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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2019

Regulatory Design for Transport Security Regulations of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material

A cornerstone within a nuclear security regime of a country is a legislative and regulatory framework that both regulates the individuals using radioactive and nuclear materials, but also regulates the regulators for their commitments under International Law. When drafting nuclear law and regulations, both technical and legal expertise is needed to ensure the regulation meets the technical requirements for security, but also is legally enforceable within a country’s jurisdiction. While the Primary Nuclear Law, or Enabling Act provides establishes the Competent Authority and responsibilities for nuclear security, regulatory development is where the proverbial, rubber meets the road for requirements. The regulations provide instruction for inspections, authorizations, and managed activities, such as use storage, and transport. Transport Security regulatory development for radioactive and nuclear material is complex because the regulation maybe multi-jurisdictional, multi-modal, and involve multiple stakeholders. Development of transport security regulations requires coordination with other ministerial stakeholders, transport operators, and alignment to international treaties and conventions outside the nuclear domain. This paper provides a brief discussion of the challenges associated with regulatory development for transport security regulations for nuclear and other radioactive materials in transport. The paper will briefly identify key stakeholders, international law involved, and current efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in supporting Member States in regulatory development. While active in that regulations are necessary for a robust nuclear security regime, regulatory development is more a slow-burn than an active activity in nuclear security.

Fialkoff, Marc↗
DOE OSTI2012

Building Science and Technology Solutions for National Problems

The nation's investment in Los Alamos has fostered scientific capabilities for national security missions. As the premier national security science laboratory, Los Alamos tackles: (1) Multidisciplinary science, technology, and engineering challenges; (2) Problems demanding unique experimental and computational facilities; and (3) Highly complex national security issues requiring fundamental breakthroughs. Our mission as a DOE national security science laboratory is to develop and apply science, technology, and engineering solutions that: (1) ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear deterrent; (2) protect against the nuclear threat; and (3) solve national security challenges.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Blockchain: Next Generation Supply Chain Security for Energy Infrastructure and NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Compliance

The U.S. power grid is a complex system of systems that requires a secure, reliable and trustworthy global supply chain. This is especially true for the grid’s increasing number of networked energy delivery system (EDS) and industrial control systems (ICS) and associated vendors, distributers, integrators and end users. Grid modernization has increased the use of “smart” energy devices that network, digitize, automate and increasingly converge the cyber-physical energy supply chain. In this Energy Internet of Things (EIoT) environment there is an increasing number of both critical cyber assets as well as data speed and size requirements, creating new cyber supply chain security and North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) CIP compliance challenges for utilities, regulators and vendors. In realization of these goals, improvements are needed in the process and technology to better monitor, audit and realize cyber security and compliance goals in complex EIoT environments. This paper explores how blockchain technology may present a disruptive solution to facilitate NERC CIP compliance and increase the security of the electricity infrastructure supply chain through a cryptographically signed distributed ledger that provides increased data provenance, attribution and auditability.

Blockchain, Cyber security, grid cyber, NERC CIP, ↗
DOE OSTI2014

Cyber security evaluation of II&C technologies

The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is a research and development program sponsored by the Department of Energy, which is conducted in close collaboration with industry to provide the technical foundations for licensing and managing the long-term, safe and economical operation of current nuclear power plants The LWRS Program serves to help the US nuclear industry adopt new technologies and engineering solutions that facilitate the continued safe operation of the plants and extension of the current operating licenses. Within the LWRS Program, the Advanced Instrumentation, Information, and Control (II&C) Systems Technologies Pathway conducts targeted research and development (R&D) to address aging and reliability concerns with the legacy instrumentation and control and related information systems of the U.S. operating light water reactor (LWR) fleet. The II&C Pathway is conducted by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). Cyber security is a common concern among nuclear utilities and other nuclear industry stakeholders regarding the digital technologies that are being developed under this program. This concern extends to the point of calling into question whether these types of technologies could ever be deployed in nuclear plants given the possibility that the information in them can be compromised and the technologies themselves can potentially be exploited to serve as attack vectors for adversaries. To this end, a cyber security evaluation has been conducted of these technologies to determine whether they constitute a threat beyond what the nuclear plants already manage within their regulatory-required cyber security programs. Specifically, the evaluation is based on NEI 08-09, which is the industry’s template for cyber security programs and evaluations, accepted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as responsive to the requirements of the nuclear power plant cyber security regulation found in 10 CFR 73.54. The evaluation was conducted by a cyber security team with expertise in nuclear utility cyber security programs and experience in conducting these evaluations. The evaluation has determined that, for the most part, cyber security will not be a limiting factor in the application of these technologies to nuclear power plant applications.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Secure Airspace Overview

The Secure Airspace goal is to develop and demonstrate capabilities, in order to provide requirements for secure data integrity, resiliency and information privacy to Urban Air Mobility (UAM) environments.

CyberSecurity↗
NASA NTRS1994

MODIS. Volume 1: MODIS level 1A software baseline requirements

This document describes the level 1A software requirements for the moderate resolution imaging spectroradiometer (MODIS) instrument. This includes internal and external requirements. Internal requirements include functional, operational, and data processing as well as performance, quality, safety, and security engineering requirements. External requirements include those imposed by data archive and distribution systems (DADS); scheduling, control, monitoring, and accounting (SCMA); product management (PM) system; MODIS log; and product generation system (PGS). Implementation constraints and requirements for adapting the software to the physical environment are also included.

Masuoka, Edward↗
DOE OSTI2013

Management of Disused Sealed Sources in Hungary - 13077

Since 1976 the spent and disused radioactive sources arisen in Hungary are stored in a central storage facility called Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility operated by Public Limited Company for Radioactive Waste Management. The Facility is responsible for the record keeping, the waste acceptance procedure, the shipment and the storage or disposal (whether a certain source meets the waste acceptance criteria for disposal or not) of sources. Based on the more than 35 year old operation of the facility many experiences have been gathered regarding the technology for long-term storage of sources, the attitude of the users of sources, the evolution of the legislation and the national record keeping system. Recently a new legislation for the security of radioactive materials (including sources) was introduced, first in Central-Europe. It requires special security arrangements from the facility for transport and for storage. Due to the ongoing retrieval of radioactive waste formerly disposed of, partly containing sealed sources, there is a new challenge in the physical inventory control of historical waste. The paper would show the effect of the changes in the legislation system of record keeping or security on the users' attitude for discard of sources and on the management of the sources in the facility. The facility has a unique storage technology (shallow boreholes) in the narrow region. The sealed sources are placed into vertical pipes sunk into the surface. In the beginning, each of the sources were dropped into the pipe directly, recently they are placed in a metal tube first ensuring the retrieval. The lessons learned will be presented. There were several issues to introduce the new security arrangements (partly financially supported by US DOE) for storage and for transportation of sealed sources. These issues are addressed. In the past part of the sealed sources were disposed together with solid radioactive waste packaged in plastic bags. A waste retrieval campaign was fulfilled in 2008 to retrieve the sealed sources. The paper demonstrates the conditions of sealed sources after twenty-year disposal period. As a summary, the paper will share the main experiences of a 35-year old facility, managing radioactive sealed sources in Central Europe. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Industry Level Feasibility of LiDAR Data into Fire Modeling Using Fire Risk Investigation in 3D (FRI3D)

Many evaluation, assessment, and modeling tasks at nuclear power plants require spatial information this often requires physical visits to locations within the facility because the 2D or 3D schematics and current models do not contain enough detail or do not capture as-built and real-world conditions. These visits require extensive manual labor for not only the requesting party, but support groups such as security. LIDAR mapping is trying to solve that problem by providing very detailed 3D models for low costs. However, the use of these models can be very limited because either component reference information is missing and too costly to add, or there is no way to extract specific spatial data needed for other tools. This report presents Idaho National Lab's work with Environmental Intellect (Ei) covering two main efforts. First, to reduce the effort of "tagging" data in large 3D models. By using both existing plant database information, and artificial intelligence (AI) to find and read equipment labels. This research explores the ability of to provide a simple way for the user to tag items and verify plant data, capturing both the speed of AI and human verification. The second part of the work is the development of an interface for importing pieces needed for Modeling & Simulation. Analysis work such as that for fire, flood, or physical security all require spatial or 3D models in various levels of detail. This interface will allow for the retrieval of item location or boundaries, enabling the auto generation of models for varying tools. The application program interface (API) of the fire risk investigation in 3D (FRI3D) was used to test feasibility of exporting the LiDAR tagged spatial information. Outcomes from this work provide preliminary data to determine if the tools and methods could provide substantial industry benefit if fully matured.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS1983

Guidelines for development of NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration) computer security training programs

The report presents guidance for the NASA Computer Security Program Manager and the NASA Center Computer Security Officials as they develop training requirements and implement computer security training programs. NASA audiences are categorized based on the computer security knowledge required to accomplish identified job functions. Training requirements, in terms of training subject areas, are presented for both computer security program management personnel and computer resource providers and users. Sources of computer security training are identified.

Tompkins, F. G.↗
DOE OSTI2015

NPP financial and regulatory risks-Importance of a balanced and comprehensive nuclear law for a newcomer country considering nuclear power programme

The nature of Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) projects are: long duration (10-15 years for new build), high capital investment, reasonable risks and highly regulated industries to meet national and international requirement on Safety, Security, Safeguards (3S) and Liabilities. It requires long term planning and commitment from siting to final disposal of waste/spent fuel. Potential financial and regulatory risks are common in massive NPP projects and will be magnified in the case of using unproven technology. If the risks are not properly managed, it can lead to high project and operation costs, and, fail to fulfil its objectives to provide compatible electricity prices and. energy security. To ensure successful, the government and investors need to ensure that the NPP project is bankable with low cost of project and funding, have fair treatment and proper risk mitigation, and able to complete on time with no cost overrun. One of the requirements as prerequisite for the development of NPP as stipulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the establishment of a Legal and Regulatory Framework. The main objective of nuclear law is to ensure that the activities and projects carried-out in the country are legal and compliant to national and international requirements. The law should also be able to provide fair treatment of risks on its activities that is acceptable to investors. The challenge for a newcomer country is to develop a balanced and comprehensive national nuclear law that meet these objectives while taking into consideration various stakeholders’ interest without compromising on safety, security, safeguard, liability requirements and other international obligations. This paper highlights the nature of NPP projects, its potential and associated financial and regulatory risks, and its major concerns and challenges. It proposes possible risks treatment and mitigation through the formulation of a balanced and comprehensive legislation by clear understanding of various requirements of public, regulators, investors, financial institutions, international community, operator and other important stakeholders. Ambiguities and uncertainties, especially with regards to certain conditions and requirements should be minimised by emulating good practices of experienced nuclear regulators. The imposition of various financial requirements such as funds for decommissioning, radioactive waste management, financial security, nuclear liabilities and licensing fees are necessary, but at the same time the quantum needs to be clearly defined. Concerns on absolute liability of the operators need to be addressed through a creation of necessary and proper nuclear insurance legislations to mitigate operator S nuclear liability obligations and other financial risks. Another major risk to investors is the possibility of public resistance which will not only can hinder the construction but can also stop operation of the nuclear power plant which will contribute to huge losses to investors and countries. This may require a provision in the legislation that provide proper compensation for these situations and at the same time to allow operators to engage in nuclear promotional activities, such as community benefit and public consultation as voluntary initiatives. Through proper planning, research, consultation and execution, the proposed nuclear law shall be able to promote good regulatory practices for public and investors’ confidence and benefit. Early involvement of various stakeholders is essential as a platform for regular communications between regulators and interested parties. Stakeholders’ participation in the NPP programme and law developments will also promote transparency of the projects while upholding the independency of the regulators.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Analysis of Design Constraints and System Impact of DER Cryptographic Module

In designing a security module for inverter communications in a DER environment, it is critical to consider the impact of the additional security on the environment as well as what types of security is required for the various messages that must pass from the inverter to and from a utility. Also, since cyber security is more than just preventing an unauthorized user from viewing data, mechanisms for proving identity and ensuring that data cannot be altered without such a modification being discovered are needed. This is where the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability come into play. For different types of communications, these different security principles may be important or not needed at all. Furthermore, the cost and constraints for applying cryptography for securing DER communications must be considered to help determine what is feasible within this environment and what will be the impact and cost of applying common cryptographic protections to inverter communications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Analysis of Design Constraints and System Impact of DER Cryptographic Module

In designing a security module for inverter communications in a DER environment, it is critical to consider the impact of the additional security on the environment as well as what types of security is required for the various messages that must pass from the inverter to and from a utility. Also, since cyber security is more than just preventing an unauthorized user from viewing data, mechanisms for proving identity and ensuring that data cannot be altered without such a modification being discovered are needed. This is where the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability come into play. For different types of communications, these different security principles may be important or not needed at all. Furthermore, the cost and constraints for applying cryptography for securing DER communications must be considered to help determine what is feasible within this environment and what will be the impact and cost of applying common cryptographic protections to inverter communications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2012

OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2015

Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Using Cybernomic Computational Models: Tailored for Industrial Control Systems

There are many influencing economic factors to weigh from the defender-practitioner stakeholder point-of-view that involve cost combined with development/deployment models. Some examples include the cost of countermeasures themselves, the cost of training and the cost of maintenance. Meanwhile, we must better anticipate the total cost from a compromise. The return on investment in countermeasures is essentially impact costs (i.e., the costs from violating availability, integrity and confidentiality / privacy requirements). The natural question arises about choosing the main risks that must be mitigated/controlled and monitored in deciding where to focus security investments. To answer this question, we have investigated the cost/benefits to the attacker/defender to better estimate risk exposure. In doing so, it s important to develop a sound basis for estimating the factors that derive risk exposure, such as likelihood that a threat will emerge and whether it will be thwarted. This impact assessment framework can provide key information for ranking cybersecurity threats and managing risk.

Algorithms↗