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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Integration of the NCRC Database and Other INL Databases

The Nuclear Computational Resource Center provides a portal by which industry professionals, educational staff, students, national laboratory employees, and others may request access to certain engineering software tools. As the tools provided through the Nuclear Computational Resource Center portal are not open-source and freely available, a set of approvals are necessary before access is granted. All code recipients must be associated with an institution that has a license with Idaho National Laboratory for the code requested. Information about these licenses is controlled by Idaho National Laboratory’s Technology Deployment organization and housed in a Technology Deployment database. Those requesting code access who are not citizens of the United States must also have a security plan, mandated by Idaho National Laboratory policy. Security plans are managed by the International Access Program and are stored in an International Access Program database known as IFacts. Granting access to software thus depends on information stored in the Technology Deployment database and IFacts. In the past, no connection between the Nuclear Computational Resource Center portal and these databases existed, making checking the status of license agreements and security plans time consuming and error prone. This report demonstrates that the Nuclear Computational Resource Center portal now connects to both the Technology Deployment database and IFacts, greatly improving the ease of use of the Nuclear Computational Resource Center system for administrators, which leads to a better overall experience for those requesting code access.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Regulatory Considerations for Nuclear Energy Applications of Digital Twin Technologies

Digital twins (DTs) in complex industrial and engineering applications have potential benefits that include increased operational efficiencies, enhanced safety and reliability, improved security engineering, reduced errors, faster information sharing, and better predictions. The interest in DT technologies continues to grow, and many of these advanced technologies are expected to experience rapid and wide industry adoption in the near future. Some of the potential application areas for DTs in the nuclear industry are design, licensing, plant construction, training simulators, predictive operations and maintenance, autonomous operation and control, failure and degradation prediction, physical protection modeling and simulation, and safety and reliability analyses. The Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has initiated a future-focused research project to assess the regulatory viability of DTs for nuclear power plants and other NRC-regulated activities, such as fuel cycle facilities and operations. This report explores the potential impact of DT technologies in nuclear applications on NRC-regulated activities of interest. This report describes a nuclear DT system and its capabilities for nuclear power plant applications, followed by identification and discussion of some regulated activities that merit special consideration and present opportunities in implementing DT-enabling technologies and capabilities.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Portal Monitoring Considerations for Treaty Verification Applications

Portal monitoring is one method in a suite of options for treaty verification and can assist in verification of treaty accountable items (TAIs). Portal monitor technology spans a wide range of sensors, including radiation detectors, break-beams, or weight sensors. For radiation-detecting portal monitors, they are able to confirm absence / presence of a radiological signature and to track TAI direction of motion. Portal monitoring uses measurements from strategically placed sensors (e.g., radiation detectors) to record the entry or egress of TAIs. The implementation of portal monitoring relies on three key elements: perimeter definition, portal locations, and sensor technology, and can be implemented in either time-bound or continuous operations depending on what is permitted by the Treaty.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Fusion Innovation and the Valley of Death—Lessons from Fission

Over the past several decades, the United States (U.S.) and other countries have done important research and development in advanced nuclear energy technologies, both fission and fusion. The urgency of our current climate, energy, and security needs have prompted a concerted effort by innovators, investors, and the public sector to transition from research and development (R&D) to demonstration and commercialization—to cross the proverbial “valley of death.” The stakes are high: humanity needs clean energy options, and the failure of any promising alternative will lower our odds of success. The process of moving an innovation into use has often been described in phases that begin with early research and end with deployment at scale. Between those two phases lies an area often referred to as the “valley of death” because it can require a long period of time, large investments, and often includes significant challenges related to regulation, standardization, and entering markets already structured around incumbent technologies. What can we learn from recent experience with fission to inform our path forward with fusion? At least five key lessons rise to the top: 1) Set bold targets; 2) Empower the private sector; 3) Engage with regulators and the public; 4) Address costs and markets; and 5) Deliver results. Here, this editorial will consider each of these in turn.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Infrastructure and resource development needs to support a significant expansion of US nuclear capacity

In December 2023, the United States pledged at a United Nations conference to triple nuclear energy by 2050. In May of 2025 a new administration announced plans to quadruple nuclear energy by 2025, setting a new target that requires understanding the key infrastructure and resources needed to achieve large-scale deployment. This study attempts to quantify “what it takes” to deploy an additional 200 GWe of nuclear capacity. It projects demand levels for workforce, fuel, uranium mining and enrichment, waste management, supply chain, land, licensing, and water. Demand growth is also contextualized. For example, the peak number of construction workers required is approximately 215,000, a 37 % increase in the current US utility construction workforce. Up to 80,000 MT/year of mined uranium will be needed, necessitating a 60-fold increase in US mining production or a doubling of global mining if sourced externally. Advanced reactor fuels, uranium mining, and nuclear-grade equipment production would need substantial expansion. Operational workforce, enrichment needs, and licensing submissions also face significant increases. Although water consumption may see relatively lower increases, securing water rights poses unique challenges. This study consolidates various demand metrics in a broad context, highlighting the necessity of early preparations, such as workforce training, to support a tripling of nuclear energy. While it outlines the demand-side requirements, it does not assess the difficulties of ramping up or other supply-side issues. The findings also shed light on the impact of reactor size and reactor technology on various demand metrics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Wireless Sensing and Communication Capability from In-Core to a Monitoring Center

Significant cost savings can be made if electrical cables can be replaced by wireless technology in current Nuclear Power Plants (NPP) and in advance reactor designs. Wireless technology can also provide in-core opportunities by significantly reducing the number of penetrations in the pressure vessel, cost and complexity of sensor installation and by increasing the efficiency of current and advanced reactors. Unlike other deployment scenarios for an industrial environment, operators need to have centralized control over all the networks. Centralized control will reduce implementation costs, provide single point control and enable monitoring of network devices, improve security, and enhance connectivity. Micro-sensors that can simultaneously monitor temperature and pressure within a fuel rod inside nuclear reactors will enable preventative actions during abnormal operating conditions. This ability could avert accidents and enable the expedient development of accident tolerant fuels. A novel micro-sensor suite (~ mm) to simultaneously measure multiple parameters such as temperature, strain, pressure, and neutron/gamma flux inside a fuel rod is being developed for use in reactors. The necessary communication architecture is also being developed to transmit measurement signals from the core to the plant's data cloud or control room. A three three-tier strategy has been developed to support wireless transmission of in-core measurements to the control room or to a secure cloud platform for control, analytics, and decision-making purposes. 1. In-core: data signal from in-core to outside of the pressure vessel within the containment building 2. Containment building: data signal from inside to the outside of the containment building and into the balance of the plant network 3. Balance of the plant network: information transmitted to the data cloud and control room This plan presents a wireless sensing and communication system for use within a reactor core and elsewhere. The communication technology is advantageous to compensate for network equipment failures and adverse data transmission conditions. Wireless technology will significantly increase the resiliency of the plants network system. The wireless system naturally provides multiple transmission path capability and data redundancy.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Thinking the Other Unthinkable: Disarmament in North Korea and Beyond

The P5 have defined nuclear disarmament as both a process and an end state. Differences of view about the latter are sharp, bitter, and abiding. This has stripped the discussion about the former of much of its potential content and value. Where might we get, practically and conceptually, if we were to set aside for now questions about the ultimate feasibility and desirability of the long-term goal and focus instead on the process? Further, what if we were also to posit that there will be no “fundamental transformation” of the international political system of a kind that would make the nuclear-armed states, and their unarmed neighbors, unconcerned about the effectiveness of mechanisms for peace and security in a disarmed and disarming world? In this context, might it be possible to give states the confidence they would require to take more ambitious incremental steps on the disarmament pathway? How could such steps contribute to the relaxation of international tensions that the NPT itself describes as a critical enabler of disarmament? These questions motivate this timely and innovative new work by Toby Dalton and George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Their core objective is to “infuse needed realism into disarmament discussions.” Using North Korean disarmament as a test case, they explore a series of practical challenges and associated conceptual issues to frame a discussion of the possible disarming nucleararmed states. They begin by rightly noting that neither the advocates of the Ban treaty nor the advocates of North Korean disarmament have set our practical agendas for achieving their aims. They conclude that without an infusion of realism the “two polarized blocks” will continue to “stonewall and repel each other” and thus that “the risks of global nuclear disorder will grow.” This is the latest in the series of Livermore Papers begun in 2017 to stimulate the development of new strategic thought on emerging nuclear challenges. Conceptually, it is a follow-on to the inaugural Livermore Paper by Lewis Dunn on disarmament pathways. The views expressed in these papers are those of the authors and should not be attributed to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or any of its sponsors.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Panel Session 145: Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF

Issues associated with establishing a SNF Transportation System in the U.S. are complex. In part, this is because in the US when discussing SNF, there are two distinct categories. The two categories represent significant differences in ownership, transportation-regulator, and even the physical characteristics of the SNF. Specifically, the physical differences in the SNF include size of the rods, associated quantities to be shipped, cladding material, and radionuclide content/enrichment. The first is commercial SNF (i.e., that associated with nuclear power plants), owned by utilities, until a permanent repository is built with DOE obligated by law to then assume the responsibility for shipping and ownership of the SNF. Since no-permanent repository currently exists, most commercial SNF is stored near the reactor in which it was installed, hence requiring no shipments. Although current shipments of commercial SNF are very limited, the few that do occur are generally performed to support a utilities SNF consolidation effort utility and for post irradiation examination/testing. However, with approximately 83,000 metric tons currently being stored at more than 70 sites around the U.S., when a permanent repository becomes available, the required number of shipments will be extensive. The second category is DOE and research reactor fuel. These fuel rods are generally much smaller in length than commercial fuel rods, with the quantity of rods transported in a shipment significantly less than the number of rods in a typical commercial fuel assembly. Currently, most of the SNF shipments within the U.S come from this category. DOE is currently managing about 2500 metric tons of heavy metal of SNF. This panel focused on updates and status of transportation of SNF/UNF. Panelists provided updates and information on continuing impacts, risk assessment, equipment (rail cars, handling, securement), possible rail routing, and proposed inspection equipment/routing prior to shipments. Panelists with presentations: Preparing for Nuclear Waste Transportation (Daniel Ogg); Challenges and Opportunities in Establishing a System for Transportation of SNF/UNF (Kathy Langan); UNF Transportation: Challenges and Opportunities (Michael Valenzano)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

High-Level Considerations for Access and Access Controls by Design

Nuclear power plants must be, by design and construction, robust structures and difficult to penetrate. Ideally, for security, the reactors would be sited underground, beneath a massive solid block, too thick to be penetrated by tools or explosives with all communications and power transfer lines also underground and fortified. Limiting access with difficult-to-penetrate physical barriers is going to be key for determining response and staffing requirements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nevada National Security Site Demonstration Reactor Siting and Capabilities Study

The NNSS Demonstration Reactor Siting and Capabilities study identifies siting opportunities supporting the demonstration of advanced and emerging reactor designs and operations in a manner that optimizes these activities within the NNSS physical, operational, and regulatory footprint considering relevant evaluation factors to ensure the designated site locations provide the necessary defense-in-depth for safe and secure sustained operations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Take an unclassified peek inside the Lab’s classified library

Just think of these sample relics: A step-by-step manual on how to assemble a Fat Man atomic bomb. A patent application for the world’s first nuclear weapons. Laboratory notebooks of Nobel laureates. And much more. The collections at the National Security Research Center (NSRC) contain millions of historical materials and traces its origin to the Technical Library started by J. Robert Oppenheimer in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project, which was the U.S. government’s top-secret effort to create the first atomic bombs. Since then, these collections have grown and are relied upon by today’s scientists, engineers, and researchers who support our national security mission. The NSRC is the Lab’s classified library that also houses unclassified legacy materials. In recognition of National Library Week (April 3 - 9), staff from the NSRC picked some of their favorite pieces of preserved Laboratory history.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Materials and Fuels Complex (FY22 – FY26 Five-Year Investment Strategy)

The Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) vision is to “Advance nuclear energy science and technology to meet U.S. energy, environmental, and economic needs.” The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) serves as the foundation of a nuclear RD&D enabling test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and is an integral part of a National Reactor Innovation Center (NRIC) strategy. MFC facilities focus on developing and maintaining RD&D capabilities that can increase research throughput, reduce barriers to deployment, and facilitate commercialization of new ideas and technologies for clean and secure sources of energy.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Measuring very low radiation doses in PTFE for nuclear forensic enrichment reconstruction

Every country that has made nuclear weapons has used uranium enrichment to do so. Despite the centrality of this technology to international security, there is still no reliable physical marker of past enrichment in the open literature that can be used to perform forensic verification of historically produced weapons on gas centrifuges. We show that the extremely low radioactivity from uranium alpha emissions during enrichment leaves detectable and irreversible calorimetric signatures in the common enrichment gasket material PTFE, allowing for historical reconstruction of past enrichment activities at a sensitivity better than one weapon’s quantity of highly enriched uranium. Fast scanning calorimetry also enables the measurement of recrystallization enthalpies of sequentially microtomed slices, confirming the magnitude and the type of radiation exposure while also providing detection of tampering and a method for analyzing field samples useful for treaty verification. Furthermore, this work opens the door for common items to be turned into precise dosimeters to detect the past presence of radioactivity, nuclear materials, and related activities with high confidence.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Sensitivity Studies, Gap Analysis, and Benchmark Experiment Optimization for Reactor Physics and Criticality Safety Applications

Many new reactor designs, such as advanced reactors and micro reactors, have materials that lack nuclear data validation. This is also true for many other applications in criticality safety and global security. Both differential and integral experiments are needed to validate cross-section data. Without this, a user cannot have confidence in the predicted results of a radiation-transport code. This work describes an approach called ARCHIMEDES (Application Relevant Critical/Subcritical HEU/Pu-based Integral Measurements for Enhancing Data and Evaluating Sensitivities) to design new criticality experiments that have similar k eff cross-section sensitivities to an application of interest. This process involves simulations to generate cross-section sensitivities to a parameter of interest (such as k eff ), a gap analysis to determine which existing benchmarks are most similar to the application, and an experiment optimization. Recently, there has been a great deal of interest in the reactor physics community on advanced reactors, micro reactors, and accelerator driven systems (ADS). This work will apply the described method to specific examples in this area. The focus of this work will be on the sensitivity study and gap analysis, while future work will include experiment design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Designs Security Analysis, Risk, and Recommendations: Risks, Consequences, and Possible by-Design Mitigation Approaches Associated with Select Advanced Reactors

Next-generation advanced reactors (ARs) incorporate enhanced safety systems, have smaller source terms, and feature compact modular designs, which should lessen their collective risk profiles. However, to fully evaluate risk, security needs to be a part of the equation. Without taking security into consideration, safety systems and components in the new ARs may be vulnerable to sabotage. These base attributes, coupled with enhanced security features specific to AR design through sound engineering and security-by-design (SeBD), should provide developers and operators with lower inherent security risk profiles. Building security early into the AR design may remove or passively secure potential critical targets from an adversary’s reach , thereby increasing overall safety and security. An integrated approach and diverse design team that includes engineering, operations, and security experts are fundamental to building security into the design without sacrificing fundamental operational efficiencies and principles. The objective of this project was to evaluate the security and safety interfaces for five classes of reactors, identify potential security vulnerabilities of structures, systems, and components (SSC), and underscore the need to consider security alongside safety in the design o f these concepts. The five reactor classes evaluated in this project and presented in this report are molten-salt reactors (MSR), high temperature gas reactors (HTGR), sodium-fast reactors (SFR), advanced light-water reactors (ALWR), and microreactors. These designs were selected because they reflect the concepts that are closest to market deployment and have received significant resource investments from the public and private sector. This project assesses the inherent security risks posed by common classes of ARs, provides a methodology and framework to assess security along with safety, and offers an analysis of potential mitigation strategies that could be incorporated. For each AR technology, the SSCs that relate to radionuclide source safety functions are discussed to understand the SSC contribution to safety and relative importance in the protective strategy for the design. The assumptions that went into evaluating each reactor concept originated from generic publicly available nonproprietary information and should not directly be used to qualify an absolute risk profile nor to rank specific AR designs. Instead, the purpose of the analysis is to understand and compare the generic inherent security risks of different AR technologies.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2023

Godiva IV Burst Reproducibility and Diagnostic Testing

Godiva IV is a fast burst critical assembly located at the Nation Criticality Experiment Research Center (NCERC) in the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). It is constructed of approximately 65 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel alloyed with 1.5% molybdenum for strength. The assembly can be operated at delayed critical or can be used to perform super-prompt critical bursts with temperature rises of up to 250 °C. Several projects with the objective of characterizing Go diva IV are ongoing including characterizations of its radiation emission and thermomechanics. One of the characterization projects is a study of the variability in the relative source emission (or fluence in absolute terms) between bursts that are nominally the same size. There is some inherent variation in the number of fissions, or "size" of the burst, even for bursts where the operators perform identical processes. The source of the variation can be attributed to several factors. The largest contributor is the precision with which the operators are able to determine delayed critical (DC). Operators find DC for every burst operation. The impact of being slightly above or below DC can change the super-prompt critical reactivity and therefore the source term. The temperature of the fuel is another factor. Establishing delayed critical prior to performing a burst act as a control of the bulk temperature coefficient of reactivity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Current Needs in Radiochemistry

There are a number of current needs in the development of the Pu and Am separations that underpin larger interest areas including nuclear waste issues, nuclear weapons, nuclear forensics, nuclear fuels and similarly related fields. In the large areas of interest, there are a number of sub-fields that include corrosion chemistry, pyrochemistry, solution-phase chemistry, rapid separations, environmental speciation, and other similar efforts. However, in all of the these fields it is important to realize that the underlying chemistry that underpins these efforts is similar in that Pu and Am are bound to ligands that can be in the solid, aqueous, or gas phase and separations occurs due to the preferential binding of the ligand to Pu or Am based on a number of factors that include pH, concentration, oxidation state, etc. In the past, most of the Pu and Am chemistry has occurred in limited scope within universities where micro-scale and bench-top scale chemistry are the dominate investigative theme. At US national laboratory and their international counterparts, larger scale reactions have been attempted such that industrial scale chemistry has been completed. Some of this technology has been harnessed in radiopharmaceuticals and nuclear fuel reprocessing. However, such bench-top research is expensive to due to the safety and security that is concerned when dealing with Pu, and scale-up of reactions is even more resource intensive. In an effort to offset this expensive, it would be of interest to explore the ability to predict selectivity based on the computational modeling of actinide chemistry. This has historically been limited by the abilities of large supercomputers, but with the emphasis on developing exascale computers within the US and similar efforts by other countries this predictive modeling has potential to produce significant results that would yield improved understanding of actinide chemistry.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗