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At least 1,675 records · Page 93

Associations between errors and contributing factors in aircraft maintenance

In recent years cognitive error models have provided insights into the unsafe acts that lead to many accidents in safety-critical environments. Most models of accident causation are based on the notion that human errors occur in the context of contributing factors. However, there is a lack of published information on possible links between specific errors and contributing factors. A total of 619 safety occurrences involving aircraft maintenance were reported using a self-completed questionnaire. Of these occurrences, 96% were related to the actions of maintenance personnel. The types of errors that were involved, and the contributing factors associated with those actions, were determined. Each type of error was associated with a particular set of contributing factors and with specific occurrence outcomes. Among the associations were links between memory lapses and fatigue and between rule violations and time pressure. Potential applications of this research include assisting with the design of accident prevention strategies, the estimation of human error probabilities, and the monitoring of organizational safety performance.

Professional Competence↗

Unsafe acts and unsafe outcomes in aircraft maintenance

Road safety studies using the Driver Behaviour Questionnaire (DBQ) have provided support for a three-way distinction between violations, skill-based errors and mistakes, and have indicated that a tendency to commit driving violations is associated with an increased risk of accident involvement. The aims of this study were to examine whether the three-way distinction of unsafe acts is applicable in the context of aircraft maintenance, and whether involvement in maintenance safety occurrences can be predicted on the basis of self-reported unsafe acts. A Maintenance Behaviour Questionnaire (MBQ) was developed to explore patterns of unsafe acts committed by aircraft maintenance mechanics. The MBQ was completed anonymously by over 1300 Australian aviation mechanics, who also provided information on their involvement in workplace accidents and incidents. Four factors were identified: routine violations, skill-based errors, mistakes and exceptional violations. Violations and mistakes were related significantly to the occurrence of incidents that jeopardized the quality of aircraft maintenance, but were not related to workplace injuries. Skill-based errors, while not related to work quality incidents, were related to workplace injuries. The results are consistent with the three-way typology of unsafe acts described by Reason et al. (1990) and with the DBQ research indicating an association between self-reported violations and accidents. The current findings suggest that interventions addressed at maintenance quality incidents should take into account the role of violations and mistakes, and the factors that promote them. In contrast, interventions directed at reducing workplace injury are likely to require a focus on skill-based errors.

Maintenance/manpower/methods↗

Analysis of Pilot Monitoring Skills and a Review of Training Effectiveness

The commercial aviation industry world-wide has identified a need for improved pilot monitoring and awareness (e.g., FAA, 2013, ICAO, 2016). More specifically, aviation safety data indicate that failures in pilots’ flight path management (FPM) monitoring and awareness have contributed to a range of undesired outcomes: accidents, major upsets, and non-compliance with air traffic control (ATC) guidance. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has further stated that these types of FPM failures are likely to worsen with the increasingly complex air traffic control systems and FPM concepts proposed for NextGen (https://www.faa. gov/nextgen/what_is_nextgen/) operations (e.g., see Hah et al., 2017). Adding to this complexity is the introduction of increasingly automated aircraft systems that can increase monitoring burdens. One potential mitigation for this situation is to enhance pilot training for effective monitoring. NASA Ames Research Center was asked to identify and evaluate training approaches that have the potential to enhance pilots’ ability to effectively monitor for FPM (with the result of improved awareness). The focus of this work is to identify, develop or validate training guidance to improve pilot monitoring/awareness regarding FPM and mitigate the recent trend of accidents and incidents, especially loss of control (LOC) events. The result of this work should be input for improved industry standards and FAA guidance to reduce the risk of incidents and accidents due to inadequate pilot monitoring/awareness. This is the first of three reports that were developed for this project.

aviation human factors↗

Safety Issues and Approach to Meet the Safety Requirements in Tokamak Cooling Water System of ITER

The ITER (Latin for 'the way') tokamak cooling water system (TCWS) consists of several separate systems to cool the major ITER components - the divertor/limiter, the first wall blanket, the neutral beam injector and the vacuum vessel. The ex-vessel part of the TCWS systems provides a confinement function for tritium and activated corrosion products in the cooling water. The Vacuum Vessel System also has a functional safety requirement regarding the residual heat removal from in-vessel components. A preliminary hazards assessment (PHA) was performed for a better understanding of the hazards, initiating events, and defense in depth mechanisms associated with the TCWS. The PHA was completed using the following steps. (1) Hazard Identification. Hazards associated with the TCWS were identified including radiological/chemical/electromagnetic hazards and physical hazards (e.g., high voltage, high pressure, high temperature, falling objects). (2) Hazard Categorization. Hazards identified in step (1) were categorized as to their potential for harm to the workers, the public, and/or the environment. (3) Hazard Evaluation. The design was examined to determine initiating events that might occur and that could expose the public, environment, or workers to the hazard. In addition the system was examined to identify barriers that prevent exposure. Finally, consequences to the public or workers were qualitatively assessed, should the initiating event occur and one or more of the barriers fail. Frequency of occurrence of the initiating event and subsequent barrier failure was qualitatively estimated. (4) Accident Analysis. A preliminary hazards analysis was performed on the conceptual design of the TCWS. As the design progresses, a detailed accident analysis will be performed in the form of a failure modes and effects analysis. The results of the PHA indicated that the principal hazards associated with the TCWS were those associated with radiation. These were low compared to hazards associated with nuclear fission reactors and were limited to potential exposure to the on-site workers if appropriate protective actions were not used. However, the risk to the general public off-site was found to be negligible even under worst case accident conditions.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Passive Safety Features for Small Modular Reactors

The rapid growth in the size and complexity of commercial nuclear power plants in the 1970s spawned an interest in smaller, simpler designs that are inherently or intrinsically safe through the use of passive design features. Several designs were developed, but none were ever built, although some of their passive safety features were incorporated into large commercial plant designs that are being planned or built today. In recent years, several reactor vendors are actively redeveloping small modular reactor (SMR) designs with even greater use of passive features. Several designs incorporate the ultimate in passive safety they completely eliminate specific accident initiators from the design. Other design features help to reduce the likelihood of an accident or help to mitigate the accident s consequences, should one occur. While some passive safety features are common to most SMR designs, irrespective of the coolant technology, other features are specific to water, gas, or liquid-metal cooled SMR designs. The extensive use of passive safety features in SMRs promise to make these plants highly robust, protecting both the general public and the owner/investor. Once demonstrated, these plants should allow nuclear power to be used confidently for a broader range of customers and applications than will be possible with large plants alone.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

U.S. NRC CONFIRMATORY LEVEL 1 PRA SUCCESS CRITERIA ACTIVITIES

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s standardized plant analysis risk (SPAR) models are used to support a number of risk-informed initiatives. The fidelity and realism of these models are ensured through a number of processes including cross-comparison with industry models, review and use by a wide range of technical experts, and confirmatory analysis. This paper will describe a key activity in the latter arena. Specifically, this paper will describe MELCOR analyses performed to augment the technical basis for confirming or modifying specific success criteria of interest. The analyses that will be summarized provide the basis for confirming or changing success criteria in a specific 3-loop pressurized-water reactor and a Mark-I boiling-water reactor. Initiators that have been analyzed include loss-of-coolant accidents, loss of main feedwater, spontaneous steam generator tube rupture, inadvertent opening of a relief valve at power, and station blackout. For each initiator, specific aspects of the accident evolution are investigated via a targeted set of calculations (3 to 22 distinct accident analyses per initiator). Further evaluation is ongoing to extend the analyses’ conclusions to similar plants (where appropriate), with consideration of design and modeling differences on a scenario-by-scenario basis. This paper will also describe future plans.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

STUDY ON AIR INGRESS MITIGATION METHODS IN THE VERY HIGH TEMPERATURE GAS COOLED REACTOR (VHTR)

An air-ingress accident followed by a pipe break is considered as a critical event for a very high temperature gas-cooled reactor (VHTR). Following helium depressurization, it is anticipated that unless countermeasures are taken, air will enter the core through the break leading to oxidation of the in-core graphite structure. Thus, without mitigation features, this accident might lead to severe exothermic chemical reactions of graphite and oxygen. Under extreme circumstances, a loss of core structural integrity may occur along with excessive release of radiological inventory. Idaho National Laboratory under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy is performing research and development (R&D) that focuses on key phenomena important during challenging scenarios that may occur in the VHTR. Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) studies to date have identified the air ingress event, following on the heels of a VHTR depressurization, as very important (Oh et al. 2006, Schultz et al. 2006). Consequently, the development of advanced air ingress-related models and verification and validation (V&V) requirements are part of the experimental validation plan. This paper discusses about various air-ingress mitigation concepts applicable for the VHTRs. The study begins with identifying important factors (or phenomena) associated with the air-ingress accident by using a root-cause analysis. By preventing main causes of the important events identified in the root-cause diagram, the basic air-ingress mitigation ideas can be conceptually derived. The main concepts include (1) preventing structural degradation of graphite supporters; (2) preventing local stress concentration in the supporter; (3) preventing graphite oxidation; (4) preventing air ingress; (5) preventing density gradient driven flow; (4) preventing fluid density gradient; (5) preventing fluid temperature gradient; (6) preventing high temperature. Based on the basic concepts listed above, various air-ingress mitigation methods are proposed in this study. Among them, the following two mitigation ideas are extensively investigated using computational fluid dynamic codes (CFD): (1) helium injection in the lower plenum, and (2) reactor enclosure opened at the bottom. The main idea of the helium injection method is to replace air in the core and the lower plenum upper part by buoyancy force. This method reduces graphite oxidation damage in the severe locations of the reactor inside. To validate this method, CFD simulations are addressed here. A simple 2-D CFD model is developed based on the GT-MHR 600MWt design. The simulation results showed that the helium replace the air flow into the core and significantly reduce the air concentration in the core and bottom reflector potentially protecting oxidation damage. According to the simulation results, even small helium flow was sufficient to remove air in the core, mitigating the air-ingress successfully. The idea of the reactor enclosure with an opening at the bottom changes overall air-ingress mechanism from natural convection to molecular diffusion. This method can be applied to the current system by some design modification of the reactor cavity. To validate this concept, this study also uses CFD simulations based on the simplified 2-D geometry. The simulation results showed that the enclosure open at the bottom can successfully mitigate air-ingress into the reactor even after on-set natural circulation occurs.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION MONITORING IN THE CHERNOBYL EXCLUSION ZONE - HISTORY AND RESULTS 25 YEARS AFTER

This article describes results of the radiation environmental monitoring performed in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ) during the period following the 1986 Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident. This article presents a brief overview of five comprehensive reports generated under Contract No. DE-AC09-96SR18500 (Washington Savannah River Company LLC, Subcontract No. AC55559N, SOW No. ON8778) and summarizes characteristics of the ChEZ and its post-accident status and the history of development of the radiation monitoring research in the ChEZ is described. This article addresses characteristics of the radiation monitoring in the ChEZ, its major goals and objectives, and changes of these goals and objectives in the course of time, depending on the tasks associated with the phase of mitigation of the ChNPP accident consequences. The results of the radiation monitoring in the ChEZ during the last 25 years are also provided.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DEPOSITION VELOCITY ESTIMATION WITH THE GENII V2 SOFTWARE

In 2010, the Department of Energy (DOE) Chief of Nuclear Safety and Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS), with the support of industry experts in atmospheric sciences and accident dose consequences analysis, performed detailed analyses of the basis for the dry deposition velocity (DV) values used in the MACCS2 computer code. As a result of these analyses, DOE concluded that the historically used default DV values of 1 centimeter/second (cm/s) for unfiltered/unmitigated releases and 0.1 cm/s for filtered/mitigated releases may not be reasonably conservative for all DOE sites and accident scenarios. HSS recently issued Safety Bulletin 2011-02, Accident Analysis Parameter Update, recommending the use of the newly developed default DV, 0.1 cm/s for an unmitigated/unfiltered release. Alternatively site specific DV values can be developed using GENII version 2 (GENII v2) computer code. Key input parameters for calculating DV values include surface roughness, maximum wind speed for calm, particle size, particle density and meteorological data (wind speed and stability class). This paper will include reasonably conservative inputs, and a truncated parametric study. In lieu of the highly-conservative recommended DV value (0.1cm/s) for unmitigated/unfiltered release, GENII v2 has been used to justify estimated 95th percentile DV values. Also presented here are atmospheric dilution factors ({chi}/Q values) calculated with the MACCS2 code using the DV values form GENII v2, {chi}/Q values calculated directly with GENII v2, and a discussion of these results compare with one another. This paper will give an overview of the process of calculating DV with GENII v2 including a discussion of the sensitivity of input parameters.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Metal Matrix Microencapsulated (M3) fuel neutronics performance in PWRs

Metal Matrix Microencapsulated (M3) fuel consists of TRISO or BISO coated fuel particles directly dispersed in a matrix of zirconium metal to form a solid rod (Fig. 1). In this integral fuel concept the cladding tube and the failure mechanisms associated with it have been eliminated. In this manner pellet-clad-interactions (PCI), thin tube failure due to oxidation and hydriding, and tube pressurization and burst will be absent. M3 fuel, given the high stiffness of the integral rod design, could as well improve grid-to-rod wear behavior. Overall M3 fuel, compared to existing fuel designs, is expected to provide greatly improved operational performance. Multiple barriers to fission product release (ceramic coating layers in the coated fuel particle and te metal matrix) and the high thermal conductivity zirconium alloy metal matrix contribute to the enhancement in fuel behavior. The discontinuous nature of fissile material encapsulated in coated particles provides additional assistance; for instance if the M3 fuel rod is snapped into multiple pieces, only the limited number of fuel particles at the failure cross section are susceptible to release fission products. This is in contrast to the conventional oxide fuel where the presence of a small opening in the cladding provides the pathway for release of the entire inventory of fission products from the fuel rod. While conventional metal fuels (e.g. U-Zr and U-Mo) are typically expected to experience large swelling under irradiation due to the high degree of damage from fission fragments and introduction of fission gas into the lattice, this is not the case for M3 fuels. The fissile portion of the fuel is contained within the coated particle where enough room is available to accommodate fission gases and kernel swelling. The zirconium metal matrix will not be exposed to fission products and its swelling is known to be very limited when exposed solely to neutrons. Under design basis RIA and LOCA, fuel performance will be superior to the conventional oxide fuel since PCMI and rod burst, respectively, have been mitigated. Under beyond design basis accident scenarios where the fuel is exposed to high temperature steam for prolonged periods, larger inventory of zirconium metal in the core could negatively affect the accident progression. A thin steam resistant layer (e.g. alumina forming alloy steel), integrated into the solid rod during fabrication by co-extrusion or hot-isostatic-pressing, offers the potential to provide additional fuel protection from steam interaction: blanketing under a range of boiling regimes and under severe accident conditions up to high temperatures well beyond what is currently possible in the conventional fuel. A crucial aspect to the viability of M3 fuel in light water reactors is the reduced heavy metal load compared to standard pellet fuel. This study evaluated the design requirements to operate a Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) with M3 fuel in order to obtain fuel cycle length, reactivity coefficients, and power peaking factors comparable to that of standard fuel.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Fuel-Coolant Interaction Results for High Energy In-Pile LWR Fuels Experiments

Fuel-coolant interaction (FCI) has long been a subject of interest in severe-accident reactor safety applications. Significant chemical interaction also frequently results at the high temperature associated with these events in a water environment. Historical rapid, high energy transient irradiation test results are reviewed for experiments performed in transient experimental reactors in Idaho. Though such events are not credible for any deployed nuclear reactor technology, the pressure waves produced by FCI on surrounding containment structures are of importance to advanced light water reactor designs and for transient experiment design considerations. A brief introduction to steam explosion and related studies is provided in the context of these experiments. Extensive reactivity initiated accident testing programs were carried out in the Transient REActor Test (TREAT) facility, the Special Power Excursion Reactor Test (SPERT) facility, and the Power Burst Facility (PBF) from the 1960’s through the late 1970’s. A variety of fuel forms including waterlogged rods were tested in capsules containing water coolant at standard temperature pressure. A few tests were performed at high pressure and temperature in the water loop of PBF. In many of these experiments, energy deposition was high enough to greatly exceed melting temperatures of the fuel, resulting in some fraction of the fuel being dispersed into the coolant. A purpose of many of these tests was to determine the nuclear-to-mechanical energy conversion ratio as well as the extent of metal-water reaction. Relevant data collected from these tests included transient energy deposition, pressure response of the coolant, water column velocity, total hydrogen generation, and resulting particle size distributions and particle characterization. In this paper, the mechanical configuration of each experiment facility is reviewed and discussed relative to the measured responses. The empirical results for source pressure and extent of metal-water reaction are presented in the context of the experimental conditions. The results of these experiments provide a unique understanding for behavior of fuel under severe accident conditions in a reactor environment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Modelling Advanced Technology Fuels

Interest in new fuel technologies remains high after more than six years since the incident at Fukushima-Daiichi. Significant programs at national institutions and private companies work to understand new materials in an effort to improve the accident tolerance of nuclear fuel. Recently, the community has begun to use the title “Advanced Technology Fuels” to communicate that current fuels already have a degree of accident tolerance and to indicate that accident tolerance is not the only driving force in new fuel technology development. Any new fuel material faces challenges for widespread adoption. One significant challenge is the lack of experimental data. Experimental programs at Halden and elsewhere are working to provide the necessary experimental data, but much remains to be done. Given this lack of data, the use of modeling tools that can provide guidance during the design process is attractive. Support of advanced technology fuel modeling has been a significant point of emphasis in the BISON project over the past few years. We demonstrate the modeling capability, and the adaptability, of BISON using analyses of FeCrAl cladding, U3Si2 fuel, coated Zircaloy cladding, and SiC composite cladding. These examples point out strengths and weaknesses of the concepts, clarify where experimental data would be particularly useful, and indicate the utility of BISON for modeling current and future advanced technology fuels.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Application of the CFD CONV code to the analysis of LIVE L6 test

The thermo-physical behaviour of a corium pool in reactor pressure vessel of a pressurised water reactor is of principal importance for the prediction of core melt down accident development. This concerns, in general, the understanding of a severe accident with core melting, its course, major critical phases and timing, and the influence of these processes on the accident progression in terms of assessing the possibility to remove the released heat by external vessel cooling. The general objective of the LIVE program at KIT is to study phenomena resulting from core melting experimentally in large-scale 3D geometry with emphasis on the transient behaviour. The presented paper describes analysis and interpretation of the LIVE L6 experiment, in which the molten pool (non-eutectic melt KNO{sub 3}-NaNO{sub 3}) was separated by horizontal copper plate in order to develop the approach to the analysis of layering and focusing effects as the most challenging factors. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

The MacArthur Maze Fire and Roadway Collapse: Consequences for SNF Transportation - 12476

In 2007, a severe transportation accident occurred near Oakland, California, on a section of Interstate 880 known as the 'MacArthur Maze', involving a tractor trailer carrying gasoline which impacted an overpass support column and burst into flames. The subsequent fire caused the collapse of portions of the Interstate 580 overpass onto the remains of the tractor-trailer in less than 20 minutes, due to a reduction of strength in the structural steel exposed to the fire. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission is in the process of examining the impacts of this accident on the performance of a spent nuclear fuel transportation package, using detailed analysis models, in order to determine the potential regulatory implications related to the safe transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. This paper will provide a summary of this effort and present results and conclusions. The detailed thermal models of the MacArthur Maze fire scenario with ANSYS and COBRASFS have produced preliminary results indicating that in a fire of this severity, the peak fuel cladding temperature would almost certainly exceed the short-term limit of 570 deg. C (1058 deg. F), and would likely exceed the Zircaloy burst temperature limit of 750 deg. C (1382 deg. F) assumed in previous transportation studies. Additional work is needed to refine and verify some of the details of these complex models, but the overall results are consistent with previous fire analyses with similar models, and with the results obtained for the HAC fire evaluations with these models. These results as well as future results produced by these models can therefore be considered as reliable estimates of the temperatures that would be experienced in fire conditions of the severity of the MacArthur Maze fire scenario. The structural analyses show that the GA-4 package is robust enough to withstand the impact of the overhead span without suffering major damage or deformation to the containment boundary. The greatest potential for local package damage in this scenario appears to be at the bolted closure end. The thermal expansion response of the closure bolts and impact limiter attachment bolts were evaluated in a separate analysis, and it was determined that both the lid and impact limiters are expected to remain in place. The response of the closure seal is currently being evaluated separately in the context of the accident's overall potential to release radioactive material in the environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

U.S. department of energy safety design strategy review and approval beyond critical decision 3 for the high-level waste facility - 15525

The Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in Hanford, Washington, is the nation's largest environmental remediation construction project. In 2012, at the WTP's High-Level Waste (HLW) Facility, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of River Protection (ORP) restricted construction work at the Hazard Category 2 nuclear facility because of unresolved technical issues associated with the facility and of misalignment of the design and nuclear safety basis. By 2013, as additional issues were discovered, ORP limited HLW design and procurement activities. Addressing the technical issues and the misalignment of the design basis with the Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis (PDSA) is a priority for ORP. A proposal was developed to use the concept of a safety design strategy (SDS), as documented in DOE-STD-1189-2008, Integration of Safety into the Design Process, as a planning mechanism to support facility design and PDSA alignment. The standard provides the processes to develop an SDS that will ensure safety is integrated into design early in the project, by the start of preliminary design. Ultimately, as design progresses, an SDS is intended to support development of the project's PDSA. However, in this unique case, the HLW Facility design and construction phase has progressed beyond Critical Decision 3 and DOE-STD-1189-2008 was issued in 2008; 6 years after ORP approved the first WTP PDSA. In July 2013, ORP and the contractor recognized that the unresolved technical issues and design - safety basis misalignment should be addressed through a renewed look at nuclear safety requirements, and agreed that developing an SDS tailored to the criteria in DOE-STD-1189-2008 provided the best path forward to better integrate design and safety. Development of the SDS for the HLW Facility was one of many goals ORP established in a plan that describes how ORP will determine whether, and under what conditions, the contractor should be authorized to proceed with production engineering, procurement, and construction activities for the HLW Facility. Over the next several months, the contractor developed the draft SDS, identifying design basis accidents and control strategies for those accidents. ORP monitored progress and, when appropriate, provided recommendations. In April 2014, the contractor provided a draft SDS to ORP for initial review by an independent DOE Review Team. The Review Team was comprised of representatives from nuclear safety, criticality safety, engineering, fire protection, the Office of Environmental Management, the Assistant Manager WTP, and the DOE Chief of Nuclear Safety. A unique draft document review and interactive review process, facilitated through work sessions and continuous communication with the contractor, culminated in the development of 147 technical comments on topics varying from SDS implementation to hydrogen deflagration in vessels. Comment resolution sought to improve project clarity, delineation of control strategies, and, holistically, facilitate integration of safety into design in the SDS, as it will guide the restart of the HLW Facility production engineering and limited procurement and construction activities. All comments were resolved in support of a contractor submission of the final SDS to ORP at the end of June 2014. Successful resolution of these comments was achieved by continuing the real-time response and incorporation interaction with the contractor to ensure that mutual objectives were satisfied. The response times were facilitated through telephone, E-mail, and a shared file server accessible to contractor and DOE reviewers across the DOE complex. As a measure of success of this process, the Safety Basis Approval Authority (ORP Manager) and the WTP Federal Project Director approved the SDS on August 1, 2014, with no conditions of approval. DOE and the contractor recognized that it would be difficult to implement the SDS without changes to the existing contractor's engineering and nuclear safety processes. Accordingly, the contractor developed or revised a significant number of engineering and nuclear safety plans and procedures to implement the SDS into the design process. Over the coming year, the contractor will conduct a gap analysis between the SDS and the presently approved PDSA to incorporate the design basis accidents and preferred control strategies developed from the SDS into the PDSA. In addition, ORP will conduct an assessment of the contractor's implementation of the SDS into the design process at the appropriate stage of implementation, within 6 to 12 months of approval. Although the SDS was developed late in the HLW project timeline, the document will facilitate alignment of design and the safety basis, and is a key step in the return to full production engineering for the HLW Facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Geo-polymer solidification technology approved by Czech / Slovak nuclear authority to immobilise NPP resins and sludge waste - 15555

This paper presents the features and performance record of the geo-polymer solidification technology, SIAL{sup R}, licensed for use by both the Slovakian (UJD SR) and Czech Nuclear (SUJB) regulators. An overview of its performance at Bohunice in Slovakia, where it has been used to successfully treat resins and sludge wasteforms will be provided along with references to other plants where it has been used. More recently, geo-polymers have been noted as an immobilization technology which shows potential for resins produced by treatment of radioactive contaminated water resulting from the clean-up of the Fukushima Daiichi Plant. The Nuclear Power Plant A-1 located in Jaslovske Bohunice was completed in 1972 and operated for 5 years until two accidents in 1976 and 1977. After the second accident in February 1977 (INES level 4) the Nuclear Power Plant was permanently shut down for decommissioning. Fuel assemblies and fuel cladding damaged in the accidents led to significant Sr-90, Cs-137 and transuranic contamination. As a consequence of the long-term corrosion of the barrier's material, highly contaminated sludge accumulated which could not be effectively immobilized using conventional methods such as cementation or bitumen treatment due to adverse physical-chemical properties and high specific activity of the waste (Cs-137). This challenge led to AMEC developing and licensing the geo-polymer, SIAL{sup R}. Today, this geo-polymer is one of the most proven and widely used for on-site solidification of radioactive materials such as sludge, resins, sorbents and organic liquids. There are numerous benefits to using this geo-polymer for waste immobilisation. It can be used at room temperature and can incorporate up to approximately four times as much waste (sludge, resin) as a Portland cement matrix equivalent depending on the waste being treated. In addition, it is characterized by excellent mechanical and physical properties, compared with the earlier generation techniques. This includes higher mechanical strength, lower leachability, low volatility, posing a low fire risk and excellent physical stability in the presence of frost and water (no distortion or cracking). Dedicated facilities to receive and encapsulate waste from different locations can be created but this geo-polymer can also provide efficient and practical on-site treatment of radioactive waste streams. This is achievable because the equipment used to encapsulate waste using SIAL{sup R} is also modular, flexible and versatile. At Bohunice, the facility for encapsulation was designed to occupy existing areas of the plant in close proximity to the tanks where the waste was being stored. This allowed for the removal of the waste using Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs) and for the waste to be immediately treated on site without the need for transportation saving both time and resource. To achieve this, some of the rooms and areas of the building were assessed and modified to ensure that the waste package flow was suitable whilst ensuring that appropriate safety measures were in place such as adequate shielding to reduce or entirely eliminate dose uptake of workers. To date, SIAL{sup R} has been used to successfully immobilize approximately 500 tons of waste which includes sludge and resin from Bohunice, Slovakia and approximately 250 m{sup 3} of spent ion exchange resins from tanks on site at the Dukovany nuclear plant, Czech Republic. It now has a track record of over 15 years which includes on-going research and development. The International missions WANO and OSART evaluated the SIAL{sup R} matrix technology at NPP Dukovany as an example of good practice. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Overview and status of domestic and international standards for nuclear criticality safety

For many years, the domestic and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for those performing hands-on operations involving fissionable materials. These consensus standards have been crucial to reducing the number of criticality accidents in process facilities. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (39 years ago at this writing) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-Mura, Japan, in 1999 (18 years ago at this writing). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. There are currently eighteen standards in revision (seven) or maintenance (eleven) cycles, and one standard is currently in development. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, Nuclear Criticality Safety. Seven standards are currently available, one standard is in revision, and four standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report of domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development. (author)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

High-fidelity simulation-driven model development for coarse-grained computational fluid dynamics

Nuclear reactor safety analysis requires analysis of a broad range of accident scenarios and determining their consequences. For a nuclear power plant behavior, it is impossible to obtain experimental data at sufficiently large scales to support calibration and validation of various system models. In single-phase flow convective problems, high-resolution methods of Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) such as Direct Numerical Simulation (DNS) and Large Eddy Simulation (LES) can provide high fidelity results under conditions where physical measurements are unavailable. However, such high-resolution simulations are computationally expensive and not suitable for simulation of long transient scenarios in nuclear reactor accidents. In this work, we investigate the use of a high fidelity simulation-driven approach to model sub-grid scale (SGS) effect in Coarse Grained Computational Fluid Dynamics CG-CFD. Notably, fine-mesh simulations are used to construct physics-informed statistical surrogate of coarse-mesh SGS model. For an initial analysis, we consider a case of turbulent natural convection in a volumetrically heated fluid layer with a thermally insulated lower boundary and isothermal upper boundary. This scenario of unstable stratification is relevant to turbulent natural convection in a severe nuclear reactor accident, as well as in containment mixing and passive cooling. For this type of flow, the SGS effect is modeled by an added turbulent diffusivity in the energy equation. It is shown that a global correction for the energy equation is sufficient to achieve a significant improvement to the CG-CFD prediction of thermal mixing in the fluid layer. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗