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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1989

The problem of automation: Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not overautomation

As automation increasingly takes its place in industry, especially high-risk industry, it is often blamed for causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur. It is proposed that the problem is not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. When the situations exceed the capabilities of the automatic equipment, then the inadequate feedback leads to difficulties for the human controllers. The problem is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control that which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally among human operators. To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate. The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.

Norman, Donald A.↗
NASA NTRS1990

The 'problem' with automation - Inappropriate feedback and interaction, not 'over-automation'

Automation in high-risk industry is often blamed for causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur. It is proposed that the problem is not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. The problem is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerful enough to take over control which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle all abnormalities. Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs naturally among human operators. To solve this problem, the automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate. The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.

Norman, D. A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation andits impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after exposure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found afterexposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperilmission accomplishment. If mission-relevant animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗
NASA NTRS1999

Non-Traditional Displays for Mission Monitoring

Advances in automation capability and reliability have changed the role of humans from operating and controlling processes to simply monitoring them for anomalies. However, humans are traditionally bad monitors of highly reliable systems over time. Thus, the human is assigned a task for which he is ill equipped. We believe that this has led to the dominance of human error in process control activities such as operating transportation systems (aircraft and trains), monitoring patient health in the medical industry, and controlling plant operations. Research has shown, though, that an automated monitor can assist humans in recognizing and dealing with failures. One possible solution to this predicament is to use a polar-star display that will show deviations from normal states based on parameters that are most indicative of mission health.

Trujillo, Anna C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Planned Investigations to Address Acute Central Nervous System Effects of Space Radiation Exposure with Human Performance Data

This work intends to generate evidence of acute, incremental human performance decrement similar to that due to space radiation and its impacts on the brain, to accompany ongoing human performance modeling work. The planned work will explore the boundaries of human behavioral and performance decrement after expo-sure to stress, which may be expected based in part on rodent responses found after exposure to ionizing radiation. The collection of evidence via simulation studies can characterize real human errors toward determining what stress levels lead to significantly-low levels of performance (below permissible outcome limits) which would imperil mission accomplishment. If mission-relevant yet animal-study-linked tasks are used, human and animal performance levels may be aligned to enable quantitative assignment of permissible exposure limits based on animal exposure studies. Ultimately, a transfer function between the performances of exposed rodents and humans under stress can be developed using shared impairment mechanisms.

human performance↗
DOE OSTI2025

Data-Enabled Fusion Technology (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

Advancing Scientific Understanding in Fusion Energy and Machine Learning This research represented a significant step forward in machine learning (ML) applications for fusion energy experiments. The project integrated advanced data-driven modeling, optimization techniques, and artificial intelligence to enhance the predictive capabilities and operational efficiency of plasma-based fusion systems. Specifically, tasks focused on ML-enhanced diagnostics, operator guidance tools, and predictive modeling helped improve the ability to interpret complex fusion experiments. Key areas of advancement included: 1) data-driven plasma control, i.e., using ML algorithms to optimize experimental conditions and classify plasma behaviors based on historical data; 2) spectroscopy and diagnostics, i.e., applying AI models to extract previously inaccessible insights from experimental spectroscopy data; and 3) configuration mapping and operator guidance, i.e., developing a predictive framework to assist scientists in identifying the most effective experimental parameters, reducing reliance on manual adjustments. By refining these ML-driven techniques, the project contributed to the broader scientific community’s understanding of plasma dynamics and fusion energy viability. Technical Effectiveness and Economic Feasibility The methods investigated demonstrated high technical effectiveness, as reflected in milestones assessing the predictive accuracy, performance, and optimization of fusion configurations. The development of an Operator Guidance Tool (OGT), for example, led to more precise control of plasma conditions by learning from experimental data and offering real-time adjustments. From an economic standpoint, DeFT provided: 1) the ability to reduce trial-and-error experimentation, which lowered operational costs; 2) improved data interpretation methods, which enabled more efficient resource allocation in large-scale fusion research projects; and 3) the automation of key diagnostic tasks, which reduced manual labor and human error, increasing overall efficiency. 13 The final assessments of predictive models and optimization strategies demonstrated that these approaches were scalable and could be implemented across multiple fusion energy research programs. Public Benefit and Societal Impact This project contributed directly to the broader goal of achieving sustainable and commercially viable fusion energy, which had profound implications for clean energy production and climate change mitigation. The integration of AI-driven solutions into fusion research: 1) sped up scientific discovery, accelerating progress towards achieving energy breakthroughs; 2) reduced the cost of experimentation, making fusion research more accessible; and 3) provided a framework for future AI applications in high-energy physics, benefiting adjacent fields like space exploration, material science, and renewable energy. Additionally, by fostering collaborations between AI researchers and plasma physicists, this project promoted interdisciplinary innovation that could lead to broader applications beyond fusion research.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRS2011

Human Factors Throughout the Life Cycle: Lessons Learned from the Shuttle Program

With the ending of the Space Shuttle Program, it is critical that we not forget the Human Factors lessons we have learned over the years. At every phase of the life cycle, from manufacturing, processing and integrating vehicle and payload, to launch, flight operations, mission control and landing, hundreds of teams have worked together to achieve mission success in one of the most complex, high-risk socio-technical enterprises ever designed. Just as there was great diversity in the types of operations performed at every stage, there was a myriad of human factors that could further complicate these human systems. A single mishap or close call could point to issues at the individual level (perceptual or workload limitations, training, fatigue, human error susceptibilities), the task level (design of tools, procedures and aspects of the workplace), as well as the organizational level (appropriate resources, safety policies, information access and communication channels). While we have often had to learn through human mistakes and technological failures, we have also begun to understand how to design human systems in which individuals can excel, where tasks and procedures are not only safe but efficient, and how organizations can foster a proactive approach to managing risk and supporting human enterprises. Panelists will talk about their experiences as they relate human factors to a particular phase of the shuttle life cycle. They will conclude with a framework for tying together human factors lessons-learned into system-level risk management strategies.

human factors↗
NASA NTRS1997

Demonstration of a Safety Analysis on a Complex System

For the past 17 years, Professor Leveson and her graduate students have been developing a theoretical foundation for safety in complex systems and building a methodology upon that foundation. The methodology includes special management structures and procedures, system hazard analyses, software hazard analysis, requirements modeling and analysis for completeness and safety, special software design techniques including the design of human-machine interaction, verification, operational feedback, and change analysis. The Safeware methodology is based on system safety techniques that are extended to deal with software and human error. Automation is used to enhance our ability to cope with complex systems. Identification, classification, and evaluation of hazards is done using modeling and analysis. To be effective, the models and analysis tools must consider the hardware, software, and human components in these systems. They also need to include a variety of analysis techniques and orthogonal approaches: There exists no single safety analysis or evaluation technique that can handle all aspects of complex systems. Applying only one or two may make us feel satisfied, but will produce limited results. We report here on a demonstration, performed as part of a contract with NASA Langley Research Center, of the Safeware methodology on the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS) portion of the air traffic control (ATC) system and procedures currently employed at the Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) TRACON (Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol). CTAS is an automated system to assist controllers in handling arrival traffic in the DFW area. Safety is a system property, not a component property, so our safety analysis considers the entire system and not simply the automated components. Because safety analysis of a complex system is an interdisciplinary effort, our team included system engineers, software engineers, human factors experts, and cognitive psychologists.

Leveson, Nancy↗
NASA NTRS2005

Cognition in Space Workshop: Metrics and Models - 1

"Cognition in Space Workshop I: Metrics and Models" was the first in a series of workshops sponsored by NASA to develop an integrated research and development plan supporting human cognition in space exploration. The workshop was held in Chandler, Arizona, October 25-27, 2004. The participants represented academia, government agencies, and medical centers. This workshop addressed the following goal of the NASA Human System Integration Program for Exploration: to develop a program to manage risks due to human performance and human error, specifically ones tied to cognition. Risks range from catastrophic error to degradation of efficiency and failure to accomplish mission goals. Cognition itself includes memory, decision making, initiation of motor responses, sensation, and perception. Four subgoals were also defined at the workshop as follows: (1) NASA needs to develop a human-centered design process that incorporates standards for human cognition, human performance, and assessment of human interfaces; (2) NASA needs to identify and assess factors that increase risks associated with cognition; (3) NASA needs to predict risks associated with cognition; and (4) NASA needs to mitigate risk, both prior to actual missions and in real time. This report develops the material relating to these four subgoals.

Woolford, Barbara↗
NASA NTRS2018

Considerations in Assuring Safety of Increasingly Autonomous Systems

Recent technological advances have accelerated the development and application of increasingly autonomous (IA) systems in civil and military aviation. IA systems can provide automation of complex mission tasks-ranging across reduced crew operations, air-traffic management, and unmanned, autonomous aircraft-with most applications calling for collaboration and teaming among humans and IA agents. IA systems are expected to provide benefits in terms of safety, reliability, efficiency, affordability, and previously unattainable mission capability. There is also a potential for improving safety by removal of human errors. There are, however, several challenges in the safety assurance of these systems due to the highly adaptive and non-deterministic behavior of these systems, and vulnerabilities due to potential divergence of airplane state awareness between the IA system and humans. These systems must deal with external sensors and actuators, and they must respond in time commensurate with the activities of the system in its environment. One of the main challenges is that safety assurance, currently relying upon authority transfer from an autonomous function to a human to mitigate safety concerns, will need to address their mitigation by automation in a collaborative dynamic context. These challenges have a fundamental, multidimensional impact on the safety assurance methods, system architecture, and V&V capabilities to be employed. The goal of this report is to identify relevant issues to be addressed in these areas, the potential gaps in the current safety assurance techniques, and critical questions that would need to be answered to assure safety of IA systems. We focus on a scenario of reduced crew operation when an IA system is employed which reduces, changes or eliminates a human's role in transition from two-pilot operations.

Alves, Erin E.↗
NASA NTRS1994

A rose by any other name: Certification seen as process rather than content

Green (1990) believes that the two main factors safeguarding flying from human error are both related to certification and regulation. First is the increasingly proceduralized nature of flying whereby as much as possible is reduced to a rule-based activity. Second is the emphasis placed upon training and competency checking of aircrew in simulators and in the air, both generally and for all particular types of aircraft flown. This leaves, believes Green, other human factors that are relatively unaddressed as yet and which can give rise to human reliability problems. These include: hardware factors and especially pilot/co-pilot relationships; and system factors including fatigue and cost/safety trade-offs. He also, importantly, identifies problems with the integration of the 'electronic crew member' following increased automation. Human reliability failures with artificial intelligence and automation, due to over-reliance on the system fail-safe mechanisms, or to operator under- confidence in the integrity or self-regulating capacity of the system, or to out-of-loop effects, are widely accepted as being due to deficiencies in plant design, planning, management and maintenance more than to 'operator error' - Reason's (1990) latent error or organization pathogens argument. Reliability failures in complex systems are well enough documented to give cause for concern and at least promote a debate on the merits of a full certification program. The purpose of this short paper is to seek out and explore what is valuable in certification, at the least to show that the benefits outweigh the disadvantages and at best to identify positive outcomes perhaps not obtainable in other ways. On both sides of the debate on certification there is general agreement on the need for a better human factors perspective and effort in complex aviation systems design. What is at issue is how this is to be promoted. It is incumbent upon opponents of certification to say how else such promotion be enabled. This is an exploratory and philosophical review, not a focused and specific one, and it will draw upon much that is not firmly in the domain of complex aviation systems.

Wilson, John R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

CCD Camera Lens Interface for Real-Time Theodolite Alignment

Theodolites are a common instrument in the testing, alignment, and building of various systems ranging from a single optical component to an entire instrument. They provide a precise way to measure horizontal and vertical angles. They can be used to align multiple objects in a desired way at specific angles. They can also be used to reference a specific location or orientation of an object that has moved. Some systems may require a small margin of error in position of components. A theodolite can assist with accurately measuring and/or minimizing that error. The technology is an adapter for a CCD camera with lens to attach to a Leica Wild T3000 Theodolite eyepiece that enables viewing on a connected monitor, and thus can be utilized with multiple theodolites simultaneously. This technology removes a substantial part of human error by relying on the CCD camera and monitors. It also allows image recording of the alignment, and therefore provides a quantitative means to measure such error.

Wake, Shane↗
NASA NTRS1984

Aircraft automation - The problem of the pilot interface

In recent years, aviation has been experiencing a rapid growth. This growth is expected to continue, and aircraft operations in the IFR (instrument flight rules) environment, for example, are predicted to increase dramatically in the next 10 to 12 years. However, it has been found the IFR accidents are increasing at about the same rate as IFR operations, because an associated high workload can lead to human error. For this reason, NASA and others are exploring the use of aircraft systems technology as a means for reducing the pilot workload and enhancing the safety and utility of the aircraft operations. However, recent research has shown that automation, implemented with insufficient consideration to the human factors interface, can frequently create more problems than it solves. Some of this research is discussed, examples of the encountered problems are shown, and solutions regarding the arising problems are suggested.

Bergeron, H. P.↗
NASA NTRS1987

Fallible humans and vulnerable systems - Lessons learned from aviation

It is suggested that the problems being experienced in complex automatic systems are essentially due to the failure of information management and communication. The failure covers the entire spectrum: display devices and techniques, coding information so as to reduce human error, and information economy, i.e., resisting the temptation to bombard the operator with unlimited information simply because the system possesses the capability to do so. Since there has been great progress in hardware engineering, it is suggested that further attention is needed in the 'soft' side of systems. The approach should focus on (1) preventing human cognitive slips and (2) making the systems less vulnerable to such slips when they do occur. Most of the examples are taken from studies of cockpit automation.

Wiener, Earl L.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Qualitative and Quantitative Evaluation for Representative Human Reliability Analysis Methods

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) is the regulatory expert organization established by the Korean government to strengthen the nation’s technical capabilities relating to nuclear safety regulation. KINS oversees the technical aspects of nuclear safety regulation, including safety reviews, inspections, education, and safety research—all conducted based on technical knowledge and accumulated regulatory experience. In 2023, KINS requested that Idaho National Laboratory (INL) validates representative human reliability analysis (HRA) methods used throughout the world, thus affording KINS with a basis for determining an HRA method adequate for its domestic regulatory purposes. The present paper mainly examines INL’s efforts in this regard. The resulting INL study covered four representative HRA methods widely used by nuclear utilities and regulatory institutes. These methods were qualitatively evaluated by applying specific evaluation criteria and determining how well each method reflected critical HRA issues. For this assessment, INL benchmarked the Halden International HRA Empirical Study. Using the Halden empirical data, along with information on human failure events (HFEs), the present study employed the selected HRA methods to estimate human error probabilities (HEPs) for the HFEs. It also performed statistical analyses to compare the HEPs predicted via the HRA methods against those from the Halden empirical data.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS1995

Safety in the operating theatre--part 1: interpersonal relationships and team performance

The authors examine the application of interpersonal human factors training on operating room (OR) personnel. Mortality studies of OR deaths and critical incident studies of anesthesia are examined to determine the role of human error in OR incidents. Theoretical models of system vulnerability to accidents are presented with emphasis on a systems approach to OR performance. Input, process, and outcome factors are discussed in detail.

Non-NASA Center↗
NASA NTRS1990

Human factors of the high technology cockpit

The rapid advance of cockpit automation in the last decade has outstripped the ability of the human factors profession to understand the changes in human functions required. High technology cockpits require less physical (observable) workload, but are highly demanding of cognitive functions such as planning, alternative selection, and monitoring. Furthermore, automation creates opportunity for new and more serious forms of human error, and many pilots are concerned about the possibility of complacency affecting their performance. On the positive side, the equipment works as advertized with high reliability, offering highly efficient, computer-based flight. These findings from the cockpit studies probably apply equally to other industries, such as nuclear power production, other modes of transportation, medicine, and manufacturing, all of which traditionally have looked to aviation for technological leadership. The challenge to the human factors profession is to aid designers, operators, and training departments in exploiting the positive side of automation, while seeking solutions to the negative side. Viewgraphs are given.

Wiener, Earl L.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Flight Resource Management for ISS Operations

Although the astronaut training flow for the International Space Station (ISS) spans 2 years, each astronaut or cosmonaut often spends most of their training alone. Rarely is it operationally feasible for all six ISS crewmembers to train together, even more unlikely that crewmembers can practice living together before launch. Likewise, ISS Flight Controller training spans 18 months of learning to manage incredibly complex systems remotely in plug-and-play ground teams that have little to no exposure to crewmembers before a mission. How then do all of these people quickly become a team - a team that must respond flexibly yet decisively to a variety of situations? The answer implemented at NASA is Space Flight Resource Management (SFRM), the so-called "soft skills" or team performance skills. Based on Crew Resource Management, SFRM was developed first for shuttle astronauts and focused on managing human errors during time-critical events (Rogers, et al. 2002). Given the nature of life on ISS, the scope of SFRM for ISS broadened to include teamwork during prolonged and routine operations (O'Keefe, 2008). The ISS SFRM model resembles a star with one competency for each point: Communication, Cross-Culture, Teamwork, Decision Making, Team Care, Leadership/Followership, Conflict Management, and Situation Awareness. These eight competencies were developed with international participation by the Human Behavior and Performance Training Working Group. Over the last two years, these competencies have been used to build a multi-modal SFRM training flow for astronaut candidates and flight controllers that integrates team performance skills into the practice of technical skills. Preliminary results show trainee skill increases as the flow progresses; and participants find the training invaluable to performing well and staying healthy during ISS operations. Future development of SFRM training will aim to help support indirect handovers as ISS operations evolve further with the retirement of the Space Shuttle Program.

Schmidt, Lacey L.↗