Transportation Secure Data Center: Real-World Data for Planning, Modeling, & Analysis (Fact Sheet) (Revised)
Fact sheet on Transportation Secure Data Center.
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Fact sheet on Transportation Secure Data Center.
Corrective Action Unit 367 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): • 10-09-03, Mud Pit • 10-45-01, U-10h Crater (Sedan) • 10-45-02, Ess Crater Site • 10-45-03, Uncle Crater Site The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation of the corrective actions and site closure activities implemented at CAU 367. A corrective action of closure in place with use restrictions was completed at each of the three crater CASs (10-45-01, 10-45-02, and 10-45-03); corrective actions were not required at CAS 10-09-03. In addition, a limited soil removal corrective action was conducted at the location of a potential source material release. Based on completion of these correction actions, no additional corrective action is required at CAU 367, and site closure is considered complete. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from February 2010 through March 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 367: Area 10 Sedan, Ess and Uncle Unit Craters, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of non-test or other releases (e.g., migration in washes and potential source material). Based on the proximity of the Uncle, Ess, and Sedan craters, the impact of the Sedan test on the fallout deposited from the two earlier tests, and aerial radiological surveys, the CAU 367 investigation was designed to study the releases from the three crater CASs as one combined release (primary release). Corrective Action Site 10-09-03, Mud Pit, consists of two mud pits identified at CAU 367. The mud pits are considered non-test releases or other releases and were investigated independent of the three crater CASs. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 367 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. For the primary release, radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were not found to be present in the surface or shallow subsurface soil outside the default contamination boundary. However, it was assumed that radionuclides are present in subsurface media within each of the three craters (Sedan, Ess, and Uncle) due to prompt injection of radionuclides from the tests. Based on the assumption of radiological dose exceeding the FAL, corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at each crater CAS. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. With regard to other releases, no contaminants of concern were identified at the mud pits or any of the other release locations, with one exception. Potential source material in the form of lead was found at one location. A corrective action of clean closure was implemented at this location, and verification samples indicated that no further action is necessary. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 367. • Corrective Action Unit 367 should be promoted from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.
Corrective Action Unit 374 comprises five corrective action sites (CASs): • 18-22-05, Drum • 18-22-06, Drums (20) • 18-22-08, Drum • 18-23-01, Danny Boy Contamination Area • 20-45-03, U-20u Crater (Schooner) The purpose of this Corrective Action Decision Document/Closure Report is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 374 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls was implemented at CASs 18-23-01 and 20-45-03, and a corrective action of removing potential source material (PSM) was conducted at CAS 20-45-03. The other CASs require no further action; however, best management practices of removing PSM and drums at CAS 18-22-06, and removing drums at CAS 18-22-08 were performed. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from May 4 through October 6, 2010, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 374: Area 20 Schooner Unit Crater, Nevada Test Site, Nevada. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigating the primary release of radionuclides and investigating other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 374 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality indicator parameters. This evaluation demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Analytes detected during the CAI were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. Radiological doses exceeding the FAL of 25 millirem per year were found to be present in the surface soil that was sampled. It is assumed that radionuclide levels present in subsurface media within the craters and ejecta fields (default contamination boundaries) at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites exceed the FAL. It is also assumed that PSM in the form of lead-acid batteries at Schooner exceeds the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken that consist of removing PSM, where present, and implementing a use restriction and posting warning signs at the Danny Boy and Schooner sites. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: • No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 374. • A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 374. • Corrective Action Unit 374 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.
CAU 104 comprises the 15 CASs listed below: (1) 07-23-03, Atmospheric Test Site T-7C; (2) 07-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site T7-1; (3) 07-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site; (4) 07-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site T7-5a; (5) 07-23-07, Atmospheric Test Site - Dog (T-S); (6) 07-23-08, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (T-S); (7) 07-23-09, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (T-S); (8) 07-23-10, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie; (9) 07-23-11, Atmospheric Test Site - Dixie; (10) 07-23-12, Atmospheric Test Site - Charlie (Bus); (11) 07-23-13, Atmospheric Test Site - Baker (Buster); (12) 07-23-14, Atmospheric Test Site - Ruth; (13) 07-23-15, Atmospheric Test Site T7-4; (14) 07-23-16, Atmospheric Test Site B7-b; (15) 07-23-17, Atmospheric Test Site - Climax These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of viable CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed on April 28, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 104. The releases at CAU 104 consist of surface-deposited radionuclides from 30 atmospheric nuclear tests. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 104 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) to the dose-based final action level (FAL). The presence of TED exceeding the FAL is considered a radiological contaminant of concern (COC). Anything identified as a COC will require corrective action. The TED will be calculated as the total of separate estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters will be used to measure external radiological dose. Based on process knowledge of the releases associated with the nuclear tests and radiological survey information about the location and shape of the resulting contamination plume, it was determined that the releases from the nuclear tests are co-located and will be investigated concurrently. A field investigation will be performed to define areas where TED exceeds the FAL and to determine whether other COCs are present at the site. The investigation will also collect information to determine the presence and nature of contamination associated with migration and excavation, as well as any potential releases discovered during the investigation. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.
Corrective Action Unit 375 comprises three corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 25-23-22, Contaminated Soils Site; (2) 25-34-06, Test Cell A Bunker; and (3) 30-45-01, U-30a, b, c, d, e Craters. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 375 based on the implementation of corrective action of closure in place with administrative controls at CAS 25-23-22, no further action at CAS 25-34-06, and closure in place with administrative controls and removal of potential source material (PSM) at CAS 30-45-01. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from July 28, 2010, through April 4, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 375: Area 30 Buggy Unit Craters. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (migration in washes and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 375 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on the data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were assumed to be present within the default contamination boundaries at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. No contaminants were identified at CAS 25-34-06, and no corrective action is necessary. Potential source material in the form of lead plate, lead-acid batteries, and oil within an abandoned transformer were identified at CAS 30-45-01, and corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of removing the PSM. Use restrictions and warning signs were implemented for the remaining radiological contamination at CASs 25-23-22 and 30-45-01. These use restrictions were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 375; (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 375; and (3) Move CAU 375 from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.
Corrective Action Unit 106 comprises four corrective action sites (CASs): (1) 05-20-02, Evaporation Pond; (2) 05-23-05, Atmospheric Test Site - Able; (3) 05-45-04, 306 GZ Rad Contaminated Area; (4) 05-45-05, 307 GZ Rad Contaminated Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 106 based on the implementation of corrective actions. The corrective action of clean closure was implemented at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05, while no corrective action was necessary at CASs 05-20-02 and 05-23-05. Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from October 20, 2010, through June 1, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 106: Areas 5, 11 Frenchman Flat Atmospheric Sites. The approach for the CAI was divided into two facets: investigation of the primary release of radionuclides, and investigation of other releases (mechanical displacement and chemical releases). The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 106 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in fulfilling the DQO data needs. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Industrial Area exposure scenario (2,250 hours of annual exposure). The only radiological dose exceeding the FAL was at CAS 05-45-05 and was associated with potential source material (PSM). It is also assumed that additional PSM in the form of depleted uranium (DU) and DU-contaminated debris at CASs 05-45-04 and 05-45-05 exceed the FAL. Therefore, corrective actions were undertaken at these CASs that consisted of removing PSM and collecting verification samples. Results of verification samples show that remaining soil does not contain contamination exceeding the FALs. Therefore, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions are necessary for CAU 106. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 106. (3) Corrective Action Unit 106 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.
Corrective Action Unit 366 comprises the six corrective action sites (CASs) listed below: (1) 11-08-01, Contaminated Waste Dump No.1; (2) 11-08-02, Contaminated Waste Dump No.2; (3) 11-23-01, Radioactively Contaminated Area A; (4) 11-23-02, Radioactively Contaminated Area B; (5) 11-23-03, Radioactively Contaminated Area C; and (6) 11-23-04, Radioactively Contaminated Area D. These sites are being investigated because existing information on the nature and extent of potential contamination is insufficient to evaluate and recommend corrective action alternatives (CAAs). Additional information will be obtained by conducting a corrective action investigation before evaluating CAAs and selecting the appropriate corrective action for each CAS. The results of the field investigation will support a defensible evaluation of CAAs that will be presented in the Corrective Action Decision Document. The sites will be investigated based on the data quality objectives (DQOs) developed July 6, 2011, by representatives of the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office. The DQO process was used to identify and define the type, amount, and quality of data needed to develop and evaluate appropriate corrective actions for CAU 366. The presence and nature of contamination at CAU 366 will be evaluated based on information collected from a field investigation. Radiological contamination will be evaluated based on a comparison of the total effective dose (TED) at sample locations to the dose-based final action level (FAL). The TED will be calculated by summing the estimates of internal and external dose. Results from the analysis of soil samples collected from sample plots will be used to calculate internal radiological dose. Thermoluminescent dosimeters placed at each sample location will be used to measure external radiological dose. Based on historical documentation of the releases associated with the nuclear tests, it was determined that CASs 11-23-02, 11-23-03, and 11-23-04 will be investigated as one release site. The three test areas associated with these CASs are in close proximity; the devices tested were all composed of plutonium and enriched uranium; and the ground zeroes are all posted high contamination areas (HCAs). Because the device tested at CAS 11-23-01 was composed primarily of enriched uranium and the ground zero is not a posted HCA, the CAS will be investigated as a separate release. The DQO process also resulted in an assumption that TED within the HCAs and contaminated waste dumps exceeds the FAL and requires corrective action. A field investigation will be performed to define where TED exceeds the FAL and to determine whether other contaminants of concern are present at the site associated with other activities that took place at the site or from spills or waste discovered during the investigation. The presence and nature of contamination from other types of releases (such as migration and any potential releases discovered during the investigation) will be evaluated using soil samples collected from the locations most likely containing contamination, if present. Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of the DQO methodology and the DQOs specific to each CAS.
Corrective Action Unit 365 comprises one corrective action site (CAS), CAS 08-23-02, U-8d Contamination Area. The purpose of this CADD/CR is to provide justification and documentation supporting the recommendation that no further corrective action is needed for CAU 365 based on the implementation of the corrective action of closure in place with a use restriction (UR). Corrective action investigation (CAI) activities were performed from January 18, 2011, through August 2, 2011, as set forth in the Corrective Action Investigation Plan for Corrective Action Unit 365: Baneberry Contamination Area. The purpose of the CAI was to fulfill data needs as defined during the data quality objective (DQO) process. The CAU 365 dataset of investigation results was evaluated based on a data quality assessment. This assessment demonstrated the dataset is complete and acceptable for use in supporting the DQO decisions. Investigation results were evaluated against final action levels (FALs) established in this document. A radiological dose FAL of 25 millirem per year was established based on the Remote Work Area exposure scenario (336 hours of annual exposure). Radiological doses exceeding the FAL were found to be present to the southwest of the Baneberry crater. It was also assumed that radionuclide levels present within the crater and fissure exceed the FAL. Corrective actions were undertaken that consisted of establishing a UR and posting warning signs for the crater, fissure, and the area located to the southwest of the crater where soil concentrations exceeded the FAL. These URs were recorded in the FFACO database; the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO) Facility Information Management System; and the NNSA/NSO CAU/CAS files. Therefore, NNSA/NSO provides the following recommendations: (1) No further corrective actions beyond what are described in this document are necessary for CAU 365. (2) A Notice of Completion to NNSA/NSO is requested from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection for closure of CAU 365. (3) Corrective Action Unit 365 should be moved from Appendix III to Appendix IV of the FFACO.
This Corrective Action Plan has been prepared for Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 562, Waste Systems, in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (1996; as amended March 2010). CAU 562 consists of 13 Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 2, 23, and 25 of the Nevada National Security Site. Site characterization activities were performed in 2009 and 2010, and the results are presented in Appendix A of the Corrective Action Decision Document for CAU 562. The scope of work required to implement the recommended closure alternatives is summarized. (1) CAS 02-26-11, Lead Shot, will be clean closed by removing shot. (2) CAS 02-44-02, Paint Spills and French Drain, will be clean closed by removing paint and contaminated soil. As a best management practice (BMP), asbestos tile will be removed. (3) CAS 02-59-01, Septic System, will be clean closed by removing septic tank contents. As a BMP, the septic tank will be removed. (4) CAS 02-60-01, Concrete Drain, contains no contaminants of concern (COCs) above action levels. No further action is required; however, as a BMP, the concrete drain will be removed. (5) CAS 02-60-02, French Drain, was clean closed. Corrective actions were completed during corrective action investigation activities. As a BMP, the drain grates and drain pipe will be removed. (6) CAS 02-60-03, Steam Cleaning Drain, will be clean closed by removing contaminated soil. As a BMP, the steam cleaning sump grate and outfall pipe will be removed. (7) CAS 02-60-04, French Drain, was clean closed. Corrective actions were completed during corrective action investigation activities. (8) CAS 02-60-05, French Drain, will be clean closed by removing contaminated soil. (9) CAS 02-60-06, French Drain, contains no COCs above action levels. No further action is required. (10) CAS 02-60-07, French Drain, requires no further action. The french drain identified in historical documentation was not located during corrective action investigation activities. (11) CAS 23-60-01, Mud Trap Drain and Outfall, will be clean closed by removing sediment from the mud trap. As a BMP, the mud trap and outfall pipe will be removed. (12) CAS 23-99-06, Grease Trap, will be clean closed by removing sediment from the grease trap and backfilling the grease trap with grout. (13) CAS 25-60-04, Building 3123 Outfalls, will be clean closed by removing contaminated soil and the sludge-containing outfall pipe.
This letter serves as the post-closure inspection letter report for corrective action units on the Nevada National Security Site for calendar year 2011. Copies of completed inspection checklists are included in this report.
This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data that were obtained during calendar year (CY) 2010 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (hereafter referenced as Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The CY 2010 monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12 (Figure A.1). The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system). The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Section 2 of this report provides background information pertinent to groundwater and surface water quality monitoring in each hydrogeologic regime, including the topography and bedrock geology, surface water drainage, groundwater system, and extent of groundwater contamination. The CY 2010 groundwater and surface water monitoring data in this report were obtained from sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP) managed by Babcock & Wilcox Technical Services Y-12, LLC (B&W Y-12) and from sampling and analysis activities implemented under several monitoring programs managed by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (BJC). Cooperative implementation of the monitoring programs directed by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC (i.e., coordinating sample collection and sharing data) ensures that the CY 2010 monitoring results fulfill requirements of all the applicable monitoring drivers with no duplication of sampling and analysis efforts. Section 3 of this report contains a summary of information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP including sampling locations and frequency; quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling; sample collection and handling; field measurements and laboratory analytes; data management and data quality objective (DQO) evaluation; and groundwater elevation monitoring. However, this report does not include equivalent QA/QC or DQO evaluation information regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities associated with the monitoring programs implemented by BJC. Such details are deferred to the respective programmatic plans and reports issued by BJC (see Section 3.0). Collectively, the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during CY 2010 by the Y-12 GWPP and BJC address DOE Order 450.1A (Environmental Protection Program) requirements for monitoring groundwater and surface water quality in areas: (1) which are, or could be, affected by operations at Y-12 (surveillance monitoring); and (2) where contaminants from Y-12 are most likely to migrate beyond the boundaries of the ORR (exit pathway/perimeter monitoring). Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring, based on the analytical results for the principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, volatile organic compounds (VOCs), gross alpha activity, and gross beta activity. Section 5 of this report summarizes the most pertinent findings regarding the principal contaminants, along with recommendations proposed for ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP.
The storm water pollution prevention program at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Complex) intends to protect the quality of storm water runoff through: (1) reducing the exposure of metal accumulation areas to precipitation, (2) implementation of Best Management Practices, (3) sampling during rain events and subsequent analysis, and (4) routine surveillances. When prescribed, the analytical data is compared to a set of cut-off concentration values to determine how the Y-12 Complex relates to other metal fabrication industries in the state of Tennessee. The quality of the storm water exiting the Y-12 Complex via East Fork Poplar Creek indicated some improvement in 2011. This improvement is attributable to the completion of several construction, demolition and remediation projects which occurred in 2010 and 2011. Emphasis will continue to be placed on site inspections and the timely implementation of improved storm water control measures as deemed necessary.
INL in collaboration with Itron, Inc. performed a laboratory assessment on the Itron, Inc. OpenWay Automated Metering System. During this assessment, vulnerabilities were discovered, evaluated, and mitigation strategies developed. These results were reported to Itron, Inc. to guide their efforts towards improved cyber security of their Smartgrid products.
The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is planning a 1000 kg (TNT equivalent) shot (SPE2) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in a granite borehole at a depth (canister centroid) of 45 meters. This shot follows an earlier shot of 100 kg in the same borehole at a depth 60 m. Surrounding the shotpoint is an extensive array of seismic sensors arrayed in 5 radial lines extending out 2 km to the north and east and approximately 10-15 to the south and west. Prior to SPE1, simulations using a finite difference code and a 3D numerical model based on the geologic setting were conducted, which predicted higher amplitudes to the south and east in the alluvium of Yucca Flat along with significant energy on the transverse components caused by scattering within the 3D volume along with some contribution by topographic scattering. Observations from the SPE1 shot largely confirmed these predictions although the ratio of transverse energy relative to the vertical and radial components was in general larger than predicted. A new set of simulations has been conducted for the upcoming SPE2 shot. These include improvements to the velocity model based on SPE1 observations as well as new capabilities added to the simulation code. The most significant is the addition of a new source model within the finite difference code by using the predicted ground velocities from a hydrodynamic code (GEODYN) as driving condition on the boundaries of a cube embedded within WPP which provides a more sophisticated source modeling capability linked directly to source site materials (e.g. granite) and type and size of source. Two sets of SPE2 simulations are conducted, one with a GEODYN source and 3D complex media (no topography node spacing of 5 m) and one with a standard isotropic pre-defined time function (3D complex media with topography, node spacing of 5 m). Results were provided as time series at specific points corresponding to sensor locations for both translational (x,y,z) and rotational components. Estimates of spectral scaling for SPE2 are provided using a modified version of the Mueller-Murphy model. An estimate of expected aftershock probabilities were also provided, based on the methodology of Ford and Walter , [2010].
The Department of Energy's Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) sponsored a water assessment at the Y 12 National Security Complex (Y 12) located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Driven by mandated water reduction goals of Executive Orders 13423 and 13514, the objective of the water assessment is to develop a comprehensive understanding of the current water-consuming applications and equipment at Y 12 and to identify key areas for water efficiency improvements that could be applied not only at Y-12 but at other Federal facilities as well. FEMP selected Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to coordinate and manage the water assessment. PNNL contracted Water Savers, LLC to lead the technical aspects of the water assessment. Water Savers provided key technical expertise in water auditing, metering, and cooling systems. This is the report of that effort, which concluded that the Y-12 facility could realize considerable water savings by implementing the recommended water efficiency opportunities.
This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of the 92-Acre Area, which includes Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111, 'Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits.' This CR provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that the closure objectives were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) (FFACO, 1996 [as amended March 2010]). Closure activities began in January 2011 and were completed in January 2012. Closure activities were conducted according to Revision 1 of the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2010). The following closure activities were performed: (1) Construct an engineered evapotranspiration cover over the boreholes, trenches, and pits in the 92-Acre Area; (2) Install use restriction (UR) warning signs, concrete monuments, and subsidence survey monuments; and (3) Establish vegetation on the covers. UR documentation is included as Appendix C of this report. The post-closure plan is presented in detail in Revision 1 of the CADD/CAP for the 92-Acre Area and CAU 111, and the requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this document. When the next request for modification of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Permit NEV HW0101 is submitted to the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), the requirements for post-closure monitoring of the 92-Acre Area will be included. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from NDEP to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 111; and (2) The transfer of CAU 111 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 569 is located in Area 3 of the Nevada National Security Site, which is approximately 65 miles northwest of Las Vegas, Nevada. Corrective Action Unit 569 comprises the nine numbered corrective action sites (CASs) and one newly identified site listed below: (1) 03-23-09, T-3 Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Annie, Franklin, George, and Moth); (2) 03-23-10, T-3A Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Harry and Hornet); (3) 03-23-11, T-3B Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Fizeau); (4) 03-23-12, T-3S Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Rio Arriba); (5) 03-23-13, T-3T Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Catron); (6) 03-23-14, T-3V Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Humboldt); (7) 03-23-15, S-3G Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Coulomb-B); (8) 03-23-16, S-3H Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Coulomb-A); (9) 03-23-21, Pike Contamination Area (hereafter referred to as Pike); and (10) Waste Consolidation Site 3A.
The report is the Final Construction Quality Assurance (CQA) Report for the 92-Acrew Evapotranspiration Cover, Area 5 Waste Management Division Retired Mixed Waste Pits, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, for the period of January 20, 2011, to January 31, 2012 The Area 5 RWMS uses engineered shallow-land burial cells to dispose of packaged waste. The 92-Acre Area encompasses the southern portion of the Area 5 RWMS, which has been designated for the first final closure operations. This area contains 13 Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) boreholes, 16 narrow trenches, and 9 broader pits. With the exception of two active pits (P03 and P06), all trenches and pits in the 92-Acre Area had operational covers approximately 2.4 meters thick, at a minimum, in most areas when this project began. The units within the 92-Acre Area are grouped into the following six informal categories based on physical location, waste types and regulatory requirements: (1) Pit 3 Mixed Waste Disposal Unit (MWDU); (2) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 111; (3) CAU 207; (4) Low-level waste disposal units; (5) Asbestiform low-level waste disposal units; and (6) One transuranic (TRU) waste trench.