Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Plutonium”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 1,693 records · Page 94

Time-dependent local and average structural evolution of δ-phase 239 Pu-Ga alloys

Here, plutonium metal is a very unusual element, exhibiting six allotropes at ambient pressure, between room temperature and its melting point, a complicated phase diagram, and a complex electronic structure. Many phases of plutonium metal are unstable with changes in temperature, pressure, chemical additions, or time. This strongly affects structure and properties, and becomes of high importance, particularly when considering effects on structural integrity over long periods of time [1]. This paper presents a time-dependent neutron total scattering study of the local and average structure of naturally aging δ-phase 239 Pu-Ga alloys, together with preliminary results on neutron tomography characterization.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Criticality Safety Validation of Scale 6.1

The computational bias of criticality safety computer codes must be established through the validation of the codes to critical experiments. A large collection of suitable experiments has been vetted by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiment Program (ICSBEP) and made available in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (IHECSBE). A total of more than 350 cases from this reference have been prepared and reviewed within the Verified, Archived Library of Inputs and Data (VALID) maintained by the Reactor and Nuclear Systems Division at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The performance of the KENO V.a and KENO-VI Monte Carlo codes within the Scale 6.1 code system with ENDF/B-VII.0 cross-section data in 238-group and continuous energy is assessed using the VALID models of benchmark experiments. The TSUNAMI tools for sensitivity and uncertainty analysis are utilized to examine some systems further in an attempt to identify potential causes of unexpected results. The critical experiments available for validation of the KENO V.a code cover eight different broad categories of systems. These systems use a range of fissile materials including a range of uranium enrichments, various plutonium isotopic vectors, and mixed uranium-plutonium oxides. The physical form of the fissile material also varies and is represented as metal, solutions, or arrays of rods or plates in a water moderator. The neutron energy spectra of the systems also vary and cover both fast and thermal spectra. Over 300 of the total cases used utilize the KENO V.a code. The critical experiments available for the validation of the KENO-VI code cover three broad categories of systems. The fissile materials in the systems vary and include high and intermediate-enrichment uranium and mixed uranium/plutonium oxides. The physical form of the fissile material is either metal or rod arrays in water. As with KENO V.a, both fast and thermal neutron energy spectra are represented in the systems considered. The results indicate generally good performance of both the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes across the range of systems analyzed. The bias of calculated k{sub eff} from expected values is less than 0.9% {Delta}k in all cases. All eight categories of experiments show biases of less than 0.5% {Delta}k in KENO V.a with the exception of intermediate enrichment metal systems using the 238-group library. The continuous energy library generally manifests lower biases than the multi-group data. The KENO-VI results show slightly larger biases, though this may primarily be the result of modeling systems with more geometric complexity, which are more difficult to describe accurately, even with a generalized geometry code like KENO-VI. Several additional conclusions can be drawn from the results of this validation effort. These conclusions include that the TSUNAMI tools can be used successfully to explain the cause of aberrant results, that some evaluations in the IHECSBE should be updated to provide more rigorous expected k{sub eff} values and uncertainties, and that potential cross-section errors can be identified by detailed review of the results of this validation. It also appears that the overall cross-section uncertainty as quantified through the Scale covariance library is overestimated. Overall, the KENO V.a and KENO-VI codes are shown to provide consistent, low bias results for a wide range of physical systems of potential interest in criticality safety applications.

Marshall, William BJ J↗

MPACT LSDS Progress Report: LANL and LANL-Funded Activities in Support of Spent Fuel Measurements Using a Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer in FY 2012

During FY 2012, Lead Slowing Down Spectrometer (LSDS) measurement campaigns took place at the Los Alamos Neutron Science Center, and the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. At Los Alamos, we measured the response of a thorium fission chamber to a 25 gram plutonium sample, and evaluated the performance of a 4 He-filled proportional counter. At RPI, the effort lead by Professor Danon, performed an assay of fuel pins, and used a fission chamber with plutonium to evaluate the impact of room return.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Characterization of Delayed-Particle Emission Signatures for Pyroprocessing, Part 1: Fuel Assembly

An initial study was conducted with nondestructive assay analysis using the MCNP6 Monte Carlo radiation-transport code to calculate delayed-neutron and delayed- gamma emission signature monitors to characterize burnup and isotopic composition for pyroprocessing. The study consists of five parts. In Part 1, a generic Westinghouse fuel assembly model was modified to create models with 3% and 5% 235 U enrichments, 20, 30, 40, and 50 GWd/MTU burnups, and 3-, 5-, 10-, 20-, and 30-year cooling times. MCNP6 was used to create detail-rich delayed-particle source terms for fuel assembly. Delayed-gamma activity ratios were then developed for conventional 134 Cs/ 137 Cs, 134 Cs/ 154 Eu, and 154 Eu/ 137 Cs markers as a function of burnup and of actinide mass for elemental uranium, neptunium, plutonium, americium, and curium. In addition, data mining using photon tally data was employed to discover potential new delayed-gamma activity ratios. The data mining effort was streamlined by the creation and use of several utility codes to extract and process data. The study confirms behavior for burnup dependence of 134 Cs/ 137 Cs, 134 Cs/ 154 Eu, and 154 Eu/ 137 Cs markers. A process for the discovery of potential new delayed-gamma markers has been developed, and results are presented. The actinide and nonactinide inventories for the fuel assembly models are used as source materials for the electrorefining models. Parts 2–5 contain analysis of a pyrochemical separations model that includes an MCNP6 mockup of the INL Mark IV electrorefiner (see companion documents). Part 2 focuses on delayed-particle emissions from the electrorefiner with loaded fuel dissolution baskets before electrorefining. Part 3 investigates delayed-particle emissions from the electrorefiner following electrorefining. Part 4 presents delayed-particle emissions from other pyroprocessing units that contain material developed by the electrorefining process in Part 3. Part 5 parallels Part 4, except for a 10 wt% plutonium reduction.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

LWR First Recycle of TRU with Thorium Oxide for Transmutation and Cross Sections

Thorium has been considered as an option to uranium-based fuel, based on considerations of resource utilization (thorium is approximately three times more plentiful than uranium) and as a result of concerns about proliferation and waste management (e.g. reduced production of plutonium, etc.). Since the average composition of natural Thorium is dominated (100%) by the fertile isotope Th-232, Thorium is only useful as a resource for breeding new fissile materials, in this case U-233. Consequently a certain amount of fissile material must be present at the start-up of the reactor in order to guarantee its operation. The thorium fuel can be used in both once-through and recycle options, and in both fast and thermal spectrum systems. The present study has been aimed by the necessity of investigating the option of using reprocessed plutonium/TRU, from a once-through reference LEU scenario (50 GWd/ tIHM), mixed with natural thorium and the need of collect data (mass fractions, cross-sections etc.) for this particular fuel cycle scenario. As previously pointed out, the fissile plutonium is needed to guarantee the operation of the reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

LWR First Recycle of TRU with Thorium Oxide for Transmutation and Cross Sections

Thorium has been considered as an option to uranium-based fuel, based on considerations of resource utilization (thorium is approximately three times more plentiful than uranium) and as a result of concerns about proliferation and waste management (e.g. reduced production of plutonium, etc.). Since the average composition of natural Thorium is dominated (100%) by the fertile isotope Th-232, Thorium is only useful as a resource for breeding new fissile materials, in this case U-233. Consequently a certain amount of fissile material must be present at the start-up of the reactor in order to guarantee its operation. The thorium fuel can be used in both once-through and recycle options, and in both fast and thermal spectrum systems. The present study has been aimed by the necessity of investigating the option of using reprocessed plutonium/TRU, from a once-through reference LEU scenario (50 GWd/ tIHM), mixed with natural thorium and the need of collect data (mass fractions, cross-sections etc.) for this particular fuel cycle scenario. As previously pointed out, the fissile plutonium is needed to guarantee the operation of the reactor.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Q-value (MeV/fission) Determination for the Advanced Test Reactor

This report documents a step-by-step procedure that can be used to calculate a Q-value for the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The Q-value calculation here is an estimate of the total energy released per fission event in the ATR driver fuel in units of MeV/fission and is recognized as a reactor-specific Q-value for the ATR. Such a Q-value is needed INL ATR reactor physicists to normalize calculated fluxes and reaction rates to measured ATR total core and lobe powers. The calculated ATR Q-value and the procedure used to calculate this value are presented in a detailed manner so as to establish a credible basis, such that this single Q-value can be used consistently among all ATR reactor physicists. A Q-value is essentially the summation of all the kinetic energy from all radiation components released from a single fission event that ends up as heat in the reactor coolant. Estimation of a Q-value for a given reactor can theoretically be very complex because it is dependent on several variables, which include (1) the materials in the reactor core, (2) the neutron energy spectrum, and (3) the mix of actinide isotopes that are being simultaneously fissioned. Since these three variables can potentially change over time or with reactor burnup, this potentially makes the Q-value a time-dependent quantity. However, for ATR, we will invoke some simplifying assumptions, based on the unique features of the ATR core and supported by neutronic calculations, which will reduce the complexity of the problem and lead to a single time-independent Q-value. Of the three variables, the materials in the core have the greatest impact on the ATR Q-value. Since the materials in the core are most important, an array of components (materials) have been carefully selected to compose a typical ATR core configuration. It should be noted that the step-by-step procedure here for calculating a reactor-specific Q-value can be applied to any nuclear reactor. In a more general procedure, if one needed to include time-dependent spectral and actinide composition changes as a function of burnup for a specific reactor, this procedure can still be used, but at discrete time steps throughout the burnup. The result will be a set of discrete Q-values as a function of burnup. However, here we will apply the procedure to the ATR, as an example, and obtain a single Q-value that is valid for the ATR reactor as a function of burnup. In the evaluated nuclear data file (ENDF), Q-values for specific actinides are known for a reasonably high degree of accuracy, especially the major uranium and plutonium isotopes. The isotopic Q-values are composed of the kinetic energy of the fission fragments and the energies of the various radiation components emitted from the fission event. One complication is the fact that some of these energy components are dependent on the incident neutron energy (EINC) that induces the fission event (neutron energy spectrum dependence). For ATR, we will estimate an average neutron energy based on the neutron energy flux weighted by the fission cross sections and use this average neutron energy value in the ENDF formulas. This neutron energy dependence is one of two dependencies that make the final ATR Q-value a reactor-specific value. The second dependency, and the most important variable for ATR, involves the materials in the core and the de-excitation radiations produced from neutron radiative capture radiation; radiation energy that becomes heat in the reactor coolant. This important dependency is discussed in detail below. The third dependency, or the mix of fissioning actinides as a function of ATR burnup, is ignored because the bulk of the fissions over a cycle are always due to U-235 in the high-enriched ATR core. In a fission event, the fission energy is partitioned between the fission fragments and the radiation components that include neutrons, gamma rays, and beta particles. The main variable that makes the calculated Q-value reactor-specific is the amount of radiative capture energy produced in the core due to prompt and delayed neutron capture in the reactor core materials and the subsequent release of nuclear binding energy in the form of de-excitation gamma radiation energy in the reactor core. This energy component, neutron radiative capture energy, is not in the ENDF, because it depends on the reactor and its core materials. The radiative capture gamma energy release can be significant, or approximately 3–12 MeV/fission depending on the materials in the reactor core (fuel materials, cladding, structural components, coolant, targets, reflector, etc.). For the ATR, the energy released from radiative capture gamma radiation is calculated to be near the middle of the 3–12 MeV range. This makes the radiative capture radiation component an important and significant contribution to the total ATR Q-value. The ATR has unique reactor features that will allow us to simplify the complex procedure for determining an ATR reactor-specific Q-value. For example, the ATR is a thermal reactor and contains high-enriched fuel (93.15 wt% U-235). Consequently, the bulk of the fissions in the ATR core from beginning-of-cycle (BOC) to end-of-cycle are from U-235. Even though U-238 makes up approximately 7% of the uranium atoms in the fuel, the number of fissions relative to U-235 is insignificant, since U-238 is fertile and ATR is a thermal reactor. The same is true for U-234 and U-236 (both fertile). The ATR’s high-enriched uranium fuel also inhibits the buildup of large quantities of plutonium isotopes. So, even though there is some buildup of U-236, Np-237, and Pu-239 in the ATR driver fuel, the impact or contribution of these isotopes fissions on the ATR Q-value is minor compared to U-235. Nonetheless, we will include fission contributions from all the major uranium isotopes (U-234, U-235, U-236, and U-238) in the determination of an average isotopic Q-value that is used in the ATR Q-value determination. Although the ATR Q-value calculated here is based on BOC conditions (fresh fuel with no higher order actinide buildup), it is believed that the ATR Q-value is relatively constant with burnup or during any given ATR power cycle (14–60 days). The reason is that the vast majority of the core driver fuel fissions are always from U-235 during the cycle. Also, since we effectively assume instantaneous energy release for the fission product gammas and beta particles and delayed neutrons from a fission event, this corresponds to equilibrium conditions for all fission product concentrations in the ATR driver fuel too. The goal of this effort was to determine a specific numerical and core-average Q-value for the recoverable energy released by a single fission event (MeV/fission) for the ATR. This calculated value has the potential to help standardize and add credibility to not only the Monte Carlo tally normalization process used by many ATR core physics analysts, but also to the normalization process for all reactor physics calculation methods involving ATR analyses. Currently, the ATR core physics analysts use slightly different Q-values. Some values are known to be conservative for specific applications. However, sometimes a more accurate Q-value is needed for the calculation in which ATR test specimens require non-conservative and as-accurate-as-possible Q-values to estimate burnups, heat rates, neutron fluxes, nuclear reaction rates, etc., where corresponding measured post-irradiation examination data provides the ultimate validation for the calculated results. A detailed Q-value procedure was developed and is outlined in this document along with numerical values calculated specifically for the determination of the ATR Q-value. This report attempts to document in some detail the calculation methodology, nuclear data, computer code, computer model, code calculated results, hand calculations, assumptions, and logic that went into the determination of the ATR Q-value.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Decrease the Number of Glovebox Glove Breaches and Failures

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is committed to the protection of the workers, public, and environment while performing work and uses gloveboxes as engineered controls to protect workers from exposure to hazardous materials while performing plutonium operations. Glovebox gloves are a weak link in the engineered controls and are a major cause of radiation contamination events which can result in potential worker exposure and localized contamination making operational areas off-limits and putting programmatic work on hold. Each day of lost opportunity at Technical Area (TA) 55, Plutonium Facility (PF) 4 is estimated at $1.36 million. Between July 2011 and June 2013, TA-55-PF-4 had 65 glovebox glove breaches and failures with an average of 2.7 per month. The glovebox work follows the five step safety process promoted at LANL with a decision diamond interjected for whether or not a glove breach or failure event occurred in the course of performing glovebox work. In the event that no glove breach or failure is detected, there is an additional decision for whether or not contamination is detected. In the event that contamination is detected, the possibility for a glove breach or failure event is revisited.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Characterization of High Level Waste from a Hybrid LIFE Engine for Enhanced Repository Performance

In the interest of providing unlimited greenhouse gas-free energy at low cost, the Laser Inertial Fusion Energy (LIFE) project provides a testbed for inertial confinement fusion technology. Proposed designs are a pure fusion reactor or a hybrid fusion-fission reactor, which includes a subcritical blanket of fissionable material to be irradiated by neutrons from the fusion reaction. Two possible fuels are considered: (1) used fuel from current reactors; (2) thorium. Amounts of high level waste (HLW) generated per kilowatt-hour (kW*h) produced are lower relative to current Light Water Reactors (LWR), but potential hazard associated with 1 ton of HLW from LIFE is superior. The scope of this study is to combine quantities and qualities of HLW from LIFE and determine the repository space required relative to HLW from LWR for a once through fuel cycle. Repository space was determined in terms of number of canisters required disposal of waste in the production of 1 kW*h. HLW properties were determined using the Oak Ridge Isotope GENeration code (ORIGEN-S) and waste was conditioned and stored in borosilicate glass. For a LWR, the fuel was burnt to 50 gigawatt-days per tonne heavy metal (GWd/tHM) then reprocessed through Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX). For LIFE, fuel burnup varied from 478.6 to 971.8 GWd/tHM and both PUREX reprocessing and conditioning with no separation were analyzed. HLW load per canister was determined for each fuel by combining mass, decay heat, and composition constraints, but the decay heat constraint was eliminated, allowing the spent fuel to cool before solidification. If PUREX reprocessing is applied, LIFE requires 1.47E-10 and 1.39E-10 canisters per kW*h for used fuel and thorium fuel, respectively. A LWR requires 1.56E-10 canisters per kW*h. Limiting constraints for LIFE spent fuel were mass of the canister, mass fraction of the glass frit, or molybdenum trioxide mass fraction. If uranium and plutonium are not separated from LIFE spent fuel, then 2.10E-10 and 1.96E-10 canisters are required per kW*h, for the used fuel and thorium fuel, respectively. Required number of canisters decreases with increased fuel burnup. HLW waste disposal of LIFE is not only feasible, but more efficient than LWR with separation per kW*h. High burnups of LIFE offer the greatest waste performance benefit. Limitations of the study include assumption of generic processing or PUREX extraction for LIFE fuel. Future work will include environmental impact after canister failure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Reevaluation of the Jezebel Benchmark

Every nuclear engineering student is familiar with Jezebel, the homogeneous bare sphere of plutonium first assembled at Los Alamos in 1954-1955. The actual Jezebel assembly was neither homogeneous, nor bare, nor spherical; nor was it singular – there were hundreds of Jezebel configurations assembled. The Jezebel benchmark has been reevaluated for the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook. Logbooks, original drawings, mass accountability statements, internal reports, and published reports have been used to model four actual three-dimensional Jezebel assemblies with high fidelity. Because the documentation available today is often inconsistent, three major assumptions were made regarding plutonium part masses and dimensions. The first was that the assembly masses given in Los Alamos report LA-4208 (1969) were correct, and the second was that the original drawing dimension for the polar height of a certain major part was correct. The third assumption was that a change notice indicated on the original drawing was not actually implemented. This talk will describe these assumptions, the alternatives, and the implications. Since the publication of the 2013 ICSBEP Handbook, the actual masses of the major components have turned up. Our assumption regarding the assembly masses was proven correct, but we had the mass distribution incorrect. Work to incorporate the new information is ongoing, and this talk will describe the latest assessment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Thermodynamic database development: Al-Am-Ga-Pu-U

The goal of this study is about the thermodynamic re-assessment of the Plutonium- Uranium (Pu-U) system as a first step leading to the development of a plutonium-based thermodynamic database (i.e., Pu with Al, Am, Ga, Mo, U…) with resulting phase diagrams and associated thermodynamic data. Indeed, phase stability trends and phase diagrams of multi-component nuclear materials are crucial for predicting properties and performance under normal, hypothetical or even accidental conditions. This work is based on a coupling between ab initio energetics, phenomenological thermodynamics models - based on the CALPHAD (CALculation of PHAse Diagrams) approach - and the use of the Thermo-Calc software, together with experimental data (whenever available). The present report summarizes results obtained (quarter period: 10/07/2013-01/07/2014) under the auspices of an agreement between CEA/DAM and NNSA/DP on cooperation in fundamental science supporting stockpile stewardship (P182).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

A Quick Overview of the Extended Feynman Project

The low natural background rates and the penetrating nature of neutron radiation makes neutron detection a good method for quantifying and accounting for large amounts of special nuclear material capable of neutron induced fission and fission chains. Fission is one of the few natural processes that produces time-correlated neutrons, the others are spallation-type processes (e.g. (n,Xn), cosmic induced background, etc) which have low but measurable rates in common terrestrial material. The high rates of most transuranic spontaneous fission sources of even a gram or less usually swamp any cosmic induced background rate but even Kilogram quantities of natural uranium produce neutrons only on the same order as that of the cosmic generated background flux. However the primary characteristic of special nuclear material is its ability to fission and to support fission chains through neutron induced fission. This means that neutrons produced from fission are not produced randomly singly but rather in time-correlated bursts. Almost from the beginning of the atomic age, the measurement of time-correlated neutrons has been used to detect and quantify fission and fission processes. Feynman himself proposed a method, the grandfather of what is used today, to compare correlation rates of neutron flux in a fixed time to that which would be expected of a random neutron source. The larger variance (broader distribution) as compared to a random distribution is a tell-tale sign of correlated production and commonly used as signature of fission and more importantly fission chains, the broader the distribution (and its departure from a random distribution) the higher the multiplication. Feynman’s original method was used to determine the criticality of the first reactor and other critical or near critical systems. We at LLNL have been developing this concept over the past decade and a half and have employed it for the detection and assessment of nuclear materials. Our method for doing this involved generating a theoretical prediction of what we might expect to see, given a neutron source (spontaneous fission with a nubar, or alpha-n) and a possibly multiplying material (Plutonium or Uranium) and comparing it to a measured result and deducing from this what it is we are measuring. We first developed these methods for portable (low efficiency) thermal neutron detectors that were used predominantly for emergency response situations and we have applied some of these techniques with thermal neutron detectors to arms control verification and authentication, for example verifying that there are multiplying quantities of plutonium in an unknown object. In recent years we have been exploring the use of fast neutrons using liquid scintillator cells with Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD) and in this project we developing both the theory of fast particle production from fission and fission chains and the use of fast particle detection methods primarily for arms control verification and authentication, but for other uses. We have found that fast detection has many advantages, primarily because the speed of the detection (nanoseconds) preserves the original time scale of the particles produced by fission (and more importantly from induced fission) but also because the fast time scales allow for considering much shorter measurement times (binning) that greatly reduce the pollution of random correlations.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Tomographic Gamma Scanner Experience: Three Cases

This is a summary of field applications of tomographic gamma scanning (TGS). Three cases are shown: enriched uranium scanning at Rocky Flats, heat-source plutonium at LANL, and plutonium-bearing pyrochemical salts at Rocky Flats. Materials are taken from the references shown below.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Soils Activity Mobility Study: Methodology and Application

This report presents a three-level approach for estimation of sediment transport to provide an assessment of potential erosion risk for sites at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) that are posted for radiological purposes and where migration is suspected or known to occur due to storm runoff. Based on the assessed risk, the appropriate level of effort can be determined for analysis of radiological surveys, field experiments to quantify erosion and transport rates, and long-term monitoring. The method is demonstrated at contaminated sites, including Plutonium Valley, Shasta, Smoky, and T-1. The Pacific Southwest Interagency Committee (PSIAC) procedure is selected as the Level 1 analysis tool. The PSIAC method provides an estimation of the total annual sediment yield based on factors derived from the climatic and physical characteristics of a watershed. If the results indicate low risk, then further analysis is not warranted. If the Level 1 analysis indicates high risk or is deemed uncertain, a Level 2 analysis using the Modified Universal Soil Loss Equation (MUSLE) is proposed. In addition, if a sediment yield for a storm event rather than an annual sediment yield is needed, then the proposed Level 2 analysis should be performed. MUSLE only provides sheet and rill erosion estimates. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Hydrologic Engineering Center-Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) provides storm peak runoff rate and storm volumes, the inputs necessary for MUSLE. Channel Sediment Transport (CHAN-SED) I and II models are proposed for estimating sediment deposition or erosion in a channel reach from a storm event. These models require storm hydrograph associated sediment concentration and bed load particle size distribution data. When the Level 2 analysis indicates high risk for sediment yield and associated contaminant migration or when there is high uncertainty in the Level 2 results, the sites can be further evaluated with a Level 3 analysis using more complex and labor- and data-intensive methods. For the watersheds analyzed in this report using the Level 1 PSIAC method, the risk of erosion is low. The field reconnaissance surveys of these watersheds confirm the conclusion that the sediment yield of undisturbed areas at the NNSS would be low. The climate, geology, soils, ground cover, land use, and runoff potential are similar among these watersheds. There are no well-defined ephemeral channels except at the Smoky and Plutonium Valley sites. Topography seems to have the strongest influence on sediment yields, as sediment yields are higher on the steeper hill slopes. Lack of measured sediment yield data at the NNSS does not allow for a direct evaluation of the yield estimates by the PSIAC method. Level 2 MUSLE estimates in all the analyzed watersheds except Shasta are a small percentage of the estimates from PSIAC because MUSLE is not inclusive of channel erosion. This indicates that channel erosion dominates the total sediment yield in these watersheds. Annual sediment yields for these watersheds are estimated using the CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII channel sediment transport models. Both transport models give similar results and exceed the estimates obtained from PSIAC and MUSLE. It is recommended that the total watershed sediment yield of watersheds at the NNSS with flow channels be obtained by adding the washload estimate (rill and inter-rill erosion) from MUSLE to that obtained from channel transport models (bed load and suspended sediment). PSIAC will give comparable results if factor scores for channel erosion are revised towards the high erosion level. Application of the Level 3 process-based models to estimate sediment yields at the NNSS cannot be recommended at this time. Increased model complexity alone will not improve the certainty of the sediment yield estimates. Models must be calibrated against measured data before model results are accepted as certain. Because no measurements of sediment yields at the NNSS are available, model validation cannot be performed. This is also true for the models used in the Level 2 analyses presented in this study. The need to calibrate MUSLE to local conditions has been discussed. Likewise, the transport equations of CHAN-SEDI and CHAN-SEDII need to be calibrated against local data to assess their applicability under semi-arid conditions and for the ephemeral channels at the NNSS. Before these validations and calibration exercises can be undertaken, a long-term measured sediment yield data set must be developed. Development of long-term measured sediment yield data cannot be overemphasized. Long-term monitoring is essential for accurate characterization of watershed processes. It is recommended that a long-term monitoring program be set up to measure watershed erosion rates and channel sediment transport rates.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Evaluating the effect of varying flux group endpoints on reaction rates of 238 U

This acts as a short note on the effects of varying the value of the endpoints of the thermal, epithermal, and fast flux groups. As expected, varying these endpoints can alter the value of the cross-section for a given nuclide. This effect is quantified in this note for an important nuclide in reactor simulations, 238 U. Uranium-238 is responsible for the production of Plutonium in most reactors, making it critical to understand all of the 238 U capture modes leading to Plutonium. We explicitly quantify the reaction rates for 238 U that are altered when we use a given research reactor flux and vary the endpoint definitions of said flux as well as the reactor position.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Hydroxylamine Nitrate Decomposition under Non-radiological Conditions

Hydroxylamine nitrate (HAN) is used to reduce Pu(IV) to Pu(III) in the separation of plutonium from uranium. HAN becomes unstable under certain conditions and has been known to explode, causing injury to humans including death. Hence, it is necessary to deactivate HAN once the reduction of plutonium is finished. This report reviews what is known about the chemistry of HAN and various methods to achieve a safe decomposition. However, there are areas where more information is needed to make a decision about the handling of HAN in reprocessing of nuclear fuel. Experiments have demonstrated a number of non-radiolytic ways to safely decompose HAN, including heating in HNO 3 , photolytic oxidation in the presence of H 2 O 2 , and the addition of a metal such as Fe(III) that will oxidize the HAN.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Project Trinity: The Myth, The Legend, The Legacy [Slides]

The Manhattan Project was established in June 1942. Its mission: beat the Nazis to the atomic bomb. Los Alamos was selected as the site for the weapons design laboratory. J. Robert Oppenheimer served as the Laboratory’s director. In the spring of 1944, Los Alamos scientists discovered plutonium would not work in a gun assembly. That summer, the Laboratory was reorganized to build an implosion bomb. Scientists were confident Little Boy, the uranium gun weapon, would perform in combat. Initially, however, scientists were skeptical its imploding plutonium counterpart would function. Eventually, due to improvements in the high explosives (HE), most scientists were confident the implosion bomb would work …but not confident enough to use it in combat without testing it first! Oppenheimer persuaded General Leslie Groves, Commander of the Manhattan Engineer District, to test.

Military Technology, Weaponry, & National Defense(↗

Gum-compliant uncertainty propagations for Pu and U concentration measurements using the 1st-prototype XOS/LANL hiRX instrument; an SRNL H-Canyon Test Bed performance evaluation project

An SRNL H-Canyon Test Bed performance evaluation project was completed jointly by SRNL and LANL on a prototype monochromatic energy dispersive x-ray fluorescence instrument, the hiRX. A series of uncertainty propagations were generated based upon plutonium and uranium measurements performed using the alpha-prototype hiRX instrument. Data reduction and uncertainty modeling provided in this report were performed by the SRNL authors. Observations and lessons learned from this evaluation were also used to predict the expected uncertainties that should be achievable at multiple plutonium and uranium concentration levels provided instrument hardware and software upgrades being recommended by LANL and SRNL are performed.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗