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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Testing of Crystalline Silicotitanate to Support Tank-Side Cesium Removal System Operations - 20458

The direct feed of waste from the Hanford tank farms to the Low-Activity Waste Facility at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant requires an intermediate treatment step that prepares the waste for vitrification. Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) selected a near-tank treatment system known as the Tank-Side Cesium Removal (TSCR) system to perform the required intermediate treatment functions. The approach in the TSCR system is to filter waste supernatant with a sintered metal dead-end filter and then use a series of ion exchange columns to remove cesium; this system has several similarities to the Tank Closure Cesium Removal system that has been deployed on the Savannah River Site. The ion exchange media proposed for use is crystalline silicotitanate (CST), which is a non-elutable media with a high affinity for cesium. Because the media is non-elutable, loaded columns will be blown down with compressed air, moved into interim storage, and replaced with new columns when cesium capacity is reached. The assumed extent and rate of drying that could be achieved in the TSCR column geometry lacked confirmation by experimental data. In addition, once the columns are loaded with cesium, they generate flammable gases (primarily hydrogen) via radiolysis acting on any resident liquids, i.e., moisture, remaining in the media bed. An assessment of available information on CST concluded that gas generation data that bounds expected operational conditions were needed to support the TSCR system safety basis and planned operations. Working with WRPS, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) designed and conducted testing with CST media to address the need for (a) representative in-column drying data, and (b) bounding flammable gas generation data. Drying testing was performed using a full-height column with a diameter of approximately 2 inches with injected air at temperatures of 18 deg. C and 30 deg. C. Gas generation testing was conducted in an engineered bunker that allowed simultaneous irradiation of up to eight samples at a time. These two experimental approaches used at PNNL for the CST testing are summarized and the major outcomes are presented. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

ADVANCED CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE (ACTI)

Advanced reactor technologies have attracted considerable financial support, catalyzing innovation in the nuclear energy landscape. These next generation reactors are designed with enhanced passive safety systems and the potential for cost reductions. As these advanced reactors approach technological maturity, their commercial success also requires focused examination and essential support. Economic assessments in the nuclear energy sector often emphasize construction costs and the risk of scheduling delays as primary contributors to deployment expenditures. Traditionally, vital elements of nuclear energy deployment including civil/structural engineering, design sophistication and automation have been either undervalued or postponed in the development cycles. Additionally, the nuclear industry’s collective experience in nuclear project execution has diminished over the past several decades due to the infrequency of new plant constructions. Hence, The National Reactor Innovation Center’s (NRIC) Advanced Construction Technology Initiative (ACTI) program aims to reduce cost overruns and schedule slippages that have plagued the construction of nuclear power plant projects. With this initiative, NRIC is facilitating the development of advanced nuclear plant construction technologies and approaches through partnerships that would provide game-changing benefits to the construction of advanced nuclear power plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Formal Methods for Provably Secure Software and Firmware

This project addresses a gap observed in verifying the programming in embedded devices used in international arms control: namely verifying that embedded programming in an arms control device does exactly what it is supposed to do, no more and no less, every time without fail, and without disclosing unauthorized information accidentally or intentionally. In critical military, aerospace, and industrial safety systems this problem is sometimes addressed using formal methods (FM). This multi-year project seeks to identify formal methods toolsets useable in arms control regimes, with emphasis on applicability, ease of use, long term availability, and support.

formal methods, Arms Control Verification↗
DOE OSTI2025

IOTA Pre-Bake Test Development

The IOTA (Integrable Optics Test Accelerator) Bakeout project is intended to improve the quality of the vacuum within the IOTA ring. Impurities consisting of hydrogen and oxygen that build within the beampipe are reduced through applying heat to the beampipe’s exterior. Two versions of the Bakeout project exist, one as a smaller scale test setup, and one five times larger located within the IOTA ring. During my internship, I worked together with a team to bring this project from an effectively dormant state to ready for testing, working together to create full documentation of the PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) programs, making multiple new hardware configurations of this test possible, as well as an additional safety system.

Seagrave, Kayla [DuPage Coll.; Fermilab]↗
DOE OSTI2025

Important Human Actions for Advanced Reactors: Implications for Human Factors

As advanced reactor platforms continue to develop and gain traction in the energy sector there is a need for risk-informed, scalable regulations that match that progress. This is a core component of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s proposed Part 53 Rule Making; the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act; and other efforts that seek to update nuclear power regulations. This paper covers one key aspect of that regulatory evolution: Important Human Actions (IHA). In this paper, we discuss how the understanding and definitions of IHAs have changed and what that means for human factors engagement through the process of developing these technologies. Instead of a narrow focus on control actions that led to an increase in core damage risk, the new focus is on IHAs is “wherever they occur.” What this means is that having a highly automated or passive safety system does not eliminate IHAs. Rather, it shifts the focus point to all the actions that enable these systems. Everything from maintenance, to design, to training can be considered an IHA and that dramatically shifts the efforts and level of engagement necessary for human factors to enable these technologies. We discuss the notions of risk-informed human factors that underpin these efforts, give several examples, and briefly describe the risk assessment methodologies that will be needed. In the past, IHAs were identified and then became a focus point of human factors engineering (HFE) activities to ensure a robust evaluation of the task was completed. The future is less clear. HFE for nuclear energy will need to evolve and become more integrated in technology development than ever before.

22 - GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Business Case Analysis for Digital Safety-Related Instrumentation & Control System Modernizations

This LWRS research seeks to assist in breaking the impasse which has precluded digital safety system upgrades by generating and demonstrating a process and related business case tool to enable a Business Case Analysis (BCA). The purpose of a BCA is to show such upgrades can be economically justified. This BCA methodology first systematically establishes a forecast of expected lifecycle costs for I&C identified for upgrade by: • Definitively bounding the scope of current I&C systems envisioned for upgrade. • Collecting historical labor and material usage data that bound cost contributors related to the systems to be upgraded. • Synthesizing and analyzing the data to establish lifecycle cost forecasts for the current systems. In collaboration with engineers familiar with the attributes of the digital equipment to be used in the upgrade and how it is envisioned to be applied, cost savings categories and expected savings in those categories are then identified and applied using the analysis tools developed for this purpose. The result is an estimate NPV of savings enabled by the upgrade. This includes both direct cost savings (e.g., surveillance labor costs) as well as cost avoidance items (e.g., inventory carrying costs). Finally, when utility-provided digital upgrade costs estimates are included, the resultant BCA provides an NPV for the upgrade project. Development of a useful BCA methodology requires a real-world basis. With the cooperation of Exelon Generation (“Owner”), an Exelon-owned 2-Unit BWR Station (“Station”) was used as the foundation for this research. Exelon is pursuing a digital upgrade of current, first-echelon, safety-related I&C systems at these units, including the following: • Reactor Protection System (RPS) • Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff System (N4S) • Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) • Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) Mitigation System

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Systems and methods for improved aircraft safety

Methods and system for improved aircraft safety are described herein. A machine learning model may be trained using historical flight data for a number of previously flown flights where an automation function autonomously disengaged. The trained machine learning model may be used to generate probabilistic alert rules. The probabilistic alert rules may be used by a computing device onboard an aircraft to provide contextual information to flight crew relating to engagement status for one or more automation functions of the aircraft.

Sherry, Lance↗
DOE OSTI2024

SAM: A Modern System Code for Advanced Non-LWR Safety Analysis

The System Analysis Module (SAM), developed at Argonne National Laboratory and by collaborators at other organizations, is for advanced non–light water reactor safety analysis. SAM aims to provide fast-running, modest-fidelity, whole-plant transient analysis capabilities that are essential for fast-turnaround design scoping and engineering analyses of advanced reactor concepts. To facilitate code development, SAM utilizes the MOOSE object-oriented application framework, its underlying finite element library, and linear and nonlinear solvers to leverage modern advanced software environments and numerical methods. SAM aims to solve tightly coupled physical phenomena, including fission reaction, heat transfer, fluid dynamics, and thermal-mechanical responses in advanced reactor structures, systems, and components with high accuracy and efficiency. Finally, this paper gives an overview of the SAM code development, including goals and functional requirements, physical models, current capabilities, verification and validation, software quality assurance, and examples of simulations for advanced nuclear reactor applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Safety Standards for Fuel System and Fuel Container Integrity of Alternative Fuel Vehicles

There are two Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) in place that specify requirements for integrity of the fuel system and fuel container on compressed natural gas (CNG) fuel vehicles. These are FMVSS Nos. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicles,” and FMVSS No. 304, “CNG fuel container integrity.” At this time, no FMVSS are defined for the fuel system and fuel container integrity of propane and liquefied natural gas (LNG) vehicles or fuel system integrity requirements for heavy-duty CNG vehicles on the road. However, there are voluntary industry design standards and best practices, as well as regulations defined in other countries. FMVSS No. 303 specifies requirements for the integrity of the CNG fuel system of light-duty vehicles and school buses, and FMVSS No. 304 specifies requirements for fuel container integrity on all CNG vehicles. FMVSS No. 304 applies to containers used for vehicle propulsion, whereas containers used to transport CNG and transportation of CNG containers are regulated by the DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304 are performance-based standards to consistently test and validate equipment and are not design restrictive. Despite the increasing number of natural gas and propane medium- and heavy-duty vehicles on the road, there are no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements beyond light-duty and school buses for CNG vehicles and no FMVSS fuel system integrity requirements for propane vehicles. NHTSA is researching fuel system safety for medium- and heavy-duty natural gas and propane vehicles to update FMVSS Nos. 303 and 304. NHTSA is also researching current best practices and standards for high pressure fuel tanks in motor vehicles as they may apply to FMVSS No. 304.

30 DIRECT ENERGY CONVERSION↗
DOE OSTI2025

The SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Version 5.8 Safety Analysis Code System

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a software simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced nuclear reactors. Detailed, mechanistic models of steady-state and transient thermal, hydraulic, kinetic, and mechanical phenomena are employed to describe the response of the reactor core, the reactor primary and secondary coolant loops, the reactor control and protection systems, and the balance-of-plant to accidents caused by changes in coolant flow, loss of heat rejection, or reactivity insertion. The consequences of single and double-fault accidents can be modeled, including fuel and coolant heating, fuel and cladding mechanical behavior, core reactivity feedbacks, coolant loop performance including natural circulation, and decay heat removal. Analyses are typically terminated upon demonstration of reactor and plant shutdown to permanently coolable conditions, or upon violation of design basis margins. The objective of the analysis is to quantify accident consequences as measured by the transient behavior of system performance parameters, such as fuel and cladding temperatures, reactivity, and cladding strain. Originally developed for analysis of sodium cooled reactors with oxide fuel clad by stainless steel, the models were subsequently extended and specialized to metallic fuel clad with advanced alloys and to several other coolant options, including lead, LBE, and water.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Need for a Maximum Intensity Accident in ANS 8-Series Standards

Y-12 has installed one CAAS system under the ANS 8.3 framework as a safety significant system, and is in the process of designing, installing, and qualifying another. As a safety significant system, the Y-12 CAAS is required to demonstrate that it is able to perform its function and actuate an alarm when exposed to the radiation from both a Minimum Accident of Concern and a maximum intensity accident. The ANS 8-series standards do not present a maximum accident to be considered, nor do they specify dose rate tolerance requirements, leading CAAS vendors to potentially use other standards that provide inadequate criteria. A maximum intensity accident is proposed, and the effects of this accident on CAAS analysis and the vendor’s equipment qualification are discussed

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Need for a Maximum Intensity Accident in ANS 8-Series Standards

The Y-12 National Security Complex has installed one Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) under the ANS 8.3 framework as a safety significant system, and is in the process of designing, installing, and qualifying another. As a safety significant system, the Y-12 CAAS is required to demonstrate that it is able to perform its function and actuate an alarm when exposed to the radiation from both a Minimum Accident of Concern and a maximum intensity accident. The ANS 8-series standards do not present a maximum accident to be considered, nor do they specify radiation tolerance requirements for the CAAS equipment, leading CAAS vendors to potentially use other standards that provide inadequate criteria. In this paper, the historical basis and need for a maximum intensity accident in the ANS standards is discussed, the fission rate of a maximum intensity accident is proposed, and the effects of this accident on CAAS analysis and the vendor’s equipment qualification are discussed.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗