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Regulatory Framework for Permanent Shut-down and Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plant in Korea - 18101

Kori Unit 1, the first commercial NPP in Korea which was commissioned in 1978, was put on permanent shutdown for decommissioning on June 2017, after 40 years of operation. For permanent shutdown of the Kori Unit 1, an operation change permit was submitted in 2016 prior to the expiration since the NSA (Nuclear Safety Act) recognizes permanent shutdown as one of the operation stage. In preparation for the decommissioning of Kori Unit 1, the NSA related to decommissioning was revised and promulgated in 2015. The lower statues including Enforcement Decree and Regulation of the NSA, etc. were promptly revised to reflect decommissioning related requirements and procedures accordingly. For new NPPs, preliminary decommissioning plan is submitted and is being reviewed in the course of license review. Operating NPPs are also planning to submit the decommissioning plan by 2018 and receive approvals from Nuclear Safety and Security Commission. In case that an operator intends to decommission a nuclear installation, the operator shall apply for decommissioning and receive an approval from the NSSC. As discussed, framework for permanent shutdown and decommissioning of nuclear facilities have been well formatted by successful revision of NSA in Korea. Further detailed technical standards and regulatory guides on decommissioning will be developed to facilitate the relevant activities and ensure the nuclear safety. (authors)

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Application of an AREVA Mobile Evaporator Design Used Successfully at NRC Licensed U.S. Commercial Nuclear Sites to Support Hanford Site Operations - 18134

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP), manages the River Protection Project at the Hanford site in the South Eastern corner of Washington State in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. The mission of the River Protection Project is to retrieve and treat Hanford's tank waste and close the tank farms to protect the Columbia River. The Site Tank Operations Contractor (Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS)) via its site operations teams creates additional space in the Double Shell Tanks (DSTs) using the site's only remaining operational evaporator - 242-A. The current 242-A Evaporator has long been identified as a potential single point of failure that in the event of a major breakdown, could significantly impact retrieval operations at the Hanford Site. Areva has experience both on the Hanford site as an integrated subcontractor to the mission and in the design, procurement and construction of a mobile forced circulation evaporator unit designed to be used on Nuclear Regulatory Commission commercial nuclear utility sites. The mobile unit has been used at the following nuclear power plants: SONGS, Salem, Davis Besse, Waterford and Palo Verde. It was designed to take spent Water-EDTA based chemical cleaning solvent and evaporate water off to reduce the volume of waste required to go through downstream processes. It was further designed to fit inside ISO shipping containers. A multi-step approach will be used to: 1. review lessons learned from the previous DOE study for deploying a mobile evaporator on the Hanford sit, 2. evaluate the proposed waste streams and the required throughput and waste arising, sizing the evaporator appropriately, 3. develop a concept design requirements document for the use of a customized evaporator to meet the Hanford need 4. Design, and build a mobile evaporator and 5. Test, install and commission at a site to be agreed with WRPS/DOE. With an overall budget for the approach described of around $35 m, an operational evaporator could be delivered to site in 18-24 months from the approval of a detailed design package. Potential befits include the elimination of the 242-A evaporator as a single point failure, the creation of additional DST tank space and the elimination of the need to stage waste at the 242-A evaporator by moving the mobile unit to a location where is could be deployed at or close to the tank such as in 200W. (authors)

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International Implementation of IAEA's Borehole Disposal Concept for Sealed Radioactive Sources - 18545

With funding from the Government of Canada, and support from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC's) Office of International Program and many others, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is supporting the field deployment of the Borehole Disposal Concept (BDC) for secure disposal of radioactive sources in Ghana, the Philippines and Malaysia. This is a first-of-its-kind implementation. Though small in volume, disused sealed radioactive sources can be intensively radioactive and create a significant safety and security liability for the majority of the 168 Member States in the IAEA. Millions of sealed radioactive sources have been manufactured since 1901, and it is estimated that hundreds of thousands are now unwanted. The irony is that some of the countries with the smallest inventories have the greatest difficulties managing their radioactive wastes. The BDC was originally conceptualized in an IAEA-study undertaken by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA) for countries with small inventories of disused sealed radioactive sources. There are multiple, passive engineered and natural barriers in the BDC design, including an inner stainless-steel capsule (which holds the wastes), an inner cement containment barrier, an outer stainless steel container and outer backfill cement, as well as the surrounding geosphere. In common subsurface geochemical environments, these barriers will isolate the wastes from the biosphere, provide effective containment and ensure long-term safety. To greatly limit the likelihood of inadvertent human intrusion (safety), and deliberate human intrusion (security), these waste packages will be disposed of in a narrow diameter borehole (26 cm) at depths greater than 30 m. This type of borehole disposal creates an exceptionally small footprint, removes the wastes from normal human surficial activities, and isolates the waste packages from near-surface processes. Over the past 20 years, the IAEA, NECSA and many others have advanced the BDC on the shoulders of the IAEA's broader work supporting safe and secure disposal of radioactive wastes and management of sealed radioactive sources. With recent funding and support from many others, the IAEA has assisted Ghana, Malaysia and the Philippines in assessing their inventories and conditioning their disused sealed radioactive sources, in drilling investigation boreholes and characterizing their proposed sites, and in designing their disposal systems. These countries plan to place the uppermost waste package at depths greater than 100 m. While activities in the Philippines remain focused on-site characterization, Ghana is in the latter stages of developing their Safety Case for operational and 'post-closure' safety and Malaysia has completed their Safety Case and submitted a license application to construct and operate a BDC facility. Though this paper identifies the support provided to Member States by the IAEA, it is the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission and the Malaysian Nuclear Agency that are responsible for the safety and security of the disposals and that have been responsible for carrying-out their disposal programs. Once the BDC is licensed by the relevant national regulatory bodies, these first-of-a-kind disposal approaches will provide a template for other countries to safely dispose of their disused sealed radioactive sources - permanently eliminating their safety and security liabilities. (authors)

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Model Study and Site Experience of Radiation Physics Analysis for Research Reactor Decommissioning - 18586

The University of Alberta Safe Low Power Kritical Experiment (SLOWPOKE II) nuclear reactor facility (UASF) was commissioned on April 22, 1977. It was designed, built and installed by Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and was the fourth SLOWPOKE II research reactor installed at a Canadian university at that time. The reactor was used as a source of neutrons for radionuclide production and elemental analysis via neutron activation analysis, to provide a service to industry, government and to support research and teaching at the University of Alberta. It was licensed to operate at 20 kW, less than the heat produced by a small residential furnace, and work with the reactor was typically performed at one-tenth full power. After nearly four decades of service, the reactor reached the end of its useful life in August 2017 when defueling and the project to decommission the reactor began. Decommissioning of the UASF is a process to dismantle the facility by progressively removing the reactor core and other radioactive components as well as managing the balance of contaminated materials around the reactor in a safe manner. The objective of the project is to release the site from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission's (CNSC) regulatory control and return the site to a 'greenfield' status. This paper will discuss the radiation physics analysis that was undertaken to support the decommissioning of the University of Alberta SLOWPOKE II Facility Reactor which took place from July - October 2017. It will address the radiation physics model study, development of the radiation protection (RP) plan, site experience and how the lessons learned from this project can be utilized for best practice on other similar projects. (authors)

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Challenges of SLOWPOKE-2 HEU Irradiated Fuel Transportation from Canada to USA - 19123(2)

The SLOWPOKE-2 (Safe Low-Power Kritical Experiment) was designed by AECL (Atomic Energy of Canada Limited) in the late 1960's. The core consists of HEU (highly enriched uranium) fuel with an enrichment of 93%. The fuel cage typically has approximately 300 fuel pins assembled in a triangular pitch between the two plates. The fuel pins are made from uranium-aluminum alloy cladded with aluminum. The SLOWPOKE-2 reactor is rated at a nominal 20 kW. with varying neutron flux, maximum being 1 E12 n/cm{sup 2}/s. The mass of the fuel cage is 5.06 kg. The life of the core can be extended by adding layers of beryllium reflector. The transportation flask for the irradiated fuel is a Type B(U)F. The shipment classification is UN3328 Class 7. To date, 4 SLOWPOKE-2 reactors have been decommissioned. The fuel from all these reactors was transported to the U.S. The CNSC (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) joint Canada-United States guide for approval of Type B(U) and fissile material transportation packages (RD-364) satisfies the requirements stipulated in International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) TS-R-1 1996 edition (revised) and is acceptable to the DOT (Department of Transportation) and NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) for complying with U.S. code of federal regulations 10 CFR Part 71. The export license is issued by the CNSC. The transportation licence is issued by CNSC after approval from TC (Transport Canada) and also by DOT after approval from NRC. The final home of the HEU SLOWPOKE-2 irradiated fuel is in Savannah River Site of DOE (Department of Energy). The transportation licence requires that the Type B(U)F flask is structurally sound in case of a crash. The US DOT provides a CAC (Competent Authority Certificate) which describes the irradiated fuel specifications that can be transported in the designated flask. The U.S. DOT also requires a leak test certification in accordance with ANSI N14.5-2014 to verify a leakage rate not to exceed 1 E-7 std-cm{sup 3}/s. As most SLOWPOKE-2 facilities are not located on the existing approved routes for nuclear fuel transportation, a route survey needs to be performed and submitted to the NRC. The route survey report is assessed by the NRC and issues a route approval for the transportation of the fissile material. This technical paper will discuss the detailed processes required to obtain approvals in order to transport the HEU SLOWPOKE-2 irradiated fuel from Canada to U.S. based upon recent experiences of decommissioning SLOWPOKE-2 reactors in Canada. It will provide details on the requirements of various regulators in Canada and the U.S. that govern and regulate this shipment including transportation, safety and security. It will also present lessons learned from previous experiences that can be utilized for best practice on other similar projects. (authors)

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Perception of the risks of CEA Cadarache Research Centre: Reconciling the Fears with the Challenges - 19362

The CEA Cadarache Research Centre is one of the 10 research centres of the French Commission of Atomic and Alternative Energies (CEA). Distributed throughout various research platforms, the studies of the Centre focus on nuclear fission, nuclear fusion, new energy technologies (hydrogen, solar, biomass) and fundamental research in the field of vegetal biology. The French government asked nuclear professionals to open their communication channels and to provide the Local Information Commission (CLI) and the public with all the information they requested. In its concern for its image and following a policy of transparency pursued over these last few years, the Cadarache Centre has sought to reduce the population's anxiety to a level judged consistent with the actual risks involved in the activities carried out within the Cadarache Research Centre. The Communications and Public Affairs Department has been entrusted with the task of developing a communication strategy aimed at improving the surrounding population's perception of the Centre. In a first step, we tried to find out what the current perception of the Cadarache Research Centre might be by conducting a survey among the local population. Our results showed a better knowledge of the Centre's activities than had been anticipated but there is still a lack of understanding that could lead to unnecessary anxiety in the event of an incident on the site. We worked on the elaboration of the communication campaign in consultation with psychology experts who took into account the results of the survey. This year, four actions will be implemented along with the decision to conduct a new survey every two to three years. Furthermore, the setting up of a lasting structure of exchange with the population will be pursued in a form that has yet to be determined. The effects of our communication campaign have now been evaluated following the results of this second survey, two years later. (authors)

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Communicating Technical Information: Different Approaches for Different Audiences - 19399

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), Canada's independent nuclear regulator, has a 70- year history of regulating nuclear safety in Canada. Part of the CNSC's mandate is to disseminate objective scientific, technical and regulatory information to the public. The CNSC prides itself on being transparent with the public, and openly sharing scientific, technical and regulatory information on its regulatory activities with stakeholders. We value the public's feedback, and have a robust public participation program to allow for public involvement in the CNSC's activities. However, different audiences have different needs based on their level of technical knowledge and expertise. The CNSC's experience with stakeholder interactions has demonstrated the need to balance the dissemination of technical information through different communication platforms, in order to satisfy the needs of various intended audiences. This paper will focus on the radioactive waste management communications methods that the CNSC has implemented for two distinct audiences: 1. Audiences with little or no technical background: Communications with this audience requires techniques to make highly technical concepts more understandable. The focus is on educating about matters related to radioactive waste management, and informing about the safety aspects behind the regulation of radioactive waste. 2. Audiences with previous knowledge and experience with nuclear matters: Communications with this audience requires techniques to ensure that as much technical information and data as possible is available to inform stakeholders. The focus is on giving access to studies, research and raw data, in order to allow this audience to inform themselves, and potentially bring new perspectives to the CNSC's attention that could be used in regulatory oversight activities. In its capacity to disseminate scientific and technical information to the public as required by legislation, the CNSC holds a unique position compared with other Canadian regulatory bodies. The CNSC is one of the only Canadian regulators which: - Has a public hearing process which enables the public and Indigenous groups to express their issues and concerns directly to the decision-maker (the Commission) - Publishes regular regulatory oversight reports (report card on industry) that assess the safety performance of all its licensees - Publishes responses to all public comments received during consultation periods in our environmental assessment processes as well as our regulatory framework processes, including draft regulatory documents, discussions papers and proposed regulations - Has an independent environmental monitoring program, allowing the public access to environmental data. The program also seeks public and Indigenous input with respect to proposed environmental sampling campaigns, including suggestions on the samples to be taken and sampling locations. (authors)

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Assessing the Success of Shipping High Burn-Up Sister Rods from ORNL to PNNL - 19456

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DoE's) Used Fuel Disposition Campaign (UFDC), in collaboration with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the commercial nuclear industry have initiated a group of projects to obtain data to support the enhancement of the technical bases for the extended storage and transportation of high-burnup (HBU) (>45 GWd/MTU) spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Under this overall effort, a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed storage cask was loaded with Thirty-Two (32) HBU SNF assemblies. The cask was modified to allow radial and axial temperature profiles to be measured using thermocouple lances inserted through the lid. Twenty-five (25) rods from similar assemblies of similar claddings, in-reactor placement, and burnup histories (herein called 'sister rods') have been shipped from the North Anna Nuclear Power Plant and are currently being nondestructively tested at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). To meet UFD's research objectives, testing on ten (10) of these rods is required to be performed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). Although the twenty-five rods were originally received at ORNL in the 10-160B, the PNNL facility that would need to receive the ten (10) rods did not have an active history with using the 10-160B. This paper first identifies and summarizes various criteria and evaluations used in helping to select which package will be used for the shipment of the ten (10) sister rods to PNNL (i.e., Bases on why the NACLWT was chosen). With the shipment scheduled to be complete, identified potential concerns, issues, lessons learned, and transportation summary documents were studied (post-shipment). The adequacy of the criteria and evaluations used to choose the NAC-LWT were accessed to determine their adequacy. The results show the criteria were adequate. However, it was noted that DOE Order 460.2A, DOE M 460.2-1A, and DOE G 460.2-1 have differences in the terminology and scope, resulting in clarity issues and differences in regulatory interpretation. Since one-of-a kind spent fuel shipments are uncommon, the topic will be significant interest to people who work in radioactive material packaging and transportation. (authors)

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The Role of Indian Tribes in the Safe, Secure, and Routine Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste - 19463

Far too often federally recognized Indian Tribes are the last stakeholders invited to the table to discuss a particular issue with potentially wide-ranging impacts. Indian tribes were the first governments on this continent. With respect to the future transportation of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) or high-level radioactive waste (HLW), Indian tribes are potentially impacted in a myriad of ways: economics, cultural, environmental, health and safety. Yet few regulators fully understand and appreciate the legal and political standing of Indian tribes. This paper will examine the ways in which Indian tribes must be involved with the planning for safe, secure and routine SNF and HLW shipments and the ways in which the federal government is obligated to involve tribes. Indian tribes are similar to states in that they are responsible for the health and safety of its members (which they themselves define). Tribes, like states, make, implement, interpret, and enforce laws, and provide public services - healthcare, public education, social services, drug treatment, public safety and emergency management, transportation, managing natural resources, public housing, and environmental and cultural preservation. Many tribes also operate economic enterprises - manufacturing, farming, forestry, and gaming. The most basic principle of Indian law is the principle of 'sovereignty,' that is, an Indian tribe possesses all the powers of any sovereign state. Tribal governments are not subject to state or local jurisdiction but are subject to federal jurisdiction. The tribes enjoy a government-to-government relationship (and expectation) with the federal government (i.e., agencies, like the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission). Of paramount concern to Indian tribes is the doctrine of Trust Responsibility, the general principle that the federal government's conduct 'in dealing with the Indians should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.' With respect to SNF/HLW this means that the federal government has an obligation (or a Trust Responsibility) to ensure that tribal people, lands and resources are protected. Equally important is the expectation that federal agencies will work with the Indian tribes on a government-to-government basis before undertaking any action with potential negative consequences on the tribe's people, land or resources. The concept of government-to-government consultation between Indian tribes and the United States is long standing and well recognized. As expressed in Executive Order 13175, 'Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments': 'Consultation - Each federal agency must have an accountable process to ensure meaningful and timely input by tribal officials in the development of regulatory policies that have tribal implications.' The purpose of consultation is to ensure that Indian tribes are consulted before government officials make decisions that may have an impact on their lives and territories. The three agencies involved with SNF and HLW transportation - the US Department of Transportation (DOT), the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and the US Department of Energy (DOE) - have had various degrees of success with respect to direct consultation with Indian tribes. Given that there is plenty of lead-time before the first shipments commence, there should be ample time to develop a strategy for ensuring that tribes are equal partners when planning and preparing for shipments of SNF and HLW to the first interim storage facility. (authors)

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2019 Public Debate on the French Waste Plan - 20181

For the first time, a public debate has preceded the preparation of the National Radioactive Materials and Waste Management Plan (PNGMDR). This debate, which took place over 5 months from 17 April to 25 September, was held by decision of the French National Public Debate Commission (CNDP), an independent administrative authority responsible for public participation in major projects and plans/programmes with environmental impacts. To organise and lead the debate, the CNDP appointed a Special Commission. (authors)

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Distribution Development for Residual Inventory at the New York West Valley Site - 20400

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351 ha site located approximately 48 km south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Operations led to contamination in a number of facilities and locations. Some of that contamination has migrated from waste disposal zones to other layers, formations, and features on and off the WNYNSC. Phase I decommissioning activities are ongoing and involve the removal of a number of areas and structures that have been associated with contamination. The purpose of this work is to outline the approach for characterizing contamination not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. In this work, the term, residual radiological activity, is used to describe environmental contamination that exists subsequent to the completion of Phase I decommissioning activities, that is not associated with disposed wastes, contaminated structures, or specific releases. Contamination from the Site was quantified relative to data that characterize the concentrations of radionuclides that exist in background. Background concentrations are those present in the area but having no influence from Site related activities. The existence of residual radiological activity that is elevated relative to background has the potential to contribute to future risks to human health and the environment. As a consequence, the residual inventory information is used to inform the West Valley Probabilistic Performance Assessment (PPA) model to characterize potential future risks to human health and the environment. The centralized West Valley Data Management System (DMS) was the source of information for the data assembled in this analysis. The DMS is a fairly large compilation consisting of thousands of records from investigation studies, with sample dates ranging from 1990 to present. Samples from monitoring wells, boreholes, geoprobe studies, surface water, surface soils, storm water outfalls, ventilation stack filters, plant and animal tissues, and more are included in the DMS. Results are typically reported in units of activity per unit volume. For the purpose of the analyses presented here, all results were converted into consistent units of pCi per unit volume. Since 1990, data have been collected from various locations across the WNYNSC at different times with varying frequency over the course of several decades. As a consequence, a number of potential issues can arise with respect to the assembly of a dataset that is deemed adequate for the characterization of residual radiological activity. These issues were assessed and resolved to the extent possible through careful consideration of the properties of the distributions. The intent was to use data which characterize the current state of the Site. Radionuclides can be designated to one of several groups depending on their origin. In this work the groups considered were 1) Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM), 2) fallout, and 3) Other (including power plant, medical research, etc). This grouping is a useful construct with respect to the interpretation of fixed laboratory results. For example, NORM radionuclides that exist within a decay chain should have approximately equivalent distributions of concentrations if they are representative of background conditions. Insights such as these can be used as a check to identify sample results that need to be further investigated or omitted due to issues associated with reported results from fixed laboratory analyses. This type of analysis provided a foundation for the assessment of the adequacy of sample results for use in subsequent components of an assessment. The general process for the assessment of residual radiological contamination at the Site consists of a sequence of several steps. First, for each analyte, several statistical tests were performed to assess the weight of evidence against the null hypothesis that the mean of the distribution of concentrations was equal to zero. If the mean of the distribution of concentrations for a given radionuclide was not found to be greater than zero, then it was removed from consideration as a component of the residual radiological contamination. If there was significant evidence to reject the hypothesis of the mean being equal to zero, the second step was to compare the distribution of the data from the Site to that of the corresponding background. A suite of tests was used to compare the distributions of the site and background data. The results of these tests were collectively used to determine if site data are elevated relative to background. The third step was to develop distributions using a Bayesian framework to characterize the distribution of mean of the increment present above background for each of the radionuclides. The Bayesian model implemented allowed for the comparison of site-specific records to background concentrations to better approximate contamination attributed to the Site. A final screening step was employed for radionuclides that exceed background. This screening step compared 95% upper confidence limits (UCLs) from the increment distribution developed in the previous step to the risk screening levels. This approach yields a list of analytes that were determined to be elevated relative to background.

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Quantifying the impact of climate change on erosion - 20397

The New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA) is the owner of the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), a 1,351-ha (3,338-ac) site located approximately 48 km (30 mi) south of Buffalo, New York. In 1962, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) entered into Agreements with the Atomic Energy Commission and New York State to construct the first commercial reprocessing plant of nuclear fuel in the United States. NFS, a private company, built and operated the spent fuel reprocessing plant and waste disposal facilities, processing 640 Mg (metric tons, or 705 short tons) of spent nuclear fuel from 1966 to 1972 under an Atomic Energy Commission license. Nuclear fuel reprocessing operations ended in 1972 and never reopened, leaving behind radioactive and chemical wastes. Erosion can play an important role in the fate and transport of waste at sites where disposal of long-lived waste is anticipated. The statistical characterization of key processes related to erosion is essential to the understanding of site stability through time. One of the key processes governing erosion is extreme precipitation and it is critical that trends in the distribution of extreme precipitation events through time be represented. The evidence of climate change is increasingly well documented and projected impacts on extreme precipitation events should be incorporated in performance assessment studies when relevant. Not evaluating future climate states in a performance assessment is contradictory to good modeling practice. Specifically, excluding climate change limits development of modeling information that could aid in effective decision making. The current climate literature provides both observational evidence and climate model projections of climate trends and/or climate change in the late 20. and early 21. centuries for North America and the northeast United States. In this work, this information was used to assess the impacts of potential changes in climate on erosion processes. The goal was to understand how projections of future climate relate to the performance of the WNYNSC through time. In the first stage of this work multi-temporal historical aerial images were analyzed in conjunction with orthophotography and Lidar data to develop probability distributions for variables representing important erosion processes. The information from these analyses was then used in conjunction with simulated data from the West Valley Erosion Working Group (EWG). Analysis of EWG simulations provides estimates for the change in erosion rates through time that is driven by changes in climate. The time-varying rates of erosion change were applied to the historical aerial imagery data in order to inform time-varying rates of erosion that are driven by changes in climate. Ultimately, this process resulted in the identification of locations for features like gully heads using both the Lidar dataset and projection of the estimated location from the historical aerial photo under consideration back to the Lidar dataset. The distance between the estimate of the location from the historical image and that of the Lidar dataset was the estimated distance the feature has moved. This distance was then divided by the number of years between the Lidar dataset and the year of the historical aerial image of interest to get a rate of movement through time. This was done for several dozen points on each historical aerial image. The analyses from the EWG were used to characterize the relative impact of climate change on the erosion rates. This relative impact was quantified by comparing the LEM based estimates of erosion that were derived using historical climate data with LEM based estimates of erosion that were derived using projections of future climate. The relative increase in the erosion rates was then applied to the historical estimates of erosion derived from the analysis of the historical aerial imagery. This approach was used since the LEM-based estimated of the historical erosion rates from the past century have a bias towards underestimating erosion. This underestimation is hypothesized to be a consequence of an inability of the LEMs to account for the impacts of land-use change (i.e. deforestation) which had been shown to significantly increase erosion in similar Northern hardwood forest ecosystems. In summary, gully head retreat rate and gully widening rate were characterized using statistical probability distributions from the historical aerial image analysis. Simulated data from the EWG was used to estimate the climatically-driven changes in erosion rates through time. The changes through time from the EWG were applied to the gully head retreat rate and gully widening rate characterized using the historical aerial image analysis. This information can be used to inform PPA models to project future risks from a given site. (authors)

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A qualitative assessment of current CCF guidance based on a review of safety system digital implementation changes with evolving technology - 148

This paper is a summary of a study performed in support of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to evaluate current policy on software common-cause failure (CCF). The study reported in this paper is one of several that contributed to the technical basis to inform NRC staff. The study first reviewed policies and assessment guidance as discussed in the Staff Requirements Memorandum to the Secretary of the Commission, Office of the NRC (SECY) 93-087, Policy, Technical, and Licensing Issues Pertaining to Evolutionary and Advanced Light Water Reactor (ALWR) Designs, and Branch Technical Position (BTP) 7-19, Guidance on Evaluation of Defense-in-Depth and Diversity in Digital Computer-Based Instrumentation and Control Systems, as well as Chapter 7, 'Instrumentation and Controls', in NUREG-0800, Standard Review Plan for Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants. The study then examined instrumentation and controls (I and C) technology implementations in nuclear power plants in the light of current CCF guidance. The intent was to assess whether the current position on CCF remains appropriate given the evolutions in digital safety system implementations and, if gaps in the guidance were found, to provide recommendations as to how these gaps could be closed. The methodology adopted was to review the vendors' technology and software implementation processes for digital safety systems as technology evolved. The following three representative safety systems were selected to provide illustrative examples: - Eagle 21 was selected to represent vintage microprocessor-based technology used from the 1980's to mid-1990's, - TELEPERM XS (TXS) was selected to represent second generation microprocessor-based technology used from the mid-1990's to the 2000's, and - The advanced logic system (ALS) was selected to represent the latest trend of using technology based on field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs). Technology implementations were reviewed in light of the basic premise of the NRC in BTP 7-19 (Revision 6), that software-based or software-logic-based digital system development errors are a credible source of CCF and therefore are susceptible to CCF because identical copies of the software-based logic and architecture are present in redundant divisions of safety-related systems. BTP 7-19 categorizes firmware and logic developed from software-based development systems all under software. (authors)

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Determination of activation products and resulting decommissioning implications for the Varian TruBeam linear accelerator - Paper 52

Modern medical linear accelerators used for the treatment of cancers are capable of operating at electron energies as high as 20 MeV. Above electron energies of 6 MeV, a measurable dose rate is obtained at the isocenter after beam termination. This is attributed to the activation of linear accelerator components through photonuclear reactions and neutron capture. Photons are produced as Bremsstrahlung during the collision of high-energy electrons with a heavy metal target, typically comprised of copper or tungsten. When photons exceeding the nucleon binding energy interact with a nucleus, neutrons are ejected. In the process of neutron capture, neutrons produced through ({gamma}, n) reactions are absorbed by a nucleus and the excess energy is emitted as a photon. Over the lifetime of an accelerator many components, such as the target, flattening filter, collimators, jaws, and treatment couch, are activated through these interactions. Although dependent on operating conditions, linear accelerators have an expected lifetime of 7 to 10 years. In Canada, at the end of their service, accelerators are typically sold for scrap, returned to a remanufacturing enterprise, or if the machine is still operational it can be retasked for continued use. Since many of the accelerator components have been exposed to a neutron fluence and activated to various extents, the requirements of the Canadian Nuclear Substance and Radiation Device regulations apply prior to final removal from the hospital. For shipments to the USA, there are exemption regulations to be considered. NRC regulation 10CFR 30.71 Schedule B lists a number of common radionuclides and the specific exemption quantity. Below these levels, radioactive materials may be freely transported from Canada to the USA without prior licensing from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) or United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). (authors)

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Panel discussion: Challenges and improvements in accident dose analysis; Regulatory and industry perspective

Full text of publication follows. Design basis accident (DBA) analyses are one of several ways nuclear power plant licensees demonstrate, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff verifies, that the design and location of a nuclear power plant are appropriate and that the protection of health and safety of the public is maintained. In July 2000, the NRC staff issued Regulatory Guide 1.183, 'Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors' (RG 1.183) [1]. RG 1.183 provides a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the regulatory requirements contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) Section 50.67 (50.67), 'Accident source term' [2]. RG 1.183 also provides assumptions and parameters used to model postulated DBA radiological analyses for light-water reactors (LWR). Since the initial issuance of RG 1.183, the NRC staff and the nuclear power plant licensees have both gained substantial experience with the implementation of 10 CFR 50.67 and RG 1.183. Based on this experience, comments from licensees, the anticipation of licensing advanced LWRs, and new research, the NRC is developing a proposed revision to RG 1.183. This panel discussion will provide a discussion of that proposed revision, its potential impact on existing and future evaluations, and the industry perspective on the revised guidance. References: 1) USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.183, 'Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,' Revision 0, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. (2000), Electronic copies are also available in ADAMS (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html), under Accession No. ML003716792. 2) U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Energy), Part 50 (Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities), Section 67, (Accident source term), Office of the Federal Register, Washington, DC (1999). (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Equity Considerations in Siting Consolidated Interim Storage Facilities for Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel

Questions of equity and fairness are often raised by representatives from State, Tribal and local governments and members of the public when resolving conflicts over siting of nuclear facilities. However, the two terms are not synonymous: equity can be quantified while fairness is much more subjective. The Department of Energy's (DOE) December 2021 Request for Information sought input on how to site federal facilities for the temporary, consolidated storage of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) using a consent-based approach. It is anticipated that just such questions about equity and fairness associated with the potential emergence of more than one host site may be raised by the twelve groups of university, nonprofit and private sector partners (Consortia) working to support community engagement, inclusively involve stakeholders, build relationships, and develop innovative forms of mutual learning and public capacity to participate in the consent-based siting process for a federal consolidated interim storage facility during the current Planning & Capacity Building stage of the consent-based siting process. In terms of DOE's Integrated Waste Management System (IWMS), sociopolitical equity concepts are a factor in all aspects of IWMS development and operations and will be particularly applicable should two or more host sites become a possibility, either by the emergence of multiple volunteer hosts or by pursuit as a IWMS program strategy. This paper summarizes recent analyses that explore how four equity metrics - number of states, division of the projected SNF total by the year 2083, current population and land area - might be perceived by host communities, states and regions if two, three or four sites for hosting federal consolidated interim storage facilities were to be contemporaneously realized. Existing institutional arrangements, including Nuclear Regulatory Commission regions, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission regions and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Compacts, were selected to create hypothetically merged two, three and four-region scenarios to calculate how the four metrics balance out. Projected SNF burden was prioritized with regional contiguity of the consolidated regions a requirement for a functional scenario. The intent was not to promote or suggest any construct as a program objective; the configurations are geopolitical abstractions only to explore potential perceptions of equity. Understanding the possible issues of equity that could arise may benefit program efforts toward achieving a cooperative federalism wherein both the federal and multiple State governments share the goal of manifesting more than one federal consolidated interim storage facility. The main finding is that it is not possible to optimize for all four metrics simultaneously. The analyses demonstrate that trying to create a sense of equity by backfitting a solution to a random population and land distribution will always contain a degree of artificiality.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Instrumentation for the In-Core Real-Time Mechanical Testing of Structural Materials (INCREASE) Project

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the French Atomic and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA), the Joint Research Center (JRC), the Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group (NRG), and the Research Center Rez (CVR), started a Joint Experimental Program (JEEP) project that operates within the Nuclear Energy Agency’s Framework for Irradiation Experiments (FIDES II) program in order to develop capabilities for the in-core real-time mechanical testing of structural materials. This effort will focus on designing a shared capsule capable of housing a variety of in-core mechanical testing instrumentation allowing enhanced experiments for the material science community. The outcome of the project would be high-priority, stress relaxation data for stainless-steel-based materials provided by EPRI and CEA. Stress relaxation is a major phenomenon that contributes to material degradation in nuclear reactor components. Currently, nuclear material stress relaxation is assessed both before and after irradiation, using complex and costly post-irradiation examination (PIE) activities. In-situ data would support the development of precision modeling and simulation of this degradation phenomena and would provide validation and benchmarking for existing models using the PIE data. As part of the U.S. Department of Energy Advanced Sensor and Instrumentation (ASI) program, INL has fabricated and tested out-of-core mechanical test instrumentation. This instrumentation was designed for easy adaptation to the irradiation capsule proposed under this JEEP, and can be deployed to measure real-time stress relaxation under pressurized-water reactor (PWR) conditions. This initial effort will partially serve to replace the testing capabilities lost because of shutting down the Halden Boiling Water Reactor (HBWR). The project would provide these capabilities to the international community via a shared capsule design that is easily adaptable to additional material test reactors. The design features will incorporate expansion to PWR and non-light-water reactor (LWR) environments that will be developed in future work. The capsule and instrumentation will be demonstrated in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) for phase I and the Petten High Flux Reactor (HFR) for phase II irradiations to deliver real-time stress relaxation data on high priority stainless steel structural materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

INSTRUMENTATION FOR IN-CORE REAL-TIME MECHANICAL TESTING OF STRUCTURAL MATERIALS (INCREASE) PROJECT

Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in collaboration with the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Nuclear Regulatory Commission, French Atomic and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA), Joint Research Centre, Nuclear Research and Consultancy Group, and Research Center Rez, is the operating agent of the In-Core Real-Time Mechanical Testing of Structural Materials (INCREASE) joint experimental program (JEEP) project that operates within the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)’s Framework for Irradiation Experiments (FIDES-II) program. The first objective of the INCREASE project is to design a shared capsule that can house a variety of in-core mechanical testing instrumentation for enabling smart irradiation experiments. The second objective is to collect in core stress relaxation data pertaining to high priority stainless steel (SS) materials under light water reactor conditions with target temperature of 340°C +/-20°C and a minimum neutron damage of 2 displacement per atom (dpa). The INCREASE project will be demonstrated in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Nuclear Research Reactor (MITR).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗