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All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2022

Precursor Analysis Report: Doppelpaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019

The DoppelPaymer Ransomware Attack on Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) 2019 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the PEMEX cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The 2019 DoppelPaymer ransomware attack on PEMEX, Mexico’s nationalized petroleum corporation, highlights a unique threat that ransomware and cybercriminal extortion poses to Operational Technology (OT) environments in critical infrastructure. The incident began with an employee downloading commodity malware that allowed adversaries to gain initial access to PEMEX’s enterprise environment. After conducting privilege escalation, tool ingress, and data exfiltration, the adversaries deployed DoppelPaymer ransomware throughout the PEMEX enterprise environment, resulting in the company having to take dozens of systems offline for at least several days. Although PEMEX stated that their operations were not affected, the data exfiltrated from PEMEX was made available for download on DoppelPaymer’s leak site, as well as on other illicit criminal forums. This stolen data included not only company information, but also sensitive OT-specific configuration data. This incident showcases how cybercriminal exfiltration and posting of sensitive OT architecture documentation can pose security concerns for the targeted organization for years due to the long lifespan of OT assets and architectures. Researchers and analysts identified 18 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 190 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Fifteen of the identified techniques used during the DoppelPaymer ransomware attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 163 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 34 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 60 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2020

A data analytical approach for assessing the efficacy of Operational Technology active defenses against insider threats

In recent years, the need for Operational Technology (OT) defenses has been recognized, serving as an additional line of defense when Information Technology (IT) defenses are bypassed. This is no longer considered an uncommon possibility when dealing with advanced persistent threat (APT) actors expected to be state-sponsored and receiving insider assistance. In these extreme adversarial situations, OT defenses aim to provide another layer of defense for the system, introduced directly at the physical process level, as described by the sensors data, the system model, and control actions. Just like IT defenses, two schools of thought, i.e., passive and active defenses, have emerged to address this challenge. In active defenses, representing the focus of this paper, known signatures, synthesized based on the system's unique characteristics, are inserted into the system. In contradistinction, passive methods rely solely on observing system behavior in search of patterns of normal behavior with deviations thereof representing abnormal behavior. In their most sophisticated implementations, both passive and active defenses rely on the use of data analytics to identify the patterns and synthesize the observed and/or inserted signatures. Past research has shown that passive defenses may be bypassed by APT actors relying on data analytics and their intimate knowledge of the system to evade detection by respecting the patterns identified by the defenders. Here this manuscript explores the use of active defenses under the assumption that the attacker has privileged access to the system, including access to the system's model and sensors data. Specifically, this manuscript assesses the ability of active defenses to remain invisible to the attackers, and discusses the associated challenges that must be addressed to ensure their resiliency against APT actors.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2025

Precursor Analysis Report: Blackmatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021

The BlackMatter Ransomware Attack on New Cooperative 2021 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the New Cooperative cyber attack and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. The BlackMatter ransomware was first identified in July 2021 and is reported to have infected more than 50 corporations around the world. , The Iowa-based grain cooperative, New Cooperative, was impacted by the BlackMatter ransomware on or before 18 September 2021. The adversary likely resided on New Cooperative’s networks for 15 days prior to encrypting its network and demanding New Cooperative pay $5.9 million in ransom by 25 September to unlock systems and prevent 1 terabyte (TB) of sensitive data from being publicly released. It is not clear if New Cooperative paid the ransom. The full impact of the ransomware attack is not known; however, according to New Cooperative’s general manager, the attack caused the company’s automated processes to revert back to processes used in the 1970s. , As of 6 October, only 50 percent of New Cooperative’s operations were utilizing automated processes. The company took eight weeks to rebuild the entire network and information technology (IT) systems from the ground up, which puts the date of fully recovery around 13 November. Researchers and analysts identified 20 unique techniques utilized during the attack with a total of 404 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Seventeen of the identified techniques used during the New Cooperative cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 360 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 284 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 15 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Graph link prediction in computer networks using Poisson matrix factorisation

Graph link prediction is an important task in cybersecurity: relationships between entities within a computer network, such as users interacting with computers or system libraries and the corresponding processes that use them, can provide key insights into adversary behaviour. Poisson matrix factorisation (PMF) is a popular model for link prediction in large networks, particularly useful for its scalability. In this article PMF is extended to include scenarios that are commonly encountered in cybersecurity applications. Specifically, an extension is proposed to explicitly handle binary adjacency matrices and include known categorical covariates associated with the graph nodes. A seasonal PMF model is also presented to handle seasonal networks. To allow the methods to scale to large graphs, variational methods are discussed for performing fast inference. The results show an improved performance over the standard PMF model and other statistical network models.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Cybersecurity Resiliency of Marine Renewable Energy Systems Part 2: Cybersecurity Best Practices and Risk Management

Marine renewable energy (MRE) is an emerging source of power for marine applications, marine devices, and coastal communities. This energy source relies on industrial control systems and IT to support operations and maintenance activities, which create a pathway for an adversary to gain unauthorized access to systems and data and disrupt operations. Incorporating cybersecurity risk prevention measures and mitigation capabilities from inception, development, operation, to decommissioning of the MRE system and components is paramount to the protection of energy generation and the security of network architecture and infrastructure. To improve the resilience of MRE systems as a predictable, affordable, and reliable source of energy, cybersecurity guidance was developed to enable operators to assess cybersecurity risks and implement security measures commensurate with the risk. This publication is the second of a two-part series, with Part 1 addressing a framework to determine cybersecurity risk by assessing the vulnerability of an MRE system to potential cyber threats and the consequences a cyberattack would have on the end user. This Part 2 publication describes an approach to select appropriate cybersecurity best practices commensurate with the MRE system's cybersecurity risk. The guidance includes 86 cybersecurity best practices, which are associated with 36 cybersecurity domains and grouped into nine categories. The best practices follow the core functions of the National Institute of Science and Technology Cybersecurity Framework (e.g., identify, detect, protect, respond, and and recover) and insights from both maritime and energy industry guidance documents to identify security measures effective in protecting information and operational technology assets prevalent in MRE systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

NASA NTRS2018

GEONEX: Progressive Conditional Generative Adversarial Training Using Transfer learning

Obtaining accurate segmentation on large scale images is an open problem in deep learning. The main problem is the amount of labeled data that exists for large scale images. Traditionally, the common solution to this problem is to crop the large images into smaller images to increase the amount of available data and train a Conditional Generative Adversarial Network (CGAN). CGANs are currently the state of the art in image to image translation and provide better accuracy than the traditional method of training a encoder based conv-net architecture to minimize the loss at each pixel. This method can produce noisy and discontinuous images with inaccurate results. We seek to solve this problem by utilizing the concepts of transfer learning and progressive training to create a CGAN that can segment large scale images with a limited amount of labeled data. In transfer learning we recognize that many learned features are applicable to many classes from multiple domains. This introduces the concept of feature reusability, which is the basis for finetuning. Progressive training got its start in training models on the same images at different resolutions. In this work we instead train a GAN on increasing image scales by transferring the weights from the smaller scales to the larger scales. The learned features at the smaller scales are continually reused and applied to larger scales to create a CGAN that can perform accurate segmentation on large scale images. We apply this method to detect building footprints on very high-resolution overhead imagery (e.g Digital Globe and high resolution airborne platforms).

GEONEX↗

DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗

DOE OSTI2024

PRISTINE: An Emulation Platform for PCB-Level Hardware Trojans

Printed circuit Boards (PCBs) are becoming increasingly vulnerable to malicious design alteration, also known as Trojan attacks, due to a distributed business model that often involves various untrusted parties. Such attacks can be mounted at various stages in the PCB life cycle. The relative ease of alteration of PCB hardware even after fabrication (due to physical access to surface-mounted critical components and traces) makes them attractive for an adversary to manipulate their functional/physical behavior for malicious intent. There is a growing need to explore viable Trojan attacks in a PCB, analyze their functional and physical characteristics (e.g., impact on power or delay), and study the effectiveness of countermeasures against these attacks. While simulation-based approaches for PCB Trojan insertion are effective at creating a large population of possible Trojans, they fail to provide functional feasibility analysis with a realistic workload for a trigger circuit. Also, they cannot estimate a Trojan’s side-channel footprint due to the unavailability of physical models of diverse PCB components. To address these deficiencies, in this paper, we present PRISTINE, a PCB-level emulation system for any integrity or physical tampering issues, specifically, hardware Trojan insertion. The need for building such an emulation platform to resolve PCB trust issues in the supply chain is also surveyed and discussed. Both custom Hardware Hacking (HaHa) boards and multiple commercial PCBs are then used to test the ability of the proposed system to emulate various hardware Trojans specially designed to exploit board-specific hardware characteristics. Experimental results on emulated board-level Trojans show that a wide range of Trojans can be successfully activated, thus enabling the expected payload effects on both types of boards to be studied and quantified. The resulting data are further analyzed to create PCB-level Trojan benchmarks. In particular, a comparative evaluation of the experimental results is used to propose a risk level metric that quantifies the probability of detection and degree of payload impact of each Trojan on a given commercial PCB.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2022

Pulsed Thermal Tomography Nondestructive Examination of Additively Manufactured Reactor Materials and Components (Final Technical Report)

Metal Additive Manufacturing (AM) is a promising method for cost-efficient fabrication of complex shape structures for applications in harsh environment, such as in a nuclear reactor. However, internal defects (pores) occur in high-strength AM alloys, which are manufactured with Laser Powder Bed Fusion (LPBF) AM method. Pulsed Infrared Thermography (PIT) is an efficient nondestructive evaluation (NDE) method to examine actual structures, because this method offers one-sided non-contact measurements, and fast processing of large sample areas. However, imaging of material defects, particularly defects with sizes at microscopic level, is challenging. In this report, we benchmark the performance of several Unsupervised Learning (UL) algorithms designed to enhance imaging of microscopic defects in metals with PIT. UL aims to learn the latent principal patterns (dictionaries) in PIT data to detect defects with minimal human supervision. Performance of Independent Component Analysis (ICA), Sparse Coding (SC), Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) was compared using F-score, UL model training time and defects reconstruction time. We obtained the average F-score of 0.75, and a highest F-score of 0.89 for the EFA algorithm. Overall, EFA outperforms other UL algorithms considered in this study. In another approach, we investigate Thermal Tomography (TT), which is a computational method for reconstruction of depth profile of internal material defects from PIT nondestructive evaluation (NDE). TT algorithm obtains depth reconstructions of thermal effusivity, which has been shown to provide visualization of subsurface internals defects in metals. In many applications, one needs to determine the defect shape and orientation from reconstructed effusivity images. Interpretation of TT images is non-trivial because of blurring, which increases with depth due to heat diffusion-based nature of image formation. We have developed a deep learning convolutional neural network (CNN) to classify size and orientation of subsurface material defects in TT images. CNN was trained with TT images produced with computer simulations of 2D metallic structures (thin plates) containing elliptical subsurface voids. Performance of CNN was investigated using test TT images developed with computer simulations of plates containing elliptical defects, and defects with shape imported from scanning electron microscopy (SEM) images. CNN demonstrated the ability to classify radii and angular orientation of elliptical defects in previously unseen test TT images. We have also demonstrated that CNN trained on TT images of elliptical defects is capable of classifying shape and orientation of irregular defects. Training the CNN on irregular defect shapes instead of on elliptical shapes would make the resulting classifications more descriptive of actual defect shapes. However, this requires a much higher volume of SEM images of material defects, which are difficult to obtain because of random occurrence of defects in LPBF. To address this challenge, we developed a generative adversarial network (GAN) to augment the existing dataset of SEM defect images. The GAN model is demonstrated to create novel yet realistic defect shapes that can be used as input for simulated PTT images to train CNN. We also investigate several approaches based on Gaussian Random Circle and Bezier Curves for constructing parametric models of irregular-shape defects.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

DOE OSTI2021

ResNet and CycleGAN for pulse shape discrimination of He-4 detector pulses: Recovering pulses conventional algorithms fail to label unanimously

Pulse shape discrimination (PSD) capable detectors, such as He-4, that respond to neutron and gamma-ray 7 interactions have a threshold deposited energy value below which n/γ discrimination vanishes when using 8 conventional PSD algorithms. Recent attempts in applying supervised learning based artificial neural 9 networks for PSD use the pulses in the separated regions to train the networks so they can be used to classify 10 another set of separated pulses. In doing so, pulses previously indistinguishable are not recovered for 11 classification, which would have increased the number of neutron and gamma-ray pulses that could be used 12 for further analysis. Assuming the reason why conventional PSD algorithms have unseparated regions is 13 because the parameter space of the algorithms fail to capture the intrinsic (but subtle) distinguishing 14 behavior of some of the neutron and gamma-ray pulses, a cycle-consistent generative adversarial network 15 (CycleGAN) was trained to amplify those differences and extract well separated neutron and gamma-ray 16 clusters. Results show that, once the network is trained with pulses from separated and unseparated regions, 17 it was able to transform the pulses in the unseparated region to improve the PSD. Subsequent n/γ 18 classification was performed using deep residual network (ResNet) that takes pulses with 512 data points 19 as an input. Two different ResNets were explored – simple ResNet and modified ResNet which takes 20 segmented pulse inputs in the first layer and the corresponding time axis values in the last hidden layer. 21 The later approach enables the network to extract time correlated pulse features to enhance its ability to 22 capture the pulse behaviors relevant for PSD. Although it achieves slightly lower accuracy, 99.41% versus 23 99.89%, based on simply counting the number of correct n/γ labels assigned, compared to the simple 24 ResNet, the modified ResNets architecture was able to decreases the cross-entropy loss function by half, 25 which implies that the correct n/γ labels assigned are less likely to be accidental. PSD parameter 26 distributions based on n/γ classification by ResNet before and after transforming unseparated pulses using 27 CycleGAN show that by enhancing the separation between neutrons and gamma-rays, the transformation 28 helps improve the performance of classifier networks that are trained using labeled dataset. The 29 enhancement of neutron and gamma-ray separation by the CycleGAN increased the PSD figure of merit 30 (FOM) by up to 70% in some regions. Here, the results show that, if a given detector achieves clear separation 31 between neutron and gamma-ray pulses in any energy region, such neural network approaches can help 32 lower the energy threshold for the separation and increasing the number of neutron and gamma-ray pulses 33 that can be used for further analysis.

4He↗