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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,765 records · Page 98
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DOE OSTI2018

Addressing Excess Contaminated Facilities and Mercury Cleanup At the Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Reservation - 18408

The U.S. Department of Energy's Oak Ridge Office of Environmental Management (OREM) and its prime cleanup contractor, URS | CH2M Oak Ridge LLC (UCOR) are executing an aggressive program of cleanup and risk reduction in excess contaminated facilities on the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR). Across the complex, DOE has designated more than 2,300 of its facilities 'excess'. Excess means 'nonoperational' and refers to a facility for which DOE no longer has a mission need. Many of these facilities pose high risk to workers and/or the environment. Delayed cleanup increases risk as well as cost. OREM and UCOR initiated a Working Group on Excess Facilities to identify and prioritize activities that are needed to enhance worker safety, minimize further degradation of the facilities, and reduce the environmental risk. Six Excess Contaminated Facilities projects on the ORR were identified as priorities. Three of the projects are located at ORNL - the Building 7500 Homogenous Reactor Experiment, the Building 3026 Radioisotope Development Laboratory and Buildings 3028/3029 Isotope Facilities. At Y-12, priority excess facilities include the Column Exchange Equipment (COLEX), the Alpha-4 Lithium Enrichment Facility and the Biology Complex Research Facilities. Work on these projects is aimed at stabilization of degraded higher risk facilities, characterization of conditions and hazards, removal of hazardous materials and placement of the facility in the lowest risk condition possible pending demolition. At the same time, DOE and UCOR are preparing to undertake a comprehensive program to remediate the presence of mercury in the water stemming from historical operations at the Y-12 National Security Complex. Over decades of operations, mercury migrated into the environment. Deteriorating conditions of large post-operation mercury-use buildings may be contributing to additional releases. Mercury cleanup is a high priority for Y-12 and the Oak Ridge Reservation. UCOR is completing the final design on a new Mercury Treatment Facility with construction expected to begin in late 2017. When constructed the treatment facility will reduce the amount of mercury in local waters, lower environmental contamination levels and serve as a guard against future releases. (author)

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DOE OSTI2018

Dounreay (UK) Shaft and Silo Decommissioning - Remote Handling in an Extreme and Uncertain Environment - 18420

DSRL is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Cavendish Dounreay Partnership Ltd, a consortium of Cavendish Nuclear, CH2M and AECOM. It is funded by the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA) to deliver the site closure programme. Today, Dounreay is a site of construction, demolition and waste management, all of it designed to return the site to an interim end state. Dounreay is recognised as the most complex nuclear site closure project in Europe. The experimental nature of many of the sites redundant facilities means the clean-up and demolition requires innovation as well as great care. It is driving innovation in the approach to remote handling and robotics in the highly complex, hazardous and uncertain environment, all within tight financial constraints by UK Government. Veolia Nuclear Solutions (VNS) is instrumental in delivery of the overall solutions for the shaft and silo decommissioning project working with other members of industry and directly for DSRL to deliver the overall concept design for waste treatment as well as specialised equipment to recover highly hazardous and uncertain materials in this unique project. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Multi-Faceted Approach to Evaluate Discharge Locations at a FUSRAP Site - 18421

Following the completion of a Soil and Groundwater Remedial Investigation by USACE at a FUSRAP site located in Nassau County, New York, groundwater data indicated the presence of contaminant source(s) that had not been identified. As a result, a targeted investigation was undertaken to understand how materials were handled and disposed of at a site located in Nassau County, Long Island, New York. The FUSRAP site is a 4.3-hectare (10.5-acre) site encompassing three parcels which had historically been utilized as a nuclear materials manufacturing facility (e.g., cores, slug, and fuel elements) for reactors used in both research and electric power generation in early 1950's until late 1960's; however, the targeted investigation was on the southern-most parcel known as the '70 Property' (the Site). The 70 Property contained a building that was used for atomic fuel-element manufacturing from 1958 until 1966 under license to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and involved the use of natural, enriched, and depleted uranium as well as lesser amounts of thorium. The major contaminants of concern are tetrachloroethene, nickel, uranium and thorium. During the RI, significant sources of contamination were not found in Site soils despite records indicating that chemicals and radionuclides had been disposed of on the property. In addition, downgradient groundwater data indicated a source(s) on the 70 Property that could not be identified by known sources on other the other FUSRAP parcels or from adjacent sites. This conclusion was further supported following development of groundwater contaminant transport and flow models. The main objective of the targeted investigation was to evaluate the potential discharge points on the 70 Property that may have been utilized for liquids waste disposal. However, several challenges existed including 1) lack of building construction details; 2) historical changes to Site building and property; 3) the use of the Site by various tenants; and 4) the commingling of Site contaminants with impacts from multiple sources. To overcome these challenges, historic documents/reports with information about the handling and disposal of liquid wastes were reviewed to evaluate quantities, contents and locations of waste disposal. Thereafter, an investigation was undertaken that included geophysical surveys; pipe tracing and video inspection; in-situ smoke and water testing; installation of test trenches and soil borings; and, sampling sludge residuals, soils and water within the various drainage structures that were located. This paper describes the multi-faceted investigation approach that was utilized to overcome the challenges faced during the investigation as well as insights into the waste disposal practices of the time period and the findings of the investigation. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Optimizing the Pyrolysis of Polypropylene and High-Density Polyethylene for Contaminated Solid Waste Treatment - 18537

Organic waste is generally characterized by high volume-to-weight ratio. Organic waste contaminated with radionuclides may further pose a hazard due to radiolysis and generation of combustible and explosive gases. Thus, minimizing waste volume as well as forming a chemically stable and conditioned matrix are of high importance in the treatment of contaminated polymers. In the present study, the pyrolytic decomposition of the commonly used polyolefins, polypropylene (PP) and high-density polyethylene (HDPE), was explored as a method for waste minimization by obtaining high gaseous and low char and liquid yields. The effects of two aluminosilicate catalysts, Zeolite Y and ZSM-5, and reaction temperature on decomposition efficiency were evaluated based on product conversions and gas composition. Under pyrolytic conditions, PP decomposition resulted in higher decomposition efficiency than HDPE. Over the catalysts, pyrolysis of the polymers over ZSM-5 resulted in higher gas conversions than over Zeolite Y, with a more significant impact on HDPE than PP. Increasing the reaction temperature from 450 deg. C to 525 deg. C also resulted in increased polymer decomposition. However, differences in gas composition, including olefinic to paraffinic ratio and carbon number distribution, support that the catalysts and the temperature impact polymer decomposition by different and opposing mechanisms. This conclusion was further supported by the finding that the decomposition efficiency was not significantly enhanced in the presence of the catalyst at 525 deg. C. Taken together, our study highlights the advantage of using ZSM-5 and optimizing the reaction temperature for treatment of contaminated organic solid waste. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2018

Immobilization of Radioactive Materials Using Porous Iron Composite Media - 18582

High levels of nitrate (NO{sub 3}) derived from agriculture and naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), primarily uranium (U) and natural decay chain products that have been mobilized by the influx of oxygenated, high-alkalinity water, are a threat to shallow groundwater resources in California. Porous Iron Composite (PIC) materials were evaluated as a water treatment option in a series of batch experiments. While the use of Zero Valent Iron (ZVI) to address groundwater contaminated with NO{sub 3} or U has been demonstrated, the ability of PICs to chemically reduce and immobilize U and other associated contaminants in oxygenated alkaline groundwater where soluble uranyl-carbonate species dominate and high NO{sub 3} levels may compete for reductive capacity remain a concern. Additionally, ZVI materials have been used to immobilize other redox sensitive radionuclides (e.g., technetium-99 ({sup 99}Tc)) with limited success. Batch tests were conducted using an artificial groundwater surrogate (i.e., CAGW for California Groundwater) containing ∼ 100 mg L{sup -1} NO{sub 3}{sup -}, 200 mg L{sup -1} alkalinity, 100 μg L{sup -1} U, 100 μg L{sup -1} rhenium (Re) as a non-radioactive surrogate for the nuclear fission product technetium-99 ({sup 99}Tc), 100 μg L{sup -1} stable strontium (Sr) as a surrogate for radium (Ra) and the fission product strontium-90 ({sup 90}Sr), and 50 μg L{sup -1} arsenic (As), a common groundwater contaminant. Five gram samples of the PIC material were reacted with 200 mL of CAGW under two different atmospheric conditions to evaluate the impact of O{sub 2}. Batch tests were also conducted in the presence and absence of another oxidized species, NO{sub 3}. At specific time intervals, a small aliquot was collected from each batch treatment for chemical analysis (i.e., U, Re, As, Fe, NO{sub 3}, etc.) and the pH and ORP of the remaining suspension was measured. The PIC was effective at fully reducing NO{sub 3}{sup -} levels over the extended reaction time, even though the reactor pH quickly increased above 8.0 during equilibration. Soluble levels of U and Re decreased in a similar fashion to NO{sub 3}{sup -} in the presence and absence of O{sub 2}. Soluble As levels decreased more rapidly than other contaminants, but remained at ∼ 1 μg L{sup -1}. Very little nitrite (NO{sub 2}{sup -}) was detected in the batch tests, with NH{sub 4}{sup +} levels consistent with the amount of NO{sub 3}{sup -} reduced. Similar rates of immobilization for U, Re, and As were observed in the presence and absence of NO{sub 3}{sup -}. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Infrastructure and Mission Capability at Hanford - 19048

As Hanford celebrates its 75. anniversary, the challenge to complete the cleanup mission and simultaneously prepare for new nuclear operations puts increasing pressure on an infrastructure system that in some places is nearly the same age. While the cleanup mission began in earnest in 1989 and continues today, completing construction of the country's largest Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant will put nuclear operations back into the Hanford footprint. Ensuring that the infrastructure originally built to support plutonium production as part of the Manhattan Project is the right size and reliable for the remaining missions is a delicate balance of funding priorities, strategy and a predictable project delivery. The DOE Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) and other sites across the DOE complex have recognized the need for increased investment in site infrastructure. Combined with this increasing need is the funding reality of variable fiscal budgets that creates challenges for even the best strategists. The current Hanford infrastructure priority list has approximately 100 reliability projects with a combined value over $380 million dollars. At current funding levels, there is a 10 to 15-year backlog. To meet this challenge head on, DOE-RL and Mission Support Alliance (MSA) regularly evaluate project priorities and ongoing maintenance actions to ensure the highest risk systems are addressed. This is done by integrating historical and operational knowledge, system health reports, and maintenance records then coordinating with the Facility Information Management System (FIMS). Sometimes with decades old infrastructure, it can seem as if everything is a number one priority. Recently, in a random testing of approximately 20% of the wooden power poles on site, approximately 92% of the poles were found to be in satisfactory condition with 8% percent failing. MSA Electrical Utilities group immediately replaced one pole, found to have only 8% strength remaining. This type of severely degraded infrastructure is not conducive to reliable mission execution. Given the historical prioritization of funding for cleanup, then operations, followed by infrastructure, it is not surprising that the commitment of funds on infrastructure projects such as sewer collection systems or replacing old electrical transformers has been hard fought. The acknowledgement and re-prioritization of limited funds will work towards creating a more reliable and sustainable infrastructure portfolio that will support and even enhance the cleanup and operations missions. This paper/presentation will outline Hanford's approach to executing reliability projects that will serve the remaining missions on site for years to come. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Solid Secondary Waste Immobilization in Cementitious Waste Forms at the Hanford Site - 19081

During operations of the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, solid secondary wastes (SSW) will be generated. These materials include HEPA filters, granular activated carbon (GAC), and silver mordenite (AgM). The planned disposal pathway for SSW is through solidification (blending) or encapsulation in a cementitious waste form and then disposal on site at the Hanford Site's Integrated Disposal Facility. Performance assessment evaluations of SSW forms have been performed; however, limited experimental data on simulated SSW is available as input. This paper will cover efforts to fill this gap in experimental data through testing of simulated SSW materials. Two grout formulations were used in the tests: 1) Hanford grout mix 5, a mix of 25 wt% ordinary Portland cement (OPC) and 75 wt% fly ash (FA); and 2) the Cast Stone dry blend of 47 wt% blast furnace slag, 45 wt% FA, and 8 wt% OPC. The sorption (Kd) of potential contaminants (iodide, iodate, technetium) to the grouts and SSW materials was investigated in simulated grout pore water. Waste forms containing GAC and AgM were prepared using the two grout formulations and characterized using scanning electron microscopy energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction. Acquiring this information will further support the candidacy of cementitious waste forms to be used for disposal of SSW at Hanford. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2019

Performance Assessment Results for the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility - 19134

In 2014, the US DOE Office of River Protection and its contractors began to develop a performance assessment for the near-surface disposal of low-level and mixed low-level waste at the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility. The Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility is a doubly-lined landfill that was constructed between 2004 and 2006 to be the disposal facility for the vitrified low-activity waste containers that will be produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. The disposal facility is also expected to receive solid secondary waste produced at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant and other solid wastes from site activities. The constructed facility is awaiting authorization to receive waste. Although no waste destined for the facility is currently being generated, operations cannot begin until the facility has received a Disposal Authorization Statement from US DOE and a permit modification from the State of Washington Department of Ecology. Both the Disposal Authorization Statement and permit modification require a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for the next 1,000 to 10,000 years. Based on the analyses presented in the Integrated Disposal Facility Performance Assessment, US DOE issued a conditional Disposal Authorization Statement for the facility in June 2018. Demonstrating the long-term performance of the facility to be protective of human health and the environment was evaluated under the requirements of US DOE Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. Computer simulations were performed to evaluate whether or not the disposal facility would comply with the performance objectives specified in the order. The evaluation was performed using numerical models to simulate source term releases from vitrified and cement-based waste forms. Source term releases were subsequently transported through an air pathway and a groundwater pathway to a point of compliance 100 meters from the disposed of waste. In addition, an analysis evaluating the consequences of an inadvertent intrusion into the waste was also performed. In accordance with US DoE's technical standard for performance assessments, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate that the Hanford Integrated Disposal Facility, together with the engineered features of the waste forms and natural features of the selected site, provides a reasonable expectation that the low-level waste and mixed low-level waste disposal will meet the radiological performance objectives established by US DOE. Post-closure doses to future members of the public were evaluated after the time of closure and included a 100-year period of institutional controls that limited exposure immediately following closure of the facility. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from the air pathway were below the 100 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Calculated doses to a future member of the public from all exposure pathways, including the air pathway and the groundwater pathway, were below the 250 μSv/yr dose performance objective. Doses following an inadvertent intrusion into the facility after the institutional control period were below the 5 mSv acute dose performance measure and the 1 mSv/yr chronic dose performance measure. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 88: Waste Management from Remediation of Legacy Sites or Unplanned Releases

This panel focused on the progression of cleanup on the Hanford Site, Washington, USA, from establishing the regulatory framework necessary for cleanup, to understanding the risks and addressing near-term hazards, to moving to 24/7 operations as cleanup focuses on tank waste treatment and co-located risk reduction efforts as the active cleanup footprint shrinks. Panelists with presentations: Hanford: Past, Present, Future (Brian Vance); Protecting the River (L. Ty Blackford); Hanford Tank Farms (John Eschenberg Jr.); The Hanford Site (Robert Wilkinson); The Hanford Site (Valerie McCain)

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DOE OSTI2020

SRS Strategy for Tank 3 Salt Dissolution - Performance and Lessons Learned - 20441

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Tank Farms have 51 underground waste tanks used to store and process liquid nuclear waste materials. There are 4 different tank types, ranging in capacity from 2,840,000 to 4,920,000 L (750,000 to 1,300,000 Gal). Twenty-four of the tanks are older style and do not meet full secondary containment standards. The older style tanks are the initial focus of waste removal efforts for tank closure at SRS. Eight of these twenty-four tanks have completed waste removal and are filled with grout. Prior to salt dissolution, Tank 3 was a dry salt tank that contained 5.06 m (199.3 in) of salt and sludge waste. Additional salt waste was present on cooling coils above the salt layer up to approximately 5.59 m (220 in). Three mixing eductors were installed in Tank 3 to aid in dissolving salt waste in three tank riser access ports. A transfer pump was installed, and the transfer pump suction was located 25.4 cm (10 in) from the tank bottom. Well water was added to the tank through a downcomer until the dry bulk salt was covered with liquid. During the initial fill of Tank 3, approximately 242,000 L (64,000 Gal) of rain water were added from periodic F-Tank Farm (FTF) Catch Tank additions and approximately 17,000 L (4,500 Gal) of well water were added. Following liquid additions to cover the dry bulk salt, well water was added through the three mixing eductors in batches during each stage. Additionally, during the salt dissolution campaigns, the FTF Catch Tank was utilized to add rain water through a downcomer in the center tank riser access port as needed for volume relief in the FTF Catch Tank. Following liquid additions, the water was recirculated (internal to the tank) using the transfer pump, and a sample was pulled to confirm the target specific gravity (SpG) of the dissolved salt solution was achieved. The dissolved salt solution was then transferred to the receipt tank (Tank 7), and the mixing eductors were lowered as close to the new bulk salt layer as possible, to support subsequent dissolution campaigns. While the mixing jets were able to dissolve salt successfully in Tank 3, they did not do so in a completely uniform manner. Throughout dissolution, mounds were discovered under Riser 1, Riser 2, and the Center Riser. The mixing jets dissolved the salt around the edges of the tank well but were not as effective toward the center of the tank. FTF Catch Tank additions through the center tank riser access port downcomer were required to impact the mound under the center tank riser. FTF Catch Tank additions were sporadic as they were dependent on rainfall in the area. Additionally, all mixing jets were rarely able to be lowered to the same elevation, indicating some mounding in the bulk salt layer. Indexing of the mixing jets was also utilized to impact the salt mounds. Overall, Tank 3 salt dissolution was successful as approximately 1,476,000 L (390,000 Gal) of dissolved salt solution was transferred to Tank 7 over six stages. Slightly less than 852,000 L (225,000 Gal) of water were added to Tank 3. The original material balance prediction estimated that the bulk salt level in Tank 3 would be 3.88 m (152.8 in) after six salt dissolution stages. After six stages the actual bulk salt level was 3.38 m (133 in). This paper will discuss the salt removal strategy, each salt dissolution stage, and lessons learned for future salt dissolution. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2020

Requalification and Declaration of High-alpha Cemented TRU-waste from the Late 70's and Early 80's - 20499

KTE and Siemens launched a project to qualify a series of 391 waste drums and 115 concrete containers produced from 1979 to 1984. The waste is characterized by a high content of long-lived alpha-nuclides (TRU-waste - Pu, U, Am in the range of 1 E+11-1 E+12 Bq/ drum. This high radionuclide inventory requires a special packaging according to the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) of the repository Konrad [1] despite the fact, that the waste was treated manually. The raw waste originally was delivered in nitric acid solution and was solidified using ordinary Portland cement. The existing documentation comprises analyses, transfer documentation for the nuclear fuel nuclides and waste treatment documentation yielding information, which waste was treated together in a batch. Additionally all drums were subjected to non-destructive gamma-spectrometry assay. A small number of 7 drums were opened and sampled to support the existing declaration. For the entire series the waste products were attributed to defined batches using the accountancy data supported by the analyses and the gamma-spectrometry. Each batch was produced from a homogeneous stock of waste solution and can therefore be declared and documented together. The declaration concept is based on the gamma spectrometry results performed on the entire drums, which were corrected and extended for the uncertainty of the analyses. The declaration concept is verified by the regulator and its independent expert. The state of the project is in the documentation of the solidification campaigns followed by the planning of the container configuration. (authors)

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DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 2, March-April 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 127 Quality Assurance in the Construction of Nuclear Power Plants by Sidney A. Bernsen, 141 1974 ANS Topical Meeting on Fast Reactor Safety by M. H. Fontana; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 150 GBR-4 Protection Systems: Failures and Their Consequences by Peter Burgsmüller, J. J. Dekais, Albert Krähe, Raffaello Pignatelli, and Gottfried Vieider, 162 Standby Emergency Power Systems. Part 2—The Later Plants by E. W. Hagen; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 180 Radiotoxic Hazard Measure for Buried Solid Radioactive Waste by J. Hamstra, 190 The Thirteenth AEC Air-Cleaning Conference by D. W. Moeller, D. W. Underhill, and M. W. First, 203 Book Review: Nuclear Criticality Safety; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 204 Environmental Radiation Effects of Nuclear Facilities in New York State by M. S. Terpilak and B. L. Jorgensen, 222 Book Review: Thermal Ecology; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 223 Set-Point Drift in Nuclear Power-Plant Safety-Related Instrumentation Adapted by the Nuclear Safety Staff, 224 Diesel-Generator Operating Experience at Nuclear Power Plants, 227 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Jan. 1, 1975, 232 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in November and December 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto, 235 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 243 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 251 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 266 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B Cottrell, 268 Proposed Rule Changes as of Jan. 1, 1975; MISCELLANY: 149 Course in Italy on High-Energy Radiation Dosimetry and Protection (Announcement), 250 Course at Northwestern on Safety of Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Announcement), 266 Symposium of the Combined Effects on the Environment of Radioactive, Chemical, and Thermal Releases from the Nuclear Industry (Announcement), 271 Short Course on Engineering for Extreme Winds and Tornadoes (Announcement), 272 Three 1-Week Courses at MIT on Nuclear Power-Reactor Safety (Announcement), 272 Harvard University Short Courses (Announcement).

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DOE OSTI1975

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 16, No. 1, January-February 1975]

Nuclear Safety covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. The scope is limited to topics relevant to the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, safety considerations in regard to the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 1 AEC Working Paper on Population Density Around Nuclear Power-Plant Sites Adapted by J. Ft. Buchanan, 8 Water-Reactor Safety-Research Information Meeting by Wm. B. Cottrell, D. O. Hobson, and G. D. Whitman; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Burnout in Boiling Heat Transfer. Part I: Pool-Boiling Systems by A. E. Bergles; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 43 Radionuclide Behavior During Normal Operation of Liquid-Metal-Cooled Fast Breeder Reactors. Part 1: Production by C. A. Erdman and A. B. Reynolds; CONSEQUENCES OF EFFLUENT RELEASE: 60 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 1: AEC-Owned Facilities by M. B. Biles and F. E. Coffman, 71 The Control, Monitoring, and Reporting of Radioactivity in Effluents. Part 2: AEC-Licensed Facilities by L. B. Higginbotham and J. T. Collins; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 76 Incident at the Lucens Reactor by J. M. Miller, 79 IAEA Symposium on Experience from Operating and Fueling of Nuclear Power Reactors by William A. Pryor, 87 Recent Occurrences at Nuclear Reactors and Their Causes Compiled by William R. Casto, 98 Summary of Operating U. S. Power Reactors as of Nov. 1. 1974, 101 Selected Safety-Related Occurrences Reported in September and October 1974 Compiled by William R. Casto; CURRENT EVENTS: 104 General Administrative Activities Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 110 Action on Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 119 Action on Nonreactor Projects Undergoing Regulatory Review or Consideration Compiled by Wm. B. Cottrell, 121 Proposed Rule Changes as of Oct. 31, 1974; MISCELLANY: 97 ASTM—Euratom Symposium on Radiation Dosimetry: Developments and Standardization (Announcement), 118 Workshops on In-Pile Filter Testing (Announcement), 119 IAEA Symposium on Radiological Impacts from Releases from Nuclear Facilities into Aquatic Environments (Announcement).

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DOE OSTI1991

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 32, No. 4, October-December 1991]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 477 Report on the International Symposium on the Use of Probabilistic Safety Assessment for Operational Safety—PSA '91, S. Chakraborty and M. Khatib-Rahbar; 488 Good Relationships Are Pivotal in Nuclear Data Bases, A. S. Heger and B. V. Koen; 494 Technical Note: The Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel's Evaluation of the Ulysses Space Mission, J. A. Sholtis, Jr., D. A. Huff, L. B. Gray, N. P. Klug, and R. O. Winchester; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 502 The Severe Accident Analysis Program for the Savannah River Nuclear Production Reactors, M. L. Hyder; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 511 A Framework for Selecting Suitable Control Technologies for Nuclear Power Plant Systems, R. A. Kisner; DESIGN FEATURES: 521 Containments for Gas-Cooled Power Reactors History and Status, P.W. Williams; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 537 Indoor Radon: A Natural Risk, N. H. Harley and J.H. Harley; On the Importance of the Atmospheric Parameters in the Fission Products Distribution of a Severe Reactor Accident, M. C. Barla and A. R. Bayulken; Book Review: Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation BEIR V, C. R. Richmond; WASTE AND SPENT FUEL MANAGEMENT: 555 Activities Related to Waste and Spent Fuel Management, M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 567 Effects of Component Aging on the Westhinghouse Control Rod Drive System, K. Sullivan and W. Gunther; 577 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 580 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; 582 Operating U 8 Power Reactors, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver, RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 596 General Administrative Activities, Compiled by M. D. Muhlheim and E. G. Silver; 610 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 614 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1991; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 520 Workshop on PC PRAISE: A Probabilistic Fracture Mechanics Personal Computer Code for Nuclear Power Plant Piping Reliability Assessment; 536 Fifth Workshop on Nuclear Power Plant Containment Integrity; 624 New OECD "International Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)"; 625 Harvard School of Public Health Announces Short Courses; 625 Eighth Power Plant Dynamics, Control and Testing Symposium; 626 Second Training Course on Off-Site Emergency Planning and Response for Nuclear Accidents; 618 The Authors; 622 Reviewers of Nuclear Safety, Vol 32.

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DOE OSTI1988

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 29, No. 1, January-March 1988]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Core History and Nuclide Inventory of the Chernobyl Core at the Time of Accident by Gerald Kirchner and Cornelius C. Noack; GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: 6 Nonprescriptive Nuclear Safety Regulation: The Example of Loss of Offsite Power by M. W. Golay, V. P. Manno, and C. Vlahoplus, Jr., 20 Nuclear Power Safety Goals in Light of the Chernobyl Accident by C. Whipple and C. Starr; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 29 Containment Loads from Severe Accidents—U.S. Program by W. Kerr and M. K. Dey; PLANT SAFETY FEATURES: 36 Safety Characteristics of Modern High-Temperature Reactors: Focus on German Designs by W. Kröger, H. Nickel, and R. Schulten; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 49 Radiation Hormesis and Nuclear Safety by C. C. Congdon; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 58 Evaluation of Nonradiological Water Chemistry at Power Reactors by Harvey Zibulsky, James J. Kottan, Walter J. Pasciak, Mary Ann Castrogivanni, and Sujit Banerjee, 64 Reactor Shutdown Experience Compiled by J. W. Cletcher, 67 Operating U.S. Power Reactors Compiled by E. G. Silver; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 85 General Administrative Activities Compiled by E. G. Silver, 94 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides by D. S. Queener, 100 Status of Power-Reactor Projects Undergoing Licensing Review Compiled by E. G. Silver, 103 Proposed Rule Changes as of Sept. 30, 1987; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 5 Northwestern University Short Course on Radiation Safety, 28 International Approach to Nuclear Safety (After Three-Mile Island and Chernobyl), 57 RPI Short Course on Modern Developments in Boiling Heat Transfer and Two-Phase Flow, 107 20th DOE/NRC Nuclear Air Cleaning Conference, 110 Third International Topical Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Thermal Hydraulics and Operations, 108 The Authors, 111 Indexes to Nuclear Safety, Volume 28.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗