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At least 1,711 records · Page 95

Subsurface Biogeochemistry of Actinides

A major scientific challenge in environmental sciences is to identify the dominant processes controlling actinide transport in the environment. It is estimated that currently, over 2200 metric tons of plutonium (Pu) have been deposited in the subsurface worldwide, a number that increases yearly with additional spent nuclear fuel (Ewing et al., 2010). Plutonium has been shown to migrate on the scale of kilometers, giving way to a critical concern that the fundamental biogeochemical processes that control its behavior in the subsurface are not well understood (Kersting et al., 1999; Novikov et al., 2006; Santschi et al., 2002). Neptunium (Np) is less prevalent in the environment; however, it is predicted to be a significant long-term dose contributor in high-level nuclear waste. Our focus on Np chemistry in this Science Plan is intended to help formulate a better understanding of Pu redox transformations in the environment and clarify the differences between the two long-lived actinides. The research approach of our Science Plan combines (1) Fundamental Mechanistic Studies that identify and quantify biogeochemical processes that control actinide behavior in solution and on solids, (2) Field Integration Studies that investigate the transport characteristics of Pu and test our conceptual understanding of actinide transport, and (3) Actinide Research Capabilities that allow us to achieve the objectives of this Scientific Focus Area (SFA and provide new opportunities for advancing actinide environmental chemistry. These three Research Thrusts form the basis of our SFA Science Program (Figure 1).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

TA-55 and Sigma Overview

These are slides from a facility overview presentation for visiting agencies to Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). The TA-55 Plutonium Facility (PF-4) is discussed in detail. PF-4 is a unique resource for US plutonium programs. The basic design is flexible and has adapted to changing national needs. It is a robust facility with strong safety and security implementation. It supports a variety of national programs. It will continue for many years into the future. Sigma is then discussed in detail, which handles everything from hydrogen to uranium. It has been in long term service to the Nation (nearly 60 years). It has a flexible authorization basis to handle almost the entire periodic table. It has a wide breadth of prototyping and characterization capabilities. It has integrated program and line management.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Nightshade Prototype Experiments (Silverleaf)

The Red Sage campaign is a series of subcritical dynamic plutonium experiments designed to measure ejecta. Nightshade, the first experiments in Red Sage scheduled for fiscal year 2019, will measure the amount of ejecta emission into vacuum from a double-­shocked plutonium surface. To address the major technical risks in Nightshade, a Level 2 milestone was developed for fiscal year 2016. Silverleaf, a series of four experiments, was executed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in July and August 2016 to demonstrate a prototype of the Nightshade package and to satisfy this Level 2 milestone. This report is documentation that Red Sage Level 2 milestone requirements were successfully met.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Applications of Antineutrino Monitoring to Nonproliferation

Antineutrinos are highly penetrating particles emitted by the fission process in operating nuclear power and research reactors. Their rate of emission and energy spectrum can provide useful information about reactor operations, including the existence of the reactor, its power level, and the fissile mass inventories in the core. Because the signal cannot be attenuated or masked, this information can be gathered at long standoff outside the core. Building on our group’s successful experimental demonstrations of plutonium content monitoring at 25 meters from a reactor core, the goal of this project is to demonstrate detectors for reactor monitoring and discovery detectors at increasing standoffs, out to a practical limit of about 1000 kilometers. Our two main goals for FY16 and 17 are: 1) design a detector capable of monitoring nuclear reactor operations at 25 kilometer standoff, and 2) engage in a cooperative effort to monitor a former plutonium production reactor in India (at close range).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Analysis of tank 38H (HTF-38-17-18, -19) and tank 43H (HTF-43-17-20, -21) samples for support of the enrichment control and corrosion control programs

SRNL analyzed samples from Tank 38H and Tank 43H to support ECP and CCP. The total uranium in the Tank 38H samples ranged from 53.7 mg/L for the surface sample to 57.0 mg/L in the sub-surface sample. The Tank 43H samples showed uranium concentrations of 46.2 mg/L for the surface sample and 45.7 mg/L in the sub-surface sample. The U-235 percentage was 0.63% in the Tank 38H samples and 0.62% in the Tank 43H samples. The total uranium and percent U-235 results appear consistent with recent Tank 38H and Tank 43H uranium measurements. The plutonium results for the Tank 38H surface sample are slightly higher than recent sample results, while the Tank 43H plutonium results are within the range of values measured on previous samples. The Cs-137 results for the Tank 38H surface and subsurface samples are slightly higher than the concentrations measured in recent samples. The Cs-137 results for the two Tank 43H samples are within the range of values measured on previous samples. The comparison of the sum of the cations in each sample versus the sum of the anions shows a difference of 23% for the Tank 38H surface sample and 18% for the Tank 43H surface sample. The four samples show silicon concentrations somewhat lower than the previous samples with values ranging from 80.2 to 105 mg/L.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Accountability Tanks Calibration Data Analysis

MET-1 utilizes tanks to store plutonium in solution. The Nuclear Material Control & Accountability group at LANL requires that MET-1 be able to determine the amount of SNM remaining in solution in the tanks for accountability purposes. For this reason it is desired to determine how well various operators may read the volume of liquid left in the tank with the tank measurement device (glass column or slab). The accuracy of the measurement is then compared to the current SAFE-NMCA acceptance criteria for lean and rich plutonium solutions to determine whether or not the criteria are reasonable and may be met.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Improvement of INVS Measurement Uncertainty for Pu and U-Pu Nitrate Solution

In the Tokai Reprocessing Plant (TRP) and the Plutonium Conversion Development Facility (PCDF), a large amount of plutonium nitrate solution which is recovered from light water reactor (LWR) and advanced thermal reactor (ATR), FUGEN are being stored. Since the solution is designated as a direct use material, the periodical inventory verification and flow verification are being conducted by Japan Safeguard Government Office (JSGO) and International Atomic Agency (IAEA).

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PU-ICE Summary Information.

The Generator Knowledge Report for the Plutonium Isentropic Compression Experiment Containment Systems (GK Report) provides information for the Plutonium Isentropic Compression Experiment (Pu- ICE) program to support waste management and characterization efforts. Attachment 3-18 presents generator knowledge (GK) information specific to the eighteenth Pu-ICE conducted in August 2015, also known as ‘Shot 18 (Aug 2015) and Pu-ICE Z-2841 (1).’ Shot 18 (Aug 2015) was generated on August 28, 2015 (1). Calculations based on the isotopic content of Shot 18 (Aug 2015) and the measured mass of the containment system demonstrate the post-shot containment system is low-level waste (LLW). Therefore, this containment system will be managed at Sandia National Laboratory/New Mexico (SNL/NM) as LLW. Attachment 3-18 provides documentation of the TRU concentration and documents the concentration of any hazardous constituents.

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Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I & II

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. However, POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a new series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016, and described herein, were done in two phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I and II, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Corrosion Testing of 304L SS 3013 Inner Container and Teardrop Samples

The Department of Energy (DOE) 3013 Standard specifies a minimum of two containers to be used for the storage of plutonium-bearing materials containing at least 30 wt.% plutonium and uranium. Three nested containers are typically used, the outer, inner, and convenience containers, shown in Figure 1. Both the outer and inner containers are sealed with a weld while the innermost convenience container must not be sealed. Lifetime of the containers is expected to be fifty years. The containers are fabricated of austenitic stainless steels (SS) due to their high corrosion resistance. Potential failure mechanisms of the storage containers have been examined by Kolman and Lillard et al.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

LLNL SFA OBER SBR FY17 Program Management and Performance Report: Subsurface Biogeochemistry of Actinides

A major scientific challenge in environmental sciences is to identify the dominant processes controlling actinide transport in the environment. It is estimated that currently, over 2200 metric tons of anthropogenic plutonium (Pu) has accumulated worldwide, a number that increases yearly with additional spent nuclear fuel (Ewing et al., 2010). Plutonium has been shown to migrate on the scale of kilometers, giving way to a critical concern that the fundamental biogeochemical processes that control its behavior in the subsurface are not well understood (Kersting et al. 1999; Novikov et al. 2006; Santschi et al. 2002). Neptunium (Np) is less prevalent in the environment; however, it is predicted to be a significant long-term dose contributor in high-level nuclear waste. Our focus on Np chemistry in this Science Plan is intended to help formulate a better understanding of Pu redox transformations in the environment and clarify the differences between the two long-lived actinides. The research approach of our Science Plan combines (1) Fundamental Mechanistic Studies that identify and quantify biogeochemical processes that control actinide behavior in solution and on solids, (2) Field Integration Studies that investigate the transport characteristics of Pu and test our conceptual understanding of actinide transport, and (3) Actinide Research Capabilities that allow us to achieve the objectives of this Scientific Focus Area (SFA) and provide new opportunities for advancing actinide environmental chemistry. These three Research Thrusts form the basis of our SFA Science Program.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Analysis of the 2H-evaporator scale samples (HTF-17-56, -57)

Savannah River National Laboratory analyzed scale samples from both the wall and cone sections of the 242-16H Evaporator prior to chemical cleaning. The samples were analyzed for uranium and plutonium isotopes required for a Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of the scale removal process. The analysis of the scale samples found the material to contain crystalline nitrated cancrinite and clarkeite. Samples from both the wall and cone contain depleted uranium. Uranium concentrations of 16.8 wt% 4.76 wt% were measured in the wall and cone samples, respectively. The ratio of plutonium isotopes in both samples is ~85% Pu-239 and ~15% Pu-238 by mass and shows approximately the same 3.5 times higher concentration in the wall sample versus the cone sample as observed in the uranium concentrations. The mercury concentrations measured in the scale samples were higher than previously reported values. The wall sample contains 19.4 wt% mercury and the cone scale sample 11.4 wt% mercury. The results from the current scales samples show reasonable agreement with previous 242-16H Evaporator scale sample analysis; however, the uranium concentration in the current wall sample is substantially higher than previous measurements.

2H evaporator system↗

DN/DG Screening of Environmental Swipe Samples: FY2016 Report

The Delayed Neutron Delayed Gamma (DNDG) technique provides a new analytical capability to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for detecting undeclared nuclear activities. IAEA’s Long Term R&D (LTRD) plan has a stated high urgency need to develop elemental and isotopic signatures of nuclear fuel cycle activities and processes (LTRD 2.2). The new DNDG capability is used to co-detect both uranium and plutonium as an extension of a DN only method that is already being utilized by the IAEA for the analysis of swipes to inform on undeclared nuclear activities. Analytical method involving irradiation of swipe samples potentially containing trace quantities of fissile material in a thermal neutron field, followed by the counting of delayed neutrons, is a well-known technique in the field of safeguards and nonproliferation. It is used for detecting the presence of microscopic amounts of fissile material, (typically a linear combination of 233 U, 235 U, 239 Pu, and 241 Pu)and quantifying it in terms of the equivalent mass of 235U. The delayed neutron (DN) technique is very sensitive and is been routinely employed at the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). Both uranium and plutonium are of high safeguards value. However, the DN technique is not well suited for distinguishing between U and Pu isotopes since the decay curves overlap closely. The delayed gamma (DG) technique will help detect the presence of 239Pu in a mixture of U and Pu. Thus the DNDG approach combines the best of both worlds; the sensitivity of DN counting and the isotopic specificity of DG counting. The present work seeks to build on the delayed neutron and delayed gamma methods that have been developed at ORNL. It is recognized that the distribution profile of heavy fission products remains fairly invariant for the fissile nuclides whereas the distribution of light fission products varies from one isotope to another. That is, the ratio of the yield of a light fission fragment to a heavy fission fragments is isotope specific. Measurement of the ratio of the net full energy peak (FEP) from low/high mass fission products is an elegant way to characterize the fraction of fissile materials present in a mixture. By empirically calibrating the ratio of the net FEP as a function of known concentration of the binary mixture, one can determine the fraction of fissile isotopes in an unknown sample. In the work done in fiscal year (FY) 2016, samples of single fissile material isotopes as well as binary mixtures were irradiated in a well thermalized irradiation field in the HFIR. Delayed neutron counting was performed using the neutron counter at the HFIR Neutron Activation Analysis (NAA) laboratory. Delayed gamma counting was performed using a shielded high purity germanium (HPGe) detector. Delayed neutron decay curve results highlighted the difficulty of distinguishing between U and Pu isotopes, and the need for including the delayed gamma component. Based on delayed gamma spectrometry, twelve ratios of low mass/high fission product gamma ray FEP have been identified as valid candidates. Linearity of the ratios, as a function of 239 Pu fraction in 235 U+ 239 Pu mixtures, was confirmed for the low mass/high mass candidates that were selected. The DNDG method we are spearheading allows not only the presence of total fissile content to be detected, but whether the material is predominantly U or predominantly Pu, or a mixture. This provides additional SG relevant information.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Effects of Laser Etching on the Corrosion Susceptibility of SAVY 4000 and Hagan Containers

Since the late 1990’s, the Hagan container was used as the primary container for packaging of plutonium-bearing materials. The Hagan design consisted of a threaded closure, a Viton® ORing, a carbon-carbon filter, and a 304L stainless steel (SS) body. Over the years, Hagans have shown vulnerability in their design [1]. In 2008, The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, which detailed an approach to obtain highconfidence in containers by including specific design requirements, material contents and an approach to determine life span from said contents, and surveillance techniques [2]. In response to both the vulnerability issues with the Hagan and DOE M 441.1-1, the SAVY 4000 container with its twist style closure, Viton® O-Ring, Fiberfrax-Gortex filter, and annealed 316L SS body, was designed as the replacement for Hagan containers, but only for a short term lifespan of 5 years [1]. However, both the Hagan and SAVY 4000 are being pushed to maintain a lifespan of 40 years. Therefore, proper confidence must be placed on each component of each container to last a minimum of 40 years. So far, the biggest concern found during surveillance of these containers is corrosion and the potential for failure by corrosion. One concern is that the containers fail due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC), especially around the weld between the collar and the body as welds leave residual stresses. One advantage the SAVY 4000 has is that the body is annealed, but its weld is still susceptible as it was welded after annealing [3, 4]. Moreover, 316L SS is known to have a higher pitting resistance (pits are a precursor to SCC and can also lead to extensive failure of the material), than 304L SS [4]. During recent surveillance activities, two SAVY 4000’s containing Solution Assay Instrument (SAI) solutions were opened. The SAI SAVY 4000’s contained plutonium (Pu) in 3M HCl solution in plastic volumetric flasks placed inside of polyethylene bags. Historically, a SAVY 4000 containing an SAI solution is packaged for 3 weeks, however, these particular containers were not reopened until 14 months later. When opened, brown-red corrosion product was found all over the inside of the container as shown in Figure 1.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Pipe Overpack Container Fire Testing: Phase I II & III.

The Pipe Overpack Container (POC) was developed at Rocky Flats to transport plutonium residues with higher levels of plutonium than standard transuranic (TRU) waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for disposal. In 1996 Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) conducted a series of tests to determine the degree of protection POCs provided during storage accident events. One of these tests exposed four of the POCs to a 30-minute engulfing pool fire, resulting in one of the 7A drum overpacks generating sufficient internal pressure to pop off its lid and expose the top of the pipe container (PC) to the fire environment. The initial contents of the POCs were inert materials, which would not generate large internal pressure within the PC if heated. POCs are now being used to store combustible TRU waste at Department of Energy (DOE) sites. At the request of DOE’s Office of Environmental Management (EM) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), starting in 2015 SNL conducted a series of fire tests to examine whether PCs with combustibles would reach a temperature that would result in (1) decomposition of inner contents and (2) subsequent generation of sufficient gas to cause the PC to over-pressurize and release its inner content. Tests conducted during 2015 and 2016 were done in three phases. The goal of the first phase was to see if the PC would reach high enough temperatures to decompose typical combustible materials inside the PC. The goal of the second test phase was to determine under what heating loads (i.e., incident heat fluxes) the 7A drum lid pops off from the POC drum. The goal of the third phase was to see if surrogate aerosol gets released from the PC when the drum lid is off. This report will describe the various tests conducted in phase I, II, and III, present preliminary results from these tests, and discuss implications for the POCs.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Actinides and Correlated Electron Materials

The Actinides and Correlated Electron Materials area of leadership spans Los Alamos National Laboratory competency in actinide materials research dating to the Manhattan Project as articulated in the Integrated Plutonium Science and Research Strategy and competency in strongly correlated electron systems dating back to at least the early 1980s. This area of leadership focuses on the goals of discovering, understanding, and controlling emergent electronic states and predictive performance of actinide materials. They are quintessentially linked by the fact that the physics of actinides—and plutonium in particular—are governed by strong electronic correlations. Not only is the electronic structure of actinides dictated by fine details of electron correlations, but chemical bonding and physical structure are as well. Hence, by addressing the first goal of this leadership area we can significantly accelerate progress on the second goal. To understand such matter requires probing the intertwined spin, charge, orbital, and lattice degrees of freedom with greater precision and developing models that accurately predict the consequences of these coupled degrees of freedom, on multiple length and time scales and including acute reactivity and effects of self-irradiation phenomena in these materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Development and Optimization of Voltammetric Methods for Real Time Analysis of Electrorefiner Salt with High Concentrations of Actinides and Fission Products

This project addresses the problem of achieving accurate material control and accountability (MC&A) around pyroprocessing electrorefiner systems. Spent nuclear fuel pyroprocessing poses a unique challenge with respect to reprocessing technology in that the fuel is never fully dissolved in the process fluid. In this case, the process fluid is molten, anhydrous LiCl-KCl salt. Therefore, there is no traditional input accountability tank. However, electrorefiners (ER) accumulate very large quantities of fissile nuclear material (including plutonium) and should be well safeguarded in a commercial facility. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) currently operates a pyroprocessing facility for treatment of spent fuel from Experimental Breeder Reactor-II with two such ER systems. INL implements MC&A via a mass tracking model in combination with periodic sampling of the salt and other materials followed by destructive analysis. This approach is projected to be insufficient to meet international safeguards timeliness requirements. A real time or near real time monitoring method is, thus, direly needed to support commercialization of pyroprocessing. A variety of approaches to achieving real time monitoring for ER salt have been proposed and studied to date—including a potentiometric actinide sensor for concentration measurements, a double bubbler for salt depth and density measurements, and laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) for concentration measurements. While each of these methods shows some promise, each also involves substantial technical complexity that may ultimately limit their implementation. Yet another alternative is voltammetry —a very simple method in theory that has previously been tested for this application to a limited extent. The equipment for a voltammetry system consists of off-the-shelf components (three electrodes and a potentiostat), which results in substantial benefits relative to cost and robustness. Based on prior knowledge of electrochemical reduction potentials for each of the species of interest, voltammetry can be used to quantify concentrations of a variety of elemental species—including uranium, plutonium, minor actinides, and rare earths. Various methods have been tested by other researchers to date—including cyclic voltammetry, square wave voltammetry, normal pulse voltammetry, etc. In most cases, it has been observed that there is a very limited concentration range for which the output can be readily correlated with concentration in the salt. Furthermore, testing to date has been limited to simple ternary salts with only a single element being quantified. While incomplete for application to MC&A for pyroprocessing, these results lead us to believe that voltammetry can be optimized based on salt properties and fundamental electrochemical rate processes to yield a highly accurate and robust method. This project is divided into four tasks jointly executed by three university research groups. This includes experimental measurement of key physical data on the systems of interest, development of a predictive voltammetry model, experimental validation of the voltammetry model, and design/verification of an optimized measurement method. This project supports the goals of the US-ROK Joint Fuel Cycle Study in addition to the NA-24 Office of the National Nuclear Security Agency and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

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Cheesecloth Alternatives Testing

Heat source plutonium oxide (HS-PuO 2 ) enriched with 65% or greater plutonium-238, is recovered and purified using an aqueous nitric acid process. Historically, cheesecloth has been employed for small spill clean-up and for routine housekeeping. However, the 2016 Department of Energy (DOE) Operating Experience report, entitled Nitrate Waste Evaluations, stated that the mixing of nitrate wastes with organic absorbents, such as cheesecloth, may render transuranic waste unacceptable for disposal at WIPP in the future. This report explores the feasibility of replacement of cheesecloth with an alternative sorbent wipe that has similar absorption and cleaning abilities and improved acid resistance. Currently, cheesecloth is used for three different functions in HS-PuO 2 operations: spill cleanup; general housekeeping operations such as cleaning glovebox floors and windows, balances, furnaces, etc.; and decontamination of iridium cladded heat sources containing HS-PuO 2 . Alternatives used for spill cleanup must be able to tolerate high neutron doses found in the HS-Pu gloveboxes. They must also be able to withstand exposure to nitric acid concentrations up to 15.8 M without decomposing. Wipes used for general housekeeping must also be durable enough to clean rough surfaces and remain intact when used for scrubbing. Wipes used for clad decontamination do not need to absorb large amounts of liquid but they must be able to withstand neutron exposures, temperatures of up to several hundred degrees Celsius, and exposure to acid solutions followed by mild scrubbing. Finally wipes used for any purpose must resist chemical reactions with nitric acid that could cause issues for waste disposal such as energetic exothermic reactions or flammable gas build-up. The wipes selected for this study were ranked based on their usability (radiation tolerance, absorbency, integrity in nitric acid, and durability) as well as their chemical compatibility with nitric acid as demonstrated using several types of chemical analyses. Wipes were then ranked based on the combination of their usability and chemical compatibility scores.

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