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Site Environmental Report for 2018

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL, Berkeley Lab) is a multi-program scientific facility operated by the University of California (UC) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Berkeley Lab’s research is focused on the physical, biological, environmental, and computational sciences, with the objective of delivering scientific knowledge and discoveries pertinent to DOE’s mission. This annual report describes environmental protection activities and potential impacts resulting from LBNL operations conducted in 2018. The format and content of this report satisfy the requirements of both DOE Order 231.1B, Administrative Change 1 (Environment, Safety, and Health Reporting) and the operating contract between UC and DOE (DOE Contract No. DE-AC02-05CH11231, also known as Contract 31). LBNL activities are planned and conducted with full regard to protecting employees, the public, and the environment, as well as complying with all applicable environmental, safety, and health laws and regulations. As presented in Chapter 2, Berkeley Lab implements an Environmental Management System (EMS) to oversee environmental compliance activities and continually improve overall environmental performance while maintaining operational capability and sustaining its overall mission. The effectiveness of the EMS and environmental programs is reviewed annually as part of the performance evaluation process of Contract 31. For fiscal year (FY) 2018, which began October 1, 2017, and ended September 30, 2018, the EMS was given a performance rating of B plus for its management of environmental activities (on a scale from A plus as the highest grade, to F as the lowest). The measurement and rating system was developed jointly by Berkeley Lab, UC, and DOE. The FY 2018 rating was based on how Berkeley Lab met the objective in DOE’s FY 2018 Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (Appendix B in Contract 31, Section J) of providing an efficient and effective EMS. Six significant accomplishments, which ranged from effective teaming on projects and with regulatory agencies to improved program assessment approaches, were factors in the rating. The EMS was also graded through the federal Office of Management and Budget’s annual EMS performance metrics, in which a reporting scorecard rates elements of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 14001 standard and the degree of integration between the EMS and Berkeley Lab’s sustainable practices. Overall scores fall into one of three categories: green (highest), yellow (middle), or red (lowest). For FY 2018, Berkeley Lab received a score of green. A week-long formal conformity audit of the EMS was conducted at the end of July by a qualified external party, as is required every three years. The audit team found that Berkeley Lab’s EMS continues to conform to the ISO standard with no major nonconformance. An overview of environmental protection and restoration programs is provided in Chapter 3, including information about compliance activities, operating permits, and regulatory agency inspections and audits that occurred during 2018. Twenty-one minor violations and two Class II violations were issued during agency inspections of programs governing aboveground and underground storage tanks, hazardous waste treatment units, hazardous waste storage areas, hazardous materials management, and wastewater, stormwater, and air emission sources. This report also includes information on environmental monitoring performed in 2018 (Chapter 4). The results of these monitoring activities confirmed that groundwater cleanup actions have been effective in reducing concentrations of volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the groundwater, although concentrations appear to be reaching asymptotic levels in some areas. Site groundwater plumes are stable or are attenuating, and VOCs are not migrating off site. All emissions and discharges from LBNL operations were within environmental compliance release limits except oxides of nitrogen and carbon monoxide from boilers (under 5 million BTUs) from Buildings 2, 66, and 88. The radiological dose assessments (Chapter 5) performed in 2018 concluded that the maximum potential dose to a hypothetical resident from Berkeley Lab’s airborne radionuclide releases was approximately 0.04% of the DOE and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency annual limit of 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr); the potential dose from all radiation sources at Berkeley Lab was approximately 0.15% of the average natural background radiation dose of 310 mrem/yr in the United States, and about 0.5% of the DOE annual limit of 100 mrem/yr from all sources.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2011

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2011 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2011 will be in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 540.1A and the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring during CY 2011 will be performed primarily in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2011 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. All modifications to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as addenda to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2011 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2011) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2010

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2010 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2010 will be in accordance with requirements of DOE Order 540.1A and the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring during CY 2010 will be performed primarily in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley, and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge, along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2010 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. All modifications to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as addenda to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2010 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding data summary tables presented in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2010) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater And Surface Water Sampling And Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2012

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2012 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2012 is in accordance with the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring will be performed in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2012 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. Each modification to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as an addendum to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2012 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3. Sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4, and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information. The narrative sections of the report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and tables (excluding a data summary table presented in Section 4) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Groundwater Monitoring Schedules (when issued throughout CY 2012) will be inserted in Appendix C, and addenda to this plan (if issued) will be inserted in Appendix D. Laboratory requirements (bottle lists, holding times, etc.) are provided in Appendix E, and an approved Waste Management Plan is provided in Appendix F.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information Fisheries Acoustics Archive Network Deep Dive

EPOC uses the Deep Dive process to discuss and analyze current and planned science use cases and anticipated data output of a particular use case, site, or project to help inform the strategic planning of a campus or regional networking environment. This includes understanding future needs related to network operations, network capacity upgrades, and other technological service investments. A Deep Dive comprehensively surveys major research stakeholders’ plans and processes in order to investigate data management requirements over the next 5–10 years. Deep Dives help ensure that key stakeholders have a common understanding of the issues and the actions that a campus or regional network may need to undertake to offer solutions. The EPOC team leads the effort and relies on collaboration with the hosting site or network, and other affiliated entities that participate in the process. EPOC organizes, convenes, executes, and shares the outcomes of the review with all stakeholders. Between May 2021 and August 2021, staff members from the Engagement and Performance Operations Center (EPOC) met with researchers and staff from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s N-Wave (the Enterprise network that supports the NOAA mission) and National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI)'s Fisheries Acoustics Archive for the purpose of a recording a Deep Dive into research drivers. The goal of these meetings was to help characterize the requirements for the research use case, and to enable cyberinfrastructure support staff to better understand the needs of the researchers they support.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

The Cognitive Challenges of Flying a Remotely Piloted Aircraft

A large variety of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) designs are currently in production or in development. These aircraft range from small electric quadcopters that are flown close to the ground within visual range of the operator, to larger systems capable of extended flight in airspace shared with conventional aircraft. Before RPA can operate routinely and safely in civilian airspace, we need to understand the unique human factors associated with these aircraft. The task of flying an RPA in civilian airspace involves challenges common to the operation of other highly-automated systems, but also introduces new considerations for pilot perception, decision-making, and action execution. RPA pilots participated in focus groups where they were asked to recall critical incidents that either presented a threat to safety, or highlighted a case where the pilot contributed to system resilience or mission success. Ninety incidents were gathered from focus-groups. Human factor issues included the impact of reduced sensory cues, traffic separation in the absence of an out-the-window view, control latencies, vigilance during monotonous and ultra-long endurance flights, control station design considerations, transfer of control between control stations, the management of lost link procedures, and decision-making during emergencies. Some of these concerns have received significant attention in the literature, or are analogous to human factors of manned aircraft. The presentation will focus on issues that are poorly understood, and have not yet been the subject of extensive human factors study. Although many of the reported incidents were related to pilot error, the participants also provided examples of the positive contribution that humans make to the operation of highly-automated systems.

remote pilot station↗

International Approaches for Nuclear Waste Disposal in Geological Formations: Geological Challenges in Radioactive Waste Isolation—Fifth Worldwide Review

The overall objective of the Fifth Worldwide Review (WWR-5) is to document the current state-of-the-art of major developments in a number of nations throughout the World pursuing geological disposal programs, and to summarize challenging problems and experience that have been obtained in siting, preparing and reviewing cases for the operational and long-term safety of proposed and operating nuclear waste repositories. The scope of the Review is to address current specific technical issues and challenges in safety case development along with the interplay of technical feasibility, siting, engineering design issues, and operational and post-closure safety. In particular, the chapters included in the report present the following types of information: the current status of the deep geological repository programs for high level nuclear waste and low- and intermediate level nuclear waste in each country, concepts of siting and radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel management in different countries (with the emphasis of nuclear waste disposal under different climatic conditions and different geological formations), progress in repository site selection and site characterization, technology development, buffer/backfill materials studies and testing, support activities, programs, and projects, international cooperation, and future plans, as well as regulatory issues and transboundary problems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Chest Reirradiation With External Beam Radiotherapy for Locally Recurrent Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer: A Review

Lung cancer remains one of the most prevalent and deadliest malignancies worldwide. For 2008, the International Agency for the Research of Cancer (IARC) estimated 1.6 million new cancer cases of lung cancer (1.095 million in men and 0.514 million in women), with an associated 1.38 million deaths (0.95 million in men and 0.43 million in women). In the United States, lung cancer remained the number one cancer killer for both sexes in 2009, with 219,440 new cases diagnosed overall and an estimated 159,390 deaths. Recent biological and technological advances in lung cancer management notwithstanding, disease recurrence is still the dominant cause of death after initial treatment of lung cancer. This is irrespective of histology (NSCLC vs. small cell cancer), stage (early vs. locally advanced vs. metastatic), or initial treatment (surgery, RT, chemotherapy [CHT] or combinations thereof). Time to recurrence of lung cancer is not predictable, with some failures appearing early and others manifesting years later. Patterns of failure are also not easily anticipated as local (e.g., lung parenchyma, bronchial stump, or chest wall), regional (e.g., mediastinal lymph nodes), or distant (e.g., brain, liver, or bone) recurrences can appear alone or in combination. Whatever the presentation, recurrent lung cancer has historically been judged almost universally fatal as only rarely did efforts at treatment lead to control, let alone cure. More importantly, recurrence is often associated with significant distress requiring substantial supportive treatment. Recurrence leads ultimately to a significant decrease in patient quality of life, making further interventions even more limited. Because of the bleak outcome associated with recurrence, palliative retreatment has nonetheless often been attempted precisely as a means of preventing this decline in quality of life and/or reversing symptoms. However, complicating these attempts at retreatment has been the forms of initial therapy used to manage the lung cancer, the site of recurrence, and the performance of the patient at relapse. All of these have been relevant to the issue of whether the modality used initially for primary treatment could be both safe and effective in the setting of retreatment. That said, some reports in the surgical literature have suggested, for example, that re-resection in the case of local relapses in selected patients who had previous surgery for stage I lung cancer is feasible and effective and could predict for survival compared to providing the patients with supportive care alone. A particular challenge has been the question of the role and safety of thoracic reirradiation for local recurrences in those patients where RT was used as part of their initial management strategy. Thus, it has been generally assumed that once definitive EBRT has been administered further RT cannot be given because it would likely exceed normal tissue tolerances (6), or, if done, thoracic reirradiation could only be a palliative measure, as the expectation was that patients would not survive to experience potential late effects. A 2007 retrospective study by Estall et al. (4) is instructive in regard to rates of chest reirradiation. Of 527 lung cancer patients treated between 1993 and 1996, the authors reported that 279 (53%) patients were treated at least once with RT, with initial treatment being palliative for 79% of patients, definitive for 14% of patients, and adjuvant for 7% of patients. Of these 279 initial cases, 73 (27%) patients subsequently received a second course of RT, 19 (7%) patients had a third RT course, and 6 (2%) patients received a fourth course. Contemporary technological advances in the diagnosis and staging of lung cancer as well as in the delivery of EBRT, along with the increasing primary role of RT in lung cancer care, now raise the question as to the appropriateness of a palliative-only model for dealing with locally recurrent lung cancer. However, in order to appropriately characterize the historic practice relevant to thoracic reirradiation of recurrent lung cancer, we carried out a comprehensive search of the English-language literature to identify and review relevant studies of the use of EBRT in the treatment of locally recurrent cancer. We limited our scope to treatment of NSCLC and excluded other RT modalities such as brachytherapy and stereotactic body radiotherapy (SBRT). The goal of this systematic review was to better inform current practice in order to ultimately generate appropriate future research endeavors in this setting.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Oxygen Penalty for Waste Oxidation in an Advanced Life Support System: A Systems Approach

Oxidation is one of a number of technologies that are being considered for waste management and resource recovery from waste materials generated on board space missions. Oxidation processes are a very effective and efficient means of clean and complete conversion of waste materials to sterile products. However, because oxidation uses oxygen there is an "oxygen penalty" associated either with resupply of oxygen or with recycling oxygen from some other source. This paper is a systems approach to the issue of oxygen penalty in life support systems and presents findings on the oxygen penalty associated with an integrated oxidation-Sabatier-Oxygen Generation System (OGS) for waste management in an Advanced Life Support System. The findings reveal that such an integrated system can be operated to form a variety of useful products without a significant oxygen penalty.

Pisharody, Suresh↗

Lessons learned from Shuttle/Mir: psychosocial countermeasures

BACKGROUND: During future long-duration space missions, countermeasures need to be developed to deal with psychosocial issues that might impact negatively on crewmember performance and well-being. METHODS: In our recently completed NASA-funded study of 5 U.S. astronauts, 8 Russian cosmonauts, and 42 U.S. and 16 Russian mission control personnel who participated in the Shuttle/Mir program, we evaluated a number of important psychosocial issues such as group tension, cohesion, leadership role, and the displacement of negative emotions from crewmembers to people in mission control and from mission control personnel to management. RESULTS: Based on our findings, which are reviewed, a number of psychosocial countermeasures are suggested to help ameliorate the negative impact of potential psychosocial problems during future manned space missions. CONCLUSIONS: Crewmembers should be selected not only to rule out psychopathology but also to select-in for group compatibility and facility in a common language. Training should include briefings and team building related to a number of psychosocial issues and should involve both crewmembers and mission control personnel. During the mission, both experts on the ground and the crewmembers themselves should be alert to potential interpersonal problems, including the displacement of negative emotions from the crew to the ground. Supportive activities should consist of both individual and interpersonal strategies, including an awareness of changing leisure time needs. Finally, attention should be given to postmission readjustment and to supporting the families on Earth.

Non-NASA Center↗

Prioritization of remedial actions for radioactive waste burials in the Chernobyl exclusion zone

Large volumes of radioactive waste were urgently buried in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ) in the aftermath of the 1986 accident. Twenty-six years later, decisions must be taken about whether and how to remediate these sites. An attempt to resolve two key issues is described here: 1. How to assess the hazards posed by these facilities, recognizing that, for the foreseeable future, the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone will remain under institutional control? and 2. What standards to apply in deciding the extent of remediation? This paper presents an examination of the issues and proposes a simple decision-making process. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Status Report (Fiscal Year 2011) Composite Analysis of Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau at the Hanford Site

In accordance with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requirements in DOE O 435.1 Chg 11, and as implemented by DOE/RL-2000-29, Rev. 22, the DOE Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) has prepared this annual summary of the composite analysis for fiscal year (FY) 2011 as originally reported in PNNL-118003 (henceforth referred to as the Composite Analysis). The main emphasis of DOE/RL-2000-29, Rev. 2 is to identify additional data and information to enhance the Composite Analysis and the subsequent PNNL-11800 Addendum 14 (hereinafter referred to as the Addendum), and to address secondary issues identified during the review of the Composite Analysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Annual Status Report (Fiscal Year 2012) Composite Analysis of Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Central Plateau at the Hanford Site

In accordance with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) requirements in DOE O 435.1, Chg. 1,1 and as implemented by DOE/RL-2000-29, Rev. 2,2 the DOE Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) has prepared this annual summary of the Hanford Site Composite Analysis for fiscal year (FY) 2012, as originally reported in PNNL-118003 and PNNL-11800, Addendum 14 (hereafter these reports are referred to collectively as the Composite Analysis), and to address secondary issues identified during the review of the Composite Analysis.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Terrestrial Biological Carbon Sequestration: Science for Enhancement and Implementation

Fossil-fuel combustion and land-use change have elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations from 280 ppmv at the beginning of the industrial era to more than 381 ppmv in 2006. Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels and cement rose 71% during 1970–2000 to a rate of 7.0 PgC/y (1). Canadell et al. (2) estimated that CO2 emissions rose at a rate at 1.3% per year during 1990–1999, but since 2000 it has been growing at 3.3% per year. Emissions reached 8.4 PgC/y in 2006. It is likely that the current 2-ppm annual increase will accelerate as the global economy expands, increasing the risk of climate system impacts. There is good agreement that photosynthetic CO2 capture from the atmosphere and storage of the C in above- and belowground biomass and in soil organic and inorganic forms could be exploited for safe and affordable greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation (3). Nevertheless, C sequestration in the terrestrial biosphere has been a source of contention before and since the drafting of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. Concerns have been raised that C sequestration in the biosphere is not permanent, that it is difficult to measure and monitor, that there would be “carbon leakage” outside of the mitigation activity, and that any attention paid to environmental sequestration would be a distraction from the central issue of reducing GHG emissions from energy production and use. A decade after drafting the Kyoto Protocol, it is clear that international accord and success in reducing emissions from the energy system are not coming easily and concerns about climate change are growing. It is time to re-evaluate all available options that might not be permanent yet have the potential to buy time, bridging to a future when new energy system technologies and a transformed energy infrastructure can fully address the climate challenge. Terrestrial sequestration is one option large enough to make a contribution in the coming decades using proven land-management methods and with the possibility that new technologies could significantly enhance the opportunity. Here we review progress on key scientific, economic, and social issues; postulate the extent to which new technologies might significantly enhance terrestrial sequestration potential; and address remaining research needs.

Post, W M↗

Characterization of radioactive wastes with respect to harmful materials

In addendum 4 to the license of the German KONRAD repository, which considers mainly radiological aspects, a water law permit was issued in order to prevent the pollution of the near-surface groundwater. The water law permit stipulates limitations for 10 radionuclides and 2 groups of radionuclides as well as mass limitations for 94 substances and materials relevant for water protection issues. Two collateral clauses, i.e. additional requirements imposed by the licensing authority, include demands on the monitoring, registering and balancing of non-radioactive harmful substances and materials /1/. In order to fulfill the requirements of the water law permit the German Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) being the operator of the KONRAD repository has developed a concept, which ensures the compliance with all requirements of the water law permit and which provides standardized easy manageable guidance for the waste producers to describe their wastes. On 15 March 2011 the competent water authority, the 'Niedersaechsischer Landesbetrieb fuer Wasserwirtschaft, Kuesten- und Naturschutz' (NLWKN) issued the approval for this concept. Being the most essential part of this concept the procedural method and the developed description of nonradioactive waste package constituents by use of standardized lists of materials and containers is addressed and presented in this paper. The waste producer has to describe his waste package in a standardized way on the base of the lists of materials and containers. For each material in the list a comprehensive description is given comprising the composition, scope of application, quality control measures, thresholds and other data. Each entry in the list has to be approved by NLWKN. The scope of the lists is defined by the waste producers' needs. Using some particular materials as examples, the approval procedure for including materials in the list is described. The procedure of describing the material composition has to be considered in the KONRAD waste acceptance requirements. The respective part of these requirements will be introduced. In order to clarify the procedure of describing waste packages by use of the standardized lists of materials and containers some examples of typical waste package descriptions will be presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Dispersal and fallout simulations for urban consequences management (u)

Hazardous chemical, biological, or radioactive releases from leaks, spills, fires, or blasts, may occur (intentionally or accidentally) in urban environments during warfare or as part of terrorist attacks on military bases or other facilities. The associated contaminant dispersion is complex and semi-chaotic. Urban predictive simulation capabilities can have direct impact in many threat-reduction areas of interest, including, urban sensor placement and threat analysis, contaminant transport (CT) effects on surrounding civilian population (dosages, evacuation, shelter-in-place), education and training of rescue teams and services. Detailed simulations for the various processes involved are in principle possible, but generally not fast. Predicting urban airflow accompanied by CT presents extremely challenging requirements. Crucial technical issues include, simulating turbulent fluid and particulate transport, initial and boundary condition modeling incorporating a consistent stratified urban boundary layer with realistic wind fluctuations, and post-processing of the simulation results for practical consequences management. Relevant fluid dynamic processes to be simulated include, detailed energetic and contaminant sources, complex building vortex shedding and flows in recirculation zones, and modeling of particle distributions, including particulate fallout, as well as deposition, re-suspension and evaporation. Other issues include, modeling building damage effects due to eventual blasts, addressing appropriate regional and atmospheric data reduction.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

When Is the Simple Radiotoxicity Approach Useful for Advanced Fuel Cycle System Assessments Given the Existence of Complex Performance Dose Assessments?

Engineers often face the general question of which approximations are appropriate for a given analytical task. In particular, when is a simpler model useful if a more complex model also exists? This paper explores this question in the domain of radiotoxicity relative to geologic disposal performance dose assessments. Criterion 1 requires that the simpler approach, radiotoxicity, must be calculated correctly. The concept of ingestion radiotoxic inventories is analogous to the inventory of toxic chemicals in other industries. From a decision analysis perspective, it is also somewhat analogous to the nuclear reactor safety concept of “passive safety.” This paper explains some of the issues in calculating radiotoxicity, motivated by the author’s observations of errors in the literature: not accounting for radioactive progeny, misunderstanding natural “ore,” and focusing on transuranic (TRU) isotopes without adequate attention to actinide decay products. For example, Th/233U fuel cycles do have lower amounts of TRU isotopes than U/239Pu fuel cycles, but that does not necessarily mean lower long-term hazard. Criterion 2 requires that the uncertainties in the more complex approach, performance dose assessments, must raise issues for the assessments’ intended purposes—in which case, radiotoxic inventory may be of assistance until those issues are resolved. Performance dose assessments were developed for, and are legally the way to show, compliance with regulations, but the uncertainties are large. Less obvious is the degree to which dose assessments are applicable to other purposes—comparing fuel cycle options prior to site selection and showing the safety of a fuel cycle and waste management approach to the public. In the last sense especially, performance dose assessments are analogous to probabilistic risk assessments for nuclear reactor safety. The United States lacks a selected consensus site, selected fuel cycle approach (direct disposal versus recycling), and selected waste form. Thus, the paper does not intend to discuss all the issues with performance dose assessments but rather intends to focus on only those performance dose uncertainties that raise issues when comparing fuel cycles. Uncertainties associated with whether a generic geological environment is attractive or a specific location meets requirements are beyond the scope of this paper. Ingestion radiotoxicity correlates with heat, gamma, and inhalation radiotoxicity. Thus, options that are relatively high in ingestion radiotoxicity tend to be high in other parameters. Therefore, reduction in ingestion radiotoxicity means both that the potential source term for release is lower but also that one driving force for release (heat) is also lower. However, the most important time frames differ as heat is mainly an issue in decades and centuries after reactor discharge, but ingestion radiotoxicity is mainly an issue during longer time periods. Ingestion radiotoxicity points to the importance of actinides in long-term waste management, followed by specific fission products such as 99Tc, 129I, 93Zr, 135Cs, and 79Se.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗