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At least 163 records · Page 9

Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) Integration into the National Airspace System (NAS)

NASA's Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) integration into the National Air Space (NAS) project has been working closely with the FAA and RTCA Special Committee 228 to identify and break down barriers to UAS integration. A focus of this work is on detect and avoid (DAA) technologies. A pilot has responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and to remain "well clear," using their best judgment (Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Sec. 91.113). For UAS to perform this function, the see function is replaced by sensors to detect the other aircraft. Secondly, the pilot judgment of well clear has to be replaced by a mathematical expression. For Phase 1 of this effort, a well clear violation was defined if all three of these conditions are true: a) the horizontal clearance is less than 4000 ft., and b) the vertical clearance is less than 450 ft., and c) the time to loss of well clear is less than 35 seconds. This definition was developed with a great deal of community input and testing to ensure interoperability with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots of manned aircraft. Appropriate guidance, alerting and displays were developed to allow UAS, with the appropriate sensors, to effectively maintain well clear. This work contributed to FAA Technical Standard Orders: TSO-C211, Detect and Avoid and TSO-C212, ATAR for Traffic Surveillance. Phase 2 of this work extends the operational environment to include the terminal area and lesser capable aircraft that might not have the payload capability to carry the RADAR defined in Phase 1. This session reports on work from Phase 1 and initial work in Phase 2.

UAS↗

Detect and Avoid: Efforts from NASA's UAS Integration into the NAS Project

NASA's Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) integration into the National Air Space (NAS) project has been working closely with the FAA and RTCA Special Committee 228 to identify and break down barriers to UAS integration. A focus of this work is on detect and avoid (DAA) technologies. A pilot has responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft and to remain "well clear," using their best judgment (Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Sec. 91.113). For UAS to perform this function, the see function is replaced by sensors to detect the other aircraft. Secondly, the pilot judgment of well clear has to be replaced by a mathematical expression. For Phase 1 of this effort, a well clear violation was defined if all three of these conditions are true: a) the horizontal clearance is less than 4000 ft., and b) the vertical clearance is less than 450 ft., and c) the time to loss of well clear is less than 35 seconds. This definition was developed with a great deal of community input and testing to ensure interoperability with Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots of manned aircraft. Appropriate guidance, alerting and displays were developed to allow UAS, with the appropriate sensors, to effectively maintain well clear. This work contributed to FAA Technical Standard Orders: TSO-C211, Detect and Avoid and TSO-C212, ATAR for Traffic Surveillance. Phase 2 of this work extends the operational environment to include the terminal area and lesser capable aircraft that might not have the payload capability to carry the RADAR defined in Phase 1. This session reports on work from Phase 1 and initial work in Phase 2.

Detect and Avoid (DAA)↗

Present statue of Japanese ERS-1 Project

Earth Resources Satellite 1 (ERS-1) will be launched in the FY 1990 with the H-1 rocket from Tanegashima Space Center. ERS-1 will seek to firmly establish remote sensing technologies from space by using synthetic aperture radar and optical sensors, as well as primarily exploring for non-renewable resources and also monitoring for land use, agriculture, forestry, fishery, conservation of environment, prevention of disasters, and surveillance of coastal regions. ERS-1 is a joint project in which the main responsibility for the development of the mission equipment is assumed by the Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, MITI, and the Technology Research Association of Resources Remote Sensing System, while that for the satellite itself and launching rocket is assumed by the Science and Technology Agency (STA) and the National Space Development Agency (NASDA). In relation to this project, users have maintained a close working relationship with the manufacturers after submitting their requirements in 1984 on the specifications of the mission equipments. This missions parameters are outlined.

Ishiwada, Yasufumi↗

Air Traffic Controller Performance and Acceptability of Multiple UAS in a Simulated NAS Environment

Previously, we showed that air traffic controllers (ATCos) rated UAS pilot verbal response latencies as acceptable when a 1.5 s delay was added to the UAS pilot responses, but a 5 s delay was rated as mostly unacceptable. In the present study we determined whether a 1.5 s added delay in the UAS pilots' verbal communications would affect ATCos interactions with UAS and other conventional aircraft when the number and speed of the UAS were manipulated. Eight radar-certified ATCos participated in this simulation. The ATCos managed a medium altitude sector containing arrival aircraft, en route aircraft, and one to four UAS. The UAS were conducting a surveillance mission and flew at either a "slow" or "fast" speed. We measured both UAS and conventional pilots' verbal communication latencies, and obtained ATCos' acceptability ratings for these latencies. Although the UAS pilot response latencies were longer than those of conventional pilots, the ATCos rated UAS pilot verbal communication latencies to be as acceptable as those of conventional pilots. Because the overall traffic load within the sector was held constant, ATCos only performed slightly worse when multiple UAS were in their sector compared to when only one UAS was in the sector. Implications of these findings for UAS integration in the NAS are discussed.

measured response↗

A wide angle search technique for a 10.6 micron ladar

A ladar (laser radar) sensor designed around a pulsed passively Q-switched CO2 laser, capable of a efficient and rapid scans with a narrow beam over a wide field of view, is considered for surveillance and tracking applications in space. The output is a train of narrow pulses with a controllable pulse repetition rate. A resonant vibrating mirror in back of a classical Gregorian telescope, and a plane pointing mirror in front for beam steering, are used in scanning. Scan pulse sequences are described and illustrated. The 10.6 micron ladar set is under consideration as baseline sensor for various space rendezvous and docking applications.

Levinson, S.↗

Observations of Enhanced Radar Backscatter (ERB) from Millstone Hill

Intense enhancements of the incoherent radar backscatter spectrum from the topside ionosphere were observed with the Millstone Hill UHF radar. Enhancements occurring at the local ion acoustic frequency causing large asymmetries in the measured ion line may be produced by current driven instabilities. These enhancements pose a practical problem for space surveillance systems because their cross section and spectral width are characteristic of satellites. Conversely, their hard target signature complicates the study of naturally occurring ERB events; it is nearly impossible to distinguish them from satellites based on a single measurement. Statistical comparisons of observed coherent echo distributions with predictions from a satellite catalog were used to broadly identify periods of ERB activity. A series of experiments using multiple diagnostics, including satellite instruments, for simultaneous observations have established the association of ERB with large fluxes of soft suprathermal electrons carrying field aligned currents. Zenith data are also presented which show the asymmetric growth of ion acoustic waves directly above Millstone Hill. Details of these results are presented.

Lee, M. C.↗

Evaluation, Analysis and Results of the DANTi Flight Test Data, the DAIDALUS Detect and Avoid Algorithm, and the DANTi Concept for Detect and Avoid in the Cockpit

The DAIDALUS Detect and Avoid Algorithm [1] was developed to address the operational needs of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and meet the Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Detect and Avoid [2]. The DANTi (Detect and Avoid iN the cockpit) concept [3], developed at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Langley Research Center, leverages advancements achieved in surveillance and Detect and Avoid technologies for unmanned aircraft systems as a safety enhancing capability for pilots of manned aircraft. Pilots operating under Visual Flight Rules and not receiving Air Traffic Control radar services rely on see and avoid to remain well clear of other aircraft and avoid collisions. The DANTi concept has been conceived as a safety enhancement capability to remain well clear and avoid potential collisions. The DANTi concept uses a traffic display to provide situational awareness, conflict detection, alerting, and guidance to remain well clear.

Detect and Avoid↗

An Examination of Two Non-Cooperative Detect and Avoid Well Clear Definitions

NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Integration into the National Airspace System (UAS in the NAS) project examines the technical barriers associated with the operation of UAS in civil airspace. The present study explored the differential effects of two candidate non-cooperative Detect-and-Avoid Well Clear (DWC)definitions on pilot and system performance in a human-in-the-loop simulation. Active-duty UAS pilots were recruited to maintain DWC against representative Class 4 encounter types with a low size, weight, and power (SWaP) radar declaration range of 3.5 nautical miles (nmi). Objective performance indicated that pilots could consistently maintain DWC against non-cooperative intruders with either DWC candidate, with negligible differences in response times and separation performance against caution and warning-level threats. While losses of DWC were avoided at rates comparable to Phase 1 findings, pilots uploaded their responses to caution-level alerts over 5 seconds faster in the current setup relative to Phase 1. Encounters with faster closure rates were susceptible to shortened caution-level alert durations, especially when employing the DWC criterion with the additional ‘Tau’ (temporal) component. Consequently, caution-level threats frequently elevated to warning-level status (nearly twice as often with theTau candidate). The variable caution alert durations appeared to impact pilots’ coordination with air traffic control (ATC), as ATC approval rates were lower with the ‘Tau’and ‘Disc’ candidates relative to Phase 1 research. Ultimately, the increased alerting time enabled by the Disc candidate deemed it more suitable for any reductions to the assumed radar declaration range requirement, which was re-evaluated in a follow-on study. Findings from this study will inform Phase 2 Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)development for UAS with alternative surveillance equipment and performance capabilities.

Kevin J Monk↗

Detect-and-Avoid Surveillance Range Requirements for Electro-Optical/Infra-Red Sensors

A detect-and-avoid (DAA) system provides surveillance, alerting, and maneuver guidance (referred to as guidance in this report) that are critical to an unmanned aircraft system’s (UAS) ability to maintain separation from manned aircraft and other unmanned aircraft. The last decade has seen significant progress in the development of DAA requirements, spearheaded by RTCA Special Committee 228 (SC228) and subsequently by other standards organizations such as EUROCAE and ASTM. SC-228’s development of DAA requirements assumes the UAS follows instrument flight rules (IFR) and has a remote pilot or operator in the loop. As of the publication of this document, the SC-228’s latest Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for DAA, versioned as DO-365B [1], DAA systems use onboard and/or ground surveillance systems to detect traffic. The surveillance systems must detect both cooperative and non-cooperative air traffic. Cooperative traffic are vehicles that have a broadcasting transponder, while non-cooperative traffic do not, and so must be detected via radar or other sensors. A DAA system’s alerting and guidance functions alert the pilot/operator in the loop of potential hazards, such as intruder aircraft, and provide maneuver solutions which help the pilot/operator avoid or mitigate observed hazards. A UAS pilot is expected to coordinate with air traffic control (ATC) before executing a conflict avoidance maneuver if the type of alert is not urgent enough to require an immediate maneuver.

uncrewed aviation systems↗

Radar Observations from the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar in 2019

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) relies primarily on ground-based radar measurements to characterize the distribution of small debris, down to approximately 3 mm depending upon altitude and the sensor used, in low Earth orbit (LEO). Since the early 1990’s, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory (LL) has been collecting radar measurements for the NASA ODPO under agreements with the U.S. Department of Defense. The Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) is the primary ground-based radar sensor used by the ODPO and provides data on orbital debris down to an approximate size of 5.5 mm below 1000km altitude using the NASA size estimation model (SEM). Since orbital debris of this size are a significant risk to both human and robotic missions in LEO, the sensitivity of this radar makes it a high-value sensor. The NASA ODPO radar measurements are conducted on a continual basis for monitoring and enabling modeling of the orbital debris environment over time. HUSIR observations from 2019 are the most recent snapshot of the environment that has been measured and analyzed to date. In recent years, HUSIR measurements indicated relatively stable populations for the orbital debris objects that it is able to detect. In 2019, several interesting events happened on-orbit, including the start of large constellation deployments into LEO, as well as the Indian anti-satellite test with Microsat-R (International Designator 2019-006A, U.S. Strategic Command Space Surveillance Network catalog number 43947). Due to these events, coupled with a general increase in the number of missions and participants launching missions in recent years, continual monitoring is necessary to determine the effects of this increased activity on the orbital debris environment. This paper will explore the results of the 2019 HUSIR radar measurements, including above-average flux measurements at lower LEO altitudes and the evolution of the flux during the time of observations.

James Murray↗

Radar Observations from the Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar in 2019

The NASA Orbital Debris Program Office (ODPO) relies primarily on ground-based radar measurements to characterize the distribution of small debris, down to approximately 3 mm depending upon altitude and the sensor used, in low Earth orbit (LEO). Since the early 1990’s, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Lincoln Laboratory (LL) has been collecting radar measurements for the NASA ODPO under agreements with the U.S. Department of Defense. The Haystack Ultrawideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) is the primary ground-based radar sensor used by the ODPO and provides data on orbital debris down to an approximate size of 5.5 mm below 1000km altitude using the NASA size estimation model (SEM). Since orbital debris of this size are a significant risk to both human and robotic missions in LEO, the sensitivity of this radar makes it a high-value sensor. The NASA ODPO radar measurements are conducted on a continual basis for monitoring and enabling modeling of the orbital debris environment over time. HUSIR observations from 2019 are the most recent snapshot of the environment that has been measured and analyzed to date. In recent years, HUSIR measurements indicated relatively stable populations for the orbital debris objects that it is able to detect. In 2019, several interesting events happened on-orbit, including the start of large constellation deployments into LEO, as well as the Indian anti-satellite test with Microsat-R (International Designator 2019-006A, U.S. Strategic Command Space Surveillance Network catalog number 43947). Due to these events, coupled with a general increase in the number of missions and participants launching missions in recent years, continual monitoring is necessary to determine the effects of this increased activity on the orbital debris environment. This paper will explore the results of the 2019 HUSIR radar measurements, including above-average flux measurements at lower LEO altitudes and the evolution of the flux during the time of observations.

James Murray↗

Air Traffic Management Blockchain Infrastructure for Security, Authentication, and Privacy

Current radar-based air traffic service providers may preserve privacy for military and corporate operations by procedurally preventing public release of selected flight plans, position, and state data. The FAA mandate for national adoption of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) in 2020 does not include provisions for maintaining these same aircraft-privacy options, nor does it address the potential for spoofing, denial of service, and other well-documented risk factors. This paper presents an engineering prototype that embodies a design and method that may be applied to mitigate these ADS-B security issues. The design innovation is the use of an open source permissioned blockchain framework to enable aircraft privacy and anonymity while providing a secure and efficient method for communication with Air Traffic Services, Operations Support, or other authorized entities. This framework features certificate authority, smart contract support, and higher-bandwidth communication channels for private information that may be used for secure communication between any specific aircraft and any particular authorized member, sharing data in accordance with the terms specified in the form of smart contracts. The prototype demonstrates how this method can be economically and rapidly deployed in a scalable modular environment.

air traffic privacy & authentication↗

Air Traffic Management Blockchain Infrastructure for Security, Authentication, and Privacy

Current radar-based air traffic service providers may preserve privacy for military and corporate operations by procedurally preventing public release of selected flight plans, position, and state data. The FAA mandate for national adoption of Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) in 2020 does not include provisions for maintaining these same aircraft-privacy options, nor does it address the potential for spoofing, denial of service, and other well-documented risk factors. This paper presents an engineering prototype that embodies a design and method that may be applied to mitigate these ADS-B security issues. The design innovation is the use of an open source permissioned blockchain framework to enable aircraft privacy and anonymity while providing a secure and efficient method for communication with Air Traffic Services, Operations Support, or other authorized entities. This framework features certificate authority, smart contract support, and higher-bandwidth communication channels for private information that may be used for secure communication between any specific aircraft and any particular authorized member, sharing data in accordance with the terms specified in the form of smart contracts. The prototype demonstrates how this method can be economically and rapidly deployed in a scalable modular environment.

ADS-B cybersecurity↗

Operational Concept for the Smart Landing Facility (SLF)

The purpose of this document is to describe an operational concept for the Smart Landing Facility (SLF). The SLF is proposed as a component of the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) and is envisioned to utilize Communication, Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) technologies to support higher-volume air traffic operations in a wider variety of weather conditions than are currently possible at airports without an Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) or Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). In order to accomplish this, the SLF will provide aircraft sequencing and separation within its terminal airspace (the SLF traffic area) and on the airport surface. The approach taken in this report is to first define and describe the SLF environment and the type of operations and aircraft that must be supported. Services currently provided by an ATCT and TRACON are reviewed and assembled into a set of high-level operational functions. A description of the applicable CNS/ATM technologies that have been deployed in the NAS (National Airspace System) or have been demonstrated to be operationally feasible is presented. A candidate SLF system concept that employs the CNS/ATM technologies is described. This is followed by SLF operational scenarios for minimally-equipped aircraft and for aircraft fully-equipped to make full use of SLF services. An assessment is made of the SLF technology and key research issues are identified.

Thompson, S. D.↗

Characterization of the 2012-044c Briz-M Upper Stage Breakup

On 6 August, 2012, Russia launched two commercial satellites aboard a Proton rocket, and attempted to place them in geosynchronous orbit using a Briz-M upper stage (2012-044C, SSN 38746). Unfortunately, the upper stage failed early in its burn and was left stranded in an elliptical orbit with a perigee in low Earth orbit (LEO). Because the stage failed with much of its fuel on board, it was deemed a significant breakup risk. These fears were confirmed when it broke up 16 October, creating a large cloud of debris with perigees below that of the International Space Station. The debris cloud was tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which can reliably detect and track objects down to about 10 cm in size. Because of the unusual geometry of the breakup, there was an opportunity for NASA Orbital Debris Program Office to request radar assets to characterize the extent of the debris cloud in sizes smaller than the standard debris tracked by the SSN. This paper will describe the observation campaign to measure the small particle distributions of this cloud, and presents the results of the analysis of the data. We shall compare the data to the modelled size distribution, number, and shape of the cloud, and what implications this may have for future breakup debris models. We shall conclude the paper with a discussion how this measurement process can be improved for future breakups.

Matney, M. J.↗

Radar Cross Section of Orbital Debris Objects

This discussion is concerned with the radar-data analysis and usage involved in the building of model orbital debris (OD) populations in the near-Earth environment, focusing on radar cross section (RCS). While varying with radar wavelength, physical dimension, material composition, overall shape and structure, the RCS of an irregular object is also strongly dependent on its spatial orientation. The historical records of observed RCSs for cataloged OD objects in the Space Surveillance Network are usually distributed over an RCS range, forming respective characteristic patterns. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Size Estimation Model provides an empirical probability-density function of RCS as a function of “effective diameter” (or “characteristic length”), which makes it feasible to predict possible RCS distributions for a given model OD population and to link data with model from a statistical perspective. The discussion also includes application of the widely used method of moments (MoM) and the Generalized Multi-particle Mie-solution (GMM) in the prediction of the RCS of arbitrarily shaped objects. Theoretical calculation results for an aluminum cube are compared with corresponding experimental measurements.

Xu, Yu-Lin↗

Characterization of the 2012-044C Briz-M Upper Stage Breakup

On 6 August, 2012, Russia launched two commercial satellites aboard a Proton rocket, and attempted to place them in geosynchronous orbit using a Briz-M upper stage (2012-044C, SSN 38746). Unfortunately, the upper stage failed early in its burn and was left stranded in an elliptical orbit with a perigee in low Earth orbit (LEO). Because the stage failed with much of its fuel on board, it was deemed a significant breakup risk. These fears were confirmed when it broke up 16 October, creating a large cloud of debris with perigees below that of the International Space Station. The debris cloud was tracked by the US Space Surveillance Network (SSN), which can reliably detect and track objects down to about 10 cm in size. Because of the unusual geometry of the breakup, there was an opportunity for NASA Orbital Debris Program Office to use specialized radar assets to characterize the extent of the debris cloud in sizes smaller than the standard debris tracked by the SSN. This paper will describe the observation campaign to measure the small particle distributions of this cloud, and presents the results of the analysis of the data. We shall compare the data to the modelled size distribution, number, and shape of the cloud, and what implications this may have for future breakup debris models. We shall conclude the paper with a discussion how this measurement process can be improved for future breakups.

Matney, M. J.↗

The structure of a microburst - As observed by ground-based and airborne Doppler radar

Attention is given to the microburst observed near Denver, CO, on June 29, 1982, in the course of the Joint Airport Weather Study (JAWS). The JAWS ground radar network was specifically established to furnish high spatial and temporal resolution multiple Doppler data for microburst observations. The data, which were collected from directly above the microburst, permitted direct measurements of vertical velocities to be made. P-3 surveillance aircraft Doppler data was also available for this microburst, whose considerable complexity is noted.

Mueller, C. K.↗