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FPGA Authentication Methods.

One of the greatest challenges facing designers of equipment to be used in a nuclear arms control treaty is how to convince the other party in the treaty to trust its results and functionality. Whether the host provides equipment meant to prove treaty obligations and the inspector needs to gain that trust (commonly referred to as authentication), or the inspector provides this equipment and the host needs to gain this trust (commonly considered to be included in certification), one party generally has higher confidence in the equipment at the start of a treaty regime and the other party needs to gain that confidence prior to use. While we focus on authentication in this document—that is, the inspector gaining confidence in host-provided equipment—our conclusions will likely apply to host certification of inspector-provided equipment.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Open Radiation Monitoring: Conceptual System Design

The Open Radiation Monitoring (ORM) Project seeks to develop and demonstrate a modular radiation detection architecture designed specifically for use in arms control treaty verification (ACTV) applications that will facilitate rapid development of trusted systems to meet the needs of potential future treaties. Development of trusted systems to support potential future treaties is a complex and costly endeavor that typically results in a purpose-built system designed to perform one specific task. The majority of prior trusted system development efforts have relied on the use of commercial embedded computers or microprocessors to control the system and process the acquired data. These processors are complex, making authentication and certification of measurement systems and collected data challenging and time consuming. We believe that a modular architecture can be used to reduce more complex systems to a series of single-purpose building blocks that could be used to implement a variety of detection modalities with shared functionalities. With proper design, the functionality of individual modules can be confirmed through simple input/output testing, thereby facilitating equipment inspection and in turn building trust in the equipment by all treaty parties. Furthermore, a modular architecture can be used to control data flow within the measurement system, reducing the risk of "hidden switches" and constraining the amount of sensitive information that could potentially be inadvertently leaked. This report documents a conceptual modular system architecture that is designed to facilitate inspection in an effort to reduce overall authentication and certification burden. As of publication, this architecture remains in a conceptual phase and additional funding is required to prove out the utility of a modular architecture and test the assumptions used to rationalize the design.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Concept of Operations for Nuclear Warhead Embedded Sensors

Embedded arms-control-sensors provide a powerful new paradigm for managing compliance with future nuclear weapons treaties, where deployed warhead numbers will be reduced to 1000 or less. The CONOPS (Concept of Operations) for use with these sensors is a practical tool with which one may help define design parameters, including size, power, resolution, communications, and physical structure. How frequently must data be acquired and must a human be present? Will such data be acquired for only stored weapons or will it be required of deployed weapons as well? Will tactical weapons be subject to such monitoring or will only strategic weapons apply? Which data will be most crucial? Will OSI's be a component of embedded sensor data management or will these sensors stand alone in their data extraction processes? The problem space is massive, but can be constrained by extrapolating to a reasonable future treaty regime and examining the bounded options this scenario poses. Arms control verification sensors, embedded within the warhead case or aeroshell, must provide sufficient but not excessively detailed data, confirming that the item is a nuclear warhead and that it is a particular warhead without revealing sensitive information. Geolocation will be provided by an intermediate transceiver used to acquire the data and to forward the data to a central processing location. Past Chain-of-Custody projects have included such devices and will be primarily responsible for adding such indicators in the future. For the purposes of a treaty regime a TLI will be verified as a nuclear warhead by knowledge of (a) the presence and mass of SNM, (b) the presence of HE, and (c) the reporting of a unique tag ID. All of these parameters can be obtained via neutron correlation measurements, Raman spectroscopy, and fiber optic grating fabrication, respectively. Data from these sensors will be pushed out monthly and acquired nearly daily, providing one of several verification layers in depth, including on-site inspections, NTM, declarations, and semi-annual BCC meetings. Human intervention will not be necessary. The sheer numbers, small size, and wide distribution of warhead TLIs will mandate the added level of remote monitoring that Embedded Sensors can provide. This multilayer protection will limit the need to increase the frequency of OSIs, by adding confidence that declared TLIs remain as declared and that no undeclared items enter the regime without the other States Party's knowledge. Acceptance of Embedded arms control Sensor technologies will require joint development by all State's Parties involved. Principles of operation and robustness of technologies must be individually evaluated to sustain confidence in the strength of this system against attack. Weapons designers must be assured that these sensors will in no way impact weapon performance and operation, will not affect weapons security and safety, and will have a neutral impact upon weapon system surety. Each State's Party will need to conduct an in depth review of their weapons lifecycle to determine where moves may be reduced to minimize vulnerabilities and where random selection may be used to minimize the ability to make undeclared changes. In the end Verification is a political measure, not a technical one. If the potential users can gain sufficient confidence in the application of Embedded arms control Sensors, they could constitute the final layer of glue to hold together the next Nuclear Arms Control agreement.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Scenarios for exercising technical approaches to verified nuclear reductions

Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 committed to a continuing process of step-by-step nuclear arms reductions beyond the new START treaty that was signed April 8, 2010 and to the eventual goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, the US Nuclear Posture review released April 6, 2010 commits the US to initiate a comprehensive national research and development program to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies and the development of transparency measures. It is impossible to predict the specific directions that US-RU nuclear arms reductions will take over the 5-10 years. Additional bilateral treaties could be reached requiring effective verification as indicated by statements made by the Obama administration. There could also be transparency agreements or other initiatives (unilateral, bilateral or multilateral) that require monitoring with a standard of verification lower than formal arms control, but still needing to establish confidence to domestic, bilateral and multilateral audiences that declared actions are implemented. The US Nuclear Posture Review and other statements give some indication of the kinds of actions and declarations that may need to be confirmed in a bilateral or multilateral setting. Several new elements of the nuclear arsenals could be directly limited. For example, it is likely that both strategic and nonstrategic nuclear warheads (deployed and in storage), warhead components, and aggregate stocks of such items could be accountable under a future treaty or transparency agreement. In addition, new initiatives or agreements may require the verified dismantlement of a certain number of nuclear warheads over a specified time period. Eventually procedures for confirming the elimination of nuclear warheads, components and fissile materials from military stocks will need to be established. This paper is intended to provide useful background information for establishing a conceptual approach to a five-year technical program plan for research and development of nuclear arms reductions verification and transparency technologies and procedures.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Fieldable Nuclear Material Identification System

The Fieldable Nuclear Material Identification System (FNMIS), funded by the NA-241 Office of Dismantlement and Transparency, provides information to determine the material attributes and identity of heavily shielded nuclear objects. This information will provide future treaty participants with verifiable information required by the treaty regime. The neutron interrogation technology uses a combination of information from induced fission neutron radiation and transmitted neutron imaging information to provide high confidence that the shielded item is consistent with the host's declaration. The combination of material identification information and the shape and configuration of the item are very difficult to spoof. When used at various points in the warhead dismantlement sequence, the information complimented by tags and seals can be used to track subassembly and piece part information as the disassembly occurs. The neutron transmission imaging has been developed during the last seven years and the signature analysis over the last several decades. The FNMIS is the culmination of the effort to put the technology in a usable configuration for potential treaty verification purposes.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Field Implementation of Nuclear Safeguards: ENEA' s Capability Projection - 17174

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for Italy entered into force on May 2, 1975, in the framework of the national political position to deal with the nuclear energy only for civilian medical and industrial uses, being the country included in the NNWS (Non-Nuclear Weapon States). It is recognized that for these scopes nuclear material is produced, used, shipped and disposed, but it is at the same time known that it is not like any other material. The signature of further international treaties like the Additional Protocol to NPT led the Italian Ministry for the Economic Development (MISE) to take advantage of the public Italian Agency for Energy Environment and the Economic Development (ENEA) by means of a three years basis renewable agreement that could support the Ministry in fulfilling the clauses and obligations rising from the treaty itself and then fostering R and D in the field of the safeguards. MISE supported the procurement of a mobile laboratory able to bring sophisticated analysis instruments on the field in case of suspected environmental contamination deriving from the presence of nuclear materials. The description of this mobile laboratory and its capabilities is illustrated in this paper. (authors)

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear disarmament verification via resonant phenomena

Nuclear disarmament treaties are not sufficient in and of themselves to neutralize the existential threat of the nuclear weapons. Technologies are necessary for verifying the authenticity of the nuclear warheads undergoing dismantlement before counting them toward a treaty partner’s obligation. In this work, we present a concept that leverages isotope-specific nuclear resonance phenomena to authenticate a warhead’s fissile components by comparing them to a previously authenticated template. All information is encrypted in the physical domain in a manner that amounts to a physical zero-knowledge proof system. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the system is shown to reveal no isotopic or geometric information about the weapon, while readily detecting hoaxing attempts. This nuclear technique can dramatically increase the reach and trustworthiness of future nuclear disarmament treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Warhead verification as inverse problem: Applications of neutron spectrum unfolding from organic-scintillator measurements

Verification of future warhead-dismantlement treaties will require detection of certain warhead attributes without the disclosure of sensitive design information, and this presents an unusual measurement challenge. Neutron spectroscopy—commonly eschewed as an ill-posed inverse problem—may hold special advantages for warhead verification by virtue of its insensitivity to certain neutron-source parameters like plutonium isotopics. In this article, we investigate the usefulness of unfolded neutron spectra obtained from organic-scintillator data for verifying a particular treaty-relevant warhead attribute: the presence of high-explosive and neutron-reflecting materials. Toward this end, several improvements on current unfolding capabilities are demonstrated: deuterated detectors are shown to have superior response-matrix condition to that of standard hydrogen-base scintintillators; a novel data-discretization scheme is proposed which removes important detector nonlinearities; and a technique is described for re-parameterizing the unfolding problem in order to constrain the parameter space of solutions sought, sidestepping the inverse problem altogether. These improvements are demonstrated with trial measurements and verified using accelerator-based time-of-flight calculation of reference spectra. Then, a demonstration is presented in which the elemental compositions of low-Z neutron-attenuating materials are estimated to within 10%. These techniques could have direct application in verifying the presence of high-explosive materials in a neutron-emitting test item, as well as other for treaty verification challenges.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

The ratification and ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty have been widely regarded as noteworthy global security achievements for both the Obama Administration and the Putin (formerly Medvedev) regime. But deeper cuts that move beyond the United States and Russia to engage the P-5 and other nuclear weapons possessor states are envisioned under future arms control regimes, and are indeed required for the P-5 in accordance with their Article VI disarmament obligations in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Future verification needs will include monitoring the cessation of production of new fissile material for weapons, monitoring storage of warhead components and fissile materials and verifying dismantlement of warheads, pits, secondary stages, and other materials. A fundamental challenge to implementing a nuclear disarmament regime is the ability to thwart unauthorized material diversion throughout the dismantlement and disposition process through strong chain of custody implementation. Verifying the declared presence, or absence, of nuclear materials and weapons components throughout the dismantlement and disposition lifecycle is a critical aspect of the disarmament process. From both the diplomatic and technical perspectives, verification under these future arms control regimes will require new solutions. Since any acceptable verification technology must protect sensitive design information and attributes to prevent the release of classified or other proliferation-sensitive information, non-nuclear non-sensitive modalities may provide significant new verification tools which do not require the use of additional information barriers. Alternative verification technologies based upon electromagnetic and acoustics could potentially play an important role in fulfilling the challenging requirements of future verification regimes. For example, researchers at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) have demonstrated that low frequency electromagnetic signatures of sealed metallic containers can be used to rapidly confirm the presence of specific components on a yes/no basis without revealing classified information. PNNL researchers have also used ultrasonic measurements to obtain images of material microstructures which may be used as templates or unique identifiers of treaty-limited items. Such alternative technologies are suitable for application in various stages of weapons dismantlement and often include the advantage of an inherent information barrier due to the inability to extract classified weapon design information from the collected data. As a result, these types of technologies complement radiation-based verification methods for arms control. This article presents an overview of several alternative verification technologies that are suitable for supporting a future, broader and more intrusive arms control regime that spans the nuclear weapons disarmament lifecycle. The general capabilities and limitations of each verification modality are discussed and example technologies are presented. Potential applications are defined in the context of the nuclear material and weapons lifecycle. Example applications range from authentication (e.g., tracking and signatures within the chain of custody from downloading through weapons storage, unclassified templates and unique identification) to verification of absence and final material disposition.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

NMIS with Imaging and Gamma Ray Spectrometry for Pu, HEU, HE and Other Materials

The Nuclear Material Identification System (NMIS) has been under development at ORNL and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Y-12 National Security Complex since 1984. In the mid-1990s, what is now the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) realized that it was a useful technology for future arms control treaty applications and supported further development of the system. In 2004, fast-neutron imaging was incorporated into the system. In 2007, the ONV decided to develop a fieldable version of the system, designated as FNMIS, for potential use in future treaties. The FNMIS is being developed to be compatible with the eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier. This report addresses how and what attributes could be determined by the FNMIS system with gamma-ray spectrometry. The NMIS is a time-dependent coincidence system that incorporates tomographic imaging (including mapping of the fission sites) and gamma-ray spectrometry. It utilizes a small, lightweight (30 lb), portable deuterium-tritium (DT) neutron (14.1 MeV) generator (4 x 10 7 neutrons/second) for active interrogation and can also perform passive interrogation. A high-purity germanium (HPGe) gamma-ray detector with multichannel analysis can be utilized in conjunction with the source for active interrogation or passively. The system uses proton recoil scintillators: 32 small 2.5 x 2.5 x 10.2-cm-thick plastic scintillators for imaging and at least two 2 x 2 arrays of 27 x 27 x 10-cm-thick plastic scintillators that detect induced fission radiation. The DT generator contains an alpha detector that time and directionally tags a fan beam of some of the neutrons emitted and subdivides it into pixels. A fast (1 GHz) time correlation processor measures the time-dependent coincidence among all detectors in the system. A computer-controlled scanner moves the small detectors and the source appropriately for scanning a target object for imaging. The system is based on detection of transmitted 14.1 MeV neutrons, fission neutrons, and gamma rays from spontaneous, inherent source fission of the target, fission neutrons and gamma rays induced by the external DT source, gamma rays from natural emissions of uranium and plutonium, and induced gamma-ray emission by the interaction of the 14.1 MeV neutrons from the DT source. The NMIS can and has been used with a time-tagged californium spontaneous fission source. It has also been used with pulsed interrogation sources such as LINACs, DT, and deuterium-deuterium (DD) sources. This system is uniquely suited for detection of shielded highly enriched uranium (HEU), plutonium, and other special nuclear materials and detection of high explosives (HE) and chemical agents. The NMIS will be adapted to utilize a trusted processor that incorporates information barrier and authentication techniques using open software and then be useful in some international applications for materials whose characteristics may be classified. The proposed information barrier version of the NMIS system would consist of detectors and cables, the red (classified side) computer system, which processes the data, and the black (unclassified side) computer, which handles the computer interface. The system could use the 'IB wrapper' concept proposed by Los Alamos National Laboratory and the software integrity (digital signatures) system proposed by Sandia. Since it is based entirely on commercially available components, the entire system, including NMIS data acquisition boards, can be built with commercial off-the-shelf components. This system is being developed into a fieldable system (FNMIS) for potential arms control treaties by the ONV. The system will be modularly constructed with the RF shielded modules connected to the processor by appropriate control and signal cable in metal conduit. The FNMIS is presently being designed for eventual incorporation of gamma-ray spectrometry and an information barrier to protect classified information. The system hardware and software can be configured to obtain the following: plutonium presence, plutonium mass, Pu-240/239 ratio, plutonium geometry, plutonium metal vs non-metallic (absence of metal), time (age) since processing for plutonium (or last purification), uranium presence, uranium mass, uranium enrichment, uranium geometry, uranium metal vs non-metallic compound (absence of metal), beryllium presence and mass, tritium and deuterium gas bottle presence, HE, and chemical weapons. A matrix of the quantities determined, the method of determination, whether active (external neutron source) or passive, and the measurement equipment involved is given in the Tables 1-4. Some of these attributes can be obtained by multiple data analysis methods. The gamma-ray spectrometry methods for HEU, plutonium, and HE have been developed by other laboratories, are well known, and will be incorporated.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Investigation of CTBT OSI Radionuclide Techniques at the DILUTED WATERS Nuclear Test Site

Under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a verification regime that includes the ability to conduct an On-Site Inspection (OSI) will be established. The Treaty allows for an OSI to include many techniques, including the radionuclide techniques of gamma radiation surveying and spectrometry and environmental sampling and analysis. Such radioactivity detection techniques can provide the “smoking gun” evidence that a nuclear test has occurred through the detection and quantification of indicative recent fission products. An OSI faces restrictions in time and manpower, as dictated by the Treaty; not to mention possible logistics difficulties due to the location and climate of the suspected explosion site. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding of the possible source term an OSI will encounter and the proper techniques that will be necessary for an effective OSI regime. One of the challenges during an OSI is to locate radioactive debris that has escaped an underground nuclear explosion (UNE) and settled on the surface near and downwind of ground zero. To support the understanding and selection of sampling and survey techniques for use in an OSI, we are currently designing an experiment, the Particulate Release Experiment (PRex), to simulate a small-scale vent from an underground nuclear explosion. PRex will occur at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The project is conducted under the National Center for Nuclear Security (NCNS) funded by the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA). Prior to the release experiment, scheduled for Spring of 2013, the project scheduled a number of activities at the NNSS to prepare for the release experiment as well as to utilize the nuclear testing past of the NNSS for the development of OSI techniques for CTBT. One such activity—the focus of this report—was a survey and sampling campaign at the site of an old UNE that vented: DILUTED WATERS. Activities at DILUTED WATERS included vehicle-based survey, in situ measurements with high-purity germanium (HPGe) and hand-held LaBr 3 systems, soil sampling with a variety of tools, and laboratory gamma spectrometric analysis of those samples. A further benefit of the measurement campaign was to gain familiarity with the many logistical aspects of performing radiological field work at NNSS ahead of the PRex. Many practical lessons concerning the proper methodologies and logistics of using the surveying and sampling equipment were noted. These Lessons Learned are compiled together in Appendix A. The vehicle-based survey was successful in that it found a previously unknown hotspot (determined to be 232 Th) while it demonstrated that a better method for keeping a serpentine track without staking was needed. Some of the soil sampling equipment was found to be impractical for the application, though core sampling would not be the correct way to take soil samples for a fresh vent deposit (as opposed to an old site like DILUTED WATERS). Due to the site’s age, 137 Cs was the only fission radioisotope identified, though others were searched for. While not enough samples were taken and analyzed to definitively link the 137 Cs to DILUTED WATERS as opposed to other NNSS activities, results were consistent with the historical DILUTED WATERS plume. MDAs were compared for soil sampling and in situ measurements.

CTBT↗

Plutonium particle analysis by LG-SIMS and LA-MC-ICP-MS for environmental safeguards

During nuclear facility inspections, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors collect dust particles using cotton swipes. Analysis of these swipes is an extremely powerful tool with which to confirm treaty compliance or identify treaty violations. Through particle analysis it is possible to identify individual particles representative of nuclear activities. Uranium particle analysis is a reasonably mature technique used by IAEA and its Network of Analytical Laboratories for treaty verification. However, the IAEA has recently identified the maturation of plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium particle analysis techniques as a top priority. We propose to address this area directly by developing the new methods necessary to analyze samples containing plutonium and mixed uranium-plutonium particles. The end products of this study will be: (A) more accurate and ultra-precise isotopic characterization of plutonium -bearing particles from environmental swipe samples, and (B) development and validation of laser ablation particle analysis techniques as robust and accurate analysis methodologies for future safeguards missions.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

I55US Revalidation Manual

By means of the Antarctic Treaty, which all announced claimants have signed and ratified, no claims to territorial sovereignty shall be asserted while the Treaty is in force. The Treaty, which has been signed by 44 countries (May 2000), reserves the area south of 60 degrees south a zone for peaceful conduct of research.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Extended Deterrence in the New Security Environment

To address the challenges of the emerging security environment and its impact on extended deterrence and assurance, there has been an effort in the United States to ensure it maintains capabilities for extended deterrence, to enhance assurances and to continue to pursue with allies non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorism - including defenses and consequence management-as priorities. These and other activities are important to the US and its allies, and are essential to maintaining and strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain. As the developments leading to the ban treaty suggest, the political requirement for dealing with calls for disarmament in the NPT context is indisputable. This may not have been the understanding of the negotiators of the treaty, but it is today's reality.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The future of the NPT: REVCON and beyond

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Guidelines for Broadband Seismometer Testing

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty mandates the four verification technologies to be used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to monitor compliance to the Treaty. These technologies are seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide. Operational manuals for each of these technologies specify the requirements that equipment installed at IMS stations must meet for data from said stations to be accepted by the International Data Center. Following a model in which a revised set of infrasound sensor specifications and accompanying test procedures were developed in an international collaboration overseen by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, the same process was recently followed for seismometers potentially of use by the IMS. This document, a product of that collaboration, defines key concepts and recommends test procedures to be followed to characterize broadband seismometers in a consistent and standardized way. Results from these test procedures can be used to verify that a seismometer meets the manufacturers stated specifications and IMS requirements. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The writers of this document would like to acknowledge Charles R. Hutt, John R. Evans, Fred Followill, Robert L. Nigbor, and Erhard Wielandt, the authors of the 2009 Guidelines for Standardized Testing of Broadband Seismometers and Accelerometers funded by the U.S. Department of Interior, on which this document is based. Although this document is limited in scope to seismometers and much of the document has been updated, the structure remains essentially the same.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗