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DOE OSTI2020

Update to the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20124

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement (DAS) from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance. In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. In accordance with the guidance and recommendations in US DoE's technical standard for DAS, deterministic and probabilistic analyses were performed to demonstrate the SDF system, which includes the engineered cover system, the SDUs, the waste form, and the natural features of the site, provides a reasonable expectation that saltstone disposal will meet performance objectives. Post-closure doses to future members of the public (MOP) were evaluated; dose estimates from the air pathway were well below the 1.0 E-04 Sv/yr (10 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years, and the calculated doses to the MOP from all exposure pathways, including the groundwater and air pathways, were well below the 2.5 E-04 Sv/yr (25 mrem/yr) performance objective within 1,000 years. Doses following an assumed intrusion event within the facility boundaries were well below the IHI performance objectives, where the acute IHI dose was below the acute IHI dose performance objective of 5.0 E-03 Sv (500 mrem) and the chronic IHI dose was below the chronic IHI dose performance objective of 1.0 E-03 Sv/yr (100 mrem/yr) within 1,000 years. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI1996

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 37, No. 3, July-September 1996]

Nuclear Safety is a journal that covers significant issues in the field of nuclear safety. Its primary scope is safety in the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power reactors worldwide and the research and analysis activities that promote this goal, but it also encompasses the safety aspects of the entire nuclear fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing and handling, and nuclear waste disposal, the handling of fissionable materials and radioisotopes, and the environmental effects of all these activities. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 181 Attitudes and Practices Regarding Disposal of Liquid Nuclear Waste at Clinton Laboratories in the Very Early Years: A Historical Analysis, S. H. Stow; 202 Off-Site Nuclear Emergency Management in Germany Under the Auspices of the Federal Structure, A. Bayer, S. Bittner, and H. Korn; DESIGN FEATURES: 211 Twenty-Fourth DOE/NRC Nuclear Air-Cleaning and Treatment Conference, R. R. Bellamy, J. J. Hayes, R. D. Porco, and M. W. First; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 222 Explosion in the Tomsk-7 Reprocessing Plant on April 6, 1993, M. L. Hyder, W. G. Lussie, and F. E. Witmer; 234 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INFORMATION AND ANALYSES: 237 Assessment of Spent Fuel Cooling, J. G. Ibarra, W. R. Jones, G. F. Lanik, H. L. Ornstein, and S. V. Pullani; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 256 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 260 Proposed Rule Changes as of June 30, 1996; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 210 Tennessee Industries Week; 221 21st International Symposium on The Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management; 259 IAEA Programme of Scientific Meetings for 1997; 270 PSAM 4 (International Conference on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Management); 265 The Authors; 268 Errata.

05 NUCLEAR FUELS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL Radiological Response Training Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Radiological Response Training Range (RRTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for a period of 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface soil impacts were calculated with the computer program Mixing-Cell Model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2020 (Rev. 2)

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities in compliance with the requirements listed in Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Permit Number NEV HW0101 associated with the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): 1) CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; 2) CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well; 3) CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; 4) CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; 5) CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; 6) CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches The locations of the sites are shown in Figure ES-1. This report covers calendar year 2020. The post-closure requirements for these sites are described in RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 and are summarized in each CAU-specific section of this report. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAUs 92 and 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAUs 110 and 111, soil moisture monitoring and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 110, the site fence, gate, lock, and use restriction signs are evaluated. At CAU 111, an ecological survey, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are also conducted. This report will address all monitoring item notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 6 of RCRA Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remained in effect until December 10, 2020. At the time of this report submittal, the new RCRA permit application was in review.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Sensitivity study of coupled chemical-CFD simulations for analyzing aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel storage in sealed canisters

We report the United States Department of Energy (DOE) manages over 50 Metric Tons Heavy Metal (MTHM) of aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel. One main source for DOE’s Aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) inventory is the advanced test reactor (ATR) at the INL site, which makes this fuel of particular interest for storage scenarios. Road-ready and final disposition packaging configurations for the ATR fuel dictates storage within helium-backfilled, sealed DOE standard canisters. The conditions within these sealed canisters for extended (greater than50 year dry) storage is of interest. To further this goal, a three-dimensional (3D) multi-physics computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model is developed of the sealed DOE standard canisters. This 3D CFD model is one-way coupled with bulk gas radiolysis reactions considering sealed canisters with inert gas and possible trace amounts of air and water vapor. This study looks at the evolution of the thermal history of the canisters over a 50 year time period with a coupling to the chemical reactions occurring from radiolytic breakdown of residual water. A sensitivity study is then carried out over the parameters of the model including the fuel decay heat, residual water content, sealed pressure, canister external temperature, and canister emissivity. In pure helium, hydrogen generation rates are low, under 10 ppm, but hydrogen generation rates are affected greatly by the presence of even 1% residual air, increasing by 50-plus-fold, and nitric acid generation with residual air also occurs ranging from 500 to 4000 ppm after 50 years. The fuel decay heat and the residual water content show the most importance in the generation of hydrogen gas in pure air, and for nitric acid with a residual air condition. External temperature, canister emissivity and sealed pressure all show minor sensitivity effects to the generation of potentially harmful species.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Issue Resolution During the Development of the Performance Assessment for the Savannah River Site Saltstone Disposal Facility - 20125

In 2019, Savannah River Remediation developed a revision to the performance assessment (PA) on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Operations Office (SR) for the near-surface disposal of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site (SRS) Saltstone Disposal Facility (SDF). Soluble waste from SRS Tank Farms undergoes salt processing to remove cesium and other high-activity constituents. The low-activity decontaminated salt solution (DSS) is then immobilized by mixing it into a cementitious waste form known as saltstone. After mixing, the saltstone is poured into leak-tight concrete vaults, known as saltstone disposal units (SDUs), where the waste form cures. By the time of facility closure, the SDF is expected to consist of 15 SDUs with a combined capacity of 1.06 E+09 L (280 Mgal) of cured saltstone. The facility operates under a Disposal Authorization Statement from DOE and a permit from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC). Since the start of operations in 1990, the SDF has received almost 6.7 E+07 L (18 Mgal) of DSS, resulting in the safe disposal of 2.7 E+16 Bq (7.3 E+05 Ci) of activity. Due to the radioactive decay of short-lived contaminants, the total remaining activity in the disposed waste is estimated to be approximately 1.4 E+16 Bq (3.9 E+05 Ci), as of September 2018. The Disposal Authorization Statement requires a demonstration that the system of engineered and natural features of the disposal facility will limit releases from the facility and be protective of human health and the environment for at least the next 1,000 years. The long-term performance of the facility was evaluated under the requirements of the DoE's Radioactive Waste Management Manual (US DOE Manual 435.1-1). Simulations were performed to demonstrate that the disposal facility would meet performance objectives specified in the manual. The evaluation was based on numerical models that simulate the releases of contaminants from the saltstone waste form. Contaminants were transported through groundwater and air pathways to points of assessment to evaluate compliance (i.e., 100 m from the SDUs). In addition, the potential consequences of an inadvertent human intrusion (IHI) were also evaluated. A number of issues were overcome during the development of these simulations. These issues were identified as part of internal technical reviews. Simulations are developed by people and people make mistakes, so the internal technical review process is a vital step in PA development. Specific examples of resolved issues include a unit-conversion error, an inappropriate definition for a model boundary condition, a model time-stepping issue, and an error in the calculation for the buildup of contaminants in soil. Actions taken to address these issues resulted in an improved product with a better supported technical basis and more defensible results. The identification and correction of these issues are discussed. By understanding these issues, model developers and technical reviewers working on PAs in the future may avoid repeating these types of mistakes. Transparency with respect to these mistakes builds trust between waste management sites, regulators, and stakeholders. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Adsorption of Radioactive Iodine Using Nanocarbon on ETS-10 as Adsorbent

Here, laboratory-synthesized nanocarbon pelletized with titanosilicate (ETS-10) as a support matrix has been investigated for the capture of radioactive iodine present as methyl iodide (CH 3 I) in the off-gas streams produced during aqueous reprocessing of used nuclear fuel. The mass fraction of carbon in the sorbent matrix was 0.10. The effects of residence time and CH 3 I concentration were investigated using a continuous flow column setup to quantify the adsorption and desorption capacities of adsorbent under dynamic conditions from an air stream containing CH 3 I present at concentrations representative of those expected in the off-gas streams. Air with CH 3 I gas as a source in the column resulted in quantifiable CH 3 I adsorption with 0.98 mg/g of adsorption capacity. Laboratory-made nanocarbons had a larger adsorption capacity than those of the other carbons reported in the literature. Additionally, the adsorption capacity of nanocarbon on ETS-10 is compared to that of nanocarbon coated on cordierite in previous studies.

ETS-10↗
DOE OSTI2022

Hanford Site Composite Analysis: Dose Sensitivity Analyses

This environmental calculation file (ECF) documents the methodologies, assumptions, and results of five analyses that evaluate parameter changes to the revised Hanford Site Composite Analysis (CA) (DOE-RL-2019-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau). Specifically, this ECF describes the impact on total dose and analyte-specific doses for five sensitivity cases where changes to the following exposure-related parameters were implemented – (1) inventory, (2) recharge rate, (3) external dose conversion factors (DCFs) based on Federal Guidance Report (FGR) No. 15 in (EPA-402-R-19-002, Federal Guidance Report No. 15, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil) instead of FGR No. 12 (EPA 402-R-93-081, Federal Guidance Report No. 12, External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil) for groundwater pathway scenario; (4) use of mean instead of 95th percentile intake assumptions for groundwater pathway scenario; and (5) consideration of limited sources based on U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) owned waste sites regulated under DOE O 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management. It should be noted that dose assessments for both base and sensitivity cases are based on the all-pathways representative person groundwater exposure scenario presented in DOE/RL-2022-52, Composite Analysis for Low-Level Waste Disposal in the Hanford Site Central Plateau.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

INL Environmental Monitoring Plan (DOE/ID-11088 Rev. 5)

This plan provides a high-level summary of environmental monitoring performed by various organizations within and around the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) Site as required by U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Order 435.1, Radioactive Waste Management, and DOE Order 458.1, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, Guide DOE/EH-0173T, Environmental Regulatory Guide for Radiological Effluent Monitoring and Environmental Surveillance, and in accordance with 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 61, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants. The purpose of these orders is to 1) implement sound stewardship practices that protect the air, water, land, and other natural and cultural resources that may be impacted by DOE operations, and 2) to establish standards and requirements for the operations of DOE and DOE contractors with respect to protection of the environment and members of the public against undue risk from radiation. This plan describes the organizations responsible for conducting environmental monitoring across the INL Site, the rationale for monitoring, the types of media being monitored, where the monitoring is conducted, and where monitoring results can be obtained. Detailed monitoring procedures, program plans, or other governing documents used by contractors or agencies to implement requirements are referenced in this plan. This plan covers all planned monitoring and environmental surveillance. Non-routine activities such as special research studies and characterization of individual sites for environmental restoration are outside the scope of this plan.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Monitoring of helium gas leakage from canister storing spent nuclear fuel: Radiological consequences and management

Chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC) of canisters has been identified as a potential degradation mechanism requiring ageing management — especially in a marine air environment. Methods for monitoring helium gas leakage from canisters have been developed on the basis of a phenomenon that the bottom temperature of the canister increases as the top temperature of the canister decreases when helium gas leaks during storage. In this paper, we consider the radiological consequences of CISCC based on two scenarios of helium gas leakage and propose effective management that includes a timeline for monitoring and mitigation. Monitoring helium gas leakage by measuring the difference in temperature between canister surfaces in the dry cask storage of spent fuel (SF) can detect leakage before SF undergoes oxidation as a result of air ingress and before country-specific regulatory limits of off-site doses are exceeded, thereby enabling mitigatory action.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

2019↗
DOE OSTI2021

Investigation of Thermolytic Hydrogen Generation Rate in Tank 44 Dissolved Saltcake Samples

Saltcake core samples collected from Tank 44 in 2006 were dissolved to provide material for HGR measurements applicable to F-Area dissolved saltcake material. Additionally, characterization was performed on the Tank 44 saltcake material. The following are key results from the Tank 44 saltcake characterization. The Tank 44 Upper Saltcake Composite, corresponding to the 171 to 285 inch tank level, contained by mass approximately 69% sodium nitrate, 11% sodium carbonate, 8% sodium nitrite, smaller amounts of other salts and components, and 9% unquantified (which includes water, water of hydration, oxygen/hydrogen content of oxides and hydroxides, and uncertainty). The Tank 44 Lower Saltcake Composite, corresponding to the 76 to 114 inch tank level, contained by mass approximately 49% sodium carbonate, 18% sodium nitrate, smaller amounts of other salts, at least 8% sludge, and 9% unquantified (see above). The dissolved saltcake contained free hydroxide less than quantifiable (<0.01 M) due to the limited quantity of material that could be removed from the Shielded Cells based on the sample radioactivity. Measurement by pH paper provided an approximate pH of 12. The following are key results from the Tank 44 HGR testing. During boiling at 106.7 °C, HGR for Tank 44 dissolved saltcake without added glycolate was 7.2×10 -8 ft 3 h -1 gal -1 . During boiling at 106.9 °C, HGR for Tank 44 dissolved saltcake with 1000 mg/L of added glycolate was 8.2×10 -8 ft 3 h -1 gal -1 . For the test without added glycolate, the first several HGR measurements at 70, 85, and 100 °C gave indication of the release of dissolved hydrogen and should not be used to represent the sustained thermolytic HGR for those temperatures. The measurements at boiling are the best representation of thermolysis in this testing. Carbon dioxide was observed at concentrations up to 6 vol% in the flow-system offgas for the test at boiling. Methane generation was observed at 100 °C and boiling. Methane concentration in the total gas generated during testing remained well below the lower flammability limit for methane in air. The addition of 1000 mg/L of glycolate did not have a significant impact on the hydrogen generation rates measured during this testing. The low hydroxide concentration in the Tank 44 dissolved saltcake likely influenced the relatively low thermolytic HGR and high carbon dioxide release observations in this testing. Based on the observation that methane was generated or released upon heating SRS radioactive Tank 44 waste samples to 100 °C and above, we recommend gaining a greater understanding of the cause and mechanism of its generation. First, the applicable literature should be reviewed to reveal the thermolytic methane generation mechanisms of possible methane generating species in the SRS CSTF. If warranted, a plan should be developed for simulant tests with methylated siloxanes and other applicable compounds in order to gain a better mechanistic understanding of methane generation in the SRS CSTF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Thermolytic Hydrogen Generation Rate in Tank 44 Dissolved Saltcake Samples

Saltcake core samples collected from Tank 44 in 2006 were dissolved to provide material for HGR measurements applicable to F-Area dissolved saltcake material. Additionally, characterization was performed on the Tank 44 saltcake material. The following are key results from the Tank 44 saltcake characterization. The Tank 44 Upper Saltcake Composite, corresponding to the 171 to 285 inch tank level, contained by mass approximately 69% sodium nitrate, 11% sodium carbonate, 8% sodium nitrite, smaller amounts of other salts and components, and 9% unquantified (which includes water, water of hydration, oxygen/hydrogen content of oxides and hydroxides, and uncertainty). The Tank 44 Lower Saltcake Composite, corresponding to the 76 to 114 inch tank level, contained by mass approximately 49% sodium carbonate, 18% sodium nitrate, smaller amounts of other salts, at least 8% sludge, and 9% unquantified (see above). The dissolved saltcake contained free hydroxide less than quantifiable (<0.01 M) due to the limited quantity of material that could be removed from the Shielded Cells based on the sample radioactivity. Measurement by pH paper provided an approximate pH of 12. The following are key results from the Tank 44 HGR testing. During boiling at 106.7 °C, HGR for Tank 44 dissolved saltcake without added glycolate was 7.2×10 -8 ft 3 h -1 ga l-1 . During boiling at 106.9 °C, HGR for Tank 44 dissolved saltcake with 1000 mg/L of added glycolate was 8.2×10 -8 ft 3 h -1 gal -1 . ∙ For the test without added glycolate, the first several HGR measurements at 70, 85, and 100 °C gave indication of the release of dissolved hydrogen and should not be used to represent the sustained thermolytic HGR for those temperatures. The measurements at boiling are the best representation of thermolysis in this testing. Carbon dioxide was observed at concentrations up to 6 vol% in the flow-system offgas for the test at boiling. ∙ Methane generation was observed at 100 °C and boiling. Methane concentration in the total gas generated during testing remained well below the lower flammability limit for methane in air. The addition of 1000 mg/L of glycolate did not have a significant impact on the hydrogen generation rates measured during this testing. The low hydroxide concentration in the Tank 44 dissolved saltcake likely influenced the relatively low thermolytic HGR and high carbon dioxide release observations in this testing. Based on the observation that methane was generated or released upon heating SRS radioactive Tank 44 waste samples to 100 °C and above, we recommend gaining a greater understanding of the cause and mechanism of its generation. First, the applicable literature should be reviewed to reveal the thermolytic methane generation mechanisms of possible methane generating species in the SRS CSTF. If warranted, a plan should be developed for simulant tests with methylated siloxanes and other applicable compounds in order to gain a better mechanistic understanding of methane generation in the SRS CSTF.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Alpha-Imaging Detector System Development for Large Area Monitoring

Effective management and disposal of legacy nuclear waste are essential for ensuring safe work environments and minimizing environmental impacts. Monitoring airborne actinide contamination is particularly critical due to the high internal dose potential of alpha-emitting radionuclides. Traditional continuous air monitoring systems (CAMs) used in the industry are limited in the volume of air they can sample, potentially leading to inaccurate radiation detection over large areas. For example, in 2018, elevated levels of airborne Plutonium-239 were detected beyond the controlled areas of the Hanford Plutonium Finishing Plant, highlighting the potential risks to both plant workers and nearby residents. To address these challenges, high-efficiency particulate absorbing (HEPA) air purifiers can enhance air flow by up to 1.5 orders of magnitude, thereby increasing monitoring efficiency and providing a cost-effective solution for large-area surveillance. To quantify the activities of alpha-emitting radionuclides on HEPA filters, the Savannah River National Laboratory is developing an advanced alpha-imaging detection system. This system includes scintillating materials combined with a digital scientific camera. A significant concern in operating such a large-area airborne monitoring system is the handling of HEPA filters, which may be contaminated with radioactive particles. To mitigate these hazards, it is crucial to ensure that any contamination is securely fixed onto the filters. Efforts have been made to optimize the sensitivity of scintillator-epoxy composites and apply them to HEPA filters. These materials were characterized using fluoroscence spectroscopy. These techniques confirmed the purity of the raw materials, the dispersion of scintillators in the epoxy matrix, and the stability of their optical and structural properties post-modification. The optimal scintillator-epoxy composite was selected for use on alpha-spiked HEPA filters to evaluate the efficiency of the sprayer. HEPA filters, embedded with alpha particles collected by an air purifier deployed in an airborne radiation area, have been tested to assess detection efficiency. Future work will focus on employing multiple imaging sensors simultaneously to enhance sensitivity across different regions of the HEPA filter.

Pham, Phuong [Savannah River National Laboratory (↗
DOE OSTI2020

West Valley Demonstration Project Annual Site Environmental Report (CY2019)

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2019. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2019 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2020. The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2020. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2020 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act↗
DOE OSTI2022

West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Annual Site Environmental Report (ASER) for Calendar Year 2021

The report, prepared for the U.S. Department of Energy West Valley Demonstration Project office (DOE-WVDP), summarizes the environmental protection program at the WVDP for calendar year (CY) 2021. Monitoring and surveillance of the facilities used by the DOE are conducted to verify protection of public health and safety and the environment. The report is a key component of DOE’s effort to keep the public informed of environmental conditions at the WVDP. The quality assurance protocols applied to the environmental monitoring program ensure the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data. In addition to demonstrating compliance with environmental laws, regulations, and directives, evaluation of data collected in 2021 continued to indicate that WVDP activities pose no threat to public health or safety, or to the environment.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗