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At least 1,783 records · Page 99

Granal thylakoid structure and function: explaining an enduring mystery of higher plants

Summary In higher plants, photosystems II and I are found in grana stacks and unstacked stroma lamellae, respectively. To connect them, electron carriers negotiate tortuous multi‐media paths and are subject to macromolecular blocking. Why does evolution select an apparently unnecessary, inefficient bipartition? Here we systematically explain this perplexing phenomenon. We propose that grana stacks, acting like bellows in accordions, increase the degree of ultrastructural control on photosynthesis through thylakoid swelling/shrinking induced by osmotic water fluxes. This control coordinates with variations in stomatal conductance and the turgor of guard cells, which act like an accordion's air button. Thylakoid ultrastructural dynamics regulate macromolecular blocking/collision probability, direct diffusional pathlengths, division of function of Cytochrome b 6 f complex between linear and cyclic electron transport, luminal pH via osmotic water fluxes, and the separation of pH dynamics between granal and lamellar lumens in response to environmental variations. With the two functionally asymmetrical photosystems located distantly from each other, the ultrastructural control, nonphotochemical quenching, and carbon‐reaction feedbacks maximally cooperate to balance electron transport with gas exchange, provide homeostasis in fluctuating light environments, and protect photosystems in drought. Grana stacks represent a dry/high irradiance adaptation of photosynthetic machinery to improve fitness in challenging land environments. Our theory unifies many well‐known but seemingly unconnected phenomena of thylakoid structure and function in higher plants.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Office of River Protection Advanced Low-Activity Waste Glass Research and Development Plan

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection (ORP) has initiated and leads an integrated Advanced Waste Glass (AWG) program to increase the loading of Hanford tank wastes in glass while meeting melter lifetime expectancies and process, regulatory, and product performance requirements. The integrated ORP program is focused on providing a technical, science-based foundation for making key decisions regarding the successful operation of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) facilities in the context of an optimized River Protection Project (RPP) flowsheet. The fundamental data stemming from this program will support development of advanced glass formulations, key product performance and process control models, and tactical processing strategies to ensure safe and successful operations for both the low-activity waste (LAW) and high-level waste vitrification facilities. These activities will be conducted with the objective of improving the overall RPP mission by enhancing flexibility and reducing cost and schedule.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Office of River Protection Advanced Low-Activity Waste Glass Research and Development Plan

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of River Protection (ORP) has initiated and leads an integrated Advanced Waste Glass (AWG) program to increase the loading of Hanford tank wastes in glass while meeting melter lifetime expectancies and process, regulatory, and product performance requirements. The integrated ORP program is focused on providing a technical, science-based foundation for making key decisions regarding the successful operation of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) facilities in the context of an optimized River Protection Project (RPP) flowsheet. The fundamental data stemming from this program will support development of advanced glass formulations, key product performance and process control models, and tactical processing strategies to ensure safe and successful operations for both the low-activity waste (LAW) and high-level waste vitrification facilities. These activities will be conducted with the objective of improving the overall RPP mission by enhancing flexibility and reducing cost and schedule. The purpose of this advanced LAW glass research and development plan is to identify the near-term, mid-term, and longer-term research and development activities required to develop and validate advanced LAW glasses, property-composition models and their uncertainties, and an advanced glass algorithm to support WTP facility operations, including both Direct Feed LAW and full pretreatment flowsheets. Data are needed to develop, validate, and implement 1) new glass property-composition models and 2) a new glass formulation algorithm. Hence, this plan integrates specific studies associated with increasing the Na2O and SO3/halide concentrations in glass, because these components will ultimately dictate waste loadings for LAW vitrification. Of equal importance is the development of an efficient and economic strategy for 99Tc management. Specific and detailed studies are being implemented to understand the fate of Tc throughout the WTP flowsheet and the underlying mechanisms that dictate its partitioning between streams within the LAW vitrification facility. These studies are aimed at increasing the single-pass Tc retention in glass and the potential use of high-temperature mineral phases to capture Tc. The Tc-bearing mineral phases would be thermally stable and resistant to Tc release during feed melting reactions or they could serve as alternative waste forms. The LAW glass research and development is focused on reducing the total volume of LAW glass produced and minimizing the impact of (or potentially eliminating) the need for recycle.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Feedstock to Tailpipe Initiative: Kansas Biofuels Production, Testing and Certification Laboratory

The primary task of this grant was to establish an ASTM testing facility for biodiesel and ethanol and to use this facility to develop methods to predict fuel characteristics based on feedstock composition and feedstock cultivation. In addition to characterizing fuel properties, this grant allowed for the purchase and installation of a Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy (FTIR) emissions analyzer that will provide an analysis of the emissions leaving the engine in order to meet EPA regulations. This FTIR system is combined with an Alternating Current (AC) dynamometer that allows the engine to follow Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Federal Test Procedure (FTP) cycles. A secondary task was to investigate cultivating algae utilizing wastewater and top-down ecological control and subsequent harvesting using coagulation and dissolved air flotation. Lipid extraction utilizing environmentally-friendly and cost-effective solvents, with and without cell-disruption pretreatment was also explored. Significant work on the hydrothermal liquefaction of wastewater cultivated algae was conducted.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

BOP-301 and BOP-302R: Test Definitions and Analyses

Following the conclusion of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) coordinated research project (CRP) on analysis of two EBR-II tests, Argonne has continued its EBR-II analysis with additional tests from the Shutdown Heat Removal Test (SHRT) series. The tests selected for this follow-up analysis are BOP-301 and BOP-302R, two unprotected loss of heat of sink tests in which the intermediate sodium pump tripped without scramming the control rods or tripping the primary pumps. The IAEA CRP focused on the SHRT-17 and SHRT-45R tests, the most severe protected and unprotected loss of flow tests performed during the SHRT series. With the primary pumps tripping, flow rates decreased to levels where flowmeter uncertainty was very high. Accurately capturing the progressions of the two tests despite this uncertainty was one of the key modeling and simulation challenges during the CRP. BOP-301 and BOP-302R were selected because the primary sodium pumps did not trip for those tests. Primary flow rate measurements are known with greater certainty. Power and temperature discrepancies can be explored without concern that flow predictions match test measurements but not the actual flow rates from the tests. These two tests were performed during the same test window as SHRT-45R and had the same core load configuration. Therefore, core models created for analysis of SHRT-45R were easily adapted for analysis of BOP-301 and BOP-302R. Another reason for analyzing BOP-301 and BOP-302R is to analyze tests in which the core inlet temperature changed significantly, which did not occur during the loss of flow tests. The transient progression of the unprotected SHRT-45R test was driven by a decreasing core flow rate while the core inlet temperature remained relatively constant. For the BOP tests, the transient progression was driven by an increasing core inlet temperature while the core flow rate was stable. This report defines the BOP-301 and BOP-302R tests and provides a selection of measured test data. Initial predictions from SAS4A/SASSYS-1 simulations of these tests are then presented. Following these simulations, additional analysis was performed with the Dakota uncertainty quantification and optimization toolkit to determine which parameters have the greater impact on the transient results and the optimal values of the most important parameters.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Effects of Borate and Organics on U(VI) Solubility in WIPP Brine

The solubility of uranium (VI) in Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)-relevant brine was determined to support ongoing WIPP recertification activities. This research was performed by the Los Alamos National Laboratory Carlsbad Operations (LANL-CO) Actinide Chemistry and Repository Science Program (ACRSP). The WIPP Actinide Source Term Program (ASTP) did not develop a model for the solubility of actinides in the VI oxidation state. The solubility of UO 2 2+ , in the absence of WIPP specific data, is presently set to be equal to a conservatively high 1 mM within the WIPP Performance Assessment (PA) for all expected WIPP conditions (SOTERM, 2019) as selected at the recommendation of the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) (EPA, 2005). According to the current WIPP chemistry model assumptions and conditions, the expected pC H+ is about 9.5 and controlled by MgO buffering CO 3 2- . The goal of this study is to perform screening experiments that account for the contributions of organics and borate on uranium solubility. In this report, the solubility of U(VI) was determined at pC H+ 9 WIPP brine in the absence or presence of borate and organics at under-saturation approach. Experiments were equilibrated for about 135 days. Organic compounds present in WIPP waste can form strong complexes with actinides and can affect the oxidation states of actinides. The organic compounds addressed in WIPP performance assessment include EDTA (Ethylenediaminetetraacetic Acid), oxalate, citrate, and acetate (SOTERM, 2019). These data quantify the effects of WIPP-relevant concentrations of borate and organics effects on the solubility of U(VI) to challenge the predictions of the WIPP actinide model and inform decisions and recommendations made in the upcoming recertification of the WIPP (CRA-2024). The experiments performed were done according to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) approved Test Plan entitled “Experimental Strategy to Challenge Actinide Solubility Predictions” and designated LCO-ACP-26. All data reported were obtained under the LANL-CO Quality Assurance Program, which is compliant with the DOE Carlsbad Field Office, Quality Assurance Program Document (CBFO/QAPD) (QAPD, 2017).

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

43-0434 Bridge Inspection Report 2021

The documentation includes the following: 1. 2021 NMDOT Bridge Inspection Report including Element Level Data Collection (in digital formats prepared by NMSU)--conforms to the National Bridge Inspection Standards and AASHTO Manual for Bridge Element Inspection; 2. 2021 Supplemental Report (in digital formats prepared by NMSU)--provides detailed information related to current condition of major bridge components; 3. 2021 Inspection Pictures (in digital format prepared by NMSU); 4. 2021 Delamination Map (in digital format prepared by LANL). During the 2021 inspection, three critical findings were reported to our LANL contact, Mr. Jonathan Stein, by text and/or email on June 26, 2021. 1. The south joint of the bridge had a modular section of the joint that could potentially come loose during the passing of vehicles. This was reported as a critical finding for safety. If the modular section becomes dislodged or deformed it could pose a serious hazard that could result in a punctured tire to vehicles, motorcyclists and/or bicyclist causing drivers/riders to lose control; 2. The bracket plate located at the north end of the bridge on the pedestrian walkway was corroded through and provides little protection to pedestrians and bicyclists. This was reported as a critical finding for safety to prevent injuries to people; 3. The north approach rail has three missing posts. These posts help ensure that traffic is redirected and the energy is absorbed by the rail. This was reported as a critical finding for safety. Additionally, the approach rail is on a curve with a nearby drop off. Immediate repair is recommended. Based on the 2021 inspection, the bridge deck is rated in "fair" condition. The chain drag performed on the deck identified several areas with delamination that are concentrated near the expansion joints, in the closure joint of the deck near the bridge centerline, and at the south end of the northbound lanes. The chain drag performed during the 2021 inspection revealed 215,333 sq. in. (1495 sq. ft) of delaminations and patched areas (not including the sidewalk). This is approximately a 600% increase from 2019. It is recommended that the delaminations and spalls with exposed rebar be repaired. The "delaminated area" map for the 2021 inspection is provided in the supplemental report.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Implementation of a System of Gamma Imagers for Measuring Plutonium Holdup

The Surplus Plutonium Disposition (SPD) project is an effort to dilute and dispose of many tonsof weapons grade plutonium. This work will take place in a shielded glovebox to protect workers fromradiological dose. Accurate measurements of the holdup, or material left behind, in the gloveboxes is im-portant for Nuclear Material Control and Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, andprocess monitoring. Shielding around the gloveboxes presents an obstacle for the traditional GeneralizedGamma Holdup (GGH) method. The uncertainties associated with that method, at around 28%, arealso detrimental since the amount of holdup must be kept below an established limit with a high level ofconfidence.Passive gamma-ray imaging provides a more complete depiction of the distribution of radioactivematerials. Recent refinement of the method has demonstrated that quantitative information can beextracted from the images with a well-characterized system. A permanently installed system of gamma-ray imagers is currently being developed to measure plutonium holdup in the SPD gloveboxes. Thispaper will report on progress with the development of this system.This application requires that the features of current commercially available instruments from H3Dand PHDS, optimized for measurement performance in a mobile application, be translated into theconstraints of the operational environment with fixed installations. The interaction between facilityconstraints and measurement capabilities will be addressed.A series of measurements with plutonium sources in a mocked-up glovebox geometry with imagersmounted above the ceiling of the glovebox have been taken. Imager performance with respect to angularresolution, minimum measurement time for quantification, and signal-to-noise ratio with a multitudeof sources will be evaluated for those measurements. A series of prototypes of user interfaces will bepresented for display of the data to its various consumers for the purposes of Nuclear Material Controland Accountancy, worker dose minimization, criticality safety, and process monitoring.

Schmitt, Kyle↗

Collimators and beam dumps for the APS-upgrade storage ring - 25478

Argonne's Advanced Photon Source is planning a major upgrade that will increase the storage ring current from the present 100 mA to 200 mA and decrease the beam lifetime due to high charge-per-bunch and substantially smaller transverse beam size. Collimators in the horizontal plane around the storage ring will be used to control beam losses. These collimators will also serve as whole beam dumps in cases where the stored beam must be dumped for machine protection. Another feature of the Upgrade is swap-out injection, in which a stored electron bunch will be extracted to a dedicated swap-out dump when its charge falls to about 90% of the initial value and immediately replaced with a new bunch. Since particle losses will be concentrated in these collimators and beam dumps, there is the potential for high dose rates around these locations and for activation of nearby accelerator components. This paper contains a brief summary of the APS Upgrade, discusses electron losses in the storage ring, and presents calculations of dose rates and induced activity around the collimators and beam dumps. (authors)

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons • CAS TA-21-001-TARC Roller Coaster N. Disposal Trench These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify these URs to administrative URs. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). These Administrative URs were based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

FIDVR Capability of Hybrid Grid-Forming PV Power Plants During Feeder Restoration

Grid-forming inverters must optimally transfer power from dc-coupled photovoltaic arrays and batteries into an ac grid. Further, they must be able to restore single-phase induction motors (SPIMs) and withstand fault-induced delayed voltage-recovery (FIDVR) events. These resilience and reliability challenges are addressed here by: (i) engineering a controller to optimally operate dc-coupled hybrid resources; (ii) modeling residential air-conditioning compressors for restoration/FIDVR studies; and (iii) analyzing SPIM thermal-relay performance under limited inverter currents and designing an electronic protection for stalled SPIMs. Furthermore, these contributions are demonstrated via electromagnetic-transient simulations and can be helpful to understand recommendations by the North American Electric Reliability Corporation.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Controlled growth, characterization and thermodynamic behavior of bismuth–tin nanostructures sheathed in carbon nanotubes

We report the controlled synthesis of bismuth–tin (Bi–Sn) nanostructures sheathed in graphitic shells that resemble carbon nanotubes (CNTs). Our approach is based on a simple catalytic chemical vapor deposition over a mixture of Bi{sub 2}O{sub 3} and SnO{sub 2} supplied as starting materials. Shape control of the nanostructures strongly relies on the weight ratio of Bi{sub 2}O{sub 3} and SnO{sub 2}. Sheathed nanoparticles and nanorods are formed at SnO{sub 2} to Bi{sub 2}O{sub 3} weight ratios of less than 4:1. They are composed of two separate crystals: rhombohedral Bi and tetragonal Sn{sub 19}Bi crystals. On the other hand, the sheathed nanowires are formed at SnO{sub 2} to Bi{sub 2}O{sub 3} weight ratios above 4:1. The nanowires have only tetragonal Sn{sub 19}Bi structure with a diameter of approximately 100 nm. Elementary analyses support the core/shell heterostructure of the resulting products. A favorable temperature for the Sn-rich Sn{sub 19}Bi nanowires is in the range of 700–800 °C, more specifically around 750 °C. Thermodynamic analysis reveals that the CNTs play a significant role in the protection of the Bi–Sn nanostructures during phase transition by temperature change. This simple and reproducible method may be extended to the fabrication of similar binary or ternary nanostructures. - Highlights: • Controlled growth of Bi–Sn nanostructures sheathed in CNTs relies on MSnO{sub 2}/MBi{sub 2}O{sub 3}. • Growth mechanism is based on catalytic reaction of C{sub 2}H{sub 2} over an oxide mixture. • Nanoparticles and nanorods consist of rhombohedral Bi and tetragonal Sn{sub 19}Bi. • A favorable temperature for the Sn{sub 19}Bi nanowires is in the range of 700–800 °C. • CNT acts as a protective barrier during phase change of the Bi–Sn nanostructures.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Novel 6xHis tagged foot-and-mouth disease virus vaccine bound to nanolipoprotein adjuvant via metal ions provides antigenic distinction and effective protective immunity

Here, we engineered two FMD viruses with histidine residues inserted into or fused to the FMDV capsid. Both 6xHis viruses exhibited growth kinetics, plaque morphologies and antigenic characteristics similar to wild-type virus. The 6xHis tag allowed one-step purification of the mutant virions by Co{sup 2+} affinity columns. Electron microscopy and biochemical assays showed that the 6xHis FMDVs readily assembled into antigen: adjuvant complexes in solution, by conjugating with Ni{sup 2+}-chelated nanolipoprotein and monophosphoryl lipid A adjuvant (MPLA:NiNLP). Animals Immunized with the inactivated 6xHis-FMDV:MPLA:NiNLP vaccine acquired enhanced protective immunity against FMDV challenge compared to virions alone. Induction of anti-6xHis and anti-FMDV neutralizing antibodies in the immunized animals could be exploited in the differentiation of vaccinated from infected animals needed for the improvement of FMD control measures. The novel marker vaccine/nanolipid technology described here has broad applications for the development of distinctive and effective immune responses to other pathogens of importance. - Highlights: • 6xHis-tags in A{sub 24} FMDV enable purification and biding to adjuvants via metal ions. • 6xHis A{sub 24} FMDV:MPLA:NiNLP vaccine enhanced protective immunity against FMDV. • Surface exposed capsid tags allow distinction of infected from vaccinated animals.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Bradwell - The first UK Nuclear Site to Enter Care and Maintenance - 18152

Magnox Ltd, a Cavendish Fluor company, is currently decommissioning twelve nuclear sites on behalf of the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA). Ten of these sites are former Power Stations; the other two are closed Research and Development facilities. An overall strategy for decommissioning the Magnox sites has been agreed between Magnox and the NDA. For all but one of these sites the decommissioning strategy involves an extended quiescent period, known as Care and Maintenance (C and M), during which remaining radiological hazards reduce naturally through radioactive decay. After this quiescent period the sites will be restored to an agreed end state through further decommissioning and clearance work. Sites in C and M will not be permanently manned. They will be passively safe such that prompt action will not be required in response to an alarm or fault. Preparing a nuclear site for C and M involves several inter-related strands of work including definition of the intended physical configuration of the site during C and M (the C and M entry state), establishing a safety case to support that configuration, carrying out the physical works needed to deliver the C and M entry state, preparing arrangements and a team to manage the site during C and M and consolidating the knowledge and information needed to support C and M and final clearance of the site. To enter C and M there needs to be a carefully controlled transition of site, personnel and management system into the agreed C and M configuration. Bradwell, a site on the east coast of England, was selected as part of the overall decommissioning strategy for 'early' entry into C and M; Bradwell is scheduled to enter C and M in late 2018, several years in advance of the next scheduled site, with the intent of carrying learning forward from Bradwell to the subsequent sites. Bradwell is now in the final stages of preparation for C and M. Decommissioning commenced on completion of defueling in 2005. A clearly defined C and M entry state was established early in decommissioning and, through interaction with Regulators and internal and external stakeholders, developed as a shared target, thus providing certainty to the scope of the overall decommissioning project. The site has subsequently been systematically decommissioned to meet this target C and M entry state. All legacy waste has been retrieved and packaged into robust disposal containers, the reactor buildings have a new weather envelope, and much of the site is empty space with concrete hardstanding where facilities used to exist and bare rooms where plant used to operate. The remaining radiological and environmental hazards are not significant. During C and M, which is anticipated to last for 70 years, Bradwell will be managed remotely without the requirement for personnel to be present on site, with the possible exception of an ongoing security presence when the site first enters C and M. In terms of UK decommissioning, many of the projects undertaken at Bradwell were first of a kind. The company operates under a programmed organisational and delivery model, which will enable innovation and learning from Bradwell to be carried forward across the whole Magnox fleet. In addition to decommissioning tools and techniques, processes to manage decommissioning, optimise the C and M entry state to reduce the burden on the UK taxpayer and to transition a site into C and M have been developed. This, in addition to taking people from Bradwell and seeding them into Magnox and the broader UK nuclear industry, should help to provide long term cost savings and delivery efficiencies across the entire NDA estate. This paper describes the journey of Bradwell Site through decommissioning and into C and M, highlighting the innovation and challenges that have contributed to the success of delivering the first UK nuclear site into Care and Maintenance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Quality-Control Mechanism for Telomerase RNA Folding in the Cell

Long non-coding RNAs can often fold into different conformations. Telomerase RNA, an essential component of the telomerase ribonucleoprotein (RNP) enzyme, must fold into a defined structure to fulfill its function with the protein catalytic subunit (TERT) and other accessory factors. However, the mechanism by which the correct folding of telomerase RNA is warranted in a cell is still unknown. Here we show that La-related protein Pof8 specifically recognizes the conserved pseudoknot region of telomerase RNA and instructs the binding of the Lsm2-8 complex to its mature 3' end, thus selectively protecting the correctly folded RNA from exonucleolytic degradation. In the absence of Pof8, TERT assembles with misfolded RNA and produces little telomerase activity. Therefore, Pof8 plays a key role in telomerase RNA folding quality control, ensuring that TERT only assembles with functional telomerase RNA to form active telomerase. Our finding reveals a mechanism for non-coding RNA folding quality control.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Secure Control Systems for the Energy Sector

The Padlock Project is an alliance between Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc. (SEL). SEL is the prime contractor on the Padlock project. Rhett Smith (SEL) is the project director and Adrian Chaves (SNL) and John Stewart (TVA) are principle investigators. SEL is the world’s leader in microprocessor-based electronic equipment for protecting electric power systems. The Tennessee Valley Authority, a corporation owned by the U.S. government, provides electricity for 9 million people in parts of seven southeastern states at prices below the national average. TVA, which receives no taxpayer money and makes no profits, also provides flood control, navigation and land management for the Tennessee River system and assists utilities, and state and local governments with economic development.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

A Risk-Informed Performance-Based Methodology to Manage Fire Protection Systems in Nuclear Facilities

Fire protection systems (FPSs) and features are installed in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hazard Category 1, 2, or 3 nuclear facilities to protect property (maximum possible fire loss thresholds), life, and nuclear safety (i.e., structures, systems, and components). These FPSs and features are designed and maintained in accordance with the prescriptive guidance provided in applicable building codes and National Fire Protection Association codes and standards. Management, operations, and maintenance activities of FPSs involve significant effort. A DOE facility’s documented safety analysis or other safety basis document could also rely on FPSs to provide either a safety significant or safety class function to mitigate fire hazards and minimize radiological consequences. In some cases, the designation of safety significant or safety class may be determined to provide a layer of defense-in-depth to minimize nuclear safety risks independent of the fire risk. DOE standards allow the use of performance-based design alternatives developed by the fire industry but do not consider the defense-in-depth layers of protection provided in DOE facilities to prevent or mitigate the risks associated with unintended release of radioactive materials into the environment. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory developed a decision-making methodology tailored for DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities to manage FPSs and features by integrating nuclear safety risk insights into a performance-based analysis. This risk-informed, performance-based (RIPB) methodology can be used to provide the technical basis for classifying an FPS as safety class and safety significant, tailoring administrative controls (e.g., technical safety requirements), and ranking the importance of FPSs to prioritize maintenance, upgrades, and replacement activities. The RIPB methodology is a graded approach to inform DOE facility owners and Fire Protection Program managers of the most risk-significant FPSs and equipment, and those systems would be cost-beneficial to relax rigor if there is a need to re-design the FPS coverage or deviate from DOE and National Fire Protection Association standards for those systems that would be less significant. This paper describes the framework used to develop the RIPB methodology and the outcome of implementing this methodology in a use-case nuclear facility. This paper also discusses the impact to DOE policies and standards and the safety margins and defense-in-depth measures credited in nuclear safety assessments in a facility’s documented safety analysis and the benefits of implementing an RIPB methodology in lieu of a prescriptive method to comply with fire protection requirements.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Improving nuclear criticality safety in maintenance and construction activities at Y-12 national security complex

Maintenance and construction activities inside aging DOE nuclear facilities often impact nuclear criticality safety controls and requirements. Gaps in communication, training, and implementation of criticality safety guidance and controls in maintenance and construction work packages were identified at the Y-12 National Security Complex in 2016 when a maintenance package in the field was discovered to not have been reviewed by criticality safety. This incident resulted in a deficiency because criticality safety review is required any time maintenance or construction is working on equipment containing fissile material or their work impacts fissile material or fissile material activities. This review is required to protect the basis and requirements of criticality safety evaluations. To address these issues, the Y-12 criticality safety group reviewed a large number of maintenance packages, created a new method of communicating criticality safety controls to maintenance and construction, and developed a criticality safety training session designed specifically for maintenance and construction work planners. This paper presents the improvements in communication and implementation made between criticality safety, maintenance, and construction at the Y-12 National Security Complex and possible applications for other DOE sites. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗