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Errors and Uncertainties in Dose Reconstruction for Radiation Effects Research

Dose reconstruction for studies of the health effects of ionizing radiation have been carried out for many decades. Major studies have included Japanese bomb survivors, atomic veterans, downwinders of the Nevada Test Site and Hanford, underground uranium miners, and populations of nuclear workers. For such studies to be credible, significant effort must be put into applying the best science to reconstructing unbiased absorbed doses to tissues and organs as a function of time. In many cases, more and more sophisticated dose reconstruction methods have been developed as studies progressed. For the example of the Japanese bomb survivors, the dose surrogate “distance from the hypocenter” was replaced by slant range, and then by TD65 doses, DS86 doses, and more recently DS02 doses. Over the years, it has become increasingly clear that an equal level of effort must be expended on the quantitative assessment of uncertainty in such doses, and to reducing and managing uncertainty. In this context, this paper reviews difficulties in terminology, explores the nature of Berkson and classical uncertainties in dose reconstruction through examples, and proposes a path forward for Joint Coordinating Committee for Radiation Effects Research (JCCRER) Project 2.4 that requires a reasonably small level of effort for DOSES-2008.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Annual Site Environmental Report, 2007(ASER)

This report provides information about environmental programs during the calendar year (CY) of 2007 at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC), Menlo Park, California. Activities that span the calendar year, i.e., stormwater monitoring covering the winter season of 2007/2008 (October 2007 through May 2008), are also included. Production of an annual site environmental report (ASER) is a requirement established by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for all management and operating (M&O) contractors throughout the DOE complex. SLAC is a federally-funded research and development center with Stanford University as the M&O contractor. Under Executive Order (EO) 13423 and DOE Order 450.1, 'Environmental Protection Program', SLAC effectively implemented and integrated the key elements of an Environmental Management System (EMS) to achieve the site's integrated safety and environmental management system goals. For normal daily activities, SLAC managers and supervisors are responsible for ensuring that policies and procedures are understood and followed so that: (1) Worker safety and health are protected; (2) The environment is protected; and (3) Compliance is ensured. Throughout 2007, SLAC focused on development and implementation of SLAC management systems to ensure continual improvement. These systems provided a structured framework for SLAC to implement 'greening of the government' initiatives such as EO 13148. Overall, management systems at SLAC are effective, supporting compliance with all relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. SLAC continues to demonstrate significant progress in implementing and integrating EMS into day-to-day operations at SLAC. The annual management review and ranking of environmental aspects were completed this year by SLAC's EMS Steering Committee, the Environmental Safety Committee (ESC) and thirteen objectives and targets were established for 2007. For each objective and target, a work plan, or Environmental Management Program (EMP) was completed and progress reports were routinely provided to SLAC senior management. During 2007, there were no reportable releases to the environment from SLAC operations. In addition, many improvements in waste minimization, recycling, stormwater management, groundwater restoration, and SLAC's chemical management system (CMS) were continued during 2007. SLAC replaced two process tanks at the Plating Shop which previously contained chromium solutions with non-chromium containing solutions, reducing the overall use of hazardous chemicals. In addition, 346 polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB)-contaminated capacitors were replaced with non-PCB capacitors, reducing the potential of a release of oil with PCBs during an event such as a fire or an earthquake. SLAC operates its industrial and sanitary wastewater management program in compliance with established permit conditions. During 2007, SLAC obtained a new facility-wide wastewater discharge permit which replaced four separate permits that were previously issued to SLAC. In 2007, no radiological incidents occurred that increased radiation levels or released radioactivity to the environment. In addition to managing its radioactive wastes safely and responsibly, SLAC worked to reduce the amount of waste generated. SLAC has implemented programs and systems to ensure compliance with all radiological requirements related to the environment. Specifically, the Radiation Protection Radiological Waste Management (RPRWM) Group developed a training course to certify Radioactive Waste Generators, conducted a training pilot, and developed a list of potential radioactive waste generators to train. In 2007, the SLAC Environmental Restoration Program continued work on site characterization and evaluation of remedial alternatives at four sites with volatile organic compounds in groundwater and several areas with polychlorinated biphenyls and low concentrations of lead in soil. SLAC is regulated under a site cleanup requirements order (board order) issued by the California Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), San Francisco Bay Region in May 2005 for the investigation and remediation of impacted soil and groundwater at SLAC. The board order lists specific tasks and deadlines for completion of groundwater and soil characterization and other remediation activities. All 2007 submittals to the RWQCB were completed and submitted on time.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Novel Bioplastics and biocomposites from Vegetable Oils

Polymeric materials have been prevalent in our everyday lives for quite a long time. Most of today's polymeric materials are derived from nonrenewable petroleum-based feedstocks. Instabilities in the regions where petroleum is drilled, along with an increased demand in petroleum, have driven the price of crude oil to record high prices. This, in effect, increases the price of petroleum-based polymeric materials, which has caused a heightened awareness of renewable alternatives for polymeric feedstocks. Cellulose, starch, proteins and natural oils have all been examined as possible polymeric feedstocks. Natural oils are commercially available on a large scale and are relatively cheap. It is projected that the U.S. alone will produce 21 billion pounds of soybean oil in the period 2008/2009. Natural oils also have the advantages of inherent biodegradability, low toxicity, high purity and ready availability. Most natural oils possess a triglyceride structure as shown in Figure 1. Most natural oils have a unique distribution of fatty acid side chains, along with varying degrees of unsaturation per triglyceride. Common fatty acid side chains in naturally occurring oils are palmitic acid (C16:0), a 16 carbon fatty acid with no unsaturation; stearic acid (C18:0), an 18 carbon fatty acid with no unsaturation; oleic acid (C18:1), an 18 carbon fatty acid with one double bond; linoleic acid (C18:2), an 18 carbon fatty acid with two double bonds; and linolenic acid (C18:3), an 18 carbon fatty acid with three double bonds. Of course, there are other fatty acids with varying degrees of unsaturation, but their abundance is usually minimal. All of the unsaturated fatty acids mentioned have naturally occurring cis double bonds, which is common for most unsaturated fatty acids. In addition, the afore mentioned fatty acids have the first double bond at the position of carbon 9 (C9), followed by carbon 12 (C12), if there are two degrees of unsaturation, then at carbon 15 (C15), if there are three degrees of unsaturation. In addition, the double bonds are not in conjugation. Table 1 gives the fatty acid make-up of linseed oil. It can be seen that linseed oil has an average of 6.0 double bonds per triglyceride. Its fatty acid content consists of 5.4% palmitic acid (C16:0), 3.5% stearic acid (C18:0), 19% oleic acid (C18:1), 24 % linoleic acid (C18:2) and 47% linolenic (C18:3). Table 1 also gives the fatty acid composition and varying degrees of unsaturation for various other naturally-occurring natural vegetable oils. The regions of unsaturation in natural oils allow for interesting polymer chemistry to take place. Some of this interesting polymer science, however, involves chemical modification of the regions of unsaturation. Acrylated epoxidized soybean oil (AESO) is prepared by epoxidation of the double bonds, followed by ring opening with acrylic acid. The resulting oil has both acrylate groups and hydroxyl groups. Wool and colleagues have further reacted the hydroxyl groups within the oil with maleic anhydride to produce maleated acrylated epoxidized soybean oil (MAESO). The MAESO has been copolymerized with styrene free radically to produce promising thermosetting sheet molding resins. Petrovi? and co-workers have directly ring opened the epoxidized oil to produce polyols that produce promising polyurethanes through condensation polymerization with diisocyanates. Our group's work initially focused on direct cationic copolymerization of the double bonds or conjugated double bonds of natural oils with monomers, such as styrene and divinylbenzene, to produce promising thermosetting resins. The only modification of the oils that was carried out in these studies was conjugation of the double bonds to enhance the reactivity of the oil. This work has been expanded recently with the incorporation of glass fiber to produce promising composites. We have also explored thermal polymerization techniques to make novel thermosets. This dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter discusses the synthesis and characterization of biobased thermosets prepared by the free radical polymerization of conjugated linseed oil with commercially available monomers. The second chapter covers the synthesis and characterization of a chemically modified castor oil and its copolymerization with cyclooctene via ring opening metathesis polymerization (ROMP). The third chapter looks at the ROMP of a commercially available vegetable oil containing an unsaturated bicyclic moiety with dicyclopentadiene (DCPD) and characterization of the resulting materials. The fourth chapter discusses the reinforcement of a ROMP resin using short glass fibers to make composite materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan for Corrective Action Unit 107: Low Impact Soil Sites, Nevada Test Site, Nevada

This Streamlined Approach for Environmental Restoration Plan covers activities associated with Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 107 of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO, 1996 [as amended February 2008]). CAU 107 consists of the following Corrective Action Sites (CASs) located in Areas 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, and 18 of the Nevada Test Site. (1) CAS 01-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site - High Alt; (2) CAS 02-23-02, Contaminated Areas (2); (3) CAS 02-23-03, Contaminated Berm; (4) CAS 02-23-10, Gourd-Amber Contamination Area; (5) CAS 02-23-11, Sappho Contamination Area; (6) CAS 02-23-12, Scuttle Contamination Area; (7) CAS 03-23-24, Seaweed B Contamination Area; (8) CAS 03-23-27, Adze Contamination Area; (9) CAS 03-23-28, Manzanas Contamination Area; (10) CAS 03-23-29, Truchas-Chamisal Contamination Area; (11) CAS 04-23-02, Atmospheric Test Site T4-a; (12) CAS 05-23-06, Atmospheric Test Site; (13) CAS 09-23-06, Mound of Contaminated Soil; (14) CAS 10-23-04, Atmospheric Test Site M-10; and (15) CAS 18-23-02, U-18d Crater (Sulky). Based on historical documentation, personnel interviews, site process knowledge, site visits, photographs, engineering drawings, field screening, analytical results, and the results of data quality objectives process (Section 3.0), closure in place with administrative controls or no further action will be implemented for CAU 107. CAU 107 closure activities will consist of verifying that the current postings required under Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 835 are in place and implementing use restrictions (URs) at two sites, CAS 03-23-29 and CAS 18-23-02. The current radiological postings combined with the URs are adequate administrative controls to limit site access and worker dose.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

THE ROLE OF LIQUID WASTE PRETREATMENT TECHNOLOGIES IN SOLVING THE DOE CLEAN-UP MISSION

The objective of this report is to describe the pretreatment solutions that allow treatment to be tailored to specific wastes, processing ahead of the completion schedules for the main treatment facilities, and reduction of technical risks associated with future processing schedules. Wastes stored at Hanford and Savannah River offer challenging scientific and engineering tasks. At both sites, space limitations confound the ability to effectively retrieve and treat the wastes. Additionally, the radiation dose to the worker operating and maintaining the radiochemical plants has a large role in establishing the desired radioactivity removal. However, the regulatory requirements to treat supernatant and saltcake tank wastes differ at the two sites. Hanford must treat and remove radioactivity from the tanks based on the TriParty Agreement and Waste Incidental to Reprocessing (WIR) documentation. These authorizing documents do not specify treatment technologies; rather, they specify endstate conditions. Dissimilarly, Waste Determinations prepared at SRS in accordance with Section 3116 of the 2005 National Defense Authorization Act along with state operating permits establish the methodology and amounts of radioactivity that must be removed and may be disposed of in South Carolina. After removal of entrained solids and site-specific radionuclides, supernatant and saltcake wastes are considered to be low activity waste (LAW) and are immobilized in glass and disposed of at the Hanford Site Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) or formulated into a grout for disposal at the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility. Wastes stored at the Hanford Site or SRS comprise saltcake, supernate, and sludges. The supernatant and saltcake waste fractions contain primarily sodium salts, metals (e.g., Al, Cr), cesium-137 (Cs-137), technetium-99 (Tc-99) and entrained solids containing radionuclides such as strontium-90 (Sr-90) and transuranic elements. The sludges contain many of the transition metal hydroxides that precipitate when the spent acidic process solutions are rendered alkaline with sodium hydroxide. The sludges contain Sr-90 and transuranic elements. The wastes stored at each site have been generated and stored for over fifty years. Although the majority of the wastes were generated to support nuclear weapons production and reprocessing, the wastes differ substantially between the sites. Table 5 shows the volumes and total radioactivity (including decay daughters) of the waste phases stored in tanks at each site. At Hanford, there are 177 tanks that contain 56.5 Mgal of waste. SRS has 51 larger tanks, of which 2 are closed, that contain 36.5 Mgal. Mainly due to recovery operations, the waste stored at Hanford has less total curies than that stored at Savannah River. The total radioactivity of the Hanford wastes contains approximately 190 MCi, and the total radioactivity of the Savannah River wastes contains 400 MCi.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Final Progress Report: Developing Ethical Practices for Genetics Testing in the Workplace

Our multidisciplinary research team for this project involved collaboration between the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Medicine at the Medical College of Wisconsin (MCW) and the Department of Family and Community Medicine at the University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center (UNM HSC). Our research team in Wisconsin was led by Laura Roberts, M.D., Principal Investigator, and included Scott Helberg, MLS (Project Coordinator), Kate Green Hammond, Ph.D. (Consultant), Krisy Edenharder (Research Coordinator), and Mark Talatzko (Research Assistant). Our New Mexico-based team was led by Teddy Warner, Ph.D., Co-Principal Investigator and UNM Site Principal Investigator, and included Suzanne Roybal (Project Assistant), Darlyn Mabon (Project Assistant), Kate Green Hammond, PhD (Senior Research Scientist on the UNM team from 2004 until January, 2007), and Paulette Christopher (Research Assistant). In addition, computer technical and web support for the web-based survey conducted on a secure server at the University of New Mexico was provided by Kevin Wiley and Kim Hagen of the Systems and Programming Team of the Health Sciences Center Library and Information Center. We stated 3 aims in the grant proposal: (1) To collect web survey reports of the ethical perspectives, concerns, preferences and decision-making related to genetic testing using surveys from employees at: (a) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); (b) Sandia National Laboratories (SNL); and (c) the University of New Mexico Health Sciences Center (UNMHSC); (2) To perform an extensive literature search and the extant survey data to develop evidence-based policy recommendations for ethically sound genetic testing associated with research and occupational health activities in the workplace; and, (3) To host a conference at the Medical College of Wisconsin to provide employers, workers, health professionals, researchers, the public, and the media an opportunity to consider ethical issues involved in genetic testing in the context of the workplace.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

Economic Development Benefits from Wind Energy in Nebraska: A Report for the Nebraska Energy Office (Revised)

This report focuses on the economic development impacts estimated from building and operating 7,800 MW of new wind power in Nebraska. This level of development is on the scale envisioned in the Department of Energy (DOE) report 20% Wind Energy by 2030. A practical first step to building 7,800 of wind is completing 1,000 MW. We also include the estimated economic impacts to Nebraska from building 1,000 MW of wind power. Our primary analysis indicates that the development and construction of approximately 7,800 MW of wind energy in Nebraska by 2030 will support 20,600 to 36,500 annual full-time equivalents (AFTE). In addition, operating the full 7,800 MW of wind energy could support roughly 2,000 to 4,000 full-time workers throughout the operating life of the wind facilities (LFTE). Nebraska's economy is estimated to see an average annual boost in economic activity ranging from $140 million to $260 million solely from construction and development related activities between 2011 and 2030. An additional boost of $250 - $442 million annually is estimated from operating 7,800 MW of wind capacity.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 271: Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems Nevada Test Site, Nevada, Revision 0 with ROTC 1

This document constitutes an addendum to the August 2004, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 271, Areas 25, 26, and 27 Septic Systems as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS 27-05-02, Leachfield. This UR was established as part of a Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective action and is based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify the UR to an administrative UR. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). This Administrative UR was based on an “Occasional Use Area” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 400 total work hours). Any proposed activity within this use restricted area that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining postings at this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at this site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at this site that are unrelated to the FFACO UR such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at this site.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 0

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the cancellation of the URs for: • CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons • CAS TA-21-001-TARC Roller Coaster N. Disposal Trench These URs were established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and were based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since these URs were established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, these URs were re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This re-evaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the URs) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify these URs to administrative URs. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). These Administrative URs were based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining these URs will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Documented Safety Analysis for the B695 Segment

This Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) was prepared for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Building 695 (B695) Segment of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF). The report provides comprehensive information on design and operations, including safety programs and safety structures, systems and components to address the potential process-related hazards, natural phenomena, and external hazards that can affect the public, facility workers, and the environment. Consideration is given to all modes of operation, including the potential for both equipment failure and human error. The facilities known collectively as the DWTF are used by LLNL's Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) Division to store and treat regulated wastes generated at LLNL. RHWM generally processes low-level radioactive waste with no, or extremely low, concentrations of transuranics (e.g., much less than 100 nCi/g). Wastes processed often contain only depleted uranium and beta- and gamma-emitting nuclides, e.g., {sup 90}Sr, {sup 137}Cs, or {sup 3}H. The mission of the B695 Segment centers on container storage, lab-packing, repacking, overpacking, bulking, sampling, waste transfer, and waste treatment. The B695 Segment is used for storage of radioactive waste (including transuranic and low-level), hazardous, nonhazardous, mixed, and other waste. Storage of hazardous and mixed waste in B695 Segment facilities is in compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). LLNL is operated by the Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, for the Department of Energy (DOE). The B695 Segment is operated by the RHWM Division of LLNL. Many operations in the B695 Segment are performed under a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operation plan, similar to commercial treatment operations with best demonstrated available technologies. The buildings of the B695 Segment were designed and built considering such operations, using proven building systems, and keeping them as simple as possible while complying with industry standards and institutional requirements. No operations to be performed in the B695 Segment or building system are considered to be complex. No anticipated future change in the facility mission is expected to impact the extent of safety analysis documented in this DSA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Simulating Nationwide Pandemics: Applying the Multi-scale Epidemiologic Simulation and Analysis System to Human Infectious Diseases

This study uses the Multi-scale Epidemiologic Simulation and Analysis (MESA) system developed for foreign animal diseases to assess consequences of nationwide human infectious disease outbreaks. A literature review identified the state of the art in both small-scale regional models and large-scale nationwide models and characterized key aspects of a nationwide epidemiological model. The MESA system offers computational advantages over existing epidemiological models and enables a broader array of stochastic analyses of model runs to be conducted because of those computational advantages. However, it has only been demonstrated on foreign animal diseases. This paper applied the MESA modeling methodology to human epidemiology. The methodology divided 2000 US Census data at the census tract level into school-bound children, work-bound workers, elderly, and stay at home individuals. The model simulated mixing among these groups by incorporating schools, workplaces, households, and long-distance travel via airports. A baseline scenario with fixed input parameters was run for a nationwide influenza outbreak using relatively simple social distancing countermeasures. Analysis from the baseline scenario showed one of three possible results: (1) the outbreak burned itself out before it had a chance to spread regionally, (2) the outbreak spread regionally and lasted a relatively long time, although constrained geography enabled it to eventually be contained without affecting a disproportionately large number of people, or (3) the outbreak spread through air travel and lasted a long time with unconstrained geography, becoming a nationwide pandemic. These results are consistent with empirical influenza outbreak data. The results showed that simply scaling up a regional small-scale model is unlikely to account for all the complex variables and their interactions involved in a nationwide outbreak. There are several limitations of the methodology that should be explored in future work including validating the model against reliable historical disease data, improving contact rates, spread methods, and disease parameters through discussions with epidemiological experts, and incorporating realistic behavioral assumptions.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗

LLNL Site 200 Risk Management PlanAgust 2008

It is the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's (LLNL) policy to perform work in a manner that protects the health and safety of employees and the public, preserves the quality of the environment, and prevents property damage using the Integrated Safety Management System. The environment, safety, and health are to take priority in the planning and execution of work activities at the Laboratory. Furthermore, it is the policy of LLNL to comply with applicable ES&H laws, regulations, and requirements (LLNL Environment, Safety and Health Manual, Document 1.2, ES&H Policies of LLNL). The program and policies that improve LLNL's ability to prevent or mitigate accidental releases are described in the LLNL Environment, Health, and Safety Manual that is available to the public. The laboratory uses an emergency management system known as the Incident Command System, in accordance with the California Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) to respond to Operational Emergencies and to mitigate consequences resulting from them. Operational Emergencies are defined as unplanned, significant events or conditions that require time-urgent response from outside the immediate area of the incident that could seriously impact the safety or security of the public, LLNL's employees, its facilities, or the environment. The Emergency Plan contains LLNL's Operational Emergency response policies, commitments, and institutional responsibilities for managing and recovering from emergencies. It is not possible to list in the Emergency Plan all events that could occur during any given emergency situation. However, a combination of hazard assessments, an effective Emergency Plan, and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) can provide the framework for responses to postulated emergency situations. Revision 7, 2004 of the above mentioned LLNL Emergency Plan is available to the public. The most recent revision of the LLNL Emergency Plan LLNL-AM-402556, Revision 11, March 2008, has been included as an appendix to the RMP Supplemental Information document. LLNL Site 200 is a research and development laboratory with infrastructure necessary to support its operations and personnel. Research and development activities at LLNL are focused on stockpile stewardship; achieving robust and vital scientific, engineering, and manufacturing capability; inertial confinement fusion; laser technology; materials and process science; computational and information sciences; basic sciences; engineering sciences; and biological sciences. Based upon CalARP Program regulations, guidance found in California Accidental Release Prevention Program (CalARP) Administering Guidance, Chapter 1, a review of facility specific documents, accident analyses summarized in this document & detailed in the LLNL Site 200 RMP Supporting Information document, LLNL has determined that each process meeting the CalARP threshold criteria meets the requirements for CalARP Program Level 1. In accordance with CalARP regulations, LLNL considers the natural segmentation of processes at Site 200 to be on a building basis and therefore consideration of inventory should be on a building basis rather than a 'site-wide' basis. Only those materials identified as equal to as or greater than the threshold quantities for the CalARP program on a building (process) level are reflected in this document. As such, materials and quantities reported in this document on a building (process) level will vary from materials and quantities reported in the LLNL Hazardous Materials Business Plan, Acutely Hazardous Material Registration Form on a site-wide level. For each process involving regulated quantities of lithium hydride, worst case accident analysis shows that the toxic endpoint lies within the site boundaries. These analyses document that the nearest public receptor is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint. Refer to the LLNL Site 200 RMP Supporting Information document for a more detailed explanation of the worst case accident analyses for these processes. For the process involving regulated quantities of nitric acid, worst case accident analysis predicts a hazard zone well within areas under the jurisdiction of the Department of Energy. This analysis documents that the nearest public receptor is beyond the distance to a toxic or flammable endpoint. Refer to the LLNL Site 200 RMP Supporting Information document for a more detailed explanation of the worst case accident analysis for this process. LLNL maintains an active program to protect workers, the public, and the environment from harm resulting from its activities. Its policies and technical directions for controlling all hazards that are present as a result of its operations are described in the LLNL Environment, Health, and Safety Manual (referenced above).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program Groundwater and Surface Water Sampling and Analysis Plan For Calendar Year 2009

This plan provides a description of the groundwater and surface water quality monitoring activities planned for calendar year (CY) 2009 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) that will be managed by the Y-12 Groundwater Protection Program (GWPP). Groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the GWPP during CY 2009 will be in accordance with DOE Order 540.1 requirements and the following goals: (1) to protect the worker, the public, and the environment; (2) to maintain surveillance of existing and potential groundwater contamination sources; (3) to provide for the early detection of groundwater contamination and determine the quality of groundwater and surface water where contaminants are most likely to migrate beyond the Oak Ridge Reservation property line; (4) to identify and characterize long-term trends in groundwater quality at Y-12; and (5) to provide data to support decisions concerning the management and protection of groundwater resources. Groundwater and surface water monitoring during CY 2009 will be performed primarily in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12: the Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime), the Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime), and the Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime). The Bear Creek and East Fork regimes are located in Bear Creek Valley, and the Chestnut Ridge Regime is located south of Y-12 (Figure A.1). Additional surface water monitoring will be performed north of Pine Ridge, along the boundary of the Oak Ridge Reservation. Modifications to the CY 2009 monitoring program may be necessary during implementation. Changes in programmatic requirements may alter the analytes specified for selected monitoring wells or may add or remove wells from the planned monitoring network. All modifications to the monitoring program will be approved by the Y-12 GWPP manager and documented as addenda to this sampling and analysis plan. The following sections of this report provide details regarding the CY 2009 groundwater and surface water monitoring activities. Section 2 describes the monitoring locations in each regime and the processes used to select the sampling locations. A description of the field measurements and laboratory analytes is provided in Section 3; sample collection methods and procedures are described in Section 4; and Section 5 lists the documents cited for more detailed operational and technical information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT ALTERNATIVES ANALYSIS SUMMARY REPORT [VOLUME 1]

Highly radioactive sludge (containing up to 300,000 curies of actinides and fission products) resulting from the storage of degraded spent nuclear fuel is currently stored in temporary containers located in the 105-K West storage basin near the Columbia River. The background, history, and known characteristics of this sludge are discussed in Section 2 of this report. There are many compelling reasons to remove this sludge from the K-Basin. These reasons are discussed in detail in Section1, and they include the following: (1) Reduce the risk to the public (from a potential release of highly radioactive material as fine respirable particles by airborne or waterborn pathways); (2) Reduce the risk overall to the Hanford worker; and (3) Reduce the risk to the environment (the K-Basin is situated above a hazardous chemical contaminant plume and hinders remediation of the plume until the sludge is removed). The DOE-RL has stated that a key DOE objective is to remove the sludge from the K-West Basin and River Corridor as soon as possible, which will reduce risks to the environment, allow for remediation of contaminated areas underlying the basins, and support closure of the 100-KR-4 operable unit. The environmental and nuclear safety risks associated with this sludge have resulted in multiple legal and regulatory remedial action decisions, plans,and commitments that are summarized in Table ES-1 and discussed in more detail in Volume 2, Section 9.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Environmental Biosciences Program Quarterly Report

Current research projects have focused Environmental Biosciences Program (EBP) talent and resources on providing the scientific basis for risk-based standards, risk-based decision making and the accelerated clean-up of widespread environmental hazards. These hazards include trichloroethylene, low-dose ionizing radiation (gamma and neutron) and alpha radiation from plutonium. Trichloroethylene research has been conducted as a joint collaborative effort with the University of Georgia. Work on the trichloroethylene research projects has been slowed as a result of funding uncertainties. The impact of these funding uncertainties has been discussed with the United States Department of Energy (DOE). Laboratory work has been completed on several trichloroethylene risk assessment projects, and these projects have been brought to a close. Plans for restructuring the performance schedule of the remaining trichloroethylene projects have been submitted to the department. A comprehensive manuscript on the scientific basis of trichloroethylene risk assessment is in preparation. Work on the low-dose radiation risk assessment projects is also progressing at a slowed rate as a result of funding uncertainties. It has been necessary to restructure the proponency and performance schedule of these projects, with the project on Low-Dose Radiation: Epidemiology Risk Models transferred to DOE Office of Science proponency under a separate funding instrument. Research on this project will continue under the provisions of the DOE Office of Science funding instrument, with progress reported in accordance with the requirements of that funding instrument. Progress on that project will no longer be reported in quarterly reports for DE-FC09-02CH11109. Following a meeting at the Savannah River Site on May 8, 2008, a plan was submitted for development of an epidemiological cohort study and prospective medical surveillance system for the assessment of disease rates among workers at the Savannah River Site (SRS). This project will be incorporated into the ongoing project on Population Health Risks in the Vicinity of the Savannah River Site. During a meeting at the SRS on October 21, 2008, a presentation was made on EBP participation in the development and operation of an Epidemiology Consortium at the SRS. A follow-up meeting with SRS officials is planned for 29 and 30 January 2009 at Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC).An epidemiology project on population health risk assessment is being conducted to assess health risks among populations in the vicinity of the SRS. This project is using the capabilities of the EBP GIS for the geographical assessment of cancer and non-cancer disease rates, as well as the potential association of population health risks with environmental exposures. Although funding uncertainties have slowed progress on some aspects of this project, it has not been necessary to restructure the performance schedule to date.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Preserving SSC Design Function Using RCM Principles

Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) can be defined as an approach that employs preventive, predictive, proactive, and reactive maintenance practices and strategies in an integrated manner to increase the probability that a Structure, System, or Component (SSC) will function as designed over its life cycle with optimum maintenance. The goal of RCM is to preserve the SSC intended design function at the lowest cost by developing a maintenance strategy that is supported by sound technical and economic justification. RCM has been used extensively by the aircraft, space, defense, power generation, and manufacturing industries where functional failures of SSCs can have the potential to compromise worker or public safety, cause adverse environmental impact, cause loss of production, and/or result in excessive damage to critical SSCs. This paper provides a framework for performing an RCM analysis in support of DOE Order 430.1A (Life Cycle Asset Management) and DOE Order 420.1B (Facility Safety). The influence of RCM on the various aspects of the maintenance program including the work control process is also discussed.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Addendum to the Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Sewage Lagoons and North Disposal Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada, Revision 1

This document constitutes an addendum to the September 1998, Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 404: Roller Coaster Lagoons and Trench, Tonopah Test Range, Nevada as described in the document Recommendations and Justifications for Modifications for Use Restrictions Established under the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (UR Modification document) dated February 2008. The UR Modification document was approved by NDEP on February 26, 2008. The approval of the UR Modification document constituted approval of each of the recommended UR modifications. In conformance with the UR Modification document, this addendum consists of: • This cover page that refers the reader to the UR Modification document for additional information • The cover and signature pages of the UR Modification document • The NDEP approval letter • The corresponding section of the UR Modification document This addendum provides the documentation justifying the modification of the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC Roller Coaster Lagoons. This UR was established as part of Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) corrective actions and was based on the presence of contaminants at concentrations greater than the action levels established at the time of the initial investigation (FFACO, 1996; as amended August 2006). Since this UR was established, practices and procedures relating to the implementation of risk-based corrective actions (RBCA) have changed. Therefore, this UR was re-evaluated against the current RBCA criteria as defined in the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels (NNSA/NSO, 2006c). This reevaluation consisted of comparing the original data (used to define the need for the UR) to risk-based final action levels (FALs) developed using the current Industrial Sites RBCA process. The re-evaluation resulted in a recommendation to modify the UR for CAS TA-03-001-TARC to an administrative UR. Administrative URs differ from standard URs in that they do not require onsite postings (i.e., signs) or other physical barriers (e.g., fencing, monuments), and they do not require periodic inspections (see Section 6.2 of the Industrial Sites Project Establishment of Final Action Levels [NNSA/NSO, 2006c]). This Administrative UR was based on a “Remote Work Sites” future land use scenario that was used to calculate the FAL. The administrative UR will protect workers from an exposure exceeding that used in the calculation of the FAL (i.e., 336 hours per year). Any proposed activity within these use restricted areas that would potentially cause an exposure exceeding this exposure limit would require approval from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP). Requirements for inspecting and maintaining this UR will be canceled, and the postings and signage at each site will be removed. Fencing and posting may be present at these sites that are unrelated to the FFACO URs such as for radiological control purposes as required by the NV/YMP Radiological Control Manual (NNSA/NSO, 2004f). This modification will not affect or modify any non-FFACO requirements for fencing, posting, or monitoring at these sites.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Environment, Safety, and Health Self-Assessment Report, Fiscal Year 2008

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory's Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) Self-Assessment Program ensures that Integrated Safety Management (ISM) is implemented institutionally and by all divisions. The Self-Assessment Program, managed by the Office of Contract Assurance (OCA), provides for an internal evaluation of all ES&H programs and systems at LBNL. The functions of the program are to ensure that work is conducted safely, and with minimal negative impact to workers, the public, and the environment. The Self-Assessment Program is also the mechanism used to institute continuous improvements to the Laboratory's ES&H programs. The program is described in LBNL/PUB 5344, Environment, Safety, and Health Self-Assessment Program and is composed of four distinct assessments: the Division Self-Assessment, the Management of Environment, Safety, and Health (MESH) review, ES&H Technical Assurance, and the Appendix B Self-Assessment. The Division Self-Assessment uses the five core functions and seven guiding principles of ISM as the basis of evaluation. Metrics are created to measure performance in fulfilling ISM core functions and guiding principles, as well as promoting compliance with applicable regulations. The five core functions of ISM are as follows: (1) Define the Scope of Work; (2) Identify and Analyze Hazards; (3) Control the Hazards; (4) Perform the Work; and (5) Feedback and Improvement. The seven guiding principles of ISM are as follows: (1) Line Management Responsibility for ES&H; (2) Clear Roles and Responsibilities; (3) Competence Commensurate with Responsibilities; (4) Balanced Priorities; (5) Identification of ES&H Standards and Requirements; (6) Hazard Controls Tailored to the Work Performed; and (7) Operations Authorization. Performance indicators are developed by consensus with OCA, representatives from each division, and Environment, Health, and Safety (EH&S) Division program managers. Line management of each division performs the Division Self-Assessment annually. The primary focus of the review is workplace safety. The MESH review is an evaluation of division management of ES&H in its research and operations, focusing on implementation and effectiveness of the division's ISM plan. It is a peer review performed by members of the LBNL Safety Review Committee (SRC), with staff support from OCA. Each division receives a MESH review every two to four years, depending on the results of the previous review. The ES&H Technical Assurance Program (TAP) provides the framework for systematic reviews of ES&H programs and processes. The intent of ES&H Technical Assurance assessments is to provide assurance that ES&H programs and processes comply with their guiding regulations, are effective, and are properly implemented by LBNL divisions. The Appendix B Performance Evaluation and Measurement Plan (PEMP) requires that LBNL sustain and enhance the effectiveness of integrated safety, health, and environmental protection through a strong and well-deployed system. Information required for Appendix B is provided by EH&S Division functional managers. The annual Appendix B report is submitted at the close of the fiscal year. This assessment is the Department of Energy's (DOE) primary mechanism for evaluating LBNL's contract performance in ISM.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗