Results for “failure mode analysis” — Page 9

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets.

Burkemper, V. J.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the reaction control system, volume 3

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results for the Reaction Control System (RCS). The RCS is situated in three independent modules, one forward in the orbiter nose and one in each OMS/RCS pod. Each RCS module consists of the following subsystems: Helium Pressurization Subsystem; Propellant Storage and Distribution Subsystem; Thruster Subsystem; and Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem. Volume 3 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and the potential critical items list.

Burkemper, V. J.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the ascent thrust vector control actuator subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results for the Ascent Thrust Vector Control (ATVC) Actuator hardware are documented. The function of the Ascent Thrust Vector Control Actuators (ATVC) is to gimbal the main engines to provide for attitude and flight path control during ascent. During first stage flight, the SRB nozzles provide nearly all the steering. After SRB separation, the Orbiter is steered by gimbaling of its main engines. There are six electrohydraulic servoactuators, one pitch and one yaw for each of the three main engines. Each servoactuator is composed of four electrohydraulic servovalve assemblies, one second stage power spool valve assembly, one primary piston assembly and a switching valve. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Critical failures resulting in loss of ATVC were mainly due to loss of hydraulic fluid, fluid contamination and mechanical failures.

Wilson, R. E.↗

NASA NTRS2019

Benchmarking Mixed Mode Failure in Progressive Damage and Failure Analysis Methods

The verification and validation of progressive-damage-analysis finite element methods are difficult but critical tasks to undertake during their development. Verification exercises assess whether a predictive analysis tool produces results that are consistent with the fundamental concepts and assumptions of the tool under evaluation. Ideally, closed-form analytical solutions can be derived for which method verification results can be compared. Problems selected for computational tool verification are often simple and isolate individual features of the tool. In the case of progressive damage finite element methods, verifications should be performed to evaluate the ability of the model to predict the initiation of damage and its growth through the finite element mesh under a variety of conditions. Mabson et al. proposed a test case of a unidirectional, fiber-reinforced plate with a center crack subjected to tensile loads to evaluate matrix crack propagation predictions. The problem was modeled using the Abaqus Hashin continuum damage mechanics (CDM) model for fiber-reinforced composites. Different combinations of matrix strengths and element sizes were used in the simulations, and the results were compared to a closed-form solution based on linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM). It was determined that the Abaqus CDM model could predict the LEFM solution of Mode I cracks only when the finite element mesh density met specific requirements based on the material properties. This paper presents closed-form LEFM solutions for a center notch mixed mode (CNMM) verification problem. Parametric finite element analyses were developed using progressive damage analysis methods of both the Discrete Damage Mechanics (DDM) and CDM classes. The progressive damage analysis methods applied in the analyses of the CNMM problem include CompDam and the Floating Node Method. Analyses were conducted with various mode mixities and element sizes to verify that the damage models were working as intended and to identify any limits of applicability.

Leone, Frank↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power distribution and control subsystem, volume 1

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Each level of hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect for each failure mode. Of the 1671 failure modes analyzed, 9 single failures were determined to result in loss of crew or vehicle. Three single failures unique to intact abort were determined to result in possible loss of the crew or vehicle. A possible loss of mission could result if any of 136 single failures occurred. Six of the criticality 1/1 failures are in two rotary and two pushbutton switches that control External Tank and Solid Rocket Booster separation. The other 6 criticality 1/1 failures are fuses, one each per Aft Power Control Assembly (APCA) 4, 5, and 6 and one each per Forward Power Control Assembly (FPCA) 1, 2, and 3, that supply power to certain Main Propulsion System (MPS) valves and Forward Reaction Control System (RCS) circuits.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

NASA NTRS2002

Effect of Crystal Orientation on Fatigue Failure of Single Crystal Nickel Base Turbine Blade Superalloys

High cycle fatigue (HCF) induced failures in aircraft gas turbine and rocket engine turbopump blades is a pervasive problem. Single crystal nickel turbine blades are being utilized in rocket engine turbopumps and jet engines throughout industry because of their superior creep, stress rupture, melt resistance, and thermomechanical fatigue capabilities over polycrystalline alloys. Currently the most widely used single crystal turbine blade superalloys are PWA 1480/1493, PWA 1484, RENE' N-5 and CMSX-4. These alloys play an important role in commercial, military and space propulsion systems. Single crystal materials have highly orthotropic properties making the position of the crystal lattice relative to the part geometry a significant factor in the overall analysis. The failure modes of single crystal turbine blades are complicated to predict due to the material orthotropy and variations in crystal orientations. Fatigue life estimation of single crystal turbine blades represents an important aspect of durability assessment. It is therefore of practical interest to develop effective fatigue failure criteria for single crystal nickel alloys and to investigate the effects of variation of primary and secondary crystal orientation on fatigue life. A fatigue failure criterion based on the maximum shear stress amplitude /Delta(sub tau)(sub max))] on the 24 octahedral and 6 cube slip systems, is presented for single crystal nickel superalloys (FCC crystal). This criterion reduces the scatter in uniaxial LCF test data considerably for PWA 1493 at 1200 F in air. Additionally, single crystal turbine blades used in the alternate advanced high-pressure fuel turbopump (AHPFTP/AT) are modeled using a large-scale three-dimensional finite element model. This finite element model is capable of accounting for material orthotrophy and variation in primary and secondary crystal orientation. Effects of variation in crystal orientation on blade stress response are studied based on 297 finite element model runs. Fatigue lives at critical points in the blade are computed using finite element stress results and the failure criterion developed. Stress analysis results in the blade attachment region are also presented. Results presented demonstrates that control of secondary and primary crystallographic orientation has the potential to significantly increase a component S resistance to fatigue crack growth with- out adding additional weight or cost. [DOI: 10.1115/1.1413767]

Arakere, N. K.↗

NASA NTRS1986

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the electrical power generation/power reactant storage and distribution subsystem

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NAA FMEA/CIL documentation. The independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Generation (EPG)/Power Reactants Storage and Distribution (PRSD) System Hardware is documented. The EPG/PRSD hardware is required for performing critical functions of cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen storage and distribution to the Fuel Cell Powerplants (FCP) and Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control Subsystem (ARPCS). Specifically, the EPG/PRSD hardware consists of the following: Hydryogen (H2) tanks; Oxygen (O2) tanks; H2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (HRVFP); O2 Relief Valve/Filter Packages (ORVFP); H2 Valve Modules (HVM); O2 Valve Modules (OVM); and O2 and H2 lines, components, and fittings.

Gotch, S. M.↗

NASA NTRS1987

Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA): Analysis of the Electrical Power Distribution and Control Subsystem, Volume 2

The results of the Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items List (CIL) are presented. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents the independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD and C) hardware. The EPD and C hardware performs the functions of distributing, sensing, and controlling 28 volt DC power and of inverting, distributing, sensing, and controlling 117 volt 400 Hz AC power to all Orbiter subsystems from the three fuel cells in the Electrical Power Generation (EPG) subsystem. Volume 2 continues the presentation of IOA analysis worksheets and contains the potential critical items list.

Schmeckpeper, K. R.↗

NASA NTRS1978

Model for redundant-sensor signal errors

Report describes application of order statistics to analysis of failure modes in redundant systems. Report provides detailed mathematical discussion of approach, accompanied by graphs and equations. Techniques are relevant to process that demand high reliability, such as manufacture of dangerous chemicals. It also includes discussion of quad-redundant system.

Sowada, D. J.↗

NASA NTRS1980

MOD-0A 200 kW wind turbine generator design and analysis report

The design, analysis, and initial performance of the MOD-OA 200 kW wind turbine generator at Clayton, NM is documented. The MOD-OA was designed and built to obtain operation and performance data and experience in utility environments. The project requirements, approach, system description, design requirements, design, analysis, system tests, installation, safety considerations, failure modes and effects analysis, data acquisition, and initial performance for the wind turbine are discussed. The design and analysis of the rotor, drive train, nacelle equipment, yaw drive mechanism and brake, tower, foundation, electricl system, and control systems are presented. The rotor includes the blades, hub, and pitch change mechanism. The drive train includes the low speed shaft, speed increaser, high speed shaft, and rotor brake. The electrical system includes the generator, switchgear, transformer, and utility connection. The control systems are the blade pitch, yaw, and generator control, and the safety system. Manual, automatic, and remote control are discussed. Systems analyses on dynamic loads and fatigue are presented.

Anderson, T. S.↗

NASA NTRS1981

The ac propulsion system for an electric vehicle, phase 1

A functional prototype of an electric vehicle ac propulsion system was built consisting of a 18.65 kW rated ac induction traction motor, pulse width modulated (PWM) transistorized inverter, two speed mechanically shifted automatic transmission, and an overall drive/vehicle controller. Design developmental steps, and test results of individual components and the complex system on an instrumented test frame are described. Computer models were developed for the inverter, motor and a representative vehicle. A preliminary reliability model and failure modes effects analysis are given.

Geppert, S.↗

NASA NTRS1980

The MOD-OA 200 kilowatt wind turbine generator design and analysis report

The project requirements, approach, system description, design requirements, design, analysis, system tests, installation safety considerations, failure modes and effects analysis, data acquisition, and initial performance for the MOD-OA 200 kw wind turbine generator are discussed. The components, the rotor, driven train, nacelle equipment, yaw drive mechanism and brake, tower, foundation, electrical system, and control systems are presented. The rotor includes the blades, hub and pitch change mechanism. The drive train includes the low speed shaft, speed increaser, high speed shaft, and rotor brake. The electrical system includes the generator, switchgear, transformer, and utility connection. The control systems are the blade pitch, yaw, and generator control, and the safety system. Manual, automatic, and remote control and Dynamic loads and fatigue are analyzed.

Andersen, T. S.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS). Phase 1 report

An integrated avionics system which provides expanded functional capabilities that significantly enhance the utility and safety of general aviation at a cost commensurate with the general aviation market is discussed. Displays and control were designed so that the pilot can use the system after minimum training. Functional and hardware descriptions, operational evaluation and failure modes effects analysis are included.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2000

NASA GRC Technology Development Project for a Stirling Radioisotope Power System

NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC), the Department of Energy (DOE), and Stirling Technology Company (STC) are developing a Stirling convertor for an advanced radioisotope power system to provide spacecraft on-board electric power for NASA deep space missions. NASA GRC is conducting an in-house project to provide convertor, component, and materials testing and evaluation in support of the overall power system development. A first characterization of the DOE/STC 55-We Stirling Technology Demonstration Convertor (TDC) under the expected launch random vibration environment was recently completed in the NASA GRC Structural Dynamics Laboratory. Two TDCs also completed an initial electromagnetic interference (EMI) characterization at NASA GRC while being tested in a synchronized, opposed configuration. Materials testing is underway to support a life assessment of the heater head, and magnet characterization and aging tests have been initiated. Test facilities are now being established for an independent convertor performance verification and technology development. A preliminary Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA), initial finite element analysis (FEA) for the linear alternator, ionizing radiation survivability assessment, and radiator parametric study have also been completed. This paper will discuss the status, plans, and results to date for these efforts.

Thieme, Lanny G.↗

NASA NTRS1999

Fatigue Failure Criteria for Single Crystal Nickel Superalloys

High Cycle Fatigue (HCF) induced failures in aircraft gas-turbine and rocket engine turbopump blades is a pervasive problem. Single crystal turbine blades are being utilized in rocket engine turbopumps and jet engines throughout industry and NASA because of their superior creep, stress rupture, melt resistance and thermomechanical fatigue capabilities over polycrystalline alloys. Single-crystal materials have highly orthotropic properties making the position of the crystal lattice relative to the pan geometry a significant factor in the overall analysis. The failure modes of single crystal turbine blades is complicated to predict due to the material orthotropy and variations in crystal orientations. A fatigue failure criteria based on the maximum shear stress amplitude [delta t max] on the 30 slip systems, is presented for single crystal nickel superalloys (FCC crystal). This criteria reduces the scatter in uniaxial LCF test data, for four different specimen orientations, for PWA 1484 at 1200 F in air, quite well. A power law curve fit of the failure parameter, delta t max, vs. cycles to failure is presented.

Arakere, Nagaraj K.↗

NASA NTRS1981

Quality Assurance

General Electric Company requested a report from Jet Propulsion Laboratory which provides detailed information on failure modes, stress analysis and other reliability considerations was requested. General Electric Company's Nuclear Energy Division incorporated its information with that of the report. Routinely used, the report enables personnel time savings in establishing applicable screening test data.

Source record↗

NASA NTRS2004

Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating Risk of Single-Point Inspections on the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor

In the production of each Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), over 100,000 inspections are performed. ATK Thiokol Inc. reviewed these inspections to ensure a robust inspection system is maintained. The principal effort within this endeavor was the systematic identification and evaluation of inspections considered to be single-point. Single-point inspections are those accomplished on components, materials, and tooling by only one person, involving no other check. The purpose was to more accurately characterize risk and ultimately address and/or mitigate risk associated with single-point inspections. After the initial review of all inspections and identification/assessment of single-point inspections, review teams applied risk prioritization methodology similar to that used in a Process Failure Modes Effects Analysis to derive a Risk Prioritization Number for each single-point inspection. After the prioritization of risk, all single-point inspection points determined to have significant risk were provided either with risk-mitigating actions or rationale for acceptance. This effort gave confidence to the RSRM program that the correct inspections are being accomplished, that there is appropriate justification for those that remain as single-point inspections, and that risk mitigation was applied to further reduce risk of higher risk single-point inspections. This paper examines the process, results, and lessons learned in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk associated with single-point inspections accomplished in the production of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA Systems Engineering and Safety Culture: Aerospace Project Design and Implementation Challenges

Using Systems Engineering principles and the NASA Glenn Safety procedures and protocols, a rigorous method was developed to ensure safe testing and operation of a small, commercial off the shelf turbofan engine at the Aero-Acoustic Propulsion Laboratory (AAPL). The DGEN380 is a small, ~500-lbf thrust class, high-bypass, geared- turbofan engine with a separate flow nozzle. It is a modular, compact, lightweight turbofan with Full-Authority Digital Engine Control. It’s general characteristics make it an ideal candidate for utilization as a testbed for engine aero-acoustic technology maturation in a relevant performance environment. The DGEN380 is the core component of the DGEN Aero-propulsion Research Turbofan (DART) mobile test rig. The full presentation will describe the risk assessment and mitigation process applied to the DART by the project team. The identification and analysis of failure modes led to the development of risk mitigation plans, which include administrative, engineering, and physical controls for the safe operation of the DART test rig at the AAPL facility.

Systems Engineering, Aeronautics, safety↗