Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Software assurance”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2004

NASA Tech Briefs, March 2004

Topics covered include: 1) Advanced Signal Conditioners for Data-Acquisition Systems; 2) Downlink Data Multiplexer; 3) Viewing ISS Data in Real Time via the Internet; 4) Autonomous Environment-Monitoring Networks; 5) Readout of DSN Monitor Data; 6) Parallel-Processing Equalizers for Multi-Gbps Communications; 7) AIN-Based Packaging for SiC High-Temperature Electronics; 8) Software for Optimizing Quality Assurance of Other Software; 9) The TechSat 21 Autonomous Sciencecraft Experiment; 10) Software for Analyzing Laminar-to-Turbulent Flow Transitions; 11) Elastomer Filled With Single-Wall Carbon Nanotubes; 12) Modifying Ship Air-Wake Vortices for Aircraft Operations; 13) Strain-Gauge Measurement of Weight of Fluid in a Tank; 14) Advanced Docking System With Magnetic Initial Capture; 15) Blade-Pitch Control for Quieting Tilt-Rotor Aircraft; 16) Solar Array Panels With Dust-Removal Capability; 17) Aligning Arrays of Lenses and Single-Mode Optical Fibers; 18) Automatic Control of Arc Process for Making Carbon Nanotubes; 19) Curved-Focal-Plane Arrays Using Deformed-Membrane Photodetectors; 20) Role of Meteorology in Flights of a Solar-Powered Airplane; 21) Model of Mixing Layer With Multicomponent Evaporating Drops; 22) Solution-Assisted Optical Contacting; 23) Improved Discrete Approximation of Laplacian of Gaussian; 24) Utilizing Expert Knowledge in Estimating Future STS Costs; 25) Study of Rapid-Regression Liquefying Hybrid Rocket Fuels; and 26) More About the Phase-Synchronized Enhancement Method.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IV&V portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IV&V projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management. The identification of particular FM architectures, visibility, and associated IV&V techniques provides a TR suite that enables greater assurance that critical software systems will adequately protect against faults and respond to adverse conditions. Additionally, the role FM has with regard to strengthened security requirements, with potential to advance overall asset protection of flight software systems, is being addressed with the development of an adverse conditions database encompassing flight software vulnerabilities. Capitalizing on the established framework, this TR suite provides assurance capability for a variety of FM architectures and varied development approaches. Research results are being disseminated across NASA, other agencies, and the software community. This paper discusses the findings and TR suite informing the FM domain in best practices for FM architectural design, visibility observations, and methods employed for IV&V and mission assurance.

Fitz, Rhonda↗
DOE OSTI2025

New developments and verification of fusion blanket simulation capabilities in the MOOSE framework

Multiphysics modeling capabilities have a crucial role to play in the accelerated deployment of fusion energy. To that end, we developed new multiphysics fusion blanket simulation capabilities in the Multiphysics Object-Oriented Simulation Environment (MOOSE). Firstly, we expanded on the existing capabilities of the previously published work, by coupling 3D tritium transport modeling capabilities using the Tritium Migration Analysis Program, version 8 (TMAP8) to an existing tool including thermal hydraulics, fully three-dimensional (3D) heat transfer, and loosely coupled neutronics analysis. Secondly, we performed a thorough verification of the new capabilities and increased testing code coverage to meet MOOSE’s software quality standards. The MOOSE framework follows a strict software quality assurance plan to be Nuclear Quality Assurance, Level 1 compliant. The new multiphysics fusion blanket simulation capabilities are now held to the same standard. Thirdly, to demonstrate MOOSE’s new fusion blanket modeling capabilities, we performed a fully integrated, multiphysics simulation of a 3D solid ceramic breeder blanket design. This proof-of-concept simulation provides the temperature and tritium distribution across the blanket. In conclusion, the combined efforts towards software quality and the development of multiphysics coupling capabilities provide an effective and reliable framework for modeling solid ceramic fusion blankets using MOOSE.

modeling and simulation↗
DOE OSTI2025

Safety Assurance Framework for Nuclear Digital Instrumentation and Control Software

Software in digital instrumentation and control (D&C) systems poses unique challenges for the safety assurance of nuclear power plants. Through a literature survey of 21 sources, we analyzed various claims, arguments, and evidence used in safety assurance cases across industries. These were organized into a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) safety assurance case framework to organize and visualize the various arguments for DI&C safety. We developed a classification for the levels of the framework, which can be used in other safety assurance cases to improve clarity.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2025

MOOSE-based Tritium Migration Analysis Program, Version 8 (TMAP8) for advanced open-source tritium transport and fuel cycle modeling

Tritium management is critical for the safety, sustainability, and economics of fusion energy systems, and advanced and reliable modeling tools help accelerate the development of tritium technologies. This paper presents the Tritium Migration Analysis Program, Version 8 (TMAP8), an open-source, MOOSE-based application developed to provide state-of-the-art tritium transport and fuel cycle modeling capabilities. TMAP8 aims to expand the capabilities of previous versions (i.e., TMAP4 and TMAP7) by leveraging modern computational techniques, ensuring high software quality assurance standards (key to building trust), and enabling multispecies, multiscale, and multiphysics simulations for integrated tritium transport modeling in complex geometries. This paper outlines TMAP8’s scope and rigorous development practices, emphasizing its transparency, accessibility, modularity, and reliability. We present the current suite of verification and validation cases based on those from TMAP4, demonstrating TMAP8’s accuracy and reliability against analytical solutions and experimental data. Additionally, the paper showcases TMAP8’s integrated fuel cycle modeling capabilities, highlighting its applicability at various scales and levels. The TMAP8 code and documentation are openly available, promoting collaborative development and widespread adoption within the fusion community. Future work will soon expand TMAP8’s verification and validation suite to include those from TMAP7 and other recent experimental studies for validation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
NASA NTRS2016

Technical Reference Suite Addressing Challenges of Providing Assurance for Fault Management Architectural Design

Research into complexities of software systems Fault Management (FM) and how architectural design decisions affect safety, preservation of assets, and maintenance of desired system functionality has coalesced into a technical reference (TR) suite that advances the provision of safety and mission assurance. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IVV) Program, with Software Assurance Research Program support, extracted FM architectures across the IVV portfolio to evaluate robustness, assess visibility for validation and test, and define software assurance methods applied to the architectures and designs. This investigation spanned IVV projects with seven different primary developers, a wide range of sizes and complexities, and encompassed Deep Space Robotic, Human Spaceflight, and Earth Orbiter mission FM architectures. The initiative continues with an expansion of the TR suite to include Launch Vehicles, adding the benefit of investigating differences intrinsic to model-based FM architectures and insight into complexities of FM within an Agile software development environment, in order to improve awareness of how nontraditional processes affect FM architectural design and system health management.

Fitz, Rhonda↗
NASA NTRS1984

NASA guidelines for assuring the adequacy and appropriateness of security safeguards in sensitive applications

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-71, transmittal Memorandum No. 1, requires that each agency establish a management control process to assure that appropriate administrative, physical and technical safeguards are incorporated into all new computer applications. In addition to security specifications, the management control process should assure that the safeguards are adequate for the application. The security activities that should be integral to the system development process are examined. The software quality assurance process to assure that adequate and appropriate controls are incorporated into sensitive applications is also examined. Security for software packages is also discussed.

Tompkins, F. G.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Agile Approach to Assuring the Safety-Critical Embedded Software for NASA's Orion Spacecraft

Human-rated missions like those in NASA's Orion Program continue to grow in complexity. The role of software in achieving ambitious mission objectives has expanded dramatically in the last few decades. Assuring the safety and performance of the embedded flight software is quickly growing beyond the reach of traditional methods and resource levels. The methods used to build these software-dominant systems evolve in an on-going attempt to keep pace with the scope of our ambitions. Agile software development is now commonplace. The long timelines and large batches of work associated with traditional methods are being replaced by rapid delivery of small increments _ as system capabilities are realized in waves. Assurance of these critical software capabilities must therefore conquer an ever-expanding frontier of challenges, and do so with an approach matched to the evolving development methods. This paper recounts the journey of the Orion Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) team as we addressed this dynamic environment. Widening our aperture to encompass a dramatically larger mission scope, while adjusting our cadence to synchronize with the rapid pace of agile software development, a new approach to IV&V is emerging. This approach is characterized by a sharper focus on mission capabilities, matched with a method to dynamically _follow the risk' as the IV&V team delivers more compelling assurance data in waves. Traditional methods prevalent in IV&V tend to scope the work using artifacts of the development process as they evolve from preliminary to final versions, and the pace of delivery was synchronized with the development timelines prevalent in the waterfall lifecycle. That more static approach is out of phase with the demands of the new environment. Scoping work according to the critical capabilities of the system (rather than artifacts of development) and synchronizing with the rapid pace of agile development, we are moving toward more effective parity with the demands of the environment. We explain the concrete steps we took, the principles that motivated our choices, and the results we have achieved to date.

Capability based assurance↗
NASA NTRS2007

NASA's Software Safety Standard

NASA relies more and more on software to control, monitor, and verify its safety critical systems, facilities and operations. Since the 1960's there has hardly been a spacecraft launched that does not have a computer on board that will provide command and control services. There have been recent incidents where software has played a role in high-profile mission failures and hazardous incidents. For example, the Mars Orbiter, Mars Polar Lander, the DART (Demonstration of Autonomous Rendezvous Technology), and MER (Mars Exploration Rover) Spirit anomalies were all caused or contributed to by software. The Mission Control Centers for the Shuttle, ISS, and unmanned programs are highly dependant on software for data displays, analysis, and mission planning. Despite this growing dependence on software control and monitoring, there has been little to no consistent application of software safety practices and methodology to NASA's projects with safety critical software. Meanwhile, academia and private industry have been stepping forward with procedures and standards for safety critical systems and software, for example Dr. Nancy Leveson's book Safeware: System Safety and Computers. The NASA Software Safety Standard, originally published in 1997, was widely ignored due to its complexity and poor organization. It also focused on concepts rather than definite procedural requirements organized around a software project lifecycle. Led by NASA Headquarters Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, the NASA Software Safety Standard has recently undergone a significant update. This new standard provides the procedures and guidelines for evaluating a project for safety criticality and then lays out the minimum project lifecycle requirements to assure the software is created, operated, and maintained in the safest possible manner. This update of the standard clearly delineates the minimum set of software safety requirements for a project without detailing the implementation for those requirements. This allows the projects leeway to meet these requirements in many forms that best suit a particular project's needs and safety risk. In other words, it tells the project what to do, not how to do it. This update also incorporated advances in the state of the practice of software safety from academia and private industry. It addresses some of the more common issues now facing software developers in the NASA environment such as the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf Software (COTS), Modified OTS (MOTS), Government OTS (GOTS), and reused software. A team from across NASA developed the update and it has had both NASA-wide internal reviews by software engineering, quality, safety, and project management. It has also had expert external review. This presentation and paper will discuss the new NASA Software Safety Standard, its organization, and key features. It will start with a brief discussion of some NASA mission failures and incidents that had software as one of their root causes. It will then give a brief overview of the NASA Software Safety Process. This will include an overview of the key personnel responsibilities and functions that must be performed for safety-critical software.

Ramsay, Christopher M.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Evidence Arguments for Using Formal Methods in Software Certification

We describe a generic approach for automatically integrating the output generated from a formal method/tool into a software safety assurance case, as an evidence argument, by (a) encoding the underlying reasoning as a safety case pattern, and (b) instantiating it using the data produced from the method/tool. We believe this approach not only improves the trustworthiness of the evidence generated from a formal method/tool, by explicitly presenting the reasoning and mechanisms underlying its genesis, but also provides a way to gauge the suitability of the evidence in the context of the wider assurance case. We illustrate our work by application to a real example-an unmanned aircraft system- where we invoke a formal code analysis tool from its autopilot software safety case, automatically transform the verification output into an evidence argument, and then integrate it into the former.

Argumentation↗
NASA NTRS1997

Knowledge-Based Aircraft Automation: Managers Guide on the use of Artificial Intelligence for Aircraft Automation and Verification and Validation Approach for a Neural-Based Flight Controller

The ultimate goal of this report was to integrate the powerful tools of artificial intelligence into the traditional process of software development. To maintain the US aerospace competitive advantage, traditional aerospace and software engineers need to more easily incorporate the technology of artificial intelligence into the advanced aerospace systems being designed today. The future goal was to transition artificial intelligence from an emerging technology to a standard technology that is considered early in the life cycle process to develop state-of-the-art aircraft automation systems. This report addressed the future goal in two ways. First, it provided a matrix that identified typical aircraft automation applications conducive to various artificial intelligence methods. The purpose of this matrix was to provide top-level guidance to managers contemplating the possible use of artificial intelligence in the development of aircraft automation. Second, the report provided a methodology to formally evaluate neural networks as part of the traditional process of software development. The matrix was developed by organizing the discipline of artificial intelligence into the following six methods: logical, object representation-based, distributed, uncertainty management, temporal and neurocomputing. Next, a study of existing aircraft automation applications that have been conducive to artificial intelligence implementation resulted in the following five categories: pilot-vehicle interface, system status and diagnosis, situation assessment, automatic flight planning, and aircraft flight control. The resulting matrix provided management guidance to understand artificial intelligence as it applied to aircraft automation. The approach taken to develop a methodology to formally evaluate neural networks as part of the software engineering life cycle was to start with the existing software quality assurance standards and to change these standards to include neural network development. The changes were to include evaluation tools that can be applied to neural networks at each phase of the software engineering life cycle. The result was a formal evaluation approach to increase the product quality of systems that use neural networks for their implementation.

Broderick, Ron↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗
NASA NTRS2023

Autonomy Verification & Validation Roadmap and Vision 2045

Advanced capabilities planned for the next generation of autonomous and increasingly autonomous air vehicles will include non-traditional components based on artificial intelligence, machine learning, and complex optimization and planning algorithms. These complex components will be used to provide enhanced safety and high-level decision-making functions. However, there are serious barriers to the deployment of autonomous aircraft in the National Airspace System (NAS). Current civil aviation certification processes are based on the concept that the correct behavior of a system or a component must be completely specified and verified prior to operation. This report from the Autonomy Verification and Validation (V&V) Roadmap and Vision 2045 project presents the most recent effort to build a comprehensive list of verification challenges and needs for autonomous aircraft, a roadmap to meet those autonomy V&V needs, the services they can enable, and point to the certification gaps they fill. To accomplish these goals, we assembled a team of world-class researchers from the aerospace industry (Boeing, Collins Aerospace, and GeneralElectric) and academia (University of Michigan, University of Texas, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology) with deep expertise in autonomy, aerospace systems, and assurance of Artificial Intelligence/machine learning systems.

Software Assurance↗
NASA NTRS2009

Connecting Research and Practice: An Experience Report on Research Infusion with SAVE

NASA systems need to be highly dependable to avoid catastrophic mission failures. This calls for rigorous engineering processes including meticulous validation and verification. However, NASA systems are often highly distributed and overwhelmingly complex, making the software portion of these systems challenging to understand, maintain, change, reuse, and test. NASA's systems are long-lived and the software maintenance process typically constitutes 60-80% of the total cost of the entire lifecycle. Thus, in addition to the technical challenges of ensuring high life-time quality of NASA's systems, the post-development phase also presents a significant financial burden. Some of NASA's software-related challenges could potentially be addressed by some of the many powerful technologies that are being developed in software research laboratories. Many of these research technologies seek to facilitate maintenance and evolution by for example architecting, designing and modeling for quality, flexibility, and reuse. Other technologies attempt to detect and remove defects and other quality issues by various forms of automated defect detection, architecture analysis, and various forms of sophisticated simulation and testing. However promising, most such research technologies nevertheless do not make the transition from the research lab to the software lab. One reason the transition from research to practice seldom occurs is that research infusion and technology transfer is difficult. For example, factors related to the technology are sometimes overshadowed by other types of factors such as reluctance to change and therefore prohibits the technology from sticking. Successful infusion might also take very long time. One famous study showed that the discrepancy between the conception of the idea and its practical use was 18 years plus or minus three. Nevertheless, infusing new technology is possible. We have found that it takes special circumstances for such research infusion to succeed: 1) there must be evidence that the technology works in the practitioner's particular domain, 2) there must be a potential for great improvements and enhanced competitive edge for the practitioner, 3) the practitioner has to have strong individual curiosity and continuous interest in trying out new technologies, 4) the practitioner has to have support on multiple levels (i.e. from the researchers, from management, from sponsors etc), and 5) to remain infused, the new technology has to be integrated into the practitioner's processes so that it becomes a natural part of the daily work. NASA IV&V's Research Infusion initiative sponsored by NASA's Office of Safety & Mission Assurance (OSMA) through the Software Assurance Research Program (SARP), strives to overcome some of the problems related to research infusion.

Lindvall, Mikael↗