NASA NTRS2007
In terms of technology, the X-43A/Hyper-X represented a singular milestone. After nearly a half century of high hopes, studies, wind tunnel tests, proposals, and canceled projects, a scramjet-powered vehicle had flown. The performance of the engine qualified the scramjet design tools and scaling laws. In turn, the theoretical calculations and ground testing could be used to design more advanced engine concepts. Just as important, both the scramjet and vehicle systems had successfully operated in the variable temperatures and densities of the atmosphere. The X-43A systems were able to maintain the exact flight conditions necessary for the scramjet to operate properly. Control deflections to correct the engine-induced moments were close to pre-flight predictions. When the unexpected occurred, such as when the vehicle pitched up during the cowl opening on the second flight, the control system was sufficiently designed to correct the situation. The airframe and wing structure, the thermal protection material, and the internal conditions of the X-43A performed largely as predicted. The HXLV thermal anomaly during the ascent on the third flight and "the Mach 8 unpleasantness" during the descent indicated that the HXLV and X-43A were not as resilient to aerodynamic heating as expected. The X-43A 's airframe drag and lift both were slightly higher than predicted, but still within preflight uncertainty predictions. The stability and control were as predicted, as was the boundary layer transition. The biggest aerodynamic worry before the flight was the separation of the HXLV and the X- 43A. After all was said and done, this went exactly as predicted, proving that non-symmetrical/high-dynamic pressure stage separations could be performed. This in turn meant that two-stage-to-orbit vehicles employing this technology were feasible. The Hyper-X program also served as a training ground for a new generation of scramjet and hypersonic researchers. This included both NASA and contractor personnel, providing them with experience in ground testing and component development; vehicle design, construction, integration, system checkout, and, ultimately, flight testing and data analysis. Additionally, researchers learned the practical details of running a project within finite budget and time limits, about the ambiguousness of risk assessment, and about the need to spend a significant amount of time and effort dealing with engineering problems, such as those with the FAS, that have nothing to do with the project's research goals. Finally, all those who worked on the X-43A project now know what it is like to spend years transforming an idea into a functional vehicle, only for it to be lost in a matter of seconds. And then to go through years of work to correct the problems, to face the possibility that still more might exist, and finally to savor the triumph of two successful flights. For those who will work on the hypersonic projects that emerge in coming years, these experiences may prove to be the most valuable of all.