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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

MARSAME Radiological Release Report for Weapons Facility Operations #4 Decontamination and Demolition Project: TA-14-0005, TA-15-0009, TA-15-0202, TA-15-0233, TA-36-0019

Environmental Protection and Compliance, Environmental Stewardship (EPC-ES) has identified materials associated with Weapons Facility Operations (WFO) #4 that meet the criteria for unrestricted release to the public under Department of Energy (DOE) Order 458.1, Radiation Protection for the Public and the Environment (DOE, 2020) and materials in one building that do not meet the criteria for unrestricted release and are to be treated as low level waste (LLW). These conclusions are based on the known history of the buildings combined with radiation survey data data collected in 2022 and 2023. The findings are consistent with DOE Order 458.1 and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Functional Series Document EPC-ES-FSD-004, Environmental Radiation Protection (LANL, 2021). Sampling and data analysis, as described in this report, were sufficient to meet measurement quality objectives (MQOs) under the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment (MARSAME) manual (NUREG, 2009) and LANL procedures (LANL, 2020). Final approvals for waste disposition will come from LANL’s Waste Management Program. The scope of this final release report includes Technical Area (TA) 14 Building 5 (TA-14-0005), TA-15 Buildings 9, 202, and 233 (TA-15-0009/0202/0233), and TA-36 Building 19 (TA-36-0019). MARSAME provides guidance on statistical sampling for residual radionuclides in bulk materials; smaller, miscellaneous items can be released via the release procedures outlined in LANL Policy 121 Radiation Protection (LANL, 2023).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2022

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state, and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack. The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.” As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Device Cybersecurity Characterization Process and Profile

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) recognizes that threats in the cyberspace domain continue to grow, which requires CWMD devices and supporting systems to be both cybersecure (ability to protect or defend from cyber-attacks) and resilient (ability to maintain required capability in the face of adversity) to cyber threats. The CWMD cybersecurity characterization approach in this document supports existing cyber resilience activities within the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework. Similarly, this process supports existing Department of Homeland Security Cyber Resilience Test and Evaluation activities, which consist of iterative processes, starting at the initiation of system acquisition and continuing throughout the entire device and system life cycle. Cyber resilience is the ability of an information system to continue to operate while under attack, even if in a degraded or debilitated state,1 and to rapidly recover operational capabilities for essential functions after a successful attack.2 The goal of the security characterization task for CWMD is to support the development of a CBRN device-dependent profile that aligns with device network capabilities and maps to recommended security controls to create a characterization security profile impact levels. The impact levels for CWMD devices should be characterized as Low (L), Moderate (M), High (H) to align with the low, moderate, high control baselines. To estimate the impact levels, the device’s security-related attributes are translated into the security objectives: Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A), known as the CIA triad. The potential impact for each device can be L, M, H, for devices that connect and transmit different types of data and may have different impact levels. National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 states, “the potential impact values assigned to the respective security objectives shall be the highest value from among those security categories that have been determined for each type of information resident on the information system.”3 As CWMD is determining the cybersecurity impact levels of CBRN devices based on network connections and data transfers, the impact levels are aligned with the associated attributes of network connections and communications. For example, if the device system is connected to a wireless network and transmits different data types based on the confidentiality of the data, the highest impact value for each security objective should represent the device’s CIA impact level. This document is intended to be used by test managers, test team, and program managers.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) Data Categorization Study: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Detection Device Data

Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) seeks to address critical questions related to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection devices. This research aims to enhance the security and understanding of these devices by investigating various aspects of their identification, communication, and functionality. The primary focus is on network security, malware detection, device identification, and intelligence gathering. CBRN data can be categorized in various ways depending on the purpose of CBRN detection devices and the specific context of the applications for analysis. Criteria that can be used to assist in this effort include but are not limited to data type, data protocol, source/destination, application, time, security, and content. This study will inform additional paths for data classification, data profiling, data mapping, and data modeling. This will help the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) better understand their data and make informed decisions based on the insights gained from this study and their application. The CBRN Data Categorization study will include the identification of 5–10 different CBRN detection devices with unique characteristics for assessing and analyzing the data that is being produced by and transmitted from these devices.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

DICOMs, Missiles, and Metadata: The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Program Leverages a Medical Standard

Digital Imagine and Communications in Medicine (DICOM) images, although most commonly used in medical settings, have been widely adopted by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) for capturing images of the internal components in a nuclear weapon. DICOMs, a lesser-known file format that combine nested metadata structures with complex image data-including multiple planes, frames, and high resolution-require the creation of access copies to support usability within the DOE. Used primarily for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)’s DICOM images and corresponding image metadata must be accessible to scientists and researchers via our institutional centralized databases. This paper describes the author's creation of a Python script that converts DICOM images into accessible, archive-friendly TIFF files while preserving key image data and metadata.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2020

Post-Calibration Uncertainty Analysis for Travel Times at a Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant

The Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant (NWIRP) in McGregor, Texas began manufacturing explosives in 1980 and several hazardous chemicals were discovered in lakes and streams surrounding the site in 1998. Contaminants traveled to local lakes and streams much faster than initially predicted. This research estimated contaminant travel times and identified locations where monitoring wells should be installed to yield the greatest reductions in uncertainties in travel-time predictions. To this end, groundwater and particle-tracking models for NWIRP site were built to predict hydraulic heads and contaminant travel times. Next, parameter (hydraulic conductivities) uncertainties, parameter identifiabilities, observation (hydraulic heads) worth, and predictive (contaminant travel times) uncertainties were quantified. Parameter uncertainties were reduced by up to 92%; a total of 19 of 158 parameters were at least moderately identifiable; travel-time uncertainties were reduced up to 92%. Additionally, travel-time predictions and post-calibration parameter distributions were generated using the null-space Monte Carlo (NSMC) technique. NSMC predicted that conservative tracers exited the flow system within a year, which matches with field data. Finally, an observations-worth analysis found that additional 11 more measurements would reduce travel-time uncertainties by factors from 1.04 to 4.3 over existing data if monitoring wells were installed at the suggested locations.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
NASA NTRS1974

Nuclear weapons tests and short-term effects on atmospheric ozone

Observations made when Nimbus 4 passed over a nuclear cloud about three hours after the bomb exploded are presented. Infrared and BUV measurements indicated that the atmospheric ozone level in the area of cloud was significantly less than in areas directly north and south of the cloud. It is noted, however, that it is not possible to state definitively that the ozone depletion was caused by nitrogen oxides released in the nuclear weapons test, and that further observations must be made to clarify the situation.

Miller, A. J.↗
NASA NTRS1977

Estimation of weapon-radius versus maneuverability trade-off for air-to-air combat

A chase in a horizontal plane between a pursuer with a large capture radius and a more maneuverable evading vehicle is examined with constant-speed vehicle models. An approximation to the 'sidestepping' maneuver of the Homicidal Chauffeur Game is modified to account for the effect of evader turning rate, and an estimate of capture radius required is so obtained which agrees remarkably well with Cockayne's point-capture result. The maneuver assumes central importance for barrier surfaces appearing in the Game of Two Cars. Results are given for required weapon capture-radius in terms of the maneuverability of the two vehicles. Some calculations of capture radius are presented.

Kelley, H. J.↗
NASA NTRS1980

Flying-qualities criteria for wings-level-turn maneuvering during an air-to-ground weapon delivery task

A moving-base simulator experiment conducted at Ames Research Center demonstrated that a wings-level-turn control mode improved flying qualities for air-to-ground weapons delivery compared with those of a conventional aircraft. Evaluations of criteria for dynamic response for this system have shown that pilot ratings correlate well on the basis of equivalent time constant of the initial response. Ranges of this time constant, as well as digital-system transport delays and lateral-acceleration control authorities that encompassed Level I through Level III handling qualities, were determined.

Sammonds, R. I.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Flying-qualities criteria for wings-level-turn maneuvering during an air-to-ground weapon delivery task

A moving base simulator experiment demonstrated that a wings-level-turn control mode improved flying qualities for air to ground weapon delivery compared with those of a conventionally controlled aircraft. Evaluations of criteria for dynamic response for this system have shown that pilot ratings correlate well on the basis of equivalent time constant of the initial response. Ranges of this time constant, as well as digital system transport delays and lateral acceleration control authorities that encompassed level 1 through 3 handling qualities, were determined.

Sammonds, R. I.↗
NASA NTRS1981

A low cost maritime control aircraft-ship-weapons system

It is pointed out that the long-range antiship standoff missile is emerging as the foremost threat on the seas. Delivered by high speed bombers, surface ships, and submarines, a missile attack can be mounted against selected targets from any point on the compass. An investigation is conducted regarding the configuration of a system which could most efficiently identify and destroy standoff threats before they launch their weapons. It is found that by using ships for carrying and launching missiles, and employing aircraft with a powerful radar only for search and missile directing operations, aircraft cost and weight can be greatly reduced. The employment of V/STOL aircraft in preference to other types of aircraft makes it possible to use ships of smaller size for carrying the aircraft. However, in order to obtain an all-weather operational capability for the system, ships are selected which are still big enough to display the required stability in heavy seas.

Fluk, H.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Time-optimal aircraft pursuit-evasion with a weapon envelope constraint

The optimal pursuit-evasion problem between two aircraft, including nonlinear point-mass vehicle models and a realistic weapon envelope, is analyzed. Using a linear combination of flight time and the square of the vehicle acceleration as the performance index, a closed-form solution is obtained in nonlinear feedback form. Due to its modest computational requirements, this guidance law can be used for onboard real-time implementation.

Menon, P. K. A.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS) AN/PAS-13 diffractive optics designed for producibility

The Thermal Weapon Sight (TWS) program is a manportable 3-5 micrometer forward-looking-infrared (FLIR) rifle sight. The manportable nature requires that the optics modules be lightweight, low cost and compact while maximizing performance. These objectives were met with diffractive optics. TWS promises to be the first FLIR sensor to incorporate kinoform surfaces in full scale production.

Anderson, J. Steven↗
NASA NTRS2000

Development and Application of Computational/In Vitro Toxicological Methods for Chemical Hazard Risk Reduction of New Materials for Advanced Weapon Systems

The development of quantitative structure-activity relationship (QSAR) is essential for reducing the chemical hazards of new weapon systems. The current collaboration between HEST (toxicology research and testing), MLPJ (computational chemistry) and PRS (computational chemistry, new propellant synthesis) is focusing R&D efforts on basic research goals that will rapidly transition to useful products for propellant development. Computational methods are being investigated that will assist in forecasting cellular toxicological end-points. Models developed from these chemical structure-toxicity relationships are useful for the prediction of the toxicological endpoints of new related compounds. Research is focusing on the evaluation tools to be used for the discovery of such relationships and the development of models of the mechanisms of action. Combinations of computational chemistry techniques, in vitro toxicity methods, and statistical correlations, will be employed to develop and explore potential predictive relationships; results for series of molecular systems that demonstrate the viability of this approach are reported. A number of hydrazine salts have been synthesized for evaluation. Computational chemistry methods are being used to elucidate the mechanism of action of these salts. Toxicity endpoints such as viability (LDH) and changes in enzyme activity (glutahoione peroxidase and catalase) are being experimentally measured as indicators of cellular damage. Extrapolation from computational/in vitro studies to human toxicity, is the ultimate goal. The product of this program will be a predictive tool to assist in the development of new, less toxic propellants.

Frazier, John M.↗