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At least 163 records · Page 9

The development and use of decision support framework for informing selection of select agent toxins with modelling studies to inform permissible toxin amounts

Many countries have worked diligently to establish and implement policies and processes to regulate high consequence pathogens and toxins that could have a significant public health impact if misused. In the United States, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Public Law 104-132, 1996), as amended by the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-188, 2002) requires that the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) [through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)] establish a list of bacteria, viruses, and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. Currently, this list is reviewed and updated on a biennial basis using input from subject matter experts (SMEs). We have developed decision support framework (DSF) approaches to facilitate selection of select toxins and, where toxicity data are known, conducted modelling studies to inform selection of toxin amounts that should be excluded from select agent regulations. Exclusion limits allow laboratories to possess toxins under an established limit to support their research or teaching activities without the requirement to register with the Federal Select Agent Program. Fact sheets capturing data from a previously vetted SME workshop convened by CDC, literature review and SME input were developed to assist in evaluating toxins using the DSF approach. The output of the DSF analysis agrees with the current select toxin designations, and no other toxins evaluated in this study were recommended for inclusion on the select agent and toxin list. To inform the selection of exclusion limits, attack scenarios were developed to estimate the amount of toxin needed to impact public health. Scenarios consisted of simulated aerosol releases of a toxin in high-population-density public facilities and the introduction of a toxin into a daily consumable product supply chain. Using published inhalation and ingestion median toxic dose (TD 50 ) and median lethal dose (LD 50 ) values, where available, a range of toxin amounts was examined to estimate the number of people exposed to these amounts in these scenarios. Based on data generated by these models, we proposed toxin exclusion values corresponding to levels below those that would trigger a significant public health response (i.e., amounts estimated to expose up to ten people by inhalation or one hundred people by ingestion to LD 50 or TD 50 levels of toxin in the modeled scenarios).

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Panel Session 132: Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management: Reasonable Assurance for Safety

Mr. Larry Camper organized a panel of experts to discuss approaches to better make risk-informed decisions in waste management, decommissioning, and the management of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF). The audience heard the perspectives from four panelists that addressed issues ranging from the technical basis used to make risk-informed decisions to for developing cleanup criteria and promulgating regulations and safety standards both domestically and abroad. A summary of each of the presentations given by the panelists is provided herein. This WMS BOD featured panel focused on the Risk-Informed Approach for Decision Making in WM, D and D and SNF Management and the Reasonable Assurance for Safety. The panelists addressed and discussed with the audience different approaches used for decision-making, summarizing ongoing probabilistic vs. deterministic approaches, including IAEA graded approach, and discussed policies/approaches to achieve reasonable assurance for safety rather than using absolute assurance. Panelists with presentations: Risk-Informed Decision Making - More than a Motto? (Paul Black); NRC Staff Perspective on Risk-Informed Approach and Reasonable Safety Assurance in D and D and LLW (Rateb (Boby) Abu Eid); Risk-Informed Decision-Making and Illustrative National Academies Studies (Charles Ferguson); IAEA's Revised Safety Guidance on Remediation (Michelle Roberts); NDA Radioactive Waste Strategy - A Risk Informed Approach (James McKinney)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 181 Attitudes and Practices Regarding Disposal of Liquid Nuclear Waste at Clinton Laboratories in the Very Early Years: A Historical Analysis, S. H. Stow; 202 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Management in Germany Under the Auspices of the Federal Structure, A. Bayer, S. Bittner, and H. Korn; DESIGN FEATURES: 211 Twenty-Fourth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, R. D. Porco, and M. W. First; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 222 Explosion in the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Plant on April 6, 1993, M. L. Hyder, W. G. Lussie, and F. E. Witmer; 234 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 237 Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling, J. G. Ibarra, W. R. Jones, G. F. Lanik, H. L. Ornstein, and S. V. Pullani; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 256 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 260 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1996; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 210 Tennessee Industries Week; 221 21st International Symposium on The Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 259 IAEA Programme of Scientific Meetings for 1997; 270 PSAM 4 (International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management); 265 The Authors; 268 Errata.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗

Development of phenomena identification and ranking table for Westinghouse lead fast reactor’s safety

The Westinghouse Lead-cooled Fast Reactor (LFR) is a medium-size, passively safe, economic, Gen-IV nuclear reactor. An important effort within the Westinghouse LFR program is the development of the safety analysis methodology, which comprises computer code development, model development, and experimental testing. A key initial task associated with the development of the safety analysis methodology is the identification of processes and phenomena that affect the plant's capability to meet selected safety performance indicators. This is accomplished through the development of a Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) for selected accident scenarios which, for this specific PIRT effort, included selected postulated design basis accidents and hypothetical beyond design basis accidents in LFRs. This paper describes the role of PIRT in the development of the Westinghouse LFR safety analysis methodology and the process used in the PIRT development. Specifically, the Westinghouse LFR PIRT assessed importance of pertinent phenomena and identified gaps in their knowledge-base by evaluating current modeling capabilities and data available for validation. The ultimate goal was to provide guidance on computer code development and validation efforts and to prioritize testing to support LFR design and licensing. The key phenomena and processes that are deemed highly important for the safety performance indicators, but for which the state of knowledge is low, are presented. The testing program and analyses development are planned to address significant phenomena in the PIRT.

Lead fast reactor↗

Qualification of System-Level Advanced Reactor Safety Analysis Software for Lead Systems: Final CRADA Report

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactors. With its origin as SAS1A in the late 1960s, the SAS series of codes has been under continuous use and development for over forty-five years and represents a critical investment in safety analysis capabilities for the U.S. Department of Energy. Although SAS4A/SASSYS-1 was developed to support the analysis of any liquid-metal-cooled nuclear reactor, it has primarily been utilized to design and analyze Sodium Fast Reactors (SFRs). As a result, most of the qualification basis for SAS4A/SASSYS-1 has utilized sodium as a coolant and geometry descriptions that are prototypic of SFR configurations. In this project, which partnered with Westinghouse Electric Company, LLC, the initial foundation for a qualification basis centered on prototypic pool-type lead-cooled systems has been established, where the end goal is to extend support for utilization of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 in Lead Fast Reactor (LFR) licensing or authorization. This project included three fundamental technical tasks: LFR V&V test suite development (Task 1); qualification support for LFRs (Task 2); and LFR modeling capabilities evaluation and improvement (Task 3)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Comprehensive framework for data-driven model form discovery of the closure laws in thermal-hydraulics codes

The two-phase two-fluid model is a basis of many thermal-hydraulics codes used in design, licensing, and safety considerations of nuclear power plants. Thermal-hydraulics codes rely on the closure laws to close the system of conservation equations and describe the interactions between phases. These laws, derived from years of experimental investigations, are semi-empirical correlations that lack generality and have a limited range of applicability. Increase of computational power, availability of new experiments, and development of high-fidelity simulations has increased the number of validation data. The discrepancies between the code predictions and the validation data are a great source of knowledge. Missing physics that are not included in the model but are important for the considered phenomena can be discovered by propagating the information from the experimental results through the model. Furthermore, physics-discovered data-driven model form (P3DM) methodology integrates available integral effect tests and separate effects tests to determine the necessary corrections to the model form of the closure laws. In contrast to existing calibration techniques, the methodology modifies the functional form of the closure laws. Based on the functional form of the correction, the missing physics that were not included in the original model can be discovered. The methodology provides the alternative to the machine learning approach, in which the model is discovered in the form of the intractable black-box relation. In this work, the methodology was applied to the CTF subchannel code to improve the prediction of the two-phase flow phenomena.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor: Safety Design Approach

Deployment Objectives Flexibly co-locate with new industry users of nuclear energy Steam and electric cogeneration applications Direct process heat with temperature ranges from 700°C to 950°C Enabling Requirements Meet regulatory dose limits at the Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) 25 rem Total Effective Dose Equivalent (TEDE) for duration of the release from 10 CFR 50.34 (10 CFR 52.79) at Exclusion Area Boundary (EAB) for design basis accidents EAB is estimated approximately 400 meters from the modular HTGR plant (to support co-location with industrial facilities) Meet safety goals for cumulative individual risk for normal and off-normal operation Design goal: meet EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) at EAB 1 rem TEDE for sheltering Design basis and beyond design basis events are considered Realistically evaluated at the EAB Emergency planning and protection

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Sustainable Public Transport: Providing Responsive, On-Demand Service with Clean Energy

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) uses the Mobility Energy Productivity (MEP) as a metric and a lens to guide applied research into high performance public mobility. In the current initiative to abate global warming, the US needs not only zero-emission vehicles in the transit fleet (such as buses and shuttles) but also time- and cost-effective services to connect people with goods, services and employment toward a high-quality of life. Our current transportation system is overly dependent on personally-owned automobiles for high quality mobility, with public modes being less viable in many areas. Simply electrifying the drivetrains of existing public transit modes will fail to improve the quality of mobility for those that do not have access to private automobiles. The slow rebound by transit from the pandemic reveals the need to reinvent public transit service. Using the MEP lens, NREL researchers have tracked various novel developments in the public mobility space, with the confluence of shared, on-demand transit (ODT) services using light duty vehicles emerging as a key enabler of high-efficiency public mobility. Deployments such as those in Arlington, TX, Dallas, TX, Fort Erie, ON, and Innisfil, ON showcase the use of fleets of light-duty vehicles as the basis for community circulation and first/last mile to intra-regional transit. ODT services have demonstrated improvements in being more time efficient for riders, more energy efficient in operation (even before the introduction of fully electric vehicles), as well as being cost effective. It appears that aspects of the long-awaited promise of Personal Rapid Transit from the 1970s are beginning to be realized through ODT deployments, leveraging transportation network company (TNC) logistics, popularized by Uber and Lyft, but applied to public mobility. Currently, manually driven ODT operations are already cost competitive with traditional transit systems on a cost per ride basis, and full automation promises to reduce costs by 50% while providing additional safety and verified customer service. Connecting these ODT systems with efficient and effective intra-regional backbone transit service is the next step, with transit agencies like DART providing early results. This discussion will walk through the evidence for this postulated outcome and show results from a series of case-studies.

ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS,ENERGY PLANNING, POLIC↗

Full core LOCA safety analysis for a PWR containing high burnup fuel

For economic reasons, the US nuclear industry is renewing efforts to build a technical basis to extend peak rod average burnup limits above the current regulatory burnup limit of 62 GWd/MTU. The primary driver of these efforts is to economically increase pressurized water reactor (PWR) cycle lengths to 24 months, reduce the number of fresh fuel assemblies, increase time online, thereby reducing number of outages and their associated cost, higher fuel utilization, and possibly reduce core design constraints. In order for US nuclear utilities to leverage these economic efficiencies, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will likely require nuclear power plants (NPPs) to analyze a number of potential operational occurrences and their potential consequences with each new core design prior to resuming normal operation. Potential operational occurrences can be divided into three primary regimes: (1) normal operation, (2) anticipated operation occurrences (AOOs), and (3) design basis accidents (DBAs). Normal plant operation is an operating regime in which the plant operates within specified operational limits until the end of the cycle, whereas AOOs are events that result in the NPP deviating outside the normal operating regime. A key attribute of an AOO is that the occurrence should be expected. However, by definition, the occurrence of an AOO does not result in significant impact to critical safety functions. The last potential operational occurrence is a DBA. From the fuel performance point-of-view, DBAs can be subdivided into two bounding categories: (1) loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs), and (2) reactivity insertion accidents (RIAs). Unlike AOOs, DBAs may result in fuel rod failure. The NRC imposes fundamental acceptance criteria to minimize radiological consequences to the public and onsite staff. Furthermore, safety criteria are typically linked to the fulfillment of other acceptance criteria related to reactor safety equipment designed to mitigate DBAs.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

State-of-the-art and review of condensation heat transfer for small modular reactor passive safety: Experimental studies

Here this study focused on state-of-the-art and review of condensation heat transfer for small modular reactors (SMR). Nuclear reactors adopt passive containment cooling systems (PCCS) for accident mitigation, containment integrity, and primarily to maintain the last barrier for radioactive particle release to the environment during and beyond design-basis accidents. However, improving the effectiveness of the PCCS is more critical for the SMR than for commercial reactors to ensure higher safety margins and compactness. In the PCCS of SMR, due to its smaller size containment, the filmwise condensation (FWC) is dominant. Therefore, this study emphasized the FWC. Earlier condensation studies for the PCCS did not make SMR the primary focus, so a critical review for formulating the state-of-the-art was necessary. Part-1 of this study covered the review of physics phenomena, previous experimental studies with a brief overview of associated test facilities and empirical correlations. This study identified a research gap with the condensation test data scaling relations by using the information and findings of the previous PCCS studies and applied them to the SMR system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Panel discussion: Challenges and improvements in accident dose analysis; Regulatory and industry perspective

Full text of publication follows. Design basis accident (DBA) analyses are one of several ways nuclear power plant licensees demonstrate, and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff verifies, that the design and location of a nuclear power plant are appropriate and that the protection of health and safety of the public is maintained. In July 2000, the NRC staff issued Regulatory Guide 1.183, 'Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors' (RG 1.183) [1]. RG 1.183 provides a method acceptable to the NRC staff for complying with the regulatory requirements contained in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulation (10 CFR) Section 50.67 (50.67), 'Accident source term' [2]. RG 1.183 also provides assumptions and parameters used to model postulated DBA radiological analyses for light-water reactors (LWR). Since the initial issuance of RG 1.183, the NRC staff and the nuclear power plant licensees have both gained substantial experience with the implementation of 10 CFR 50.67 and RG 1.183. Based on this experience, comments from licensees, the anticipation of licensing advanced LWRs, and new research, the NRC is developing a proposed revision to RG 1.183. This panel discussion will provide a discussion of that proposed revision, its potential impact on existing and future evaluations, and the industry perspective on the revised guidance. References: 1) USNRC, Regulatory Guide 1.183, 'Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors,' Revision 0, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. (2000), Electronic copies are also available in ADAMS (http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html), under Accession No. ML003716792. 2) U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 (Energy), Part 50 (Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities), Section 67, (Accident source term), Office of the Federal Register, Washington, DC (1999). (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Safety Analysis of FeCrAl Accident-Tolerant Fuels with Increased Enrichment and Extended Burnup

The U.S. nuclear industry is facing a strong challenge to maintain regulatory-required levels of safety while ensuring economic competitiveness to stay in business. Safety remains a key parameter for all aspects related to the operation of light water reactor nuclear power plants (NPPs), and it can be achieved more economically by using a risk-informed ecosystem, such as that being developed by the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis Pathway under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program. This program is promoting a wide range of research and development activities to maximize both the safety and economically efficient performance of NPPs through improved scientific understanding, especially given that many plants are considering a second license renewal. The Risk-Informed Systems Analysis Pathway has two main goals: (1) The deployment of methodologies and technologies that enable a better representation of the safety margins and factors that contribute to cost and safety, and (2) The development of advanced applications that enable cost-effective plant operation. As part of this pathway, the Enhanced Resilient Plant project refers to an NPP where safety is improved by implementing various measures, such as accident-tolerant fuels, diverse and flexible coping strategies, enhancements to plant components and systems, incorporation of augmented or new passive cooling systems, and utilization of advanced battery technologies. The objective of the Enhanced Resilient Plant project is to use novel methods and computational tools to enhance existing reactors’ safety while reducing operational costs. This report documents research and development conducted in support of deployment of accident-tolerant fuels. This project performed safety analyses for the steady-state normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences, and design-basis accidents of a representative four-loop pressurized water reactor model with Zr and FeCrAl accident-tolerant fuel clad with higher enrichment and burnup supporting plant refueling cycles of 18 and 24 months. The source terms and environmental impacts were studied for a large-break loss of coolant accident, including uncertainty analyses.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Coupling of Pronghorn and RELAP-7 for a Pebble Bed Reactor

High temperature gas cooled reactors (HTGR) are a candidate for timely Gen-IV reactor technology deployment because of high technology readiness and walk-away safety. Among HTGRs, pebble bed reactors (PBRs) have attractive features such as low excess reactivity and online refueling. Pebble bed reactors pose unique challenges to analysts and reactor designers such as continuous burnup distribution depending on pebble motion and recirculation, radiative heat transfer across a variety of gas-filled gaps, and long design basis transients such as pressurized and depressurized loss of forced circulation. Modeling and simulation is essential for both the PBR’s safety case and design process. In order to verify and validate the new generation codes the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) Data bank provide a set of benchmarks data together with solutions calculated by the participants using the state of the art codes of that time. An important milestone to test the new PBR simulation codes is the OECD NEA PBMR-400 benchmark which includes thermal hydraulic and neutron kinetic standalone exercises as well as coupled exercises and transients scenarios. In this work, the reactor multiphysics code MAMMOTH and the thermal hydraulics code Pronghorn, both developed by the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) within the multiphysics object-oriented simulation environment (MOOSE), have been used to solve Phase 1 exercises 1 and 2 of the PBMR-400 benchmark. The steady state results are in agreement with the other participants’ solutions demonstrating the adequacy of MAMMOTH and Pronghorn for simulating PBRs.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Version 5.8 Safety Analysis Code System

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a software simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced nuclear reactors. Detailed, mechanistic models of steady-state and transient thermal, hydraulic, kinetic, and mechanical phenomena are employed to describe the response of the reactor core, the reactor primary and secondary coolant loops, the reactor control and protection systems, and the balance-of-plant to accidents caused by changes in coolant flow, loss of heat rejection, or reactivity insertion. The consequences of single and double-fault accidents can be modeled, including fuel and coolant heating, fuel and cladding mechanical behavior, core reactivity feedbacks, coolant loop performance including natural circulation, and decay heat removal. Analyses are typically terminated upon demonstration of reactor and plant shutdown to permanently coolable conditions, or upon violation of design basis margins. The objective of the analysis is to quantify accident consequences as measured by the transient behavior of system performance parameters, such as fuel and cladding temperatures, reactivity, and cladding strain. Originally developed for analysis of sodium cooled reactors with oxide fuel clad by stainless steel, the models were subsequently extended and specialized to metallic fuel clad with advanced alloys and to several other coolant options, including lead, LBE, and water.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Results of Re-evaluation of FEPs Related to Implementing the ABD Glass Program

The Savannah River Site plans to reprocess defense spent nuclear fuel currently stored in their L-Basin via the Accelerated Basin Deinventory (ABD) Program. The previous plan for the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel was to dispose of it directly in the federal repository without reprocessing. Implementing the ABD Program will result in final disposal of approximately 900 fewer canisters of defense spent nuclear fuel and the production of approximately 521 more canisters of vitrified high-level waste glass with some specific differences from the planned high-level waste glass. Because the 235U in the L-Basin spent nuclear fuel is not intended to be recovered, the fissile mass loading of the vitrified high-level glass waste form to be produced must be increased above the current value of 897 g/m 3 to a maximum of 2,500 g/m 3 . Therefore, implementing the ABD Program would produce a variant of high-level waste glass—the ABD glass—that needs to be evaluated for future repository licensing, which includes both preclosure safety and postclosure performance. This report describes the approach to and summarizes the results of an evaluation of the potential effects of implementing the ABD Program at the Savannah River Site on the technical basis for future repository licensing for a generic repository that is similar to Yucca Mountain and for one that is fully generic. This evaluation includes the effects on preclosure safety analyses and postclosure performance assessment for both repository settings. The license application for the proposed Yucca Mountain repository (DOE 2008), which is serving as a framework for this evaluation, concluded that the proposed Yucca Mountain repository would meet all applicable regulatory requirements. The evaluation documented in this report found that implementing the ABD Program is not expected to change that conclusion for a generic repository similar to Yucca Mountain or for a generic repository with respect to the preclosure safety analyses. With respect to the postclosure performance of a generic repository, no concerns were identified.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Modular High Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor: Accident Analysis

Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) Risk Informed Approach Selection of Licensing Basis Events (LBEs) Frequency-Consequence Target LBE Cumulative Risk Targets Structures, Systems, and Components (SSC) Safety Categories Classification Evaluation of Defense in Depth (DID) Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in LMP Process PRA Policy Statement American Nuclear Society (ANS) Non-Light-Water Reactor (non-LWR) PRA Standard

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Draft Prototype Microreactor Transportation Safety Program

Microreactors are compact reactors capable of producing less than 50 megawatts of electrical energy. Typically, these reactors are factory-fabricated and designed to be easily transportable by truck, rail, vessel, or air. Microreactor designs often assume that the unit can be transported containing either unirradiated or irradiated fuel. The interest in microreactors is driven by several factors, including the need to generate power on at remote locations, at military installations, at facilities such as data centers, and in areas recovering from natural disasters. The U.S. Department of Defense is actively pursuing the microreactor concept to meet the increasing energy demands of military operations that require portable and dense power sources. Commercial vendors are also exploring microreactor concepts. The report Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges (Maheras et al. 2024) outlined the emergency planning challenges associated with the transportation of microreactors by road, rail, and by barge/ship. The successful commercial deployment and redeployment of microreactors will also require the development of microreactor transportation safety programs. The elements in these safety programs are not specific to microreactors; however, the transport of microreactors may pose unique challenges in these areas. This report builds on the report Microreactor Transportation Emergency Planning Challenges (Maheras et al. 2024) and develops the elements of a prototype microreactor transportation safety program that describes the elements that should be contained vendor-developed microreactor transportation safety programs, identifying the unique elements associated with microreactor transport. This will provide vendors and their transportation contractors a basis for their transportation planning and will accelerate the commercial deployment and redeployment of microreactors by identifying those issues unique to microreactor transport. The emphasis of this report is on highway transport of microreactors. This is based on a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission transportation package approval strategy of crawl-walk-run, where transport by highway is evaluated first (Coles et al. 2021, 2024, Maheras et al. 2021), then other surface modes (rail and barge/ship), and finally air transport. Evaluation of maritime transport of microreactors was recently initiated (Rigato et al. 2024, Maheras et al. 2025). The report first discusses microreactors in general and microreactor transportation safety program planning assumptions. The report then provides a description of the transportation safety planning process and provides an extensive discussion of the elements of transportation safety programs. Specific elements examined included transportation roles and responsibilities, transportation planning, transportation mode and route selection, carrier selection, transportation packaging, advance notification of shipments, public information and communications, emergency response plans and procedures, inspections, security, safe parking, shipment tracking, weather and road conditions, medical preparedness, training and exercises, and program evaluation. The report then identifies the unique elements of a transportation safety program associated with microreactor transport. These unique elements were in the areas of: the unusual nature of microreactor designs, compensatory measures, increased radiation dose rates in the vicinity of microreactors, transportation package approval versus 10 CFR 50.59, and the use of a risk-informed transportation package approval process.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

International Benchmarking: A Global Perspective of Workplace Drug and Alcohol Testing

Workplace drug and alcohol testing has been widely implemented in diverse industries and is designed to detect the use of and deter the influence of legal and illegal substances that would impair the ability to perform work that has significant security and safety implications. Across the globe, patterns of drug and alcohol use and abuse and the regulations controlling drug and alcohol use vary by location (e.g., regions, countries, etc.). The prevalence of workplace drug and alcohol testing and protection of individuals’ rights in the workplace similarly tend to exhibit contextual differences. With the advancements in drug-testing technologies and the recent issuance of guidance for additional testing matrices (e.g., oral fluid, hair, etc.) by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, gaining a global perspective on the current state of drug and alcohol testing practices and regulations is important for leveraging such advancements to improve the effectiveness of drug and alcohol testing. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) tasked the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) fitness for duty (FFD) team to conduct a benchmarking analysis of international drug and alcohol testing regulations and programs to identify similarities and differences in workplace testing programs and the basis for any differences. The benchmarking study focuses on a policy analysis and benchmarking metrics comparison among different countries and regions. The policy analysis includes the following three types of relevant international and national policies relevant to drug and alcohol testing in the nuclear industry: 1. National drug and alcohol policy 2. Workplace drug and alcohol testing 3. FFD regulations for Nuclear Power Plants The international drug and alcohol benchmarking metrics focusses on the use of blood, breath, urine, hair, and oral fluid in testing; drug and drug metabolite cutoff values; point-of-collection testing devices; roadside testing methodologies; innovations in drug testing; and the extent of availability of such data. Gaining an understanding of workplace drug and alcohol testing in other countries as well as information about new testing methods, matrices, tools, and technologies that other countries have adopted provides NRC with international comparative information regarding the technical basis for such programs and methods as it relates to the protection of worker and public health and safety.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗