DOE OSTI2020
Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗