologies. To accomplish this, the CBP has two initiatives: (1) an experimental initiative to increase understanding of changes in cementitious materials over long times (> 1000 years) over changing conditions and (2) a modeling initiative to enhance and integrate a set of computational tools validated by laboratory and field experimental data to improve understanding and prediction of the long-term performance of cementitious barriers and waste forms used in nuclear applications. In FY10, the CBP developed the initial phase of an integrated modeling tool that would serve as a screening tool which could help in making decisions concerning disposal and tank closure. The CBP experimental programs are underway to validate this tool and provide increased understanding of how CM changes over time and under changing conditions. These initial CBP products that will eventually be enhanced are anticipated to reduce the uncertainties of current methodologies for assessing cementitious barrier performance and increase the consistency and transparency of the DOE assessment process. These tools have application to low activity waste forms, high level waste tank closure, D&D and entombment of major nuclear facilities, landfill waste acceptance criteria, and in-situ grouting and immobilization of vadose zone contamination. This paper summarizes the recent work provided by the CBP to support DOE operations and regulatory compliance and the accomplishments over the past 2 years. Impacts of this work include: (1) a forum for DOE-NRC technical exchange, (2) material characterization to support PA predictions, (3) reducing uncertainty in PA predictions, (4) establishing base case performance to improve PA predictions, and (5) improving understanding and quantification of moisture and contaminant transport used in PAs. Additional CBP accomplishments include: sponsorship of a national test bed workshop to obtain collaboration in establishing the path forward in obtaining actual data to support future predictions on cementitious barrier performance evaluations, and participation in an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Cooperative Research Project on the use of cementitious barriers for low-level radioactive waste treatment and disposal.

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Current status of R and D activities and future plan and role of JAEA's two generic URLs - 15356

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) has promoted R and D on geological disposal technology contribute to the implementation and safety regulation for high-level radioactive waste(HLW) disposal. JAEA launched two purpose-built generic URL projects to cover the diversity of geological environments in Japan, in accordance with 'Long-Term Program for Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy' published in 1994 by the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. One is the Mizunami URL Project started in 1996. The Mizunami URL Project is a comprehensive geo-scientific research project investigating the deep underground environment within crystalline rock at Mizunami City in Gifu Prefecture, central Japan. The other one is the Horonobe URL Project started in 2001. The Horonobe URL Project consists of two major research areas, geo-scientific studies and R and D on geological disposal technology in the sedimentary rock environment at Horonobe Town in Hokkaido Prefecture, northern Japan. Both of the URL projects have been planned to proceed in three overlapping phases, 'Phase I: Surface-based investigation', 'Phase II: Construction' and 'Phase III: Operation', with a total duration of about 20 years. Currently, the construction of research galleries in both of the Mizunami and the Horonobe URLs has been completed to 500 m and 350 m depths, respectively. R and D activities in Phase III are being conducted at both URLs. According to the latest five-year plan, announced in September 2014, JAEA will promote R and D activities in Phase III including study of the effects of long-term evolution of the geological environment on geological characteristics such as groundwater flow and chemistry for reducing the uncertainty inherent in the evaluation of the long-term stability of the geological environment. This has been a very critical issue for HLW geological disposal in Japan after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011. Furthermore, JAEA will contribute to international cooperation especially with countries having a similar geological environment such as those in the Circum-Pacific area, development of human resources and communication amongst stakeholders through the generic URL projects. (authors)

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Electrochemical behavior of simulated debris from a severe accident using a molten salt system

In a severe nuclear accident, the fuel in the reactor may melt, forming debris, which contains a UO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2} stable oxide mixture and parts of the reactor, such as Zircaloy and iron components. Proper handling of the debris is a critically important issue. The debris does not have the same composition as spent fuel, and so it is impossible to apply conventional reprocessing technology directly. In this study, we successfully separated Zr and Fe from simulated debris using NaCl-KCl molten salt electrolysis, and we selectively recovered the Zr and Fe. The simulated debris was made from Zr, Fe, and CeO{sub 2}. The CeO{sub 2} was used for simulating stable UO{sub 2}-ZrO{sub 2}. With this approach, it should be possible to reduce the volume of the debris by recovering metals, which can then be treated as low level radioactive wastes.

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Used Fuel Disposition Campaign International Activities Implementation Plan

The management of used nuclear fuel and nuclear waste is required for any country using nuclear energy. This includes the storage, transportation, and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (LILW), used nuclear fuel (UNF), and high level waste (HLW). The Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), within the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT), is responsible for conducting research and development pertaining to the management of these materials in the U.S. Cooperation and collaboration with other countries would be beneficial to both the U.S. and other countries through information exchange and a broader participation of experts in the field. U.S. participation in international UNF and HLW exchanges leads to safe management of nuclear materials, increased security through global oversight, and protection of the environment worldwide. Such interactions offer the opportunity to develop consensus on policy, scientific, and technical approaches. Dialogue to address common technical issues helps develop an internationally recognized foundation of sound science, benefiting the U.S. and participating countries. The UNF and HLW management programs in nuclear countries are at different levels of maturity. All countries utilizing nuclear power must store UNF, mostly in wet storage, and HLW for those countries that reprocess UNF. Several countries either utilize or plan to utilize dry storage systems for UNF, perhaps for long periods of time (several decades). Geologic disposal programs are at various different states, ranging from essentially 'no progress' to selected sites and pending license applications to regulators. The table below summarizes the status of UNF and HLW management programs in several countriesa. Thus, the opportunity exists to collaborate at different levels ranging from providing expertise to those countries 'behind' the U.S. to obtaining access to information and expertise from those countries with more mature programs. The U.S. fuel cycle is a once through fuel cycle involving the direct disposal of UNF, as spent nuclear fuel, in a geologic repository (previously identified at Yucca Mountain, Nevada), following at most a few decades of storage (wet and dry). The geology at Yucca Mountain, unsaturated tuff, is unique among all countries investigating the disposal of UNF and HLW. The decision by the U.S. Department of Energy to no longer pursue the disposal of UNF at Yucca Mountain and possibly utilize very long term storage (approaching 100 years or more) while evaluating future fuel cycle alternatives for managing UNF, presents a different UNF and HLW management R&D portfolio that has been pursued in the U.S. In addition, the research and development activities managed by OCRWM have been transferred to DOE-NE. This requires a reconsideration of how the UFDC will engage in cooperative and collaborative activities with other countries. This report presents the UFDC implementation plan for international activities. The DOE Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) has cooperated and collaborated with other countries in many different 'arenas' including the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and through bilateral agreements with other countries. These international activities benefited OCRWM through the acquisition and exchange of information, database development, and peer reviews by experts from other countries. DOE-NE cooperates and collaborates with other countries in similar 'arenas' with similar objectives and realizing similar benefits. However the DOE-NE focus has not typically been in the area of UNF and HLW management. This report will first summarize these recent cooperative and collaborative activities. The manner that the UFDC will cooperate and collaborate in the future is expected to change as R&D is conducted regarding long-term storage and the potential disposal of UNF and HLW in different geologic environments. While some continuation of on-going or recent cooperative and collaborative activities are expected to continue, the approach taken in these activities may be different than past activities given the changes in the U.S. waste management program. In addition, new cooperative and collaborative activities with different scope than in the past may be undertaken. Such potential future cooperative and collaborative activities will be discussed. The last part of the plan includes the implementation of the UFDC international activities.

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Natural and Engineered Features Supporting Environmental Performance of Idaho National Laboratory's Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste Disposal Facility - 19436

The Idaho National Laboratory's (INL's) Remote-Handled Low-Level Waste (RH LLW) Disposal Facility has been designed and constructed to receive waste generated at the INL site in support of the US DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) and Naval Reactors (NR) missions. The facility has been designed to receive legacy RH LLW currently in storage at INL facilities and new waste generated by nuclear research programs. RH LLW to be received at the facility is solid waste consisting of surface contaminated materials; ion exchange resins used to purify cooling and canal water; and activated metal components generated during reactor core change outs and Naval spent fuel management; and nuclear R and D. Disposal of INL's RH LLW poses unique disposal challenges due to high radiation levels (contact rates up to 600 Sv/hr [60,000 Rem/hr]) that require remote handling and adequate shielding for transportation and disposal. The facility has been designed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, including the all-pathways dose, air pathway dose, inadvertent intruder doses, and radon emissions limits. This paper presents an overview of natural and engineered design features that support the safety case and enhance the environmental performance of the facility. These features include location selection, use of reinforced pre-cast concrete vaults; a robust hydraulic drainage system; use of steel waste canisters for waste disposal; the facility monitoring system; facility layout; and crediting waste forms. The facility performance assessment (PA) developed to meet the requirements of DOE Order 435.1, credits each of these protective features. Releases from waste forms disposed of at this facility are limited by corrosion of the steel waste canisters which will ultimately allow contact with infiltrating water followed by transport of radionuclides from the vault system. The steel waste canisters were credited for their ability to limit water contact with the waste based on the demonstrated ability of the reinforced pre-caste concrete vaults to provide long-term structural protection of the steel waste canisters. Verification of hydraulic and concrete performance was conducted through laboratory data, field infiltration tests supported by a robust monitoring system, and numerical modeling. Releases into the vault system from activated metals are based on site-specific corrosion data. Radionuclide transport from the vault system from all waste forms is based on site-specific climatological, hydrologic, and stratigraphic data. At INL, the groundwater pathway historically and appropriately has received the most attention. By crediting aspects of the natural system, the engineered vault system, and the waste, estimated radiologic doses via the groundwater pathway are minimal. Air pathway doses were reduced by differentially crediting corrosion of aluminum and stainless steel activated metals resulting in the pathway being screened out of the PA. Groundwater and inadvertent intruder doses were reduced through selective facility layout. This paper provides an overview of the system-wide protective features incorporated into the facility design along with an extensive reference list to supporting technical papers and analyses that provide data and interpretation. (authors)

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The Cost of (In-) Accurate Waste Characterization in the U.S. Nuclear Power Industry - 20066

Proper disposal of waste has never been a human priority. Our history is full of examples of throwing away things with minimal effort or thought to consequence. That is until disease or toxicity become apparent and we realize we need to change. Unfortunately, we almost never have all the information we need at the time we make decisions. In addition to the technical and scientific issues, profits and politics are also factors. Newton's third law also applies to politics and so for every policy (action) put in place, there will be (opposite reaction) forces in play to push back against it. These forces are seldom balanced and so the reaction to the discovery of harm is to over-correct and destroy the benefit to be had. This of course causes those who want the benefit, or profit from it, to work to undermine or repeal those measures put in place to eliminate the harm. The issue is exacerbated when the problem to be solved is highly technical and at the edge of our science so that the harm and benefit cannot be easily or accurately quantified. At these times, reason often goes out the window and our decision makers are influenced by either greed or fear as these emotions are much easier to stoke. Those of us in the middle, with the charge to 'do the right thing for the least cost', are therefore frequently constrained and forced into actions that are neither technically the right thing to do and not cost effective. The cost of radioactive waste disposal is based on the concentrations of various radioisotopes in the waste. Some of these isotopes are relatively easy to quantify and some are not. Most laboratory methods for quantification are limited in the amount of activity that can be present during the measurement process. Current nuclear plants were not designed with the idea that taking truly representative waste samples would be important. The limits used to define waste class and therefore cost are precisely defined but the methods for determining those concentrations are far less precise. Improving the accuracy of radioactivity concentrations in waste and having consistent and reasonable oversight can reduce waste costs through active management of the process. So what can we do about it? Science may provide an answer. (authors)

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