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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 1,711 records · Page 95
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Sandia Nuclear Cartridge Concept

Nuclear power offers the promise of long-term electrical power for remote areas. Recent advances in passive safety and long-life cores make a reactor that can be operated autonomously for 20 years or more a real possibility. This white paper discusses a reactor concept that offers the potential for further development, resulting in a permanently hermetically-sealed "nuclear cartridge." The term "nuclear cartridge" is meant to imply a nuclear energy source that can be inserted into a site and operated autonomously until its energy has been depleted, then withdrawn and replaced by another cartridge. The concept can be scaled for various sizes, ranging from about 1 megawatt-electric (MWe) to about 100 MWe. The paper also discusses the concept of Integrated Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) by design as it applies to this reactor design. Finally, a discussion of smart grids and how they can benefit the transfer of power to the end user is included. The Nuclear Cartridge concept has been developed with the following characteristics in mind: highly reliable autonomous operation coupled with international monitoring, requiring minimal on-site operations personnel; walkaway passively safe design; cartridge replacement cycle on the order of 20 years; load following capability; physical security by design requiring minimal security personnel during operations; and proliferation resistance by design. As illustrated in figure 1, integrating the reactor with advanced power conversion, smart grids, and other sources of energy results in a resilient and sustainable energy source.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Properties, Theory, and Measurements for Understanding the Function of Heavy Elements (Project 20180474CR, Final Technical Report)

The FY18-20 Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) funded Properties, Theory, and Measurements for Understanding the Function of Heavy Elements Project aim has been to advance heavy element science in a comprehensive project connecting targeted research with Los Alamos mission imperatives. The mechanisms for project implementation were (1) support of a multi-year broad-based postdoctoral fellows project, (2) a summer student fellows research project and two seminar series, and (3) organization of structured workshops and integrated educational and career development opportunities. The project was successfully administered by the Glenn T. Seaborg Institute (GTSI) for Transactinium Science and has shown to be an exceptional investment in supporting the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) mission areas requiring heavy element and actinide science by attracting and funding the future generation of scientists and engineers. This project exhibited its value across the laboratory in heavy element and actinide science areas include materials, material properties, signatures, modeling, predictions, fabrication, detection, disposal, global security implications, forensics, and the specialized science surrounding plutonium, uranium, and their surrogates as fuels for energy and nuclear weapons. In this report, the GTSI project staff documents the “high return on investment” implementation as measured against the successes of previous actinide research and science-based projects and as evidenced by the retention of 30% of G.T. Seaborg Postdoctoral Fellows as permanent employees. With additional funding through LDRD Reserve funding during this project period, the GTSI expanded its support for heavy element and actinide science research with a Visiting Research Seaborg Scholar and a Rapid Response Small Projects call. These innovations have served to advance GTSI pursuits as communicated in our FY21-23 LDRD Proposal Project#: 20210527CR Seaborg Institute: Center for Advancing Actinide Science and Technology at LANL

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Scintillators

As concerns about the illicit movement of radioactive materials across international borders increase, so too has the need for increased protection of those borders both foreign and domestic. The challenge is not only to detect hidden radioactive materials, but also to distinguish them from legitimate radionuclides such as radio-pharmaceuticals that are often transported across borders and shipped throughout a country. With more than 600 U.S. border sites to protect, screening imported radioactive material requires a careful balance of high throughput and high search efficiency. However, these requirements are difficult to meet as rapid screening operations leave less time for radiation detectors to efficiently evaluate materials. In support of border security, Sandia developed organic glass scintillators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Project: Summary Report on Material Characterization, Part 1

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) undertook the Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control (MCPC) Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project to advance understanding of nuclear material processing and enable multifold acceleration in the development and qualification of new material systems in national security and advanced energy applications (Smith 2021). The MCPC Project executed research across three scientific vertices—material characterization, predictive modeling, and data analytics—with extensive support by a data curation and management team. The central technical objective in the MCPC Project was to improve the prediction and characterization of the process-structure-property relationships within the microstructurally refined region of stainless-steel samples prepared utilizing friction stir processing (FSP). Application of the FSP technique is well established at PNNL within the Solid Phase Processing capability through many years of investment across a range of materials and applications (PNNL 2024). Three distinct rounds of FSP experiments were performed by the experimental team, producing replicate samples utilizing across different nominal processing conditions (Condition IDs) listed in Table 1. The starting material on which FSP was applied was commercially available unprocessed stainless-steel type 316L material. Chosen processing conditions were very diverse, and some were intentionally chosen to produce defects. Several samples experienced tool breakage during experimentation, so a full set of three replicates was not produced for every nominal processing condition.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Project: Summary Report on Material Characterization, Part 2

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) undertook the Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control (MCPC) Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project to advance understanding of nuclear material processing and enable multifold acceleration in the development and qualification of new material systems in national security and advanced energy applications (Smith 2021). The MCPC Project executed research across three scientific vertices—material characterization, predictive modeling, and data analytics—with extensive support by a data curation and management team. The central technical objective in the MCPC Project was to improve the prediction and characterization of the process-structure-property relationships within the microstructurally refined region of stainless-steel samples prepared utilizing friction stir processing (FSP). Application of the FSP technique is well established at PNNL within the Solid Phase Processing capability through many years of investment across a range of materials and applications (PNNL 2024).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Project: Summary Report on Material Characterization, Part 3

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) undertook the Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control (MCPC) Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project to advance understanding of nuclear material processing and enable multifold acceleration in the development and qualification of new material systems in national security and advanced energy applications (Smith 2021). The MCPC Project executed research across three scientific vertices—material characterization, predictive modeling, and data analytics—with extensive support by a data curation and management team. The central technical objective in the MCPC Project was to improve the prediction and characterization of the process-structure-property relationships within the microstructurally refined region of stainless-steel samples prepared utilizing friction stir processing (FSP). Application of the FSP technique is well established at PNNL within the Solid Phase Processing capability through many years of investment across a range of materials and applications (PNNL 2024).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Project: Summary Report on Material Characterization, Part 4

The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) undertook the Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control (MCPC) Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project to advance understanding of nuclear material processing and enable multifold acceleration in the development and qualification of new material systems in national security and advanced energy applications (Smith 2021). The MCPC Project executed research across three scientific vertices—material characterization, predictive modeling, and data analytics—with extensive support by a data curation and management team. The central technical objective in the MCPC Project was to improve the prediction and characterization of the process-structure-property relationships within the microstructurally refined region of stainless-steel samples prepared utilizing friction stir processing (FSP). Application of the FSP technique is well established at PNNL within the Solid Phase Processing capability through many years of investment across a range of materials and applications (PNNL 2024).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Presentation: Scenario Timeline Exploration

Slides to discuss a current project with DOE. Topic focus is on: - Advanced reactors will be able to use risk insights for many design aspects - We need bounding scenarios for screening and scoping purposes - We need realistic scenarios for input into the licensing basis safety-case - We need to manage inherent uncertainty - We need to automate the safety-case creation as much as possible

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

2026 Annual Molten Salt Reactor Campaign Review

This report documents the 2026 Annual Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) Campaign Review held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from April 21–24, 2026. The review was organized by Dr. Patricia Paviet, National Technical Director of the Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) MSR program for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), and included participation from principal investigators, federal managers, developers, regulators, and members of the broader MSR community. The 2026 review expanded beyond the ART-MSR campaign to include related DOE-NE programs supporting molten salt reactor advancement, including the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program, Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS), Material Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT), and relevant advanced fuels activities. Three days were dedicated to technical presentations and panel discussions covering thermal properties, off-gas management, modeling and simulation, safety and licensing, safeguards and security, materials and corrosion, and irradiation activities. A fourth day was dedicated to technical tours of Sandia National Laboratories and Kairos Power facilities. Attendance was strong and comparable to the prior annual review, with approximately 75 in-person participants per day, 75–80 virtual attendees per day, and approximately 30 participants in the tour day. The review fostered significant technical exchange across national laboratories, universities, industry, regulators, and international participants. This report summarizes the review structure, technical themes, participation, tours, feedback, and conclusions relevant to future planning for the MSR campaign.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Considerations for using Privacy Preserving Machine Learning Techniques for Safeguards

In international nuclear safeguards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is tasked with inspecting and verifying nuclear facilities and their activities. Data analytics and machine learning to support inspections require large amounts of data that nuclear facility operators may consider proprietary or sensitive, so the IAEA may not have full access. Allowing computation over private data without compromising its security therefore has value for safeguards inspections and analysis. Privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) consists of security-focused techniques that allow data analytics and machine learning algorithms to run on sensitive data without revealing it. This includes ideas like homomorphic encryption (HE), secure multiparty computation (SMPC), and secure enclaves. HE allows algorithms and mathematical operations to be conducted directly on the encrypted data instead of first decrypting it. With SMPC, multiple entities collaboratively compute over distributed data such that no party is able to directly view any others’ original data. Secure enclaves allow computation to take place in a separate and heavily blocked-off section of a CPU. Techniques like these allow for several potential use cases in which the security of data is essential. With SMPC, machine learning models can be trained over the input data from multiple entities, resulting in a model that all users can benefit from without leaking the input data from any particular entity. With SMPC or a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP), an algorithm returning some single answer or truth value can be run on someone else’s data without ever needing to see that data, potentially allowing for verification or proof of some underlying question. HE can allow for outsourcing computation on data to a hostile or untrusted environment. Although most of the research in this field resides within the health and financial domains, tools from PPML may have similar applications in nuclear safeguards. Allowing the IAEA to compute over proprietary information, such as process models and raw sensor data using PPML techniques, provides the baseline for running complex analytics without needing direct unencrypted access to the underlying data, maintaining its privacy. Important limitations to consider for these techniques include the efficiency and level of security required. The security of HE and SMPC come at the cost of speed—the significant amount of overhead means that algorithms implemented in these protocols and encryption schemes are slower than when run on plaintext. Additionally, several important parameters determine what techniques or protocols are used based on the security requirements. SMPC protocols may need to be selected for resistance against a party that attempts to deviate from the protocol to distort the result or gain access to additional information, and a protocol secure against these attacks may further increase the overhead of the algorithm.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Advanced Reactor Safeguards Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards (ARS) program was established in 2020 as part of appropriations for the Advanced Reactor Demonstration Program (ARDP) through the Office of Nuclear Energy in the Department of Energy. The goal of this program is to help address near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accountancy (MC&A) and Physical Protection System (PPS) requirements for U.S. construction. Existing regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and some of the requirements are not suited to smaller, safer advanced reactor designs. The ARS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD), or the consideration of safeguards and security requirements early in the design process, is an overarching principle that guides this program. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

A New Era of Nuclear Criticality Experiments: The First 10 Years of Planet Operations at NCERC

Planet is a vertical-lift assembly machine currently located at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site. In the past, Planet resided at Technical Area-18 in Los Alamos, New Mexico, as part of the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF). Following the de-inventorying of LACEF, the Planet assembly was relocated to NCERC in 2008 and became fully operational in June of 2011. The Class Foils experiment, which involves stacking highly enriched uranium foils to obtain a critical configuration, was the first critical experiment performed on Planet. As a major component of the Nuclear Criticality Safety Class taught for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program, the Class Foils experiment allows personnel from all over the DOE complex to handle nuclear material and to complete the approach to critical safely and successfully. This paper describes the Planet vertical assembly and recent engineering upgrade and a selection of the experiments that have been performed on Planet since its transition to NCERC 10 years ago.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Materials and Fuels Complex: Five-Year Investment Strategy (FY2021-2025)

The Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) vision is to “Advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) serves as the foundation of a nuclear RD&D enabling test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and is an integral part of a National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) strategy. MFC facilities focus on developing and maintaining RD&D capabilities that can increase research throughput, reduce barriers to deployment, and facilitate commercialization of new ideas and technologies for clean and secure sources of energy.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of interinstitutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action— particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

High-Reliability Systems and the Control of National Security Data and Information

High-reliability systems are characterized by catastrophic implications in the event of failure. These implications can include substantive damage to the environment, social order, and loss of life. Examples of high-reliability systems include nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors, the electric grid, and nuclear weapons. Due to the catastrophic implications of failure, there are heightened awareness and control mechanisms surrounding related data and information. However, defining the difference between data and information is often ambiguous across scholarly disciplines and in United States policy and legislation. For high-reliability systems, the implications of ambiguity between data and information may affect the security of United States interests and even cost lives. For security, data are raw facts or figures without context, while information is the compilation or articulation of data that forms context. Security depends on clarity in the differences between data and information and how to control them. Control is necessary to ensure that data and information are not unintentionally released to foreign governments, the public, or those without need-to-know. A primary concern in the practice of security is the control of data to avoid the unintended conversion to information. Intra-institutionally, this control is highly complex given the amalgam of legacy data systems and the numerous and constantly evolving nature of modern data systems that were not necessarily designed to be integrated. The complexity of this concern is augmented when institutions are part of inter-institutional collaborations or networks of public-private partnerships that share data and information. Additionally, institutions that share data as a function of policy and legislative action—particularly formally integrated data and information system infrastructures—may be at higher security risk. This paper will present an intra-institutional paradigm that utilizes and integrates concepts from numerous disciplines to frame a critical and underspecified practical issue in security—controlling for the unintended conversion of data to information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Rock Valley Direct Comparison Relocation Working Group Location Results and Recommendations (Version 4.0)

The Source Physics Experiments (SPE) were designed to improve our physics-based understanding of explosion sources for the purposes of nuclear test monitoring. Phase I consisted of 6 chemical explosions in the Climax Stock Granite of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), while Phase II consisted of 4 explosions in a contrasting dry alluvium geology (DAG) in Yucca Flat, providing essential data in various media and emplacement conditions to further modeling efforts. For Phase III, the Rock Valley Direct Comparison (RVDC) seeks to directly compare earthquake and explosion source types. An unusually shallow series of events in 1993 along the Rock Valley Fault Zone in the southeastern portion of the NNSS has been targeted for this direct comparison. Depth ranges for the events, previously estimated to be less than 3 km, is achievable by modern drilling techniques and accessibility to the epicentral locations would require minimal improvements to the infrastructure. The events providing this unique opportunity for direct comparison are the focus of this report.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗