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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2001

Flight Computer Processing Avionics for Space Station Microgravity Experiments: A Risk Assessment of Commercial Off-the-Shelf Utilization

NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is continually looking for ways to reduce the costs and schedule and minimize the technical risks during the development of microgravity programs. One of the more prominent ways to minimize the cost and schedule is to use off-the-shelf hardware (OTS). However, the use of OTS often increases the risk. This paper addresses relevant factors considered during the selection and utilization of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) flight computer processing equipment for the control of space station microgravity experiments. The paper will also discuss how to minimize the technical risks when using COTS processing hardware. Two microgravity experiments for which the COTS processing equipment is being evaluated for are the Equiaxed Dendritic Solidification Experiment (EDSE) and the Self-diffusion in Liquid Elements (SDLE) experiment. Since MSFC is the lead center for Microgravity research, EDSE and SDLE processor selection will be closely watched by other experiments that are being designed to meet payload carrier requirements. This includes the payload carriers planned for the International Space Station (ISS). The purpose of EDSE is to continue to investigate microstructural evolution of, and thermal interactions between multiple dendrites growing under diffusion controlled conditions. The purpose of SDLE is to determine accurate self-diffusivity data as a function of temperature for liquid elements selected as representative of class-like structures. In 1999 MSFC initiated a Center Director's Discretionary Fund (CDDF) effort to investigate and determine the optimal commercial data bus architecture that could lead to faster, better, and lower cost data acquisition systems for the control of microgravity experiments. As part of this effort various commercial data acquisition systems were acquired and evaluated. This included equipment with various form factors, (3U, 6U, others) and equipment that utilized various bus structures, (VME, PC104, STD bus). This evaluation of hardware was performed in conjunction with a trade study that considered over twenty (20) different factors relevant to the selection of an optimum design approach. These factors included; safety, sizing and timing, radiation hardness and single event upset, power consumption, heat dissipation, size and volume, expected service life, maintainability, heritage, operating systems, requirements for software reuse, availability of compatible interface boards, relative cost, schedule, reliability, EMI/EMC factors, "hot swap" capability, standards for conduction cooling, I/O capabilities, unique carrier requirements and operating system considerations. The approach to evaluate Safety as part of this study included a review of the Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) for each of the experiment designs and a determination of how each hazard could be addressed and eliminated when different processors were selected. This included evaluating various design approaches and trade-offs between fault tolerant designs and fail-safe designs in accordance with NSTS 1700.7B. This will include the results of radiation testing where available. Various operating systems, such as VxWorks, Linux, QNX, and Embedded NT are evaluated and the advantages and disadvantages of their utilization are also addressed. Design implementation strategies for the various operating systems are considered and discussed. This paper presents the results and recommendations from this trade study. Preliminary conclusions from this study are that safety concerns from lack or radiation testing on COTS equipment can be addressed by additional testing and design considerations, the PC104 bus provided adequate I/O for the SDLE and EDSE microgravity experiments, and PC104 bus components offered significant advantages over VME and cPCI for weight and space reductions.

Estes, Howard↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Visual Advantage of Enhanced Flight Vision System During NextGen Flight Test Evaluation

Synthetic Vision Systems and Enhanced Flight Vision System (SVS/EFVS) technologies have the potential to provide additional margins of safety for aircrew performance and enable operational improvements for low visibility operations in the terminal area environment. Simulation and flight tests were jointly sponsored by NASA's Aviation Safety Program, Vehicle Systems Safety Technology project and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to evaluate potential safety and operational benefits of SVS/EFVS technologies in low visibility Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) operations. The flight tests were conducted by a team of Honeywell, Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation and NASA personnel with the goal of obtaining pilot-in-the-loop test data for flight validation, verification, and demonstration of selected SVS/EFVS operational and system-level performance capabilities. Nine test flights were flown in Gulfstream's G450 flight test aircraft outfitted with the SVS/EFVS technologies under low visibility instrument meteorological conditions. Evaluation pilots flew 108 approaches in low visibility weather conditions (600 feet to 3600 feet reported visibility) under different obscurants (mist, fog, drizzle fog, frozen fog) and sky cover (broken, overcast). Flight test videos were evaluated at three different altitudes (decision altitude, 100 feet radar altitude, and touchdown) to determine the visual advantage afforded to the pilot using the EFVS/Forward-Looking InfraRed (FLIR) imagery compared to natural vision. Results indicate the EFVS provided a visual advantage of two to three times over that of the out-the-window (OTW) view. The EFVS allowed pilots to view the runway environment, specifically runway lights, before they would be able to OTW with natural vision.

Kramer, Lynda J.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Development of COPVS for High pressure, In-Space, Cryogenic Fuel Storage

Polymeric composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) provide an attractive material system to support developing commercial launch business and alternate fuel ventures. However to be able to design with these materials, the mechanical behavior of the materials must be understood with regards to processing, performance, damage tolerance, and environment. For the storage of cryogenic propellants, it is important to evaluate the materials performance and impact damage resistance at cryogenic temperatures in order to minimize weight and to ensure safety and reliability. To evaluate the ultimate performance, various polymeric COPV's have been statically burst tested at cryogenic conditions before and after exposure to irradiation. Materials selected for these COPVs were based on the measured mechanical properties of candidate resin systems and fibers that were also tested at cryogenic conditions before and after exposure to irradiation. The correlation of COPV burst pressures with the constituent material properties has proven to be a valuable screening method for selection of suitable candidate materials with resistance to material degradation due to exposure to temperature and radiation.

DeLay, Tom↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Applying Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation Schemes to Detect-and-Avoid Systems

Impact of sensor noise on the performance of Detect-And-Avoid (DAA) systems can be reduced by implementing various mitigation schemes. This paper evaluates the Sensor Uncertainty Mitigation (SUM) method, implemented in the Detect and Avoid Alerting Logic for Unmanned Systems (DAIDALUS) algorithm, a reference implementation in the DAA minimum operational performance standards. DAIDALUS SUM performance is evaluated using a few safety and operational suitability metrics and compared with more traditional approaches using static safety buffers. A large number of encounters representative of low-speed unmanned aircraft against non-cooperative manned aircraft are simulated and evaluated. An air-to-air radar model produces representative sensor noise for the DAA system. Results show that increasing the tunable parameters for horizontal and vertical uncertainty in DAIDALUS SUM improves the safety metric at the cost of increasing the number of system alerts leading to increased workload. A range of SUM parameters is recommended as suitable values for the type of operations considered for this work. General trends and optimal SUM configurations were found to be nearly the same for two large and very different encounter data sets.

detect and avoid↗
NASA NTRS1998

Evaluation of Portable Multi-Gas Analyzers for use by Safety Personnel

During confined space entry operations as well as Shuttle-safing operations, United Space Alliance (USA)/National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) safety personnel use a variety of portable instrumentation to monitor for hazardous levels of compounds such as nitrogen dioxide (N%), monomethylhydrazine (NMM), FREON 21, ammonia (NH3), oxygen (O2), and combustibles (as hydrogen (H2)). Except for O2 and H2, each compound is monitored using a single analyzer. In many cases these analyzers are 5 to 10 years old and require frequent maintenance. In addition, they are cumbersome to carry and tend to make the job of personnel monitoring physically taxing. As part of an effort to upgrade the sensor technology background information was requested from a total of 27 manufacturers of portable multi-gas instruments. A set of criteria was established to determine which vendors would be selected for laboratory evaluation. These criteria were based on requests made by USA/NASA Safety personnel in order to meet requirements within their respective areas for confined-space and Shuttle-safing operations. Each of the 27 manufacturers of multi-gas analyzers was sent a copy of the criteria and asked to fill in the appropriate information pertaining to their instrumentation. Based on the results of the sensor criteria worksheets, a total of 9 vendors out of 27 surveyed manufacturers were chosen for evaluation. Each vendor included in the final evaluation process was requested to configure each of two analyzers with NO2, NH3, O2, and combustible sensors. A set of lab tests was designed in order to determine which of the multi-gas instruments under evaluation was best suited for use in both shuttle and confined space operations. These tests included linearity/repeatability, zero/span drift response/recovery, humidity, interference, and maintenance. At the conclusion of lab testing three vendors were selected for additional field testing. Based on the results of both the lab and field evaluations a single vendor was recommended for use by NASA/IJSA Safety personnel. Vendor selection criteria, as well as the results from both laboratory and field testing of the multi-gas analyzers, are presented as part of this paper.

Lueck, D. E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Applications of Advanced Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) and Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) Techniques to Address Safety of Flight Issues on NASA Spacecraft

Advanced NDE and SHM techniques are critical for ensuring the reliability and safety of NASA launch vehicles and spacecraft. NDE techniques such as infrared thermography, THz imaging, x-ray computed tomography and backscatter x-ray are used to detect indications of damage in spacecraft components and structures. Additionally, sensor and measurement systems are integrated into spacecraft to provide SHM to detect damaging events that occur during flight such as debris impacts during launch and assent or from micrometeoroid and orbital debris, or excessive loading due to anomalous flight conditions. A number of examples will be provided of how these NDE and SHM techniques have been applied to resolve safety critical inspection concerns for the Space Shuttle, International Space Station (ISS), and a variety of launch vehicles and unmanned spacecraft.

Advanced Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE)↗
NASA NTRS2014

International Space Station (ISS) Plasma Contactor Unit (PCU) Utilization Plan Assessment Update

The International Space Station (ISS) vehicle undergoes spacecraft charging as it interacts with Earth's ionosphere and magnetic field. The interaction can result in a large potential difference developing between the ISS metal chassis and the local ionosphere plasma environment. If an astronaut conducting extravehicular activities (EVA) is exposed to the potential difference, then a possible electrical shock hazard arises. The control of this hazard was addressed by a number of documents within the ISS Program (ISSP) including Catastrophic Safety Hazard for Astronauts on EVA (ISS-EVA-312-4A_revE). The safety hazard identified the risk for an astronaut to experience an electrical shock in the event an arc was generated on an extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) surface. A catastrophic safety hazard, by the ISS requirements, necessitates mitigation by a two-fault tolerant system of hazard controls. Traditionally, the plasma contactor units (PCUs) on the ISS have been used to limit the charging and serve as a "ground strap" between the ISS structure and the surrounding ionospheric plasma. In 2009, a previous NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) team evaluated the PCU utilization plan (NESC Request #07-054-E) with the objective to assess whether leaving PCUs off during non-EVA time periods presented risk to the ISS through assembly completion. For this study, in situ measurements of ISS charging, covering the installation of three of the four photovoltaic arrays, and laboratory testing results provided key data to underpin the assessment. The conclusion stated, "there appears to be no significant risk of damage to critical equipment nor excessive ISS thermal coating damage as a result of eliminating PCU operations during non- EVA times." In 2013, the ISSP was presented with recommendations from Boeing Space Environments for the "Conditional" Marginalization of Plasma Hazard. These recommendations include a plan that would keep the PCUs off during EVAs when the space environment forecast input to the ISS charging model indicates floating potentials (FP) within specified limits. These recommendations were based on the persistence of conditions in the space environment due to the current low solar cycle and belief in the accuracy and completeness of the ISS charging model. Subsequently, a Noncompliance Report (NCR), ISS-NCR-232G, Lack of Two-fault Tolerance to EVA Crew Shock in the Low Earth Orbit Plasma Environment, was signed in September 2013 specifying new guidelines for the use of shock hazard controls based on a forecast of the space environment from ISS plasma measurements taken prior to the EVA [ISS-EVA-312-AC, 2012]. This NESC assessment re-evaluates EVA charging hazards through a process that is based on over 14 years of ISS operations, charging measurements, laboratory tests, EMU studies and modifications, and safety reports. The assessment seeks an objective review of the plasma charging hazards associated with EVA operations to determine if any of the present hazard controls can safely change the PCU utilization plan to allow more flexibility in ISS operations during EVA preparation and execution.

Hernandez-Pellerano, Amri↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Microgreens Crop Readiness for Space Production.

Microgreens are small-size, nutrient-rich, and fast-grown crops, which are considered as candidates for future space exploration missions. In particular, the ISS, the Lunar Gateway, and Mars and Lunar missions could benefit from growing microgreens to supplement astronaut diets in the near future. Research at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center has focused on (1) the selection of microgreens compatible species, (2) the evaluation of microgreens food safety, (3) the use of passive wicking, on-demand watering, and hydroponics cultivation, (4) simulated microgravity growth, (5) microgreen canopy gas exchange, and (6) harvesting techniques in microgravity. This presentation summarizes this research. Microgreen species will be evaluated for their yield in relationship to the quantity of inputs – water, seeds, substrate, light intensity, photoperiod, crew time – required for their growth; for their organoleptic and sensory factors in order to down select species that are highly acceptable for humans; and for their microbial loads as detected in their growth environment and the food safety metrics of their edible tissue. Passive wicking, on-demand watering, and hydroponic systems are being studied as an efficient way to deliver essential nutrients and water to microgreens, included in a microgravity environment. Growth studies in simulated microgravity (using 3-dimensional clinostats) will assess microgreens growth relative to that in 1g. Gas exchange studies on microgreens canopies in various airflows will assess their photosynthesis and transpiration. Finally, a series of parabolic flights has enabled the evaluation of different harvesting and bagging techniques in microgravity. Indeed, traditional plant harvesting methods (scissors) in microgravity could generate significant microgreen debris in the space station cabin. Two innovative techniques, coupled to a dedicated bagging method, were designed and evaluated against the control, traditional, harvesting technique. This research was supported by grants from NASA KSC’s Independent Research and Technology Development Program, NASA’s Flight Opportunity Program, NASA Postdoctoral Program Fellowships (L.P. & C.J.) supported by NASA’s Space Biology program, and support from NASA’s Human Research Program.

crop↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Evaluating Microgreens Crop Readiness for Space Production

Microgreens are small-size, nutrient-rich, and fast-grown crops, which are considered as candidates for future space exploration missions. In particular, the ISS, the Lunar Gateway, and Mars and Lunar missions could benefit from growing microgreens to supplement astronaut diets in the near future. Research at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center has focused on (1) the selection of microgreens compatible species, (2) the evaluation of microgreens food safety, (3) the use of passive wicking, on-demand watering, and hydroponics cultivation, (4) simulated microgravity growth, (5) microgreen canopy gas exchange, and (6) harvesting techniques in microgravity. This interactive presentation summarizes this research. Microgreen species will be evaluated for their yield in relationship to the quantity of inputs – water, seeds, substrate, light intensity, photoperiod, crew time – required for their growth; for their organoleptic and sensory factors in order to down select species that are highly acceptable for humans; and for their microbial loads as detected in their growth environment and the food safety metrics of their edible tissue. Passive wicking, on-demand watering, and hydroponic systems are being studied as an efficient way to deliver essential nutrients and water to microgreens, included in a microgravity environment. Growth studies in simulated microgravity (using 3-dimensional clinostats) will assess microgreens growth relative to that in 1g. Gas exchange studies on microgreens canopies in various airflows will assess their photosynthesis and transpiration. Finally, a series of parabolic flights has enabled the evaluation of different harvesting and bagging techniques in microgravity. Indeed, traditional plant harvesting methods (scissors) in microgravity could generate significant microgreen debris in the space station cabin. Two innovative techniques, coupled to a dedicated bagging method, were designed and evaluated against the control, traditional, harvesting technique. This research was supported by grants from NASA KSC’s Independent Research and Technology Development Program, NASA’s Flight Opportunity Program, NASA Postdoctoral Program Fellowships (L.P. & C.J.) supported by NASA’s Space Biology program, and support from NASA’s Human Research Program.

Space Crop Production↗
NASA NTRS2011

Towards Measurement of Confidence in Safety Cases

Arguments in safety cases are predominantly qualitative. This is partly attributed to the lack of sufficient design and operational data necessary to measure the achievement of high-dependability targets, particularly for safety-critical functions implemented in software. The subjective nature of many forms of evidence, such as expert judgment and process maturity, also contributes to the overwhelming dependence on qualitative arguments. However, where data for quantitative measurements is systematically collected, quantitative arguments provide far more benefits over qualitative arguments, in assessing confidence in the safety case. In this paper, we propose a basis for developing and evaluating integrated qualitative and quantitative safety arguments based on the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) and Bayesian Networks (BN). The approach we propose identifies structures within GSN-based arguments where uncertainties can be quantified. BN are then used to provide a means to reason about confidence in a probabilistic way. We illustrate our approach using a fragment of a safety case for an unmanned aerial system and conclude with some preliminary observations

Denney, Ewen↗
NASA NTRS2020

Run Time Assurance as an Alternate Concept to Contemporary Development Assurance Processes

NASA and the FAA sought industry research to identify and evaluate alternate concepts for assuring safety of airborne systems. This report documents a research effort focused on the evaluation of Run Time Assurance (RTA) as applied to a novel, airborne system architecture. The RTA pattern is applied to a case study focused on a notional integrated flight and propulsion control system for a DEP VTOL aircraft. During flight, while the high-automation algorithms are operating, the RTA system will monitor the aircraft state for any impending violation of safety requirements. When necessary, it will switch to the low-automation software to prevent such violations. Assurance practices for both baseline industry activities and the RTA approach were captured and compared to illustrate the required engineering design considerations, and possible advantages and disadvantages of each approach as part of this case study.

Eric M. Peterson↗
NASA NTRS1971

Orbiting propellent depot safety. Volume 2: Technical discussion

The results of a study assessing the gross requirements and concomitant safety hazards associated with the operation of several configurations of orbiting propellant depots (OPD) are presented. The major structural and operational aspects of the integral, semimodular, and modular concepts are described. The concepts are evaluated to determine their safety hazards, and emphasis is placed on propellant transfer to and from the OPD. The study indicates that a modular mode of depot resupply is desirable regardless of the OPD configuration. This resupply mode requires no flow transfer to resupply either the semimodular or modular OPD. Of the three concepts, the semimodular appears to provide the best operational advantage and lowest safety risk.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

Contingency Operations of Americas Next Moon Rocket, Ares V

America has begun the development of a new space vehicle system which will enable humans to return to the moon and reach even farther destinations. The system is called Constellation: it has 2 earth-launch vehicles, Ares I and Ares V; a crew module, Orion; and a lander, Altair with descent and ascent stages. Ares V will launch an Earth Departure Stage (EDS) and Altair into low earth orbit. Ares I will launch the Orion crew module into low earth orbit where it will rendezvous and dock with the Altair and EDS "stack". After rendezvous, the stack will contain four complete rocket systems, each capable of independent operations. Of course this multiplicity of vehicles provides a multiplicity of opportunities for off-nominal behavior and multiple mitigation options for each. Contingency operations are complicated by the issues of crew safety and the possibility of debris from the very large components impacting the ground. This paper examines contingency operations of the EDS in low earth orbit, during the boost to translunar orbit, and after the translunar boost. Contingency operations under these conditions have not been a consideration since the Apollo era and analysis of the possible contingencies and mitigations will take some time to evolve. Since the vehicle has not been designed, much less built, it is not possible to evaluate contingencies from a root-cause basis or from a probability basis; rather they are discussed at an effects level (such as the reaction control system is consuming propellant at a high rate). Mitigations for the contingencies are based on the severity of the off-nominal condition, the time of occurrence, recovery options, options for alternate missions, crew safety, evaluation of the condition (forensics) and future prevention. Some proposed mitigations reflect innovation in thinking and make use of the multiplicity of on-orbit resources including the crew; example: Orion could do a "fly around" to allow the crew to determine the condition and cause of a partially separated payload shroud. Other mitigations are really alternate missions; example, an engine out on during ascent resulted in insufficient propellant for the lunar mission, but the on-orbit vehicle stack is otherwise perfect and can pursue an alternate mission, such as a high ballistic trajectory to test the high-speed atmospheric reentry of Orion. Evaluation and presentation of contingency operations at this early stage of the development of the Ares V rocket will improve the design of the vehicle and lay the groundwork for the exhaustive contingency planning which must be done after the vehicle is built as preparations for operations.

Jaap, John↗
NASA NTRS2008

Probabilistic Analysis and Design of a Raked Wing Tip for a Commercial Transport

An approach for conducting reliability-based design and optimization (RBDO) of a Boeing 767 raked wing tip (RWT) is presented. The goal is to evaluate the benefits of RBDO for design of an aircraft substructure. A finite-element (FE) model that includes eight critical static load cases is used to evaluate the response of the wing tip. Thirteen design variables that describe the thickness of the composite skins and stiffeners are selected to minimize the weight of the wing tip. A strain-based margin of safety is used to evaluate the performance of the structure. The randomness in the load scale factor and in the strain limits is considered. Of the 13 variables, the wing-tip design was controlled primarily by the thickness of the thickest plies in the upper skins. The report includes an analysis of the optimization results and recommendations for future reliability-based studies.

Mason Brian H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Office Safety Mission Assurance Efforts to Improve Non-destructive Evaluation Methods for Additive Manufacturing and In-Space Inspection

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) continues to push the boundary of manned flight. Current mission profiles include flights to the Moon and Mars. Many of these missions require advance manufacturing and planned off planet resource utilization. As NASA continues to develop highly advance materials and manufacturing techniques to meet these mission profiles, inspection of these increasingly complex parts has had to evolve as well. Additive manufacturing is coming to the forefront as a primary manufacturing technique but offers unique challenges when inspection and certification are required. NASA has been working diligently to be a leader in developing and utilizing inspection techniques capable of inspecting these highly advanced parts. Additionally additive manufacturing techniques can also be used to build parts in space and provides a vehicle for in-situ resource utilization for off world missions. As NASA and its commercial crew partners move forward, inspection techniques will need to continue to advance to ensure safe manned space flight. In this talk NASA will highlight many of the advanced nondestructive evaluation efforts going on across the agency, as well as providing highlights for points of infusion for helping NASA meet its future mission goals.

NDE↗
NASA NTRS2006

In-Flight Validation of a Pilot Rating Scale for Evaluating Failure Transients in Electronic Flight Control Systems

Engineering development and qualification of a Research Flight Control System (RFCS) for the Rotorcraft Aircrew Systems Concepts Airborne Laboratory (RASCAL) JUH-60A has motivated the development of a pilot rating scale for evaluating failure transients in fly-by-wire flight control systems. The RASCAL RFCS includes a highly-reliable, dual-channel Servo Control Unit (SCU) to command and monitor the performance of the fly-by-wire actuators and protect against the effects of erroneous commands from the flexible, but single-thread Flight Control Computer. During the design phase of the RFCS, two piloted simulations were conducted on the Ames Research Center Vertical Motion Simulator (VMS) to help define the required performance characteristics of the safety monitoring algorithms in the SCU. Simulated failures, including hard-over and slow-over commands, were injected into the command path, and the aircraft response and safety monitor performance were evaluated. A subjective Failure/Recovery Rating (F/RR) scale was developed as a means of quantifying the effects of the injected failures on the aircraft state and the degree of pilot effort required to safely recover the aircraft. A brief evaluation of the rating scale was also conducted on the Army/NASA CH-47B variable stability helicopter to confirm that the rating scale was likely to be equally applicable to in-flight evaluations. Following the initial research flight qualification of the RFCS in 2002, a flight test effort was begun to validate the performance of the safety monitors and to validate their design for the safe conduct of research flight testing. Simulated failures were injected into the SCU, and the F/RR scale was applied to assess the results. The results validate the performance of the monitors, and indicate that the Failure/Recovery Rating scale is a very useful tool for evaluating failure transients in fly-by-wire flight control systems.

Kalinowski, Kevin F.↗