Results for “vulnerability analysis” — Page 9

NASA NTRS2009

Investigation of Orbital Debris Impacts on Shuttle Radiator Panels

This paper documents the data collected from two hypervelocity micro-meteoroid orbital debris (MMOD) impact events where the shuttle payload bay door radiator sandwich panel was completely perforated. Scanning Electron Microscope/Energy-Dispersive x-ray Spectroscopy (SEM/EDS) analysis of impact residue provided evidence to identify the source of each impact. Impact site features that indicate projectile directionality are discussed, along with hypervelocity impact testing on representative samples conducted to simulate the impact event. The paper provides results of a study of impact risks for the size of particles that caused the MMOD damage and the regions of the orbiter vehicle that would be vulnerable to an equivalent projectile

Hyde, James L.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Environmental Justice Needs Assessment for Disasters: Assessing the Landscape and Capacity of Organizations & Communities Working Towards Environmental Justice with Potential to Use NASA Earth Observations to Support Equitable Disaster Management and Risk Reduction

Natural disasters pose an increasing risk to communities worldwide. Marginalized populations, in particular, experience compounding vulnerabilities that contribute to unequal burdens of natural hazards as a result of systemic inequality stemming from historical disenfranchisement, disinvestment, and discriminatory policies such as racial redlining. This project connected with community organizations working at the intersection of environmental justice (EJ) and natural disaster management throughout the United States, to assess how NASA DEVELOP can leverage geospatial science to advance EJ efforts. Our team conducted a landscape analysis, which included a literature review, annotated bibliography, and identification of organizations working in EJ and disasters. We engaged EJ organizations in discussions to understand their current resources, challenges, and geospatial needs to inform how DEVELOP and NASA Applied Sciences can support their EJ and disaster work. Findings were compiled in a synthesis report and visualized in an ArcGIS StoryMap to showcase the work of EJ organizations, provide geospatial resources for them to explore, and provide examples of how remote sensing can be utilized in EJ and disasters work. The knowledge gained and end products created support the integration of EJ in future DEVELOP projects, and the expanded use of Earth observations by communities in support of a more just tomorrow.

Julianne Liu↗

NASA NTRS2024

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Liftoff Debris for NASA’s Space Launch System (SLS) Prior to the Artemis I Launch

The SLS Artemis I launch vehicle is the first of several planned Artemis launch vehicles, with a number of design differences from earlier NASA missions that incur liftoff debris risk to the mission. As a test vehicle, the Artemis I hardware also endured environments and tests not planned for future missions, which led to several additional factors contributing to an evolving liftoff debris risk to the SLS vehicle. This paper will summarize these risk factors and address the processes used to evaluate and communicate the risks to support a successful Artemis I launch. It will discuss how the evolving risks that were quantified and evaluated by a Cross-Program team of debris Subject Matter Experts to mitigate liftoff debris hazards and communicate updated risk to the SLS vehicle. This process was performed through the inaugural use of an SLS debris day-of-launch (DOL) standard operating procedure that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions. This paper addresses the risk of liftoff debris, debris released by the vehicle or from the launch pad during liftoff through vehicle tower clear. Expected liftoff debris is well understood from previous NASA programs’ experience and from tests of materials, processes and functions that are known to release liftoff debris. These expected sources were assessed and cleared well ahead of launch day. However, given the ever-changing schedules and environments, processes were in place to evaluate any additional potential liftoff debris risks identified during launch countdown. Although many of the Artemis vehicle hardware components are similar to those on the NASA Shuttle Program, there are important differences in the architecture of the Artemis I vehicle which require new assessments of liftoff debris risk for the Artemis missions. The more favorable Artemis crew module location and surfaces are far less vulnerable to debris impacts; however, the longer vehicle can result in higher liftoff debris impact energies to those components on the aft end of the vehicle. Additionally, the positional change of the RS-25 liquid engines to nearer the Booster nozzle exit plane along with the change in Booster throat plug design is a disadvantage to the overall liftoff debris risk which resulted in additional test and analysis efforts for evaluating the integrated vehicle debris risk. In spite of the comprehensive tests and analyses of Artemis I expected liftoff debris, a number of additional tests/processes were completed prior to the Artemis I mission that were required to support a complete understanding of a new launch vehicle, but increased the risk of releasing liftoff debris. The hardware endured several additional cryogenic loading cycles, including the Green Run tests at Stennis Space Center, Wet Dress Rehearsals at Kennedy Space Center, and multiple launch attempts. Each of these cycles induced stresses in the thermal protection system (TPS) materials, increasing the risk of damage to and release of the TPS. Additionally, induced and weather environmental factors that could increase the likelihood of debris release were significant. Vibrations and stresses in the TPS were induced by a required roll-back to the Vehicle Assembly Building before Hurricane Ian to protect the vehicle from damage by high winds. Wind damage and potential internal stresses to several outer mold line materials on the integrated SLS vehicle and mobile launcher were caused by weathering Hurricane Nicole at Pad 39B the week before launch. A thorough imagery scan of the vehicle was performed after each event and the damage observed was repaired, removed, or assessed and the risk to the mission evaluated. Mitigation of debris risk can occur by tests and analyses to show debris impacted components as damage tolerant, by new/improved processes for prevention of debris availability, or redesign. Risk mitigation processes for Artemis I-specific liftoff debris events and the development and use of the SLS debris day of launch (DOL) procedures that will be used for subsequent Artemis missions will be described.

Space Launch System↗

NASA NTRS2022

Phoenix Climate: Employing NASA Earth Observations to Conduct Site Suitability Analyses on Residential Tree Planting Initiatives in Phoenix, AZ

Phoenix, Arizona is the hottest city in the United States, with daytime summer temperatures consistently reaching upwards of 100°F. As these daytime temperatures continue to climb, heat-related illnesses and morbidity also increase. The City of Phoenix hopes to secure funding to implement the American Rescue Plan Act (ARPA) residential tree equity accelerator program. This funding will be used for targeted investments in underserved neighborhoods to increase tree canopy cover, engaging 5,000 households across selected neighborhoods. By partnering with the City of Phoenix, the Arizona Office of Heat Mitigation, and Arizona State University’s Urban Climate Research Center, our team identified residential neighborhoods, block groups within qualified census tracts, and parcels to be prioritized in the ARPA program. We conducted an analysis using NASA Earth observations, movement and heat exposure data, sociodemographic data, and tree canopy data. For Earth observations, we acquired daytime land surface temperature from the Landsat 8 Operational Land Imager (OLI) and Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS) and land cover classification from the United States Geological Survey (USGS) National Land Cover Database (NLCD). The project will support the prioritization of city resources and tree plantings based on community vulnerability, as well as help initiate public engagement efforts and literacy with an interactive dashboard and GIS layers that contribute to the city’s property information portal.

Alison Bautista↗

NASA NTRS2005

Virtex-II Pro PowerPC SEE Characterization Test Methods and Results

The Xilinx Vix-11 Pro is a platform FPGA that embeds multiple microprocessors within the fabric of an SRAM-based reprogrammable FPGA. The variety and quantity of resources provided by this family of devices make them very attractive for spaceflight applications. However,these devices will be susceptible to single event effects (SEE), which must be mitigated. Observations from prior testing of the Xilinx Virtex-II Pro suggest that the PowerPC core has significant vulnerability to SEES. However, these initial tests were not designed to exclusively target the functionality of the PowerPC, therefore making it difficult to distinguish processor upsets from fabric upsets. The main focus of this paper involves detailed SEE testing of the embedded PowerPC core. Due to the complexity of the PowerPC, various custom test applications, both static and dynamic, will be designed to isolate each Unit of the processor. Collective analysis of the test results will provide insight into the exact upset mechanism of the PowerPC. With this information, mitigations schemes can be developed and tested that address the specific susceptibilities of these devices. The test bed will be the Xilinx SEE Consortium Virtex-II Pro test board, which allows for configuration scrubbing, design triplication, and ease of data collection. Testing will be performed at the Indiana University Cyclotron Facility using protons of varying energy levels and fluencies. This paper will present the detailed test approach along with the results.

Petrick, David↗

NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks - or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗

NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, numerous small satellites have been launched into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risksâ€”or worse, be neglected altogether. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗

NASA NTRS2024

A Decade of Salt Marsh Elevation Change in New York City’s Coastal Urban Parks

Coastal salt marshes of the eastern United States are particularly vulnerable to accelerated sea level rise, and urban marshes are at greater risk of erosion, inundation, and conversion to mudflat if left unmanaged. To guide New York City (NYC) salt marsh restoration strategies, NYC Parks collected up to 10 years of salt marsh elevation change data through 2020 at six salt marsh sites using the Surface Elevation Table-Marker Horizon (SET-MH) method, conducted a salt marsh trends analysis to determine shoreline change from 1974 to 2012, and conducted a salt marsh conditions assessment. We found that the citywide average surface elevation trend of 3.31 mm yr −1 was not significantly different from the 30-year (1990–2020) Relative Sea Level Rise of 4.23 mm yr −1 at The Battery, NY, tide station, probably due to high variability across and within sites. We also found that accretion rates differed across sites and watersheds, and sites situated lower in the tidal zone had higher accretion rates. Notably, Jamaica Bay’s Idlewild salt marsh, long suspected of being sediment-starved and ranking lowest in our conditions assessment, had the highest accretion rate at 9.5 mm yr −1 . Our salt marsh trends analysis also showed marsh loss at the shoreline edge, bare ground cover, and other indicators of marsh degradation. In mitigating marsh loss, the design grades for our recent wetland restoration projects enlarge the upper elevation ranges of the low- and high-marsh zones and incorporate wider and more gradual slopes in upland transition zones to enable inland marsh migration.

Salt marsh elevation change↗

NASA NTRS2002

Speech motor control and acute mountain sickness

BACKGROUND: An objective method that accurately quantifies the severity of Acute Mountain Sickness (AMS) symptoms is needed to enable more reliable evaluation of altitude acclimatization and testing of potentially beneficial interventions. HYPOTHESIS: Changes in human articulation, as quantified by timed variations in acoustic waveforms of specific spoken words (voice onset time; VOT), are correlated with the severity of AMS. METHODS: Fifteen volunteers were exposed to a simulated altitude of 4300 m (446 mm Hg) in a hypobaric chamber for 48 h. Speech motor control was determined from digitally recorded and analyzed timing patterns of 30 different monosyllabic words characterized as voiced and unvoiced, and as labial, alveolar, or velar. The Environmental Symptoms Questionnaire (ESQ) was used to assess AMS. RESULTS: Significant AMS symptoms occurred after 4 h, peaked at 16 h, and returned toward baseline after 48 h. Labial VOTs were shorter after 4 and 39 h of exposure; velar VOTs were altered only after 4 h; and there were no changes in alveolar VOTs. The duration of vowel sounds was increased after 4 h of exposure and returned to normal thereafter. Only 1 of 15 subjects did not increase vowel time after 4 h of exposure. The 39-h labial (p = 0.009) and velar (p = 0.037) voiced-unvoiced timed separations consonants and the symptoms of AMS were significantly correlated. CONCLUSIONS: Two objective measures of speech production were affected by exposure to 4300 m altitude and correlated with AMS severity. Alterations in speech production may represent an objective measure of AMS and central vulnerability to hypoxia.

NASA Discipline Space Human Factors↗

NASA NTRS1991

A conformal oxidation-resistant, plasma-polymerized coating

A comparative study was made of the surface recession (etching) of thin films of plasma polymerized tetrafluoro ethylene (PPTFE), polytetrafluoro ethylene (PTFE), and ion-beam sputter deposited polytetrafluoro ethylene (SPTFE) exposed to ground-state atomic oxygen downstream from a nonequilibrium radio-frequency O2 plasma. At 22 C, the etch rates for PTFE, SPTFE, and PPTFE were in the ratio of 8.7:1.8:1.0. A thin, conformal coating of PPTFE (etch rate of 0.3 nm/h at 22 C) was found to protect an underlying cast film of a reactive polymer, cis-1,4 polybutadiene, against ground-state atomic oxygen attack for the time required to fully etch away the PPTFE coating. From ESCA analysis, PTFE exhibited only minor surface oxidation (uptake of 0.5 atom percent O) upon etching, its F/C ratio decreasing slightly from 2.00 to 1.97; PPTFE exhibited considerable surface oxidation (uptake of 5.9 atom percent O) intermediate between those of PTFE and PPTFE, with a decrease in F/C ratio from 1.73 to 1.67. A plasma-polymerized fluorocarbon coating such as PPTFE might be useful for space applications to protect polymers that are vulnerable to oxidation or degradation by oxygen atoms.

Golub, Morton A.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Laser Remediation of Threats Posed by Small Orbital Debris

The continually increasing amount of orbital debris in near Earth space poses an increasing challenge to space situational awareness. Recent collisions of spacecraft caused abrupt increases in the density of both large and small debris in near Earth space. An especially challenging class of threats is that due to the increasing density of small (1 mm to 10 cm dimension) orbital debris. This small debris poses a serious threat since: (1) The high velocity enables even millimeter dimension debris to cause serious damage to vulnerable areas of space assets, e.g., detector windows; (2) The small size and large number of debris elements prevent adequate detection and cataloguing. We have identified solutions to this threat in the form of novel laser systems and novel ways of using these laser systems. While implementation of the solutions we identify is challenging we find approaches offering threat mitigation within time frames and at costs of practical interest. We base our analysis on the unique combination of coherent light specifically structured in both space and time and applied in novel ways entirely within the vacuum of space to deorbiting small debris. We compare and contrast laser based small debris removal strategies using ground based laser systems with strategies using space based laser systems. We find laser systems located and used entirely within space offer essential and decisive advantages over groundbased laser systems.

Fork, Richard L.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Changes in Vegetation Cover of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Estimated from MODIS Greenness Trends, 2000 to 2018

The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) was established in 1980 and covers 19 million acres (77,000 km2) in northeast Alaska. Wildlife habitats in the ANWR are vulnerable to long-lasting effects from any disturbance, in part because short growing seasons in the arctic provide limited time for species to recover. Trends and transitions in the growing season MODerate resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) time-series at 250-m resolution were analyzed for the period from 2000 to 2018 to understand recent patterns of vegetation change in all ecoregions of the ANWR. Statistical analysis of changes in each MODIS pixel NDVI time series was conducted using the "Breaks for Additive Seasonal and Trend" method (BFAST) to map regional change rates. Results suggested that most negative NDVI anomalies in the tundra-covered river drainages of the Brooks Range Mountains and coastal plain have been associated with early spring thawing and elevated levels of surface moisture in low elevation drainages of the northern ANWR ecoregions.

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge↗

NASA NTRS2019

Radiation Hardness Assurance: Evolving for NewSpace

During the past decade, government agencies, private companies and academic institutions, have launched hundreds of small satellites into space, with dramatically expanded dependence on advanced commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies and systems required for mission success. While the radiation effects vulnerabilities of components within small satellites are the same as those of their larger, traditional relatives, revised approaches are needed for risk management because of differences in technical requirements and programmatic resources. While moving to COTS components and systems may reduce direct costs and procurement lead times, it undermines many cost-reduction strategies used for conventional radiation hardness assurance (RHA). Limited resources are accompanied by a lack of radiation testing and analysis, which can pose significant risks. Small satellites have benefited from short mission durations in low Earth orbits with respect to their radiation response, but as mission objectives grow and become reliant on advanced technologies operating for longer and in harsher environments, requirements need to reflect the changing scope without hindering developers that provide new capabilities. In this course we suggest RHA strategies that engineers and scientists can apply to a wide range of aerospace systems, including constellations, with a focus on how to manage aggressive system scaling for smaller platforms.

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA)↗

NASA NTRS2015

On Possible Arc Inception on Low Voltage Solar Array

Recent analysis of spacecraft failures during the period of 1990-2013 demonstrated clearly that electrostatic discharges caused more than 8 of all registered failures and anomalies, and comprised the most costly losses (25) for operating companies and agencies. The electrostatic discharges on spacecraft surfaces are the results of differential charging above some critical (threshold) voltages. The mechanisms of differential charging are well known, and various methods have been developed to prevent a generation of significant electric fields in areas of triple junctions. For example, low bus voltages in Low Earth Orbit plasma environment and slightly conducting layer over coverglass (ITO) in Geosynchronous Orbit surroundings are believed to be quite reliable measures to prevent discharges on respective surfaces. In most cases, the vulnerable elements of spacecraft (solar arrays, diode boards, etc.) go through comprehensive ground tests in vacuum chambers. However, tests articles contain the miniscule fragments of spacecraft components such as 10-30 solar cells of many thousands deployed on spacecraft in orbit. This is one reason why manufacturing defects may not be revealed in ground tests but expose themselves in arcing on array surface in space. The other reason for ineffectiveness of discharge preventive measures is aging of all materials in harsh orbital environments. The expected life time of modern spacecraft varies within the range of five-fifteen years, and thermal cycling, radiation damages, and mechanical stresses can result in surface erosion on conductive layers and microscopic cracks in coverglass sheets and adhesive films. These possible damages may cause significant increases in local electric field strengths and subsequent discharges. The primary discharges may or may not be detrimental to spacecraft operation, but they can produce the necessary conditions for sustained arcs initiation. Multiple measures were developed to prevent sustained discharges between adjacent strings, and many ground tests were performed to determine threshold parameters (voltage and current) for sustained arcs. And again, manufacturing defects and aging in space environments may result in considerable decrease of critical threshold parameters. This paper is devoted to the analysis of possible reasons behind arcing on spacecraft with low bus voltages.

plasma interaction↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Effect of Boundary Conditions on Process-Induced Stresses in a Plain Weave Unit Cell

Woven polymer matrix composites (PMCs) are leveraged in aerospace applications for their desirable specific properties, yet they are vulnerable to high residual stresses during manufacturing and their complex geometry makes experimental results difficult to observe. Process modeling is needed to characterize the effects of the curing and predict end stress states. Finite element software can be used to model woven architectures, however accurate representation of processing conditions remains a challenge when it comes to selecting boundary conditions. The effect of BCs on process-induced stress within woven PMCs is studied. The commercial Finite Element Analysis (FEA) software Abaqus is coupled with user-written subroutines in a process modeling framework. A two-dimensionally (2D) woven PMC repeating unit cell (RUC) is modeled with TexGen and Abaqus. Virtual curing is imposed on the bulk matrix. The BC study is conducted with Free, Periodic, Flat, and Flat-Free configurations. Results show that the end stress state is sensitive to the boundary condition assumptions. Flat BC results show great agreement with Periodic BCs. Residual stress results from process modeling are then compared with a linear-elastic thermal cooldown analysis in Abaqus. Cooldown results indicate an overestimation in matrix stresses compared with process modeling.

micromechanics↗

NASA NTRS2015

On Possible Arc Inception on Low Voltage Solar Array

Recent analysis of spacecraft failures during the period of 1990-2013 demonstrated clearly that electrostatic discharges caused more than 8 percent of all registered failures and anomalies, and comprised the most costly losses (25 percent) for operating companies and agencies. The electrostatic discharges on spacecraft surfaces are the results of differential charging above some critical (threshold) voltages. The mechanisms of differential charging are well known, and various methods have been developed to prevent a generation of significant electric fields in areas of triple junctions. For example, low bus voltages in Low Earth Orbit plasma environment and slightly conducting layer over cover-glass (ITO) in Geosynchronous Orbit surroundings are believed to be quite reliable measures to prevent discharges on respective surfaces. In most cases, the vulnerable elements of spacecraft (solar arrays, diode boards, etc.) go through comprehensive ground tests in vacuum chambers. However, tests articles contain the miniscule fragments of spacecraft components such as 10-30 solar cells of many thousands deployed on spacecraft in orbit. This is one reason why manufacturing defects may not be revealed in ground tests but expose themselves in arcing on array surface in space. The other reason for ineffectiveness of discharge preventive measures is aging of all materials in harsh orbital environments. The expected life time of modern spacecraft varies within the range of five-fifteen years, and thermal cycling, radiation damages, and mechanical stresses can result in surface erosion on conductive layers and microscopic cracks in cover-glass sheets and adhesive films. These possible damages may cause significant increases in local electric field strengths and subsequent discharges. The primary discharges may or may not be detrimental to spacecraft operation, but they can produce the necessary conditions for sustained arcs initiation. Multiple measures were developed to prevent sustained discharges between adjacent strings, and many ground tests were performed to determine threshold parameters (voltage and current) for sustained arcs. And again, manufacturing defects and aging in space environments may result in considerable decrease of critical threshold parameters. This paper is devoted to the analysis of possible reasons behind arcing on spacecraft with low bus voltages.

low voltage solar array↗

NASA NTRS2016

Cyber-Threat Assessment for the Air Traffic Management System: A Network Controls Approach

Air transportation networks are being disrupted with increasing frequency by failures in their cyber- (computing, communication, control) systems. Whether these cyber- failures arise due to deliberate attacks or incidental errors, they can have far-reaching impact on the performance of the air traffic control and management systems. For instance, a computer failure in the Washington DC Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on August 15, 2015, caused nearly complete closure of the Centers airspace for several hours. This closure had a propagative impact across the United States National Airspace System, causing changed congestion patterns and requiring placement of a suite of traffic management initiatives to address the capacity reduction and congestion. A snapshot of traffic on that day clearly shows the closure of the ZDC airspace and the resulting congestion at its boundary, which required augmented traffic management at multiple locations. Cyber- events also have important ramifications for private stakeholders, particularly the airlines. During the last few months, computer-system issues have caused several airlines fleets to be grounded for significant periods of time: these include United Airlines (twice), LOT Polish Airlines, and American Airlines. Delays and regional stoppages due to cyber- events are even more common, and may have myriad causes (e.g., failure of the Department of Homeland Security systems needed for security check of passengers, see [3]). The growing frequency of cyber- disruptions in the air transportation system reflects a much broader trend in the modern society: cyber- failures and threats are becoming increasingly pervasive, varied, and impactful. In consequence, an intense effort is underway to develop secure and resilient cyber- systems that can protect against, detect, and remove threats, see e.g. and its many citations. The outcomes of this wide effort on cyber- security are applicable to the air transportation infrastructure, and indeed security solutions are being implemented in the current system. While these security solutions are important, they only provide a piecemeal solution. Particular computers or communication channels are protected from particular attacks, without a holistic view of the air transportation infrastructure. On the other hand, the above-listed incidents highlight that a holistic approach is needed, for several reasons. First, the air transportation infrastructure is a large scale cyber-physical system with multiple stakeholders and diverse legacy assets. It is impractical to protect every cyber- asset from known and unknown disruptions, and instead a strategic view of security is needed. Second, disruptions to the cyber- system can incur complex propagative impacts across the air transportation network, including its physical and human assets. Also, these implications of cyber- events are exacerbated or modulated by other disruptions and operational specifics, e.g. severe weather, operator fatigue or error, etc. These characteristics motivate a holistic and strategic perspective on protecting the air transportation infrastructure from cyber- events. The analysis of cyber- threats to the air traffic system is also inextricably tied to the integration of new autonomy into the airspace. The replacement of human operators with cyber functions leaves the network open to new cyber threats, which must be modeled and managed. Paradoxically, the mitigation of cyber events in the airspace will also likely require additional autonomy, given the fast time scale and myriad pathways of cyber-attacks which must be managed. The assessment of new vulnerabilities upon integration of new autonomy is also a key motivation for a holistic perspective on cyber threats.

Complex Networks↗