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Technical Review of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Transformational and Applied Research Directorate’s Research and Development Program

At the request of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), a Review Committee comprised of representatives from the American Physical Society (APS) Panel on Public Affairs (POPA) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Plasma Sciences Society (NPSS) performed a technical review of the DNDO Transformational and Applied Research Directorate (TARD) research and development program. TARD’s principal objective is to address gaps in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) through improvements in the performance, cost, and operational burden of detectors and systems. The charge to the Review Committee was to investigate the existing TARD research and development plan and portfolio, recommend changes to the existing plan, and recommend possible new R&D areas and opportunities. The Review Committee has several recommendations.

detectors, detection algorithms, strategic plannin↗

Pulsed, Photonuclear-induced, Neutron Measurements of Nuclear Materials with Composite Shielding

Active measurements were performed using a 10-MeV electron accelerator with inspection objects containing various nuclear and nonnuclear materials available at the Idaho National Laboratory’s Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) facility. The inspection objects were assembled from ZPPR reactor plate materials to evaluate the measurement technologies for the characterization of plutonium, depleted uranium or highly enriched uranium shielded by both nuclear and non-nuclear materials. A series of pulsed photonuclear, time-correlated measurements were performed with unshielded calibration materials and then compared with the more complex composite shield configurations. The measurements used multiple 3He detectors that are designed to detect fission neutrons between pulses of an electron linear accelerator. The accelerator produced 10-MeV bremsstrahlung X-rays at a repetition rate of 125 Hz (8 ms between pulses) with a 4-us pulse width. All inspected objects were positioned on beam centerline and 100 cm from the X-ray source. The time-correlated data was collected in parallel using both a Los Alamos National Laboratory-designed list-mode acquisition system and a commercial multichannel scaler analyzer. A combination of different measurement configurations and data analysis methods enabled the identification of each object. This paper describes the experimental configuration, the ZPPR inspection objects used, and the various measurement and analysis results for each inspected object.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Active Interrogation of Sensitive Nuclear Material Using Laser Driven Neutron Beams

An investigation of the viability of a laser-driven neutron source for active interrogation is reported. The need is for a fast, movable, operationally safe neutron source which is energy tunable and has high-intensity, directional neutron production. Reasons for the choice of neutrons and lasers are set forth. Results from the interrogation of an enriched U sample are shown.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessment of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence for Spent Nuclear Fuel Assay

In nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements, resonances are excited by an external photon beam leading to the emission of gamma rays with specific energies that are characteristic of the emitting isotope. NRF promises the unique capability of directly quantifying a specific isotope without the need for unfolding the combined responses of several fissile isotopes as is required in other measurement techniques. We have analyzed the potential of NRF as a non-destructive analysis technique for quantitative measurements of Pu isotopes in spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Given the low concentrations of 239Pu in SNF and its small integrated NRF cross sections, the main challenge in achieving precise and accurate measurements lies in accruing sufficient counting statistics in a reasonable measurement time. Using analytical modeling, and simulations with the radiation transport code MCNPX that has been experimentally tested recently, the backscatter and transmission methods were quantitatively studied for differing photon sources and radiation detector types. Resonant photon count rates and measurement times were estimated for a range of photon source and detection parameters, which were used to determine photon source and gamma-ray detector requirements. The results indicate that systems based on a bremsstrahlung source and present detector technology are not practical for high-precision measurements of 239Pu in SNF. Measurements that achieve the desired uncertainties within hour-long measurements will either require stronger resonances, which may be expressed by other Pu isotopes, or require quasi-monoenergetic photon sources with intensities that are approximately two orders of magnitude higher than those currently being designed or proposed.This work is part of a larger effort sponsored by the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative to develop an integrated instrument, comprised of individual NDA techniques with complementary features, that is fully capable of determining Pu mass in spent fuel assemblies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Quenching measurements and modeling of a boron-loaded organic liquid scintillator

Organic liquid scintillators are used in a wide variety of applications in experimental nuclear and particle physics. Boron-loaded scintillators are particularly useful for detecting neutron captures, due to the high thermal neutron capture cross section of 10 B. These scintillators are commonly used in neutron detectors, including the DarkSide-50 neutron veto, where the neutron may produce a signal when it scatters o protons in the scintillator or when it captures on 10 B. Reconstructing the energy of these recoils is complicated by scintillation quenching. Understanding how nuclear recoils are quenched in these scintillators is an important and dicult problem. In this article, we present a set of measurements of neutron-induced proton recoils in a boron-loaded organic liquid scintillator at recoil energies ranging from 57-467 keV, and we compare these measurements to predictions from different quenching models. We and that a modified Birks' model whose denominator is quadratic in dE=dx best describes the measurements, with χ 2 /NDF = 1:6. This result will help model nuclear recoil scintillation in similar detectors and can be used to improve their neutron tagging efficiency.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Search for long-lived isomeric states in neutron-deficient thorium isotopes

The discovery of naturally occurring long-lived isomeric states (t{sub 1/2}>10{sup 8} yr) in the neutron-deficient isotopes {sup 211,213,217,218}Th[A. Marinov et al., Phys. Rev. C 76, 021303(R) (2007)] was reexamined using accelerator mass spectrometry (AMS). Because AMS does not suffer from molecular isobaric background in the detection system, it is an extremely sensitive technique. Despite our up to two orders of magnitude higher sensitivity we cannot confirm the discoveries of neutron-deficient thorium isotopes and provide upper limits for their abundances.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

On the Search for Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence Signatures of 235U and 238U above 3 MeV

Nuclear resonance fluorescence is a physical process that provides an isotope-specific signature that could be used for the identification and characterization of materials. The technique involves the detection of prompt discrete-energy photons emitted from a sample that is exposed to MeV-energy photons. Potential applications of the technique range from detection of high explosives to characterization of special nuclear materials such as 235U. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Passport Systems have collaborated to conduct a pair of measurements to search for a nuclear resonance fluorescence response of 235U above 3 MeV and of 238U above 5 MeV using an 8 g sample of highly enriched uranium and a 90 g sample of depleted uranium. No new signatures were observed. The minimum detectable integrated cross section for 235U is presented.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Cosmic Ray Telescope For Educational Purposes

Cosmic ray detectors are widely used, for educational purposes, in order to motivate students to the physics of elementary particles and astrophysics. Using a 'telescope' of scintillation counters, the directional characteristics, diurnal variation, correlation with solar activity, can be determined, and conclusions about the composition, origin and interaction of elementary particles with the magnetic field of earth can be inferred. A telescope was built from two rectangular scintillator panels with dimensions: 91.6x1.9x3.7 cm{sup 3}. The scintillators are placed on top of each other, separated by a fixed distance of 34.6 cm. They are supported by a wooden frame which can be rotated around a horizontal axis. Direction is determined by the coincidence of the signals of the two PMTs. Standard NIM modules are used for readout. This device is to be used in the undergraduate nuclear and particle physics laboratory. The design and construction of the telescope as well as some preliminary results are presented.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Uncertainty Estimation and Anomaly Detection in Chiral Effective Field Theory Studies of Key Nuclear Electroweak Processes

Chiral effective field theory (χEFT) is a powerful tool for studying electroweak processes in nuclei. I discuss χEFT calculations of three key nuclear electroweak processes: primordial deuterium production, proton-proton fusion, and magnetic dipole excitations of 48 Ca. Further, this article showcases χEFT’s ability to quantify theory uncertainties at the appropriate level of rigor for addressing the different precision demands of these three processes.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Progress Towards Deployable Antineutrino Detectors for Reactor Safeguards

Fission reactors emit large numbers of antineutrinos and this flux may be useful for the measurement of two quantities of interest for reactor safeguards: the reactor's power and plutonium inventory throughout its cycle. The high antineutrino flux and relatively low background rates means that simple cubic meter scale detectors at tens of meters standoff can record hundreds or thousands of antineutrino events per day. Such antineutrino detectors would add online, quasi-real-time bulk material accountancy to the set of reactor monitoring tools available to the IAEA and other safeguards agencies with minimal impact on reactor operations. Between 2003 and 2008, our LLNL/SNL collaboration successfully deployed several prototype safeguards detectors at a commercial reactor in order to test both the method and the practicality of its implementation in the field. Partially on the strength of the results obtained from these deployments, an Experts Meeting was convened by the IAEA Novel Technologies Group in 2008 to assess current antineutrino detection technology and examine how it might be incorporated into the safeguards regime. Here we present a summary of our previous deployments and discuss current work that seeks to provide expanded capabilities suggested by the Experts Panel, in particular aboveground detector operation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

A Discussion of Procedures and Equipment for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty On-Site Inspection Environmental Sampling and Analysis

This paper is intended to serve as a scientific basis to start discussions of the available environmental sampling techniques and equipment that have been used in the past that could be considered for use within the context of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) on-site inspections (OSI). This work contains information on the techniques, equipment, costs, and some operational procedures associated with environmental sampling that have actually been used in the past by the United States for the detection of nuclear explosions. This paper also includes a discussion of issues, recommendations, and questions needing further study within the context of the sampling and analysis of aquatic materials, atmospheric gases, atmospheric particulates, vegetation, sediments and soils, fauna, and drill-back materials.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

IAEA Inspections for Undeclared and Declared Activities: Is a More Robust Approach Needed?

The United States has long supported a strong international safeguards system and for many years has served as the foremost supplier of technology, equipment, and training to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In doing so, it drew in many instances on DOE sponsored R&D and training that was directed towards domestic safeguards and then adapted for IAEA purposes. This was relatively straightforward because of the strong overlap between the development of nuclear material accountancy measures needed for both domestic and international purposes. Two factors have emerged that have made this strong reliance on domestic measures less and less able to be a source of support for the IAEA. One is the shift by the IAEA safeguards system towards detecting undeclared activities. The second is the shift of domestic attention away from nuclear material accountancy and towards physical protection. As a result, a gap in US sponsored R&D and training relevant to international safeguards has developed. The NNSA Next Generation Safeguards Initiative and the DOE NA-22 Safeguards R&D program are intended to help fill this gap and, thereby, permit the U.S. to remain as the pre-eminent supplier of technology for international safeguards purposes. In this context, IAEA challenges have been examined from the perspective of detecting the diversion of nuclear material from declared stocks; detecting undeclared production of nuclear material and activities at locations declared under INFCIRC/153; and detecting undeclared nuclear material and activities elsewhere in a state. Of these, the detection of undeclared nuclear material and activities is, perhaps, the IAEA’s most significant challenge. It is a challenge that even the international community finds difficult to meet because of the scope and the geographic scale of the problem, the technical constraints, the knowledge required, and the significant resources needed to deploy effective systems world-wide (e.g., satellite surveillance systems). The IAEA’s success in carrying out this mission hinges on its capability to evaluate the declarations made by the state for completeness, correctness, and consistency in order to detect possible indications of undeclared nuclear material and activities. Three elements go into this evaluation: (1) evaluating the internal consistency of a State’s declaration and comparing it to information gathered by IAEA inspectors on the basis of their access to the locations, facilities, sites, personnel, and documents disclosed in the state’s declarations; (2) comparison of States’ declarations with other information available to the IAEA, including the information it gathers from its review of open sources, including scientific and technical literature and data bases, trade journals, and media reports; and (3) its ability to archive, retrieve, organize, and analyze all available information for indications of potential undeclared nuclear material and activities, and, when warranted, to request states to provide further information and access in order to investigate and clarify any questions or inconsistencies.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DHS Summary Report -- Robert Weldon

This summer I worked on benchmarking the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory fission multiplicity capability used in the Monte Carlo particle transport code MCNPX. This work involved running simulations and then comparing the simulation results with experimental experiments. Outlined in this paper is a brief description of the work completed this summer, skills and knowledge gained, and how the internship has impacted my planning for the future. Neutron multiplicity counting is a neutron detection technique that leverages the multiplicity emissions of neutrons from fission to identify various actinides in a lump of material. The identification of individual actinides in lumps of material crossing our boarders, especially U-235 and Pu-239, is a key component for maintaining the safety of the country from nuclear threats. Several multiplicity emission options from spontaneous and induced fission already existed in MCNPX 2.4.0. These options can be accessed through use of the 6th entry on the PHYS:N card. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) developed a physics model for the simulation of neutron and gamma ray emission from fission and photofission that was included in MCNPX 2.7.B as an undocumented feature and then was documented in MCNPX 2.7.C. The LLNL multiplicity capability provided a different means for MCNPX to simulate neutron and gamma-ray distributions for neutron induced, spontaneous and photonuclear fission reactions. The original testing on the model for implementation into MCNPX was conducted by Gregg McKinney and John Hendricks. The model is an encapsulation of measured data of neutron multiplicity distributions from Gwin, Spencer, and Ingle, along with the data from Zucker and Holden. One of the founding principles of MCNPX was that it would have several redundant capabilities, providing the means of testing and including various physics packages. Though several multiplicity sampling methodologies already existed within MCNPX, the LLNL fission multiplicity was included to provide a separate capability for computing multiplicity as well as including several new features not already included in MCNPX. These new features include: (1) prompt gamma emission/multiplicity from neutron-induced fission; (2) neutron multiplicity and gamma emission/multiplicity from photofission; and (3) an option to enforce energy correlation for gamma neutron multiplicity emission. These new capabilities allow correlated signal detection for identifying presence of special nuclear material (SNM). Therefore, these new capabilities help meet the missions of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), which is tasked with developing nuclear detection strategies for identifying potential radiological and nuclear threats, by providing new simulation capability for detection strategies that leverage the new available physics in the LLNL multiplicity capability. Two types of tests were accomplished this summer to test the default LLNL neutron multiplicity capability: neutron-induced fission tests and spontaneous fission tests. Both cases set the 6th entry on the PHYS:N card to 5 (i.e. use LLNL multiplicity). The neutron-induced fission tests utilized a simple 0.001 cm radius sphere where 0.0253 eV neutrons were released at the sphere center. Neutrons were forced to immediately collide in the sphere and release all progeny from the sphere, without further collision, using the LCA card, LCA 7j -2 (therefore density and size of the sphere were irrelevant). Enough particles were run to ensure that the average error of any specific multiplicity did not exceed 0.36%. Neutron-induced fission multiplicities were computed for U-233, U-235, Pu-239, and Pu-241. The spontaneous fission tests also used the same spherical geometry, except: (1) the LCA card was removed; (2) the density of the sphere was set to 0.001 g/cm3; and (3) instead of emitting a thermal neutron, the PAR keyword was set to PAR=SF. The purpose of the small density was to ensure that the spontaneous fission neutrons would not further interact and induce fissions (i.e. the mean free path greatly exceeded the size of the sphere). Enough particles were run to ensure that the average error of any specific spontaneous multiplicity did not exceed 0.23%. Spontaneous fission multiplicities were computed for U-238, Pu-238, Pu-240, Pu-242, Cm-242, and Cm-244. All of the computed results were compared against experimental results compiled by Holden at Brookhaven National Laboratory.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Ground-state electric quadrupole moment of {sup 31}Al

The ground-state electric quadrupole moment of {sup 31}Al(I{sup {pi}}=5/2{sup +},T{sub 1/2}=644(25) ms) has been measured by means of {beta}-ray-detected nuclear magnetic resonance spectroscopy using a spin-polarized {sup 31}Al beam produced in the projectile fragmentation reaction. The obtained Q moment, |Q{sub exp}({sup 31}Al)|=112(32) e mb, is in agreement with conventional shell model calculations within the sd valence space. Previous results on the magnetic moment also support the validity of the sd model in this isotope, and thus it is concluded that {sup 31}Al is located outside of the island of inversion.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Application of laser induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) instrumentation for international safeguards

Advanced methodologies and improvements to current measurements techniques are needed to strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of international safeguards. This need was recognized and discussed at a Technical Meeting on 'The Application of Laser Spectrometry Techniques in IAEA Safeguards' held at IAEA headquarters (September 2006). One of the principal recommendations from that meeting was the need to pursue the development of novel complementary access instrumentation based on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (UBS) for the detection of gaseous and solid signatures and indicators of nuclear fuel cycle processes and associated materials'. Pursuant to this recommendation the Department of Safeguards (SG) under the Division of Technical Support (SGTS) convened the 'Experts and Users Advisory Meeting on Laser Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) for Safeguards Applications' also held at IAEA headquarters (July 2008). This meeting was attended by 12 LlBS experts from the Czech Republic, the European Commission, France, the Republic of South Korea, the United States of America, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain, Canada, and Northern Ireland. Following a presentation of the needs of the IAEA inspectors, the LIBS experts agreed that needs as presented could be partially or fully fulfilled using LIBS instrumentation. Inspectors needs were grouped into the following broad categories: (1) Improvements to in-field measurements/environmental sampling; (2) Monitoring status of activities in Hot Cells; (3) Verify status of activity at a declared facility via process monitoring; and (4) Need for pre-screening of environmental samples before analysis. The primary tool employed by the IAEA to detect undeclared processes and activities at special nuclear material facilities and sites is environmental sampling. One of the objectives of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) Program Plan calls for the development of advanced tools and methodologies to detect and analyze undeclared processing or production of special nuclear material. Los Alamos National Laboratory is currently investigating potential uses of LIBS for safeguards applications, including (1) a user-friendly man-portable LIBS system to characterize samples in real to near-real time (typical analysis time are on the order of minutes) across a wide range of elements in the periodic table from hydrogen up to heavy elements like plutonium and uranium, (2) a LIBS system that can be deployed in harsh environments such as hot cells and glove boxes providing relative compositional analysis of process streams for example ratios like Cm/Up and Cm/U, (3) an inspector field deployable system that can be used to analyze the elemental composition of microscopic quantities of samples containing plutonium and uranium, and (4) a high resolution LIBS system that can be used to determine the isotopic composition of samples containing for example uranium, plutonium... etc. In this paper, we will describe our current development and performance testing results for LIBS instrumentation both in a fixed lab and measurements in field deployable configurations.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Tracking of Nuclear Production using Indigenous Species: Final LDRD Report

Our LDRD research project sought to develop an analytical method for detection of chemicals used in nuclear materials processing. Our approach is distinctly different than current research involving hardware-based sensors. By utilizing the response of indigenous species of plants and/or animals surrounding (or within) a nuclear processing facility, we propose tracking 'suspicious molecules' relevant to nuclear materials processing. As proof of concept, we have examined TBP, tributylphosphate, used in uranium enrichment as well as plutonium extraction from spent nuclear fuels. We will compare TBP to the TPP (triphenylphosphate) analog to determine the uniqueness of the metabonomic response. We show that there is a unique metabonomic response within our animal model to TBP. The TBP signature can further be delineated from that of TPP. We have also developed unique methods of instrumental transfer for metabonomic data sets.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗