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German Support Program for Retrieval and Safe Storage of Disused Radioactive Sealed Sources in Ukraine - 13194

The German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany supports the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU) in enhancement of nuclear safety and radiation protection and strengthening of the physical protection. One of the main objectives of the agreement concluded by these parties in 2008 was the retrieval and safe interim storage of disused orphan high radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. At present, the Ukrainian National Registry does not account all high active radiation sources but only for about 70 - 80 %. GRS in charge of BMU to execute the program since 2008 concluded subcontracts with the waste management and interim storage facilities RADON at different regions in Ukraine as well with the waste management and interim storage facility IZOTOP at Kiev. Below selected examples of removal of high active Co-60 and Cs-137 sources from irradiation facilities at research institutes are described. By end of 2012 removal and safe interim storage of 12.000 disused radioactive sealed sources with a total activity of more than 5,7.10{sup 14} Bq was achieved within the frame of this program. The German support program will be continued up to the end of 2013 with the aim to remove and safely store almost all disused radioactive sealed sources in Ukraine. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Technical basis for extending storage of the UK's advanced gas-cooled reactor fuel

The UK Nuclear Decommissioning Agency has recently declared a date for cessation of reprocessing of oxide fuel from the UK's Advanced Gas-cooled Reactors (AGRs). This will fundamentally change the management of AGR fuel: from short term storage followed by reprocessing to long term fuel storage followed, in all likelihood, by geological disposal. In terms of infrastructure, the UK has an existing, modern wet storage asset that can be adapted for centralised long term storage of dismantled AGR fuel under the required pond water chemistry. No AGR dry stores exist, although small quantities of fuel have been stored dry as part of experimental programmes in the past. These experimental programmes have shown concerns about corrosion rates.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

The SAVY 4000 Container Storage Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 17313

Incidents involving release of nuclear materials stored in containers of convenience such as food pack cans, slip lid taped cans, paint cans, etc. has resulted in the U.S. Defense Nuclear Safety Board concerns over the lack of prescriptive performance requirements for interim storage of nuclear materials. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has shared in these incidents and in response proactively moved into developing a performance based storage container design, the SAVY-4000{sup R}. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is the first vented general use nuclear material container demonstrated to meet the requirements of DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. The SAVY-4000{sup R} is an innovative and creative design demonstrated by the fact that it can be opened and closed in a few seconds without torque wrenches or other tools; has a built-in, fire-rated filter that prevents the build-up of hydrogen gas, yet retains 99.97% of plutonium particulates, and prevents release of material even in a 12 foot drop. Finally, it has been fire then drop tested and will reduce the risk to the public in the event of an earthquake/fire scenario. This will allow major nuclear facilities to credit the container towards source term Material at Risk (MAR) reduction. The container was approved for nuclear material storage in the TA-55 Plutonium Facility on March 15, 2011, and there are currently over 2000 SAVY-4000{sup R} containers available for use within the facility. A Safety Analysis Report was developed to demonstrate Manual 441.1-1 compliance and was approved April, 2014. The first four SAVY-4000{sup R} containers were packaged with plutonium on August 2, 2011. Key aspects of the SAVY-4000{sup R} vented storage container design will be discussed which include design description, qualification and testing, surveillance strategy, and the design life extension program as enhanced by surveillance activities with the intent to extend well beyond the current five year design life. (authors)

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Computational Safeguards Analysis of PWR Spent Nuclear Fuel in Dry Storage - 17435

The master plan for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management in Korea recently adopted by Korean atomic energy promotion council. According to the master plan, the detailed practical and R and D strategies for SNF transferring, storage and disposal should be determined in the near future. Besides, it is also necessary to make plan how to secure SNF at each step in terms of nuclear safeguards, safety, security and nonproliferation. Several nondestructive analysis (NDA) techniques have been studied for assuring the safety of SNF in PWR methods. Obviously, gamma-ray is most dominant radiation emitted by SNF so several gamma-ray measurement methods have been developed and applied for the purpose of SNF monitoring. Those methods, however, suffer from a lack of nuclear data and interfering background radiation. To date, several neutron measurement methods have been developed as a solution to the problem of gamma-ray methods. Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) currently develops a new novel technique of fast neutron detection for spent fuel monitoring at dry spent fuel storage facilities. As the first step, a computational program has been developed in order to evaluate neutron flux on the surface of PWR dry storage cask and study for some potential sabotage events. Typically, neutron flux on the surface of dry storage cask can be evaluated via two steps. The source term, based on burn-up rate of SNF, its cooling time and others related to operation condition at nuclear power plants, can be firstly defined by ORIGEN code. The surface flux can be then evaluated via MCNP code. These two separated steps are complicated and time consuming so KINAC developed a new algorithm and user-interface, coupled ORIGEN and MCNP. (authors)

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Niagara Falls Storage Site - Balance of plant investigation results - 15432

The Niagara Falls Storage Site (NFSS) is a 77.3-hectare (ha) (191-acre) property that is owned by the United States Government and located in the township of Lewiston, Niagara County, New York. The NFSS is part of the former Lake Ontario Ordnance Works (LOOW) that was used by the War Department beginning in 1942 for the production of trinitrotoluene (TNT). During the 1940's and 1950's, the Manhattan Engineer District and the Atomic Energy Commission brought various radioactive wastes and uranium processing byproducts (residues) resulting from our nation's atomic energy program to the LOOW for storage. Site operations caused soil, sediment, and groundwater contamination that lead to several remedial actions, which culminated in the construction of the Interim Waste Containment Structure (IWCS) on the NFSS. The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)-Buffalo District is the lead Federal agency for Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) remediation of the NFSS. As the lead agency, USACE is conducting a remedial investigation/feasibility study (RI/FS) pursuant to the protocols set forth in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). CERCLA activities at the NFSS have transitioned from the site RI activities to the FS evaluation of potential remediation alternatives. USACE recognizes the need to implement a focused CERCLA FS process and, therefore, has established three separate operable units (OUs) for NFSS: the IWCS OU, the Balance of Plant (BOP) OU [i.e., all on-site areas outside the boundary of the IWCS], and the Groundwater OU. This paper details recent investigations into the underground utilities, groundwater/soil contamination, and past storage of contaminated material on the Balance of Plant Operable Unit of the NFSS. Recent fieldwork activities have investigated areas of elevated groundwater contamination as well as an investigation to determine/eliminate any preferential pathway that historical underground utilities may have provided on-site in these areas. Additional areas of investigation included strategic placement of groundwater wells at locations of historic residue storage piles and intersections of various underground utilities (based on aerial photography and geophysical surveys). Several hundred locations across the site were investigated with a gamma walk-over survey, boring, surveying and sampling of soil-cores to aide in the delineation of soil contamination throughout the Balance of Plant Operable Unit. The series of investigations indicated multiple operational areas still have impacts above background conditions, risk-based concentrations, and promulgated maximum contaminant levels for multiple media in the Balance of Plant Operable Unit. The soil, groundwater, sediment, and utility sampling data show that 1) radionuclide impacts derived from ore-residue handling operations still exist, 2) impacts from other inorganic and organic compound exist in TNT manufacturing and support areas, and 3) contaminant transport from past source areas is minimal. The full compendium of site history and recent sampling data provides a well-defined conceptual site model that provides the necessary input data to prepare volumetric soil estimates for the Balance of Plant Operable Unit Feasibility Study. The scale of the NFSS and complexity of prior operations provide many remedial challenges. (authors)

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Managing TRU waste processing and storage issues/challenges - 15487

Operational events at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility resulted in suspension of disposal operations and waste shipments to WIPP creating significant challenges for the Department of Energy (DOE) complex. The Oak Ridge Transuranic (TRU) Waste Program which was poised to re-start shipping after a 2.5 year suspension of the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) certification activities which resulted in on-site accumulation of the highest activity contact handled (CH) TRU waste containers. As a result, Transuranic Waste Processing Center (TWPC) is nearing its physical storage capacity for CH waste and has already reached storage capacity limits for remote handled (RH) TRU waste. The TWPC storage capacity for RH-TRU waste is very limited and dependent on real time shipping support to continue RH waste processing activities in the facilities Hot Cell. Additionally, changes in dispersion modeling (i.e., dry deposition factor changes) used in the TWPC Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) present Material at Risk (MAR) management challenges to effectively manage off-site dose consequences. These facts necessitated the identification of alternative waste storage options for both CH and RH waste to continue waste processing operations at TWPC. (authors)

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Accelerating the Decommissioning of the Sellafield Pile Fuel Storage Pond Using Innovative Remote Tooling Developed with the Supply Chain - 16437

The Pile Fuel Storage Pond (PFSP) at Sellafield and adjoining de-canning building provided the storage, cooling and de-canning facility for used fuel and isotopes from the two Windscale reactors and later some Magnox fuel from the Calder Hall reactors. Operations ceased in the 1970's and the facilities are now undergoing a programme of accelerated decommissioning. The pond is a sub-divided outdoor storage pond containing skips of irradiated fuel and miscellaneous waste items and the building contains a series of sub-ponds, known as bays, connected underwater to the main pond. The radiation environment and access limitations necessitate the use of remote technology for the decommissioning programme. This paper describes the philosophy and approach and the technology and equipment adopted for the removal and export of key plant equipment and waste items from within the PFSP. In order to progress the project cost effectively and speedily, the Sellafield project team looked for partners in the supply chain with the required experience, expertise and facilities to supply and test 'commercial off-the-shelf' (COTS) or modified proprietary equipment. This COTS approach minimised the need for multiple, expensive and lengthy design and manufacturing tasks associated with bespoke equipment. Sellafield partnered with specialist remote handling contractor, James Fisher Nuclear, and the respective project teams worked closely together at every stage of the project from qualifying requirements, identifying potential solutions, through to development, testing, training and final deployment. Optioneering of potential solutions involved early 'proof of principle' trials in JFN rig hall facilities, utilising existing equipment and plant mock-ups, along with other equipment manufactured in-house. Together the project teams selected the best solution to take forward, adopting a practical and trials based approach, which allowed rapid and cost effective modification of the solution throughout the project with minimal impact on the programme. When the final solution was validated, plant operators then gained familiarity and training on the equipment so they could execute the work efficiently on plant and so minimise their dose uptake. The removal of a Large De-canner is described in detail. This was a significant obstruction to the emptying, modification and re-use of the bay and a key milestone in the clean-up of the PFSP. The de-canners are large and heavy pieces of equipment which weigh 6.5 t each and approximately 6.5 m long. Their removal was further complicated by limited equipment and man access, radiological contamination from de-canning fuel, challenging material properties, unknown equipment condition and complex lifting requirements. Sellafield Ltd and JFN project teams worked closely together to rapidly develop, trial and deploy a succession of adapted 'commercial off-the-shelf' (COTS) tools whilst addressing emerging challenges and completing the overall task on time and budget. The Sellafield and JFN project and design teams provided an underwater: wheel stop removal tool; towing trolley; grinder on a carbon fibre pole, chute cutting 600 mm circular saw and hydraulic 6 t winch. The suite of tools will be reused on the remaining de-canners in the PFSP and First Generation Magnox Fuel Storage Pond (FGMSP) giving cost and programme savings. Each of the tools can also be used, and some have already been, for other tasks in the bay retrievals such as the size reduction of support frames, large steel sections and chemical de-canner preparatory works. The 'learning from experience' acquired during the project was shared by the Sellafield project with other decommissioning projects across the site. (authors)

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A New Safeguards Technique for Spent Fuel Verification in Dry Storage by Using He-4 Detectors - 18262

It is demanded to find key issues and critical paths for verifying and monitoring a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage with a purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. However, unfortunately there are no reliable methods to verify the containment in a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage. Therefore, research and development (R and D) has been continuously required to develop new and alternative technologies for searching and verifying undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and facilities. Therefore, the present authors have developed a new safeguards technique of passively scanning a spent fuel cask or storage using pressurized He-4 scintillation neutron detectors. A new approach is to quickly verify content in a spent nuclear fuel cask or presence of all special nuclear materials in unknown packages by comparing experimental and computational results. For that, the present authors have developed a new algorithm and user-interface coupled ORIGEN-ARP and MCNP codes, and the prototype safeguards apparatus employing the array of He-4 fast neutron detectors has been designed, built, and tested. The feasibility test of this new apparatus has been performed with Cf-252 neutron sources and the laboratory scale model cask, minimized by a factor of ten compared to the actual dimension of a KN-21 cask. This technique has several advantages over current methods based on neutron and gamma detection; (1) incident neutron energy information is preserved, (2) disturbance of gamma-ray is excellently rejected (discriminated), and (3) much higher neutron counts and operational cost and space-effectiveness are expected since no moderator is required for fast neutrons. The final goal of this study will (1) conduct a prototype instrument and employ it to monitor a nuclear spent fuel cask or storage at a commercial nuclear power reactor facilities, (2) use spectral-specific measurement data to show proof of concept for measurable data successfully converted to quantifiable signatures, such as diversion/removal of fuel, and maintenance of fuel and cask integrity of fuel, and (3) develop a cask imaging capability. (authors)

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Optimizing Short-Term Operation of a FIRES-like Industrial Heat Supply Thermal Energy Storage System

The Firebrick Resistance-heated Energy-storage System (FIRES) is under development at MIT for two applications: (1) integration with the Nuclear Air-Brayton Combined Cycle (NACC), a high-performance power conversion system (PCS) that may be used with high- temperature advanced reactors; and (2) industrial heat supply. This paper describes some key features of FIRES and equivalent systems configured for industrial heat supply and presents an assessment of the revenue achievable by a system operating under the conditions expected for early demonstration FIRES installations. The greatest technical challenge of the 21. century is likely to be the effort to minimize the damage caused by global climate change. This effort will require massive reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions throughout our economy and a transition to an electric power system driven entirely by very-low-carbon generators. Many investigators agree that this will require a substantial increase in electricity generation and in the use of nuclear power, and there is growing awareness that this will also require new technologies and systems for managing and storing energy and matching intermittent supply of renewable resources with electricity demand. Thermal energy storage systems (TESS) will, in some applications, be much more cost effective than the more popular and widely discussed battery electric storage systems and may provide unique capabilities. The Firebrick Resistance-heated Energy-storage System (FIRES) is under development at MIT for two applications: (1) integration with the Nuclear Air-Brayton Combined Cycle (NACC), a high-performance power conversion system (PCS) that may be used with high-temperature advanced reactors like the Fluoride-salt-cooled High-temperature Reactor (FHR), molten salt reactor (MSR) and sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR); and (2) industrial heat supply. FIRES installations include a stack of refractory firebrick with imbedded electric heaters and airflow channels, a compressor or air blower, and a duct system to connect the firebrick with the heat demand (turbine or industrial customer). Analysis of the FIRES design space has shown that the concept is suitable for a wide range of peak operating temperatures (from about 200 deg.C up to at least 1800 deg. C) and pressures (from ambient to at least 20 atmospheres) and offers very high energy density (up to 1 MWh per cubic meter of firebrick for high temperature systems) at very low cost (as low as $5/kWh). These results favor early demonstration of FIRES. If the cost target of $5/kWh for FIRES systems were achieved, even the lowest expected operating income calculated here could cover the capital cost of a 10 MWh system in a single year. If the FIRES system were assumed to operate for at least 10 years, this level of operating income could readily recover a capital investment up to $50/kWh, which is simultaneously much cheaper than the costs expected for near-future battery systems (in excess of $200/kWh) and much more expensive than the small, low temperature firebrick systems already available for domestic heating. This provides a large margin for unexpected development costs and other uncertainties. FIRES would set a minimum price of electricity near that of natural gas-improving nuclear, wind, and solar economics while reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the industrial sector. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation Planning Project Modeling Tools

The U.S. Department Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy's (DOE-NE) Nuclear Fuels Storage and Transportation (NFST) is developing foundational capabilities and tools to support and inform the future deployment of consolidated interim storage and large-scale transportation of SNF. These tools include Used Nuclear Fuel Storage, Transportation, and Disposal Analysis Resource and Data System (UNF-Standards), Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), Transportation and Storage Logistics (TSL), Next- Generation System Analysis Model (NGSAM), Execution Strategy Analysis (ESA), Multi-Objective Evaluation Framework (MOEF), and the Centralized Used Fuel Resource for Information Exchange (CURIE). (authors)

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Cosmic Ray Muon Radiography of Spent Fuel in Dry Storage Casks

In the absence of a permanent repository or reprocessing facilities, highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel bundles are typically placed in long-term storage in above ground casks. These dry storage casks are heavily shielded to prevent the escape of radiation from the contents to the environment. Casks under international safeguards are monitored to detect diversion of spent fuel. The heavy shielding of the cask walls also precludes inspection of cask contents with typical radiographic probes. When international safeguards inspectors need to verify cask contents (which may be necessary to recover from a loss of continuity of knowledge), the casks must be moved back into a cooling pool to be safely opened and visually inspected. This time-consuming procedure is invasive and potentially dangerous. A non-destructive radiographic method to verify a cask's contents in situ would therefore be a useful safeguards tool. Highly energetic cosmic ray muons are an alternative tomographic probe. Since muons are colorless leptons, they do not participate in strong interactions with nucleons, and their large mass suppresses radiative energy loss while passing through materials. These properties allow muons to penetrate dense shielding that defeats more typical probes like photons and neutrons. Measurements of the scattering of muons that pass through objects provide information on the object's internal structure. This summary describes the first measurements using cosmic ray muons to inspect the contents of a partially loaded dry storage cask. We show that partial defects in the cask loading can be identified with this technique. This data shows that cosmic ray muons are an effective radiographic probe of dry storage casks. This technique may be useful for international safeguards inspectors wishing to verify a cask's contents without opening it. The analysis techniques described here allow the column of missing fuel bundles to be determined, but not the row. Recording data from several positions around the cask would allow ambiguities in x-y position to be resolved. Alternatively, a detector could be designed such that it surrounds the cask and provides a full image of the casks interior. Improved measurements and the design of optimized cask imaging instruments are being explored. (authors)

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Panel Session 134: Stakeholder Involvement in Consolidated ISF Storage, Disposal, and Transportation Initiatives

Planning of activities related to waste storage, transportation, and disposal requires involvement and engagement on the parts of both regulators and stakeholders. There have been challenges felt by both parties, which has led to discussions about how to best proceed with projects not just from a technical perspective, but how to create better relationships between the general public and scientific community. This panel was designed to highlight lessons learned, best practices, and next steps in anticipated projects. This panel focused on the current efforts undertaken by initiatives to involve stakeholders for the success of ISF Storage and Disposal facilities. For example, two license applications were submitted to the US NRC by two private entities - Interim Storage Partners (WCS, Inc, and Orano) and Holtec, Inc./ELLA - for consolidated ISF in West Texas and in NM (respectively). This panel discussed elements needed for success in engaging various stakeholders at all levels of the project life cycle, and can include lessons learned from previous projects. Panelists with presentations: Stakeholder Engagement in SNF Storage and Disposal (Miriam Juckett); Stakeholders, Siting and Nuclear Waste Disposal -Thoughts on a Path Forward (Jim Hamilton)

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The Long-term Storage of ILW: Building Stores with the Appropriate Environmental Controls - 20294

In the UK, containers for the storage and disposal of intermediate level radioactive waste (ILW) typically use stainless steel due to its excellent mechanical properties and corrosion resistance. The period of interim storage before a disposal facility is available, however, is longer than available engineering experience with stainless steels in relevant environmental conditions. Additionally, after disposal the ability of ILW containers to withstand further periods of exposure to the environment is expected to provide substantial benefits to the operation of a disposal facility and the safety case underpinning its closure. For these reasons, although there have been no instances of failure of stainless steels in indoor storage conditions, a focused R and D programme has been carried out to identify the environmental envelope over which the material does not significantly degrade. In this study we summarise experimental and modelling studies carried out over the last decade to build a solid mechanistic understanding of the corrosion behaviour of stainless steels in indoor atmospheric conditions. We then identify suitable environmental regimes to minimise the risk of degradation processes and explore approaches to monitoring the storage conditions to gain confidence in the long-term performance of the system. (authors)

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Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage and Radioactive Waste Disposal in the United States: A Law and Policy Analysis - 20302

While Congress plays political football, spent nuclear fuel continues to sit in de facto interim nuclear waste storage sites throughout the country. This ad hoc approach - if it can even be called an approach - to nuclear waste management is in no one's best interests, because of financial, safety, environmental, and national security concerns with the status quo. Senate leadership had asserted that an up-or-down vote on the Yucca Mountain Project would take place in September or October 2019, but that did not occur. Rather, a conference bill was agreed to, and it provided that, although the nuclear program should receive some funding, funding was not made available for centralized interim storage ('CIS') or the Yucca Mountain Project. The President's FY2021 Budget Request does not contain any proposed funding for the Yucca Mountain Project ('the Project'). This paper will discuss the implications of that process, both for the Project itself and for the U.S. nuclear waste program more generally. In order to provide context for the current situation, this paper will begin by chronicling the history of U.S. nuclear waste management, from the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and to the present day. It will discuss the roles of the U.S. Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, federal and state political delegations, and the nuclear energy industry. The paper will then identify key themes that can be expected to affect the future of nuclear waste management in the United States. For example, it will consider whether development of additional CIS facilities is a viable short- to medium-term solution. CIS facilities may relieve immediate pressure at decommissioned or soon-to-be-decommissioned nuclear power plants; but with that pressure partially alleviated, support for building a long-term repository may be reduced. It will also discuss opposition by the State of New Mexico and others to the proposed New Mexico CIS project, based not only on siting concerns but also whether it might become a de facto repository, and whether the State of Texas and others may also be opposed, for similar reasons, to the proposed CIS facility in Texas. Additionally, the paper will examine consent-based siting and its implications for Nevada and other states that are potential hosts for spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal facilities. Further, if the Project is not a politically viable solution, the paper will examine whether it is now time for serious consideration of an alternate location for a permanent repository, as well as consideration of other options entirely, such as deep geologic disposal. The paper will conclude by looking ahead to the 2020 elections. It will describe the positions of candidates (particularly Presidential candidates) on spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal options, without advocating for any particular candidate or political party. Perhaps in 2020, we will at least see a start to a solution to the seemingly intractable problem of nuclear waste management in the United States. (authors)

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Consequence Analysis of Residual Water in a Storage Canister - 20484

Recent observations from projects sponsored under the DOE-Nuclear Energy Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition campaign show that residual free water, well above the 0.4 gm-moles that correspond to a 3 torr rebound pressure after a 30-minute hold following prototypic drying, may remain within SNF canisters used for long-term dry storage. Specifically, experimental observations in an Integrated Research Project showed subzero temperatures and a local pocket of frozen water in a mockup fuel assembly subjected to an industry practiced drying process. In gas sampling and analysis from the High Burnup (HBU) Demonstration project, using a fully loaded and dried SNF canister, indicated presence of 100 g of residual water had remained in the canister. The effects of residual water in terms of potential adverse impacts on the condition of the SNF and the canister internals during long-term dry storage has been rigorously evaluated to address inadvertent residual water contents. The impact of residual water on the fuel and canister internals, with a focus on the oxidation of the cladding and of postulated exposed (breached-clad) fuel, were evaluated using an integrated set of time-dependent environmental conditions with semi-empirical materials oxidation models. An 'integration model,' with coupled sub-models, developed and previously used by the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analysis (CNWRA), was applied and expanded with improved sub-models for water radiolysis, and for cladding and fuel oxidations. Cladding oxidation models for various alloys were developed using the rate constants for various cladding alloys in the dry storage temperature range. A burnup-dependent fuel oxidation model was developed; it accounted for inhibition effect of fission products on fuel oxidation rates. The potential for extension of the initial breach flaw (1 mm hole) was evaluated by two separate mechanics criteria. In the first case, a critical cladding strain criterion was used. In the second case, a critical stress intensity was used to evaluate stability of a planar axial flaw postulate. A failure condition exists when a sufficient amount of fuel oxidation (at the postulated breached-clad location) causes fuel pellet swelling to load the cladding to meet a mechanics criterion for flaw extension. The integration model's results provide the following insights. The radiolysis-generated oxygen is consumed with a partitioning between the cladding and the fuel. The extent of cladding oxidation is no more than 2 μm additional consumption of the cladding metal even with 10 moles of residual water, indicating that changes in cladding conditions due to water are expected to be negligible. The conditions for cladding failure (breach opening size extension) directly correlates with the extent of fuel oxidation. Fuel oxidation significant to extend the breach could occur even with 5.5 moles of residual water. The results indicate that fuel oxidation vis-a-vis cladding oxidation is more likely under a higher radiation field, i.e., when radiolytic decomposition of the residual water occurs in few years compared to several decades, and that the conditions to cause failure are increased with fuel and cladding temperatures approaching the peak storage temperature limit of 400 deg. C. (authors)

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Feasibility study for detection of fuel assemblies state inside sealed dry storage casks using external gamma flux measurements - 25445

The license for the storage of spent nuclear fuel assemblies in dry casks is limited to 40 years. In Germany, a site for a final repository of spent fuel is not yet available. Therefore, this license has to be renewed for prolonged storage period. Currently, there is no experience with dry cask storage worldwide that goes beyond a period of 40 years. Beside regulatory and security aspects, there are questions concerning the long-term integrity of the spent fuel assemblies as this is of relevance for final transportation and reloading to final waste repository casks. Once the cask is filled and sealed, the knowledge about the state of the fuel assemblies is limited. This study investigates the feasibility of using external gamma flux measurements to detect the state of the spent fuel assemblies inside the cask. Monte-Carlo simulations were performed to evaluate the gamma flux distribution outside the sidewall of a cask with all intact fuel assemblies and a cask with one damaged fuel assembly, mimicking a fuel assembly with expanded rods and fuel relocation. The evaluation was performed for different location of the damaged fuel assembly and different storage times. The results of the investigation showed that the intensity and the shape of the gamma flux outside the sidewall of the cask are sufficient to identify the damaged fuel assembly, in case it is located near the inner wall of the cask. The detection of the inner damaged fuel assemblies, however, is less feasible. Due to the self-shielding of the fuel assemblies, the gamma photons which come from the inner fuel assemblies stopped within the fuel basket and assemblies materials. The gamma photons which do survive the fuel assemblies self-shielding reach the inner cask wall with not enough energy to escape the shielding of the thick cast iron wall. In general, it can be concluded that the more the damaged fuel assembly is close to the cask inner walls and that the damage is in a large scale (i.e., significant fuel relocation), the more it can be detected by external gamma flux measurements. (authors)

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Equity Considerations in Siting Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

Questions of equity and fairness are often raised by representatives from State, Tribal and local governments and members of the public when resolving conflicts over siting of nuclear facilities. However, the two terms are not synonymous: equity can be quantified while fairness is much more subjective. The Department of Energy's (DOE) December 2021 Request for Information sought input on how to site federal facilities for the temporary, consolidated storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) using a consent-based approach. It is anticipated that just such questions about equity and fairness associated with the potential emergence of more than one host site may be raised by the twelve groups of university, nonprofit and private sector partners (Consortia) working to support community engagement, inclusively involve stakeholders, build relationships, and develop innovative forms of mutual learning and public capacity to participate in the consent-based siting process for a federal consolidated interim storage facility during the current Planning & Capacity Building stage of the consent-based siting process. In terms of DOE's Integrated Waste Management System (IWMS), sociopolitical equity concepts are a factor in all aspects of IWMS development and operations and will be particularly applicable should two or more host sites become a possibility, either by the emergence of multiple volunteer hosts or by pursuit as a IWMS program strategy. This paper summarizes recent analyses that explore how four equity metrics - number of states, division of the projected SNF total by the year 2083, current population and land area - might be perceived by host communities, states and regions if two, three or four sites for hosting federal consolidated interim storage facilities were to be contemporaneously realized. Existing institutional arrangements, including Nuclear Regulatory Commission regions, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regions and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, were selected to create hypothetically merged two, three and four-region scenarios to calculate how the four metrics balance out. Projected SNF burden was prioritized with regional contiguity of the consolidated regions a requirement for a functional scenario. The intent was not to promote or suggest any construct as a program objective; the configurations are geopolitical abstractions only to explore potential perceptions of equity. Understanding the possible issues of equity that could arise may benefit program efforts toward achieving a cooperative federalism wherein both the federal and multiple State governments share the goal of manifesting more than one federal consolidated interim storage facility. The main finding is that it is not possible to optimize for all four metrics simultaneously. The analyses demonstrate that trying to create a sense of equity by backfitting a solution to a random population and land distribution will always contain a degree of artificiality.

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Geomembranes for Pumped Storage Hydro

Energy storage is fundamental to ensuring the reliability, stability, and resilience of the grid, essential for meeting the energy demands now and in the future. Pumped storage stands out as a proven energy storage solution. There are 43 pumped-storage plants operating in the USA today, and they offer unparalleled scalability, rapid-response capabilities, and long-term reliability at a competitive cost. With a history of successful operation spanning decades, and approximately 60 sites proposed at various stages of permitting and development, this technology is a critical component for the US energy sector. However, its development involves some complex engineering and regulatory challenges.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗