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At least 1,621 records · Page 90
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Site-Directed Research & Development Annual Report Overview FY 2020

The SDRD program’s annual report for fiscal year 2020 consists of two parts: the program overview, which contains three major sections, Program Description, Program Accomplishments, and Program Value, and individual project report summaries published electronically on the Nevada National Security Site’s website, www.nnss.gov/pages/programs/sdrd.html. Complete technical reports for concluding projects are available from the Office of Scientific and Technical Information (OSTI) or the principal investigator.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2016

Automation and Database Collection and Extrapolation

This report highlights overall design consideration regarding automation and database collection and extrapolation prototype for Farmpod, LLC. There are potentially many combinations of software, hardware, and networking which suffices for the requirements. For this report, we suggest a Raspberry Pi 2 Model B for the hardware. We suggest the Mako application server for the user interface and RPIO python modules for automated software processes. At the present moment, security is not a major concern, but should be addressed during the initial design phase. The software stack consists of two primary components: the automated processes and application server to implement a user interface.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Pebble Bed Reactor: Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of High Temperature Gas Reactors (HTGRs) that utilize pebble-based fuels and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model HTGR that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic HTGR facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic HTGRs. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for SMRs. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all SMR designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

U.S. Domestic Microreactor Security-by-Design

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping cost reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security in the design process can provide robust, cost effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this work is both to develop a framework for the integration of security into the design phase of a microreactor and increase the use of modeling and simulation tools to optimize the design of physical protection systems. Specifically, this effort focuses on integrating security into the design phase of a model microreactor that meets current Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) physical protection requirements and providing advanced solutions to improve physical protection and decrease costs. A suite of tools, including SCRIBE3D©, PATHTRACE© and Blender© were used to model a hypothetical, generic domestic microreactor facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, cameras, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical protection systems. Multiple outsider sabotage scenarios were examined with four-to-eight adversaries to determine security metrics. The results of this work will influence physical protection system designs and facility designs for U.S. domestic microreactors. This work will also demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex can impact the design of and complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for microreactors. The conclusions and recommendations in this document may be applicable to all microreactor designs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Applied ML Needs in Uncrewed Aerial Systems [Slides]

We have an urgent need to optimize data analyses and UAS operations to better position its use in sensitive and high-consequence national security applications. LANL has a mature, robust, and multidisciplinary UAS deployment capability with proficiency in single and multi-modal data acquisition for signature detection.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2022

Equipment Testing Environment (ETE) Specification

Cyber security has been difficult to quantify from the perspective of defenders. The effort to develop a cyber-attack with some ability, function, or consequence has not been rigorously investigated in Operational Technologies. This specification defines a testing structure that allows conformal and repeatable cyber testing on equipment. The purpose of the ETE is to provide data necessary to analyze and reconstruct cyber-attack timelines, effects, and observables for training and development of Cyber Security Operation Centers. Standardizing the manner in which cyber security on equipment is investigated will allow a greater understanding of the progression of cyber attacks and potential mitigation and detection strategies in a scientifically rigorous fashion.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Data Science Model for Detecting Intelligent Malware

This study focused on developing a robust artificial intelligence (AI) model capable of detecting and characterizing advanced malware in Internet of Things (IoT) devices using network data. By analyzing network traffic with various machine learning (ML) models, our AI model can identify and characterize malicious activities to significantly improve malware detection accuracy and reliability as compared to traditional methods. The developed AI/ML model was trained using network data from IoT devices, leveraging classifiers such as Random Forest, Gradient Boosting, AdaBoost, and others to optimize detection performance. This project demonstrates a scalable framework for real-time malware detection and characterization in IoT networks, capable of identifying infected devices and facilitating the necessary steps to remove or isolate them, thereby preventing further infections. Although digital twin (DT) integration is not yet implemented in the current model, it represents a promising future enhancement. By creating a virtual replica of physical IoT devices, DT technology would allow for real-time monitoring and analysis without directly accessing operational technology, thus reducing the risk of compromising or reducing the performance of actual devices. This integration would further enhance the security of IoT ecosystems, combining AI technology to better flag and detect indications of malware-infected devices within a nuclear system environment.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Extended Duration: The SIRIUS 21 Crew Perspective

The SIRIUS (Scientific International Research In a Unique terrestrial Station) missions represent a collaborative effort between NASA and Russia’s Institute for Biomedical Problems (IBMP) to conduct a series of long duration isolation and confinement spaceflight analog missions. Three missions of 17-day, 4-month, and 8-month duration (SIRIUS 17, 19, and 21) have been completed at IBMP’s Ground-Based Experimental Complex / Nazemnyy eksperimental'nyy kompleks (NEK) in Moscow, Russia. The international SIRIUS 21 crew comprising representatives from the United States, United Arab Emirates and Russia recently completed the 8-month analog lunar mission. The extended duration mission included simulated lunar transit, orbital, and surface operations with corresponding deep space communication delay, during which the crew participated in nearly 70 studies, eight of which were sponsored by NASA’s Human Research Program. The studies examined the effect of isolation and confinement on the behavioral health of research subjects, and investigated medical countermeasures, team performance, crew dynamics, crew autonomy, food system risks, consequences of confinement and associated physiological stressors. SIRIUS 21 crewmembers also participated in operational tasks such as Rover and CubeSat assembly, simulated lunar sample assessment, VR activities, robotic arm training, environmental systems monitoring, exercise, greenhouse maintenance and 3D printing. Communication with Mission Control was limited to 30-minute periods every two hours. Since access to the internet and email was restricted, simulated ground support provided the Crew’s primary source of daily news and mission information. This panel discussion will include presentations from the US SIRIUS 21 crewmembers – William Brown and Ashley Kowalski – about their experience participating in the mission and science. A facilitated question and answer session will follow with attendees encouraged to ask questions and join in discussion with the SIRIUS 21 crewmembers about their experiences. William Brown came to SIRIUS 21 with experience spread across multiple industries, including the military, defense contracting, healthcare consulting, software engineering, and logistics. He has lived in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Russia. A former Boren Scholar, Brown is fluent in Russian. He holds a Master of International Business degree from the University of South Carolina’s Darla Moore School of Business. Prior to that, he earned a bachelor’s degree in Russian language, literature, and culture from the University of South Carolina. There, he also completed additional undergraduate coursework in computer science. Ashley Kowalski is a Project Leader in The Aerospace Corporation’s International Partnerships Department, where she works with, represents, and provides technical support to the the U.S. Space Force Space Systems Command International Affairs (SSC/IA) office. Through her numerous national and international assignments (Russia, China, and Germany), she has worked on topics related to international space systems, national security space systems, civil systems (including human spaceflight and civil launch projects), space policy, satellite industry analysis, and satellite manufacturing start-ups. She is proficient in Russian and German, and fluent in Polish. Kowalski received her Bachelor of Science and Master of Science degrees in mechanical and aerospace engineering from George Washington University in 2011 and 2012, respectively.

S. E. Whiting↗
DOE OSTI2018

Development of a Methodology to Assess the Impact of Non-Conventional Waste Streams Following a Radiological Incident - 18271

The Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST) is a Geographic Information System (GIS)-based decision support tool for estimating waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities following a radiological incident. WEST uses the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) Hazus-MH software's infrastructure information combined with image classification capabilities to estimate the quantity of waste and debris that may result from a radiological incident. WEST can be used to create customized decontamination strategies that allow end-users to evaluate different means of decontamination and how those strategies may impact the resulting waste stream in each geographical locality. This capability can potentially reduce the response/recovery time frame and cost. One of the key observations from past applications of WEST is that planning scenarios are site-specific, especially when dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) waste management issues. Furthermore, site-specific issues are not limited to resource limitations or response bottlenecks but should also account for differences in an area's geography and urban footprint, a phenomenon observed during the Fukushima response. For instance, a recent WEST case study found that the amount of waste generated per unit of affected area, for a given decontamination approach, is largely a function of the building surface area in the affected area (relative to the ground surfaces). However, differences in the geometry and density of contaminated objects in the landscape may impact the amount and characteristics of the waste stream. Although buildings typically constitute a large portion of the surface area in urban environments, other objects such as vehicles and trees can be just as prominent. For example, seasonal changes in the amount of foliage present can alter the non-structural surface area calculated for an area like New York City by 20-30%. Very little is known about the impact that these non-conventional waste streams have on overall remediation strategies, or to what extent differences in characteristics of urban versus rural environments, traffic activities, or seasonal variations may have on these factors. This paper will present the proposed methodology to incorporate into WEST the impacts that niche, nonconventional waste streams might have from rural and urban environments following a nuclear power plant incident or detonation of a radiological dispersal device or improvised nuclear device. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Outcome Following a Negative CT Angiogram for Gastrointestinal Hemorrhage

ObjectiveThis study was designed to evaluate the role of a negative computed tomography angiogram (CTA) in patients who present with gastrointestinal (GI) hemorrhage.MethodsA review of all patients who had CTAs for GI hemorrhage over an 8-year period from January 2005 to December 2012 was performed. Data for patient demographics, location of hemorrhage, hemodynamic stability, and details of angiograms and/or the embolization procedure were obtained from the CRIS/PACS database, interventional radiology database, secure electronic medical records, and patient’s clinical notes.ResultsA total of 180 patients had 202 CTAs during the 8-year period: 87 CTAs were performed for upper GI hemorrhage (18 positive for active bleeding, 69 negative) and 115 for lower GI hemorrhage (37 positive for active bleeding, 78 negative); 58.7 % (37/63) of patients with upper GI bleed and 77.4 % (48/62) of patients with lower GI bleed who had an initial negative CTA did not rebleed without the need for radiological or surgical intervention. This difference was statistically significant (p = 0.04). The relative risk of rebleeding, following a negative CTA, in lower GI bleeding versus upper GI bleeding patients is 0.55 (95 % confidence interval 0.32–0.95).ConclusionsPatients with upper GI bleed who had negative CTAs usually require further intervention to stop the bleeding. In contrast, most patients presenting with lower GI hemorrhage who had a negative first CTA were less likely to rebleed.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Design of a High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium Tri-Structural Isotropic Critical Experiment for Advanced Reactor Validation

High-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) fuel is a key component of many small modular reactor designs. Critical experiments are an important way to understand the neutronic performance of systems by obtaining nuclear data validations through measurements. Data reduce uncertainty and risk by showing that systems respond as predicted to changes such as temperature, subsequently advancing the overall technology readiness level of the materials within. Numerous critical experiments have been performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory at the Nevada National Security Site since it became operational in 2011. However, the first experiment with HALEU fuel did not occur until 2024. Through extensive engineering, the experiment described in this paper was successfully designed and executed for the Comet vertical lift assembly at NCERC to perform measurements with HALEU tri-structural isotropic fuel that will assist in validation of nuclear data and computational modeling of small modular reactors for years to come.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Measuring Equality in Machine Learning Security Defenses: A Case Study in Speech Recognition

Over the past decade, the machine learning security community has developed a myriad of defenses for evasion attacks. An understudied question in that community is: for whom do these defenses defend? This work considers common approaches to defending learned systems and how security defenses result in performance inequities across different sub-populations. We outline appropriate parity metrics for analysis and begin to answer this question through empirical results of the fairness implications of machine learning security methods. We find that many methods that have been proposed can cause direct harm, like false rejection and unequal benefits from robustness training. The framework we propose for measuring defense equality can be applied to robustly trained models, preprocessing-based defenses, and rejection methods. We identify a set of datasets with a user-centered application and a reasonable computational cost suitable for case studies in measuring the equality of defenses. In our case study of speech command recognition, we show how such adversarial training and augmentation have non-equal but complex protections for social subgroups across gender, accent, and age in relation to user coverage. We present a comparison of equality between two rejection-based defenses: randomized smoothing and neural rejection, finding randomized smoothing more equitable due to the sampling mechanism for minority groups. This represents the first work examining the disparity in the adversarial robustness in the speech domain and the fairness evaluation of rejection-based defenses.

• Artificial intelligence (AI) / machine learning ↗
DOE OSTI2015

Nevada National Security Site Site-Directed Research and Development FY 2014 Annual Report

The reports contained herein are for project activities that occurred from October 2013 through September 2014. Project life cycle is indicated under the title as well as the original proposal number (in the following format: site abbreviation--ID #--originating fiscal year; e.g., STL-03-14). Each of the reports describes in detail the discoveries, achievements, and challenges encountered by our principal investigators. As SDRD, by definition, invests in “high-risk” and hopefully “high-payoff” research, the element of uncertainty is inherent. While many of our efforts are “successful” and result in positive outcomes or technology utilization, some fall short of expectations, but cannot be construed as “failure” in the negative sense. The latter is a natural and valid part of the process of advanced research and often leads to unforeseen new pathways to future discovery. Regardless, either result advances our knowledge base and increases our ability to identify solutions and/or avoid costly and unwarranted paths for future challenges. In summary, the SDRD program continues to provide an unfettered mechanism for innovation that returns multifold to our customers, to national security, and to the general public. The program is a vibrant R&D innovation engine, benefited by its discretionary pedigree, enhanced mission spectrum, committed resources, and sound competitiveness to yield maximum taxpayer benefit. The 25 projects described exemplify the creativity and ability of a diverse scientific and engineering talent base. The efforts also showcase an impressive capability and resource that can be brought to find solutions to a broad array of technology needs and applications relevant to the NNSS mission and national security. Further SDRD performance metrics can be found in the appendix at the end of this report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2019

Machine Learning

Presentation overview: Why Machine Learning?; Why ML-Informed Physics?; Why Physics-Informed ML?; LANL ML strategy related to National & Energy Security; ML-Informed Physics for climate modeling and induced seismicity (LDRD-DR); Physics-Informed ML for blind source separation (LDRD-DR); ML forecasting production from tight rock reservoirs (Chevron)

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cybersecurity Threat Profile for a Connected Lighting System

In anticipation of improved energy performance and cost savings, cities and building owners are increasingly considering “smart lighting initiatives” that aim to convert their collection of simple luminaires (i.e., lighting fixtures) into an intelligent connected lighting system (CLS) capable of remotely monitoring energy consumption and fault conditions, and possibly implementing adaptive lighting schemes. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has set an national goal of tripling the energy efficiency and demand flexibility of the buildings sector by 2030, relative to 2020 levels 1. It is forecast that connected lighting systems can contribute to that goal by delivering 125 TWh of annual energy savings by 2035 2, equivalent to the annual output of 50 typical (500 MW) power plants. However, these energy savings and the DOE goal are put at significant risk if connected technologies are not adopted due to real or perceived cybersecurity concerns. Connected IoT devices such as these have historically been rife with vulnerabilities which sometimes put security considerations secondary to functionality and operability. What are the cybersecurity threats that will impact these systems, as formerly banal luminaires transition into intelligent connected devices that collect information about themselves, their surrounding environment, and possibly us? In this paper we analyze a threat profile performed on a fault-detection use case for streetlights. A threat profile establishes security requirements, justifies security measures, yields actionable controls, and effectively communicates risk to stakeholders. This effort provides critical information for making threat-based decisions to increase security at a reasonable cost, and can effectively be used by development teams, software architects, and managers to make cybersecurity a part of their ongoing culture of awareness, training, and prevention. This leads to more secure systems and better-understood security. On-premise, cloud, and hybrid architectures with different authentication mechanisms were modeled and later categorized using the Microsoft STRIDE framework. An analysis of the recommended controls for each threat was performed to determine which controls could and should be put in place by manufacturers or third-party suppliers, and which controls need to be left up the end-user to implement. Fifty-seven threats were identified. Among our key findings: (1) 65% (37/57) of the threats did not involve the luminaires, but rather the other components needed to communicate with and manage them; (2) 63% (36/57) of the threats could have been mitigated through manufacturer-implemented defensive techniques or “controls”; and (3) 23% (13/57) of the threats were dependent on the network configuration. Recommendations based on the results of this work are made to key stakeholder groups. Notably, lighting technology developers are advised to address all threats that can be reasonably controlled with baked-in technology solutions (e.g., encryption or authentication controls), and employ some form of secure supply chain management and tracking where other parts (e.g., sensors, microprocessors) of a luminaire must also be built and manufactured with the proper security controls in place. Developers should also review threats involving assets not developed in-house to understand how connectivity with other devices will affect their product during system operation and determine if a compensating control for a defense-in-depth strategy will be needed. Finally, those interested in deploying CLS should compare the differences between cloud and on-premise models to determine which is more suitable for their needs and the abilities of their security team.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗