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DOE OSTI2018

Hanford Waste End Effector Prototype Test Plan – Phase II

This test plan describes the Phase II testing program of the Hanford Waste End Effector (HWEE) at the Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) Cold Test Facility (CTF) using a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)-designed testing setup. This task builds on Phase I development testing completed in August 2017 and reported in PNNL-26856 to address some key actual tank waste challenges. The task includes demonstrating retrieval of a mixed layered simulant and retrieval of uneven simulant profiles like that found near tank walls. A separate demonstration using only the HWEE conveyance jet pump will start to assess the lifting capabilities of this device for transporting waste out of an underground tank. The PNNL-designed robotic gantry system and associated systems (e.g., tanks, high-pressure water delivery and valves, instruments, etc.) used at CTF during Phase I have been modified and upgraded to implement the Phase II test program and measure various process parameters. The tests will involve retrieval of water and kaolin (sludge) simulant to determine pumping rate, dilution factors, and screen fouling rate.

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DOE OSTI2017

Hanford Waste End Effector Prototype Test Plan

This test plan describes the Phase 1 testing program of the Hanford Waste End Effector (HWEE) at the Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) Cold Test Facility (CTF) using a Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL)-designed testing setup. This task supports Phase 1 development testing of the HWEE to support the informational needs for initial assessment of the HWEE to support Hanford single shell tank A-105 retrieval. This task will install the HWEE on a PNNL-designed robotic gantry system at CTF, install instrumentation to measure reaction forces and process parameters, prepare and characterize simulant materials, and implement the test program. The tests will involve retrieval of water, sludge, and hardpan simulants to determine pumping rate, dilution factors, and screen fouling rate.

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DOE OSTI2017

Hanford Waste End Effector Prototype Test Plan (Rev.1)

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NASA NTRS2014

Wide Range Vacuum Pumps for the SAM Instrument on the MSL Curiosity Rover

Creare Incorporated and NASA Goddard Space Flight Center developed and space qualified two wide range pumps (WRPs) that were included in the Sample Analysis at Mars (SAM) instrument. This instrument was subsequently integrated into the Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) "Curiosity Rover," launched aboard an Atlas V rocket in 2011, and landed on August 6, 2012, in the Gale Crater on Mars. The pumps have now operated for more than 18 months in the Gale Crater and have been evacuating the key components of the SAM instrument: a quadrupole mass spectrometer, a tunable laser spectrometer, and six gas chromatograph columns. In this paper, we describe the main design challenges and the ways in which they were solved. This includes the custom design of a miniaturized, high-speed motor to drive the turbo drag pump rotor, analysis of rotor dynamics for super critical operation, and bearing/lubricant design/selection.

Sorensen, Paul↗

DOE OSTI2012

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval And Delivery Of The Hanford Tank Wastes For Vitrification In The Waste Treatment Plant

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction ofWTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration & Controls, Front-End Design & Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety & Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH&QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant Foundation-configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan.

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DOE OSTI2013

Deep Sludge Gas Release Event Analytical Evaluation

Long Abstract. Full Text. The purpose of the Deep Sludge Gas Release Event Analytical Evaluation (DSGRE-AE) is to evaluate the postulated hypothesis that a hydrogen GRE may occur in Hanford tanks containing waste sludges at levels greater than previously experienced. There is a need to understand gas retention and release hazards in sludge beds which are 200 -300 inches deep. These sludge beds are deeper than historical Hanford sludge waste beds, and are created when waste is retrieved from older single-shell tanks (SST) and transferred to newer double-shell tanks (DST).Retrieval of waste from SSTs reduces the risk to the environment from leakage or potential leakage of waste into the ground from these tanks. However, the possibility of an energetic event (flammable gas accident) in the retrieval receiver DST is worse than slow leakage. Lines of inquiry, therefore, are (1) can sludge waste be stored safely in deep beds; (2) can gas release events (GRE) be prevented by periodically degassing the sludge (e.g., mixer pump); or (3) does the retrieval strategy need to be altered to limit sludge bed height by retrieving into additional DSTs? The scope of this effort is to provide expert advice on whether or not to move forward with the generation of deep beds of sludge through retrieval of C-Farm tanks. Evaluation of possible mitigation methods (e.g., using mixer pumps to release gas, retrieving into an additional DST) are being evaluated by a second team and are not discussed in this report. While available data and engineering judgment indicate that increased gas retention (retained gas fraction) in DST sludge at depths resulting from the completion of SST 241-C Tank Farm retrievals is not expected and, even if gas releases were to occur, they would be small and local, a positive USQ was declared (Occurrence Report EM-RP--WRPS-TANKFARM-2012-0014, "Potential Exists for a Large Spontaneous Gas Release Event in Deep Settled Waste Sludge"). The purpose of this technical report is to (1) present and discuss current understandings of gas retention and release mechanisms for deep sludge in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) complex waste storage tanks; and (2) to identify viable methods/criteria for demonstrating safety relative to deep sludge gas release events (DSGRE) in the near term to support the Hanford C-Farm retrieval mission. A secondary purpose is to identify viable methods/criteria for demonstrating safety relative to DSGREs in the longer term to support the mission to retrieve waste from the Hanford Tank Farms and deliver it to the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). The potential DSGRE issue resulted in the declaration of a positive Unreviewed Safety Question (USQ). C-Farm retrievals are currently proceeding under a Justification for Continued Operation (JCO) that only allows tanks 241-AN-101 and 241-AN-106 sludge levels of 192 inches and 195 inches, respectively. C-Farm retrievals need deeper sludge levels (approximately 310 inches in 241-AN-101 and approximately 250 inches in 241-AN-106). This effort is to provide analytical data and justification to continue retrievals in a safe and efficient manner.

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DOE OSTI2013

Overview of Hanford Single Shell Tank (SST) Structural Integrity

To improve the understanding of the single-shell tanks (SSTs) integrity, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS), the USDOE Hanford Site tank contractor, developed an enhanced Single-Shell Tank Integrity Project (SSTIP) in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity, consisting of various subject matters experts in industry and academia, was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. This panel developed 33 recommendations in four main areas of interest: structural integrity, liner degradation, leak integrity and prevention, and mitigation of contamination migration, Seventeen of these recommendations were used to develop the basis for the M-45-10-1 Change Package for the Hanford Federal Agreement and Compliance Order, which is also known as the Tri-Party Agreement. The structural integrity of the tanks is a key element in completing the cleanup mission at the Hanford Site. There are eight primary recommendations related to the structural integrity of Hanford Single-Shell Tanks. Six recommendations are being implemented through current and planned activities. The structural integrity of the Hanford is being evaluated through analysis, monitoring, inspection, materials testing, and construction document review. Structural evaluation in the form of analysis is performed using modern finite element models generated in ANSYS. The analyses consider in-situ, thermal, operating loads and natural phenomena such as earthquakes. Structural analysis of 108 of 149 Hanford Single-Shell Tanks has concluded that the tanks are structurally sound and meet current industry standards. Analysis of the remaining Hanford Single-Shell Tanks is scheduled for FY2014. Hanford Single-Shell Tanks are monitored through a dome deflection program. The program looks for deflections of the tank dome greater than 1/4 inch. No such deflections have been recorded. The tanks are also subjected to visual inspection. Digital cameras record the interior surface of the concrete tanks, looking for cracks and other surface conditions that may indicate signs of structural distress. The condition of the concrete and rebar of the Hanford Single-Shell Tanks is currently being tested and planned for additional activities in the near future. Concrete and rebar removed from the dome of a 65 year old tank was tested for mechanics properties and condition. Results indicated stronger than designed concrete with additional Petrographic examination and rebar completed. Material properties determined from previous efforts combined with current testing and construction document review will help to generate a database that will provide indication of Hanford Single-Shell Tank structural integrity.

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DOE OSTI2013

Hanford Double-Shell Tank Extent-of-Condition Construction Review

During routine visual inspections of Hanford double-shell waste tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102), anomalies were identified on the annulus floor which resulted in further evaluations. Following a formal leak assessment in October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of AY-102 was leaking. The formal leak assessment, documented in RPP-ASMT-53793,Tank 241-AY-102 Leak Assessment Report, identified first-of-a-kind construction difficulties and trial-and-error repairs as major contributing factors to tank failure. To determine if improvements in double-shell tank (DST) construction occurred after construction of tank AY-102, a detailed review and evaluation of historical construction records were performed for the first three DST tank farms constructed, which included tanks 241-AY-101, 241-AZ-101, 241-AZ-102, 241-SY-101, 241-SY-102, and 241-SY-103. The review for these six tanks involved research and review of dozens of boxes of historical project documentation. These reviews form a basis to better understand the current condition of the three oldest Hanford DST farms. They provide a basis for changes to the current tank inspection program and also provide valuable insight into future tank use decisions. If new tanks are constructed in the future, these reviews provide valuable "lessons-learned" information about expected difficulties as well as construction practices and techniques that are likely to be successful.

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DOE OSTI2014

Tank 241-AY-102 Secondary Liner Corrosion Evaluation - 14191

In October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of 241-AY-102 (AY-102) was leaking. A number of evaluations were performed after discovery of the leak which identified corrosion from storage of waste at the high waste temperatures as one of the major contributing factors in the failure of the tank. The propensity for corrosion of the waste on the annulus floor will be investigated to determine if it is corrosive and must be promptly removed or if it is benign and may remain in the annulus. The chemical composition of waste, the temperature and the character of the steel are important factors in assessing the propensity for corrosion. Unfortunately, the temperatures of the wastes in contact with the secondary steel liner are not known; they are estimated to range from 45 deg C to 60 deg C. It is also notable that most corrosion tests have been carried out with un-welded, stress-relieved steels, but the secondary liner in tank AY-102 was not stress-relieved. In addition, the cold weather fabrication and welding led to many problems, which required repeated softening of the metal to flatten secondary bottom during its construction. This flame treatment may have altered the microstructure of the steel.

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DOE OSTI2013

System Performance Testing of the Pulse-Echo Ultrasonic Instrument for Critical Velocity Determination during Hanford Tank Waste Transfer Operations - 13584

The delivery of Hanford double-shell tank waste to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is governed by specific Waste Acceptance Criteria that are identified in ICD 19 - Interface Control Document for Waste Feed. Waste must be certified as acceptable before it can be delivered to the WTP. The fluid transfer velocity at which solid particulate deposition occurs in waste slurry transport piping (critical velocity) is a key waste acceptance parameter that must be accurately characterized to determine if the waste is acceptable for transfer to the WTP. Washington River Protection Solutions and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have been evaluating the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument since 2010 for its ability to detect particle settling and determine critical velocity in a horizontal slurry transport pipeline for slurries containing particles with a mean particle diameter of ≥14 micrometers (μm). In 2012 the PulseEcho instrument was further evaluated under WRPS’ System Performance test campaign to identify critical velocities for slurries that are expected to be encountered during Hanford tank waste retrieval operations or bounding for tank waste feed. This three-year evaluation has demonstrated the ability of the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument to detect the onset of critical velocity for a broad range of physical and rheological slurry properties that are likely encountered during the waste feed transfer operations between the Hanford tank farms and the WTP.

Critical Velocity↗

DOE OSTI2014

Hanford Double-Shell Tank Extent-of-Condition Review - 15498

During routine visual inspections of Hanford double-shell waste tank 241-AY-102 (AY-102), anomalies were identified on the annulus floor which resulted in further evaluations. Following a formal leak assessment in October 2012, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) determined that the primary tank of AY-102 was leaking. A formal leak assessment, documented in RPP-ASMT-53793, Tank 241-AY-102 Leak Assessment Report, identified first-of-a-kind construction difficulties and trial-and-error repairs as major contributing factors to tank failure.1 To determine if improvements in double-shell tank (DST) construction occurred after construction of tank AY-102, a detailed review and evaluation of historical construction records was performed for Hanford’s remaining twenty-seven DSTs. Review involved research of 241 boxes of historical project documentation to better understand the condition of the Hanford DST farms, noting similarities in construction difficulties/issues to tank AY-102. Information gathered provides valuable insight regarding construction difficulties, future tank operations decisions, and guidance of the current tank inspection program. Should new waste storage tanks be constructed in the future, these reviews also provide valuable lessons-learned.

Johnson, J. M.↗

DOE OSTI2015

Progress of the Enhanced Hanford Single Shell Tank (SST) Integrity Project

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DOE OSTI2017

Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System Bench-Scale Testing: Supporting Integrated Testing and Facility Safety Analyses - 17171

The Low Activity Waste Pretreatment System (LAWPS) is being designed to enable the direct feed of waste to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) Low Activity Waste (LAW) facility to be immobilized. Prior to construction of the LAWPS, pilot-scale integrated testing of the key unit operations (crossflow filtration, ion exchange using spherical resorcinol-formaldehyde (sRF) resin) will be conducted by a team led by Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) to increase the technology maturation level of the facility’s critical technology elements. As a part of this effort, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has conducted a series of bench-scale (or engineering-scale) tests to perform two major objectives: (1) support pilot-scale integrated testing of the LAWPS by supplying information or performance data in advance of operating the pilot-scale facility; and (2) collect data needed to establish or confirm assumptions/approaches planned for implementation in the LAWPS safety basis. The first objective was focused in two technical areas: developing simulants that are representative of expected waste feed and can be produced at larger scales, and using these simulants in a bench-scale crossflow filter to establish expected solid-liquid separation performance. The crossflow filter was also used to observe the efficacy (with respect to filter production rate) of selected operational strategies. The second objective also included two technical areas: measuring the effect of sRF resin on hydrogen generation rate under irradiation, and demonstrating that the planned hydrogen management approach is effective and robust. The hydrogen management strategy involves fluidization of the sRF resin bed in the ion exchange columns and recirculating the liquid, a scenario that is planned for testing at full column height. The full height tests at PNNL also supported full-scale IX column testing conducted as part of the technology maturation plan. The experimental approaches used at PNNL in these four technical areas are summarized and selected key preliminary results are provided.

cross flow filtration↗

DOE OSTI2013

Development and Qualification of Advancements in Submersible Transfer Pump Performance and Life, and Implications for Advancing and Supporting Processing Options - 13343

From the 1950's through the 1990's, relatively inexpensive, 'off-the-shelf' type, vertical turbine pumps (VTP) were used to transfer Hanford waste. The technology of those pumps was rooted primarily in the mining and agricultural (irrigation) industries. HNF-3218, Double Shell Tank (DST) Transfer Pump History and Reliability Report, 1998, provides a summary of Hanford DST pump history to that date. Such pumps operated in the Hanford radioactive waste environment for an average of only 400 hours before failure. However, at that time, operating life was not a driving criteria within the Department of Energy (DOE) complex, as the failure of transfer pumps represented a relatively low replacement and disposal cost. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issuance of the 'Debris Rule' in 1992, which mandated that mixed radioactive waste contaminated equipment be decontaminated to a 'low level waste' category prior to burial, elevated the significance of transfer pump reliability and decontamination capability as life-cycle cost criteria. Minimizing the frequency of transfer pump failures and design for decontamination became significantly important and served to drive the need toward specific, designed for application pumps to meet this challenge. To this end, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) and the supplier, Curtiss-Wright EMD (EMD), have recently collaborated on an intense program to further transfer pump technology and performance. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval and Delivery of Hanford Tank Wastes for Vitrification in the Waste Treatment Plant - 13234

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety-conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction of WTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration and Controls, Front-End Design and Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH and QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant{sup R} Foundation-Configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2013

System Performance Testing of the Pulse-Echo Ultrasonic Instrument for Critical Velocity Determination during Hanford Tank Waste Transfer Operations - 13584

The delivery of Hanford double-shell tank waste to the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is governed by specific Waste Acceptance Criteria that are identified in ICD 19 - Interface Control Document for Waste Feed. Waste must be certified as acceptable before it can be delivered to the WTP. The fluid transfer velocity at which solid particulate deposition occurs in waste slurry transport piping (critical velocity) is a key waste acceptance parameter that must be accurately characterized to determine if the waste is acceptable for transfer to the WTP. Washington River Protection Solutions and the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory have been evaluating the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument since 2010 for its ability to detect particle settling and determine critical velocity in a horizontal slurry transport pipeline for slurries containing particles with a mean particle diameter of =14 micrometers (μm). In 2012 the PulseEcho instrument was further evaluated under WRPS' System Performance test campaign to identify critical velocities for slurries that are expected to be encountered during Hanford tank waste retrieval operations or bounding for tank waste feed. This three-year evaluation has demonstrated the ability of the ultrasonic PulseEcho instrument to detect the onset of critical velocity for a broad range of physical and rheological slurry properties that are likely encountered during the waste feed transfer operations between the Hanford tank farms and the WTP. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

Single-Shell Tanks Leak Integrity Elements/ SX Farm Leak Causes and Locations - 12127

Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS) developed an enhanced single-shell tank (SST) integrity project in 2009. An expert panel on SST integrity was created to provide recommendations supporting the development of the project. One primary recommendation was to expand the leak assessment reports (substitute report or LD-1) to include leak causes and locations. The recommendation has been included in the M-045-91F Hanford Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (Tri-Party Agreement) as one of four targets relating to SST leak integrity. The 241-SX Farm (SX Farm) tanks with leak losses were addressed on an individual tank basis as part of LD-1. Currently, 8 out of 23 SSTs that have been reported to having a liner leak are located in SX Farm. This percentage was the highest compared to other tank farms which is why SX Farm was analyzed first. The SX Farm is comprised of fifteen SSTs built 1953-1954. The tanks are arranged in rows of three tanks each, forming a cascade. Each of the SX Farm tanks has a nominal 1-million-gal storage capacity. Of the fifteen tanks in SX Farm, an assessment reported leak losses for the following tanks: 241-SX-107, 241-SX-108, 241-SX-109, 241-SX- 111, 241-SX-112, 241-SX-113, 241-SX-114 and 241-SX-115. The method used to identify leak location consisted of reviewing in-tank and ex-tank leak detection information. This provided the basic data identifying where and when the first leaks were detected. In-tank leak detection consisted of liquid level measurement that can be augmented with photographs which can provide an indication of the vertical leak location on the sidewall. Ex-tank leak detection for the leaking tanks consisted of soil radiation data from laterals and dry-wells near the tank. The in-tank and ex-tank leak detection can provide an indication of the possible leak location radially around and under the tank. Potential leak causes were determined using in-tank and ex-tank information that is not directly related to leak detection. In-tank parameters can include temperature of the supernatant and sludge, types of waste, and chemical determination by either transfer or sample analysis. Ex-tank information can be assembled from many sources including design media, construction conditions, technical specifications, and other sources. Five conditions may have contributed to SX Farm tank liner failure including: tank design, thermal shock, chemistry-corrosion, liner behavior (bulging), and construction temperature. Tank design did not apparently change from tank to tank for the SX Farm tanks; however, there could be many unknown variables present in the quality of materials and quality of construction. Several significant SX Farm tank design changes occurred from previous successful tank farm designs. Tank construction occurred in winter under cold conditions which could have affected the ductile to brittle transition temperature of the tanks. The SX Farm tanks received high temperature boiling waste from REDOX which challenged the tank design with rapid heat up and high temperatures. All eight of the leaking SX Farm tanks had relatively high rate of temperature rise. Supernatant removal with subsequent nitrate leaching was conducted in all but three of the eight leaking tanks prior to leaks being detected. It is possible that no one characteristic of the SX Farm tanks could in isolation from the others have resulted in failure. However, the application of so many stressors - heat up rate, high temperature, loss of corrosion protection, and tank design working jointly or serially resulted in their failure. Thermal shock coupled with the tank design, construction conditions, and nitrate leaching seem to be the overriding factors that can lead to tank liner failure. The distinction between leaking and sound SX Farm tanks seems to center on the waste types, thermal conditions, and nitrate leaching. (authors)

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DOE OSTI2012

Small Scale Mixing Demonstration Batch Transfer and Sampling Performance of Simulated HLW - 12307

The ability to effectively mix, sample, certify, and deliver consistent batches of High Level Waste (HLW) feed from the Hanford Double Shell Tanks (DST) to the Waste treatment Plant (WTP) has been recognized as a significant mission risk with potential to impact mission length and the quantity of HLW glass produced. At the end of 2009 DOE's Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), awarded a contract to EnergySolutions to design, fabricate and operate a demonstration platform called the Small Scale Mixing Demonstration (SSMD) to establish pre-transfer sampling capacity, and batch transfer performance data at two different scales. This data will be used to examine the baseline capacity for a tank mixed via rotational jet mixers to transfer consistent or bounding batches, and provide scale up information to predict full scale operational performance. This information will then in turn be used to define the baseline capacity of such a system to transfer and sample batches sent to WTP. The Small Scale Mixing Demonstration (SSMD) platform consists of 43'' and 120'' diameter clear acrylic test vessels, each equipped with two scaled jet mixer pump assemblies, and all supporting vessels, controls, services, and simulant make up facilities. All tank internals have been modeled including the air lift circulators (ALCs), the steam heating coil, and the radius between the wall and floor. The test vessels are set up to simulate the transfer of HLW out of a mixed tank, and collect a pre-transfer sample in a manner similar to the proposed baseline configuration. The collected material is submitted to an NQA-1 laboratory for chemical analysis. Previous work has been done to assess tank mixing performance at both scales. This work involved a combination of unique instruments to understand the three dimensional distribution of solids using a combination of Coriolis meter measurements, in situ chord length distribution measurements, and electro-resistive tomography. This current work utilized the same instruments to monitor simulated waste transfers. This paper will discuss some of the scaling compromises when it came to the scaled sampling system design, handling of large quantities of material for sampling, and present data for the discuss of likely behavior of the full scale DST based on scaling correlations using a scale ratio exponent (SRE) from 0.25 to 0.45 and the behavior observed in the SSMD platform. This does not establish a scaling factor for DST mixing using paired jet mixers but is an attempt to envelope the likely performance ranges in terms of certification sampling bias, certification sample root-mean-square-deviation, and bath to batch relative standard deviation. (authors)

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