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NASA NTRS2015

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.

Safie, Fayssal↗
NASA NTRS2011

NASA Technology Demonstrations Missions Program Overview

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10) budget introduced a new strategic plan that placed renewed emphasis on advanced missions beyond Earth orbit. This supports NASA s 2011 strategic goal to create innovative new space technologies for our exploration, science, and economic future. As a result of this focus on undertaking many and more complex missions, NASA placed its attention on a greater investment in technology development, and this shift resulted in the establishment of the Technology Demonstrations Missions (TDM) Program. The TDM Program, within the newly formed NASA Office of the Chief Technologist, supports NASA s grand challenges by providing a steady cadence of advanced space technology demonstrations (Figure 1), allowing the infusion of flexible path capabilities for future exploration. The TDM Program's goal is to mature crosscutting capabilities to flight readiness in support of multiple future space missions, including flight test projects where demonstration is needed before the capability can transition to direct mission The TDM Program has several unique criteria that set it apart from other NASA program offices. For instance, the TDM Office matures a small number of technologies that are of benefit to multiple customers to flight technology readiness level (TRL) 6 through relevant environment testing on a 3-year development schedule. These technologies must be crosscutting, which is defined as technology with potential to benefit multiple mission directorates, other government agencies, or the aerospace industry, and they must capture significant public interest and awareness. These projects will rely heavily on industry partner collaboration, and funding is capped for all elements of the flight test demonstration including planning, hardware development, software development, launch costs, ground operations, and post-test assessments. In order to inspire collaboration across government and industry, more than 70% of the TDM funds will be competitively awarded as a result of yearly calls for proposed flight demonstrators and selected based on possible payoff to NASA, technology maturity, customer interest, cost, and technical risk reduction. This paper will give an overview of the TDM Program s mission and organization, as well as its current status in delivering advanced space technologies that will enable more flexible and robust future missions. It also will provide several examples of missions that fit within these parameters and expected outcomes.

Turner, Susan↗
NASA NTRS2019

Planetary Protection Technologies for Planetary Science Instruments, Spacecraft, and Missions: Report of the NASA Planetary Protection Technology Definition Team (PPTDT)

Planetary bodies like Mars, Europa, and Enceladus pose the question, "How to study them without contaminating them and destroying future prospects to detect life, if it is there?" The natural trade-off, of course, is that the cleaner your spacecraft, the more you can explore such a body without risk of contaminating it. As chartered by NASA Headquarters, the Planetary Protection Technology Definition Team (PPTDT) was asked to provide a report covering six different areas related to the engineering and technology challenges of implementing planetary protection requirements on solar system exploration missions, including: Assessment of technical and engineering challenges to applying available microbial-reduction methods, including recontamination prevention, to spacecraft hardware and instruments, to meet current NASA requirements on preventing the forward contamination of potentially habitable worlds by future spacecraft missions (orbiters, atmospheric missions, landers, penetrators, and drills); Identification of spacecraft and instrument materials known to be compatible with existing planetary protection protocols; Planetary protection protocols/processes available or which appear promising, and areas ripe for technological development; The technical and engineering challenges in ensuring that spacecraft hardware and instruments can meet organic cleanliness requirements needed to ensure high confidence in differentiating Earth contamination from extraterrestrial signals to avoid false negative as well as false positive results; Approaches for mitigating the identified challenges that would allow instruments to be flown successfully at the required levels of cleanliness and microbial reduction, beginning with identification of commonly used materials and spacecraft hardware that are compatible (or particularly vulnerable) to planetary protection protocols; Engineering, technology, and scientific research and development that could be funded by NASA to provide future capabilities to field scientific instruments and spacecraft on missions that require either subsystem or system-level microbial reduction and recontamination prevention.

John D. Rummel↗
NASA NTRS2004

Simultaneous measurement of multiple radiation-induced protein expression profiles using the Luminex(TM) system

Space flight results in the exposure of astronauts to a mixed field of radiation composed of energetic particles of varying energies, and biological indicators of space radiation exposure provides a better understanding of the associated long-term health risks. Current methods of biodosimetry have employed the use of cytogenetic analysis for biodosimetry, and more recently the advent of technological progression has led to advanced research in the use of genomic and proteomic expression profiling to simultaneously assess biomarkers of radiation exposure. We describe here the technical advantages of the Luminex(TM) 100 system relative to traditional methods and its potential as a tool to simultaneously profile multiple proteins induced by ionizing radiation. The development of such a bioassay would provide more relevant post-translational dynamics of stress response and will impart important implications in the advancement of space and other radiation contact monitoring. c2004 COSPAR. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

NASA Center JSC↗
NASA NTRS2010

Modeling Flight: The Role of Dynamically Scaled Free-Flight Models in Support of NASA's Aerospace Programs

The state of the art in aeronautical engineering has been continually accelerated by the development of advanced analysis and design tools. Used in the early design stages for aircraft and spacecraft, these methods have provided a fundamental understanding of physical phenomena and enabled designers to predict and analyze critical characteristics of new vehicles, including the capability to control or modify unsatisfactory behavior. For example, the relatively recent emergence and routine use of extremely powerful digital computer hardware and software has had a major impact on design capabilities and procedures. Sophisticated new airflow measurement and visualization systems permit the analyst to conduct micro- and macro-studies of properties within flow fields on and off the surfaces of models in advanced wind tunnels. Trade studies of the most efficient geometrical shapes for aircraft can be conducted with blazing speed within a broad scope of integrated technical disciplines, and the use of sophisticated piloted simulators in the vehicle development process permits the most important segment of operations the human pilot to make early assessments of the acceptability of the vehicle for its intended mission. Knowledgeable applications of these tools of the trade dramatically reduce risk and redesign, and increase the marketability and safety of new aerospace vehicles. Arguably, one of the more viable and valuable design tools since the advent of flight has been testing of subscale models. As used herein, the term "model" refers to a physical article used in experimental analyses of a larger full-scale vehicle. The reader is probably aware that many other forms of mathematical and computer-based models are also used in aerospace design; however, such topics are beyond the intended scope of this document. Model aircraft have always been a source of fascination, inspiration, and recreation for humans since the earliest days of flight. Within the scientific community, Leonardo da Vinci, George Cayley, and the Wright brothers are examples of early aviation pioneers who frequently used models during their scientific efforts to understand and develop flying machines. Progress in the technology associated with model testing in worldwide applications has firmly established model aircraft as a key element in new aerospace research and development programs. Models are now routinely used in many applications and roles, including aerodynamic data gathering in wind tunnel investigations for the analysis of full-scale aircraft designs, proof-of-concept demonstrators for radical aeronautical concepts, and problem-solving exercises for vehicles already in production. The most critical contributions of aerospace models are to provide confidence and risk reduction for new designs and to enhance the safety and efficiency of existing configurations.

Chambers, Joseph↗
NASA NTRS1993

Space radiation health research, 1991-1992

The present volume is a collection of 227 abstracts of radiation research sponsored by the NASA Space Radiation Health Program for the period 1991-1992. Each abstract has been categorized within one of three discipline areas: Physics, Biology and Risk Assessment. Topic areas within each discipline have been assigned as follows: Physics - Atomic Physics, Theory, Cosmic Ray and Astrophysics, Experimental, Environments and Environmental Models, Solar Activity and Prediction, Experiments, Radiation Transport and Shielding, Theory and Model Development, Experimental Studies, and Instrumentation. Biology - Biology, Molecular Biology, Cellular Radiation Biology, Transformation, Mutation, Lethality, Survival, DNA Damage and Repair, Tissue, Organs, and Organisms, In Vivo/In Vitro Systems, Carcinogenesis and Life Shortening, Cataractogenesis, Genetics/Developmental, Radioprotectants, Plants, and Other Effects. Risk Assessment - Risk Assessment, Radiation Health and Epidemiology, Space Flight Radiation Health Physics, Inter- and Intraspecies Extrapolation and Radiation Limits and Standards. Section I contains refereed journals; Section II contains reports/meetings. Keywords and author indices are provided. A collection of abstracts spanning the period 1986-1990 was previously issued as NASA Technical Memorandum 4270.

Jablin, M. H.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Benefits of Using a Mars Forward Strategy for Lunar Surface Systems

This paper identifies potential risk reduction, cost savings and programmatic procurement benefits of a Mars Forward Lunar Surface System architecture that provides commonality or evolutionary development paths for lunar surface system elements applicable to Mars surface systems. The objective of this paper is to identify the potential benefits for incorporating a Mars Forward development strategy into the planned Project Constellation Lunar Surface System Architecture. The benefits include cost savings, technology readiness, and design validation of systems that would be applicable to lunar and Mars surface systems. The paper presents a survey of previous lunar and Mars surface systems design concepts and provides an assessment of previous conclusions concerning those systems in light of the current Project Constellation Exploration Architectures. The operational requirements for current Project Constellation lunar and Mars surface system elements are compared and evaluated to identify the potential risk reduction strategies that build on lunar surface systems to reduce the technical and programmatic risks for Mars exploration. Risk reduction for rapidly evolving technologies is achieved through systematic evolution of technologies and components based on Moore's Law superimposed on the typical NASA systems engineering project development "V-cycle" described in NASA NPR 7120.5. Risk reduction for established or slowly evolving technologies is achieved through a process called the Mars-Ready Platform strategy in which incremental improvements lead from the initial lunar surface system components to Mars-Ready technologies. The potential programmatic benefits of the Mars Forward strategy are provided in terms of the transition from the lunar exploration campaign to the Mars exploration campaign. By utilizing a sequential combined procurement strategy for lunar and Mars exploration surface systems, the overall budget wedges for exploration systems are reduced and the costly technological development gap between the lunar and Mars programs can be eliminated. This provides a sustained level of technological competitiveness as well as maintaining a stable engineering and manufacturing capability throughout the entire duration of Project Constellation.

Mulqueen, Jack↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗
NASA NTRS1987

The space station assembly phase: Flight telerobotic servicer feasibility, volume 1

The question is addressed which was raised by the Critical Evaluation Task Force (CETF) analysis of the space station: if a Flight Telerobotic Servicer (FTS) of a given technical risk could be built for use during space station assembly, could it save significant extravehicular (EVA) resources. Key issues and trade-offs associated with using an FTS to aid in space station assembly phase tasks such as construction and servicing are identified. A methodology is presented that incorporates assessment of candidate assembly phase tasks, telerobotics performance capabilities, development costs, operational constraints (STS and proximity operations), maintenance, attached payloads, and polar platforms. A discussion of the issues is presented with focus on potential FTS roles: (1) as a research-oriented test bed to learn more about space usage of telerobotics; (2) as a research-based test bed with an experimental demonstration orientation and limited assembly and servicing applications; or (3) as an operational system to augment EVA, to aid the construction of the space station, and to reduce the programmatic (schedule) risk by increasing the flexibility of mission operations. During the course of the study, the baseline configuration was modified into Phase 1 (a station assembled in 12 flights), and Phase 2 (a station assembled over a 30 flight period) configuration.

Smith, Jeffrey H.↗
NASA NTRS2024

High Density Vertiplex - Scalable Autonomous Operations - Flight Test Report

This Technical Memorandum describes the approach taken within the High Density Vertiplex Project to perform rapid prototyping and assessment of the UAM Ecosystem including representative: Onboard Autonomous Systems, Ground Control and Fleet Management Systems, Airspace Management Systems, and Vertiport Automation Systems (VAS). Small Uncrewed Aerial Systems (sUAS) were employed as effective low risk and inexpensive surrogates for larger proposed UAM aircraft to accelerate the prototyping effort, ensure safety, greatly mitigate costs, and accelerate progress. Flight testing performed included multivehicle operations where usability Human Factors (HF) data was collected on the operators.

Jacob Schaefer↗
NASA NTRS2007

Risk Assessment of Radiation Exposure using Molecular Biodosimetry

Current cytogenetic biodosimetry methods would be difficult to adapt to spaceflight operations, because they require toxic chemicals and a substantial amount of time to perform. In addition, current biodosimetry techniques are limited to whole body doses over about 10cGy. Development of new techniques that assess radiation exposure response at the molecular level could overcome these limitations and have important implications in the advancement of biodosimetry. Recent technical advances include expression profiling at the transcript and protein level to assess multiple biomarkers of exposure, which may lead to the development of a radiation biomarker panel revealing possible fingerprints of individual radiation sensitivity. So far, many biomarkers of interest have been examined in their response to ionizing radiation, such as cytokines and members of the DNA repair pathway. New technology, such as the Luminex system can analyze many biomarkers simultaneously in one sample.

Elliott, Todd F.↗
NASA NTRS2019

90/95 POD Radiography Concern for COPVs and Metal Tank Welds

Radiographic inspections of welds in all-metal tanks and composite overwrapped pressure vessel (COPV) liners that are used to establish initial crack size in damage tolerance assessments are not as rigorous as previously understood. As a result, the 90/95 percent probability of detection (POD) requirements in S-080 1 and S-081 2 are not met when this inspection method is used. Development of new inspection methods will require about three years. During that time, additional review and assessment of the fracture margin may be needed to support waivers and provide a better understanding of weld cracking risk associated with an individual tank design.

90/95 POD Radiography Concern↗
NASA NTRS2017

Assessment of the State-of-the-Art of System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies

Since its initiation, the System-wide Safety Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project has been focused on developing multidisciplinary tools and techniques that are verified and validated to ensure prevention of loss of property and life in NextGen and enable proactive risk management through predictive methods. To this end, four technical challenges have been listed to help realize the goals of SSAT, namely (i) assurance of flight critical systems, (ii) discovery of precursors to safety incidents, (iii) assuring safe human-systems integration, and (iv) prognostic algorithm design for safety assurance. The objective of this report is to provide an extensive survey of SSAT-related research accomplishments by researchers within and outside NASA to get an understanding of what the state-of-the-art is for technologies enabling each of the four technical challenges. We hope that this report will serve as a good resource for anyone interested in gaining an understanding of the SSAT technical challenges, and also be useful in the future for project planning and resource allocation for related research.

Roychoudhury, Indranil↗
NASA NTRS2002

Regaining Lost Separation in a Piloted Simulation of Autonomous Aircraft Operations

NASA is currently investigating a new concept of operations for the National Airspace System, designed to improve capacity while maintaining or improving current levels of safety. This concept, known as Distributed Air/Ground Traffic Management (DAG-TM), allows appropriately equipped autonomous aircraft to maneuver freely for flight optimization while resolving conflicts with other traffic and staying out of special use airspace and hazardous weather. While Airborne Separation Assurance System (ASAS) tools would normally allow pilots to resolve conflicts before they become hazardous, evaluation of system performance in sudden, near-term conflicts is needed in order to determine concept feasibility. If an acceptable safety level can be demonstrated in these situations, then operations may be conducted with lower separation minimums. An experiment was conducted in NASA Langley s Air Traffic Operations Lab to address issues associated with resolving near-term conflicts and the potential use of lower separation minimums. Sixteen commercial airline pilots flew a total of 32 traffic scenarios that required them to use prototype ASAS tools to resolve close range pop-up conflicts. Required separation standards were set at either 3 or 5 NM lateral spacing, with 1000 ft vertical separation being used for both cases. Reducing the lateral separation from 5 to 3 NM did not appear to increase operational risk, as indicated by the proximity to the intruder aircraft. Pilots performed better when they followed tactical guidance cues provided by ASAS than when they didn't follow the guidance. As air-air separation concepts are evolved, further studies will consider integration issues between ASAS and existing Airborne Collision Avoidance Systems (ACAS).These types of non-normal events will require the ASAS to provide effective alerts and resolutions prior to the time that an Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS) would give a Resolution Advisory (RA). When an RA is issued, a pilot must take immediate action in order to avoid a potential near miss. The Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II currently functions as an ACAS aboard commercial aircraft. Depending on the own aircraft s altitude, TCAS only issues RA s 15-35 seconds prior to the Closest Point of Approach (CPA). Prior to an RA, DAG-TM pilots operating autonomous aircraft must rely solely on ASAS for resolution guidance. An additional area of DAG-TM concept feasibility relates to a potential reduction in separation standards. Lower separation standards are likely needed in order to improve NAS efficiency and capacity. Current separation minimums are based in large part on the capabilities of older radar systems. Safety assessments are needed to determine the feasibility of reduced separation minimums. They will give strong consideration to surveillance system performance, including accuracy, integrity, and availability. Candidate surveillance systems include Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and multi-lateration systems. Considering studies done for Reduced Vertical Separation Minimums (RVSM) operations, it is likely that flight technical errors will also be considered. In addition to a thorough evaluation of surveillance system performance, a potential decision to lower the separation standards should also take operational considerations into account. An ASAS Safety Assessment study identified improper maneuvering in response to a conflict (due to ambiguous or improper resolution commands or a pilot s failure to comply with the resolution) as a potential safety risk. If near-term conflicts with lower separation minimums were determined to be more challenging for pilots, the severity of these risks could be even greater.

Barhydt, Richard↗
NASA NTRS1999

[Component and System Level of the FASTRAC Engine]

The primary activities of Lee & Associates during the period 7/20/99 to 12/31/99 as specified in the referenced Purchase Order has been in direct support of the Advanced Space Technology Program OfFice's Core Propulsion Project. An independent review to assess the program readiness to conduct component and system level testing of the FASTRAC Engine and to proceed into Fabrication has been provided. This was accomplished through the identification of program weaknesses and potential failure areas and where applicable recommended solutions were suggested to the Program Office that would mitigate technical and program risk. The approach taken to satisfy the objectives has been for the contractor to provide a team of experts with relevant experience from past programs and a strong background of experience in the fields critical to the success of the program. The team participated in Test Planning, Test Readiness Reviews for system testing at Stennis Space Center, Anomaly Resolution Reviews, an Operations Audit, and data analysis. This approach worked well in satisfying the objectives and providing the Project Office with valuable information in real time and through monthly reports. During the month of December 1999 the primary effort involved the participation in anomaly resolution and the detailed review of the data from the final H3 and H4 test series performed on the FASTRAC engine in the b-2 Horizontal Test Facility at Stennis. The more significant findings and recommendations from this review are presented in this report.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2006

Space Station MMOD Shielding

This paper describes International Space Station (ISS) shielding for micrometeoroid orbital debris (MMOD) protection, requirements for protection, and the technical approach to meeting requirements. Current activities in MMOD protection for ISS will be described, including efforts to augment MMOD protection by adding shields on-orbit. Observed MMOD impacts on ISS elements such as radiators, modules and returned hardware will be described. Comparisons of the observed damage with predicted damage using risk assessment software will be made.

Christiansen, Eric↗
NASA NTRS2006

Development of the J-2X Engine for the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle and the Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle: Building on the Apollo Program for Lunar Return Missions

The United States (U.S.) Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to develop two new launch vehicles for sending humans to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. In January 2006, NASA streamlined its hardware development approach for replacing the Space Shuttle after it is retired in 2010. Benefits of this approach include reduced programmatic and technical risks and the potential to return to the Moon by 2020, by developing the Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) propulsion elements now, with full extensibility to future Ares V Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) lunar systems. This decision was reached after the Exploration Launch Projects Office performed a variety of risk analyses, commonality assessments, and trade studies. The Constellation Program selected the Pratt & Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine to power the Ares I Upper Stage Element and the Ares V Earth Departure Stage. This paper narrates the evolution of that decision; describes the performance capabilities expected of the J-2X design, including potential commonality challenges and opportunities between the Ares I and Ares V launch vehicles; and provides a current status of J-2X design, development, and hardware testing activities. This paper also explains how the J-2X engine effort mitigates risk by building on the Apollo Program and other lessons lived to deliver a human-rated engine that is on an aggressive development schedule, with its first demonstration flight in 2012.

Snoddy, Jim↗