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At least 163 records · Page 9

Verification and Validation of the PLTEMP/ANL Code for Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis of Experimental and Test Reactors, Volume 2

This is Volume 2 of a two-volume document that collects the verification and validation (V&V) works done for the PLTEMP/ANL code during the years of its development and improvement. Volume 1 describes the V&V of sixteen capabilities of the PLTEMP/ANL code that were identified by research reactor analysts as frequently used in their thermal-hydraulic analysis. Volume 2 describes the V&V of developments and improvements since the release of PLTEMP/ANL Version 4.3. Each chapter of the document focuses on verifying or validating a specific part of the software that calculates a particular phenomenon, e.g., channel flow calculation, coolant property calculation, heat transfer calculation, and flow instability calculation. Software verification is performed by comparing the code with a hand calculation, Microsoft spreadsheet calculation, Mathematica calculation, or MATLAB calculation. The software validation is achieved by comparing the code with experimental data or a widely tested code like the RELAP5 code. In addition, some PLTEMP/ANL V&V works that are available in the open literature are simply referenced in Volume 1 of the document. PLTEMP/ANL has been used in safety analysis reports of several US and foreign research reactors licensed and converted from highly enriched uranium fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. A list of such reactors is given in Volume 1 of the document.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

CNS 10-160B RH Cask Program Guidance (Rev. 2)

The purpose of this document is to provide guidelines and to define responsibilities for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of the 10-160B cask and directly related components used for shipments of DOE controlled TRU waste. This document complies with the minimum requirements specified in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for Model 10-160B Type B Radwaste Shipping Cask and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) 9204. In the event of a conflict between this document and the SAR or C of C, the C of C shall govern.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Manned space flight nuclear system safety. Volume 3: Reactor system preliminary nuclear safety analysis. Part 2: Accident Model Document (AMD)

The Accident Model Document is one of three documents of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) - Reactor System as applied to a Space Base Program. Potential terrestrial nuclear hazards involving the zirconium hydride reactor-Brayton power module are identified for all phases of the Space Base program. The accidents/events that give rise to the hazards are defined and abort sequence trees are developed to determine the sequence of events leading to the hazard and the associated probabilities of occurence. Source terms are calculated to determine the magnitude of the hazards. The above data is used in the mission accident analysis to determine the most probable and significant accidents/events in each mission phase. The only significant hazards during the prelaunch and launch ascent phases of the mission are those which arise form criticality accidents. Fission product inventories during this time period were found to be very low due to very limited low power acceptance testing.

Source record↗

Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Ulysses Mission (Tier 2)

This Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) addresses the environmental impacts which may be caused by the preparation and operation of the Ulysses spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The launch configuration will use the STS/Inertial Upper Stage (IUS)/Payload Assist Module-Special(PAM-S) combination. The Tier 1 EIS included a delay alternative which considered the Titan 4 launch vehicle as an alternative booster stage for launch in 1991 or later. However, the U.S. Air Force, which procures the Titan 4 for NASA, could not provide a Titan 4 vehicle for the 1991 launch opportunity because of high priority Department of Defense requirements. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal Shuttle launch operations. These impacts are limited largely to the near-field at the launch pad, except for temporary stratospheric ozone effects during launch and occasional sonic boom effects near the landing site. These effects have been judged insufficient to preclude Shuttle launches. In the event of (1) an accident during launch, or (2) reentry of the spacecraft from earth orbit, there are potential adverse health and environmental effects associated with the possible release of plutonium dioxide from the spacecraft's radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG). The potential effects considered in this EIS include risks of air and water quality impacts, local land area contamination, adverse health and safety impacts, the disturbance of biotic resources, impacts on wetland areas or areas containing historical sites, and socioeconomic impacts. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the proposed action are underway and preliminary results indicate small health or environmental risks. The results of a Final Safety Analysis Report will be available for inclusion into the final EIS.

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Update to the safety program for the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators for the Galileo and Ulysses missions

With the rescheduling of the Galileo and Ulysses launches and the use of new upper stages following the Challenger accident, the aerospace nuclear safety program for the general-purpose heat source radioisotope thermoelectric generators (GPHS-RTGs) was extended to accommodate the new mission scenarios. As in the original safety program, the objectives were to determine the response of the GPHS-RTG to the various postulated accident environments and to determine the risk (if any) associated with these postulated accidents. The extended GPHS-RTG safety program was successfully completed in sufficient time to prepare an updated Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) with revisions for the October 1989 launch of the Galileo spacecraft.

Bennett, Gary L.↗

RECERTIFICATION OF THE MODEL 9977 RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL PACKAGING

The Model 9977 Packaging was initially issued a Certificate of Compliance (CoC) by the Department of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management (DOE-EM) for the transportation of radioactive material (RAM) in the Fall of 2007. This first CoC was for a single radioactive material and two packing configurations. In the five years since that time, seven Addendums have been written to the Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and five Letter Amendments have been written that have authorized either new RAM contents or packing configurations, or both. This paper will discuss the process of updating the 9977 SARP to include all the contents and configurations, including the addition of a new content, and its submittal for recertification.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Aging Behavior of the Viton® Fluoroelastomer O-Rings in the 9975 Shipping Package

The 9975 Type B shipping package is used within the DOE complex for shipping special nuclear materials. This package is re-certified annually in accordance with Safety Analysis Report requirements. The package is also used at the Savannah River Site as part of the long-term storage configuration of special nuclear materials. As such, the packages do not undergo annual recertification during storage, with uncertainty as to how long some of the package components will meet their functional requirements in the storage environment. The packages are currently approved for up to 15 years storage, and work continues to provide a technical basis to extend that period. This paper describes efforts by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to extend the service life estimate of Viton® GLT and GLT-S fluoroelastomer O-rings used in the 9975 shipping package. O-rings of both compositions are undergoing accelerated aging at elevated temperature, and are periodically tested for compression stress relaxation (CSR) behavior and leak performance. The CSR behavior of O-rings was evaluated at temperatures from 79 °C to 177 °C. These collective data were used to develop predictive models for extrapolation of CSR behavior to relevant service temperatures (< 75 °C). O-rings were also aged in Primary Containment Vessel (PCV) fixtures at temperatures ranging from 79 °C to 232 °C. The fixtures are helium leak tested periodically to determine if they remain leak-tight. The PCV fixture tests demonstrate that the 9975 O-rings will remain leak-tight at temperatures up to 149 °C for 3 years or more, and no leak failures have been observed with up to 8 years aging at 93 °C. Significantly longer periods of leak-tight service are expected at the lower temperatures actually experienced in the storage environment. The predictive model developed from the CSR data conservatively indicates a service life of more than 20 years at the bounding temperature of 75 °C. Although the relationship between CSR behavior and leak-tight performance has not been established for this design, the CSR predictions for this O-ring are conservative relative to leak-tight performance to date.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Disposition of Chicago Pile 5 (CP-5) Converter Tubes in the 10-160B Cask

This paper will focus on the unique characterization, packaging, and transportation issues associated with the disposition of the two CP-5 Converter Tube assemblies from Argonne National Laboratory. The converter tubes were constructed of combinations of HEU and alloys of zirconium, and were part of the original research facilities attached to the CP-5 reactor during operating evolutions. These assemblies were heavily irradiated during their operational lifetime, and were segregated from the balance of irradiated test specimens when the reactor was deactivated and slated for Decontamination and Demolition (D&D). In addition, the substantial contribution of fissile material to the assemblies’ inventory made the potential disposition pathways extremely challenging. As a result, these items became part of Argonne’s legacy “nuclear footprint”, and were added to the Nuclear Footprint Reduction Project scope for disposition. The Project was responsible for the size reduction and characterization of these items, as well as the ultimate disposition. After negotiating a disposal pathway for these tubes, there were significant transportation issues that required a small team to overcome, in order to successfully ship these items to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Project team at Argonne, technical support from transportation specialists, licensing support from the 10-160B license owner, the Savanah River National Lab (SRNL) Packaging Certification Team (PCT, and the DOE EM-33 staff contributed to license and safety analysis report amendments that eventually authorized the shipment of the material. The paper will identify the organizations, and the specific actions, required to successfully make three “one of a kind” shipments of irradiated test specimen material. This will include the unique packaging configurations, contents modification for the cask license (via the Amendment process), criticality evaluations, and associated review and approval processes.

CP-5↗

Disposition of Chicago Pile 5 (CP-5) Converter Tubes in the 10-160B Cask - 16632

This paper will focus on the unique characterization, packaging, and transportation issues associated with the disposition of the two CP-5 Converter Tube assemblies from Argonne National Laboratory. The converter tubes were constructed of combinations of HEU and alloys of zirconium, and were part of the original research facilities attached to the CP-5 reactor during operating evolutions. These assemblies were heavily irradiated during their operational lifetime, and were segregated from the balance of irradiated test specimens when the reactor was deactivated and slated for Decontamination and Demolition (D and D). In addition, the substantial contribution of fissile material to the assemblies' inventory made the potential disposition pathways extremely challenging. As a result, these items became part of Argonne's legacy 'nuclear footprint', and were added to the Nuclear Footprint Reduction Project scope for disposition. The Project was responsible for the size reduction and characterization of these items, as well as the ultimate disposition. After negotiating a disposal pathway for these tubes, there were significant transportation issues that required a small team to overcome, in order to successfully ship these items to the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Project team at Argonne, technical support from transportation specialists, licensing support from the 10-160B license owner, the Savannah River National Lab (SRNL) Packaging Certification Team (PCT, and the DOE EM-33 staff contributed to license and safety analysis report amendments that eventually authorized the shipment of the material. The paper will identify the organizations, and the specific actions, required to successfully make three 'one of a kind' shipments of irradiated test specimen material. This will include the unique packaging configurations, contents modification for the cask license (via the Amendment process), criticality evaluations, and associated review and approval processes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Approach to nuclear criticality in IAN-R1 research reactor

The Republic of Colombia is operating a small 100 kW(t) research reactor. The reactor was provided to Colombia under the U.S. Atoms for Peace Program, and which was fueled with MTR HEU fuel enriched nominally to 93% U{sup 235}. With the cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA, it was prepared a new safety analysis report for performing an HEU to LEU conversion of the IAN-R1 reactor and manufacture TRIGA type LEU (19.7%, enriched) fuel to replace the original MTR-HEU fuel plate assemblies. This paper describes the activities which were achieved during the approach to nuclear criticality. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Packaging and Transportation of Additional Neptunium Oxide

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a second neptunium oxide production campaign in which nine (9) additional cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. These additional cans were from a different feed solution than the first fifty (50) cans of neptunium oxide that were previously produced and shipped via a Letter of Amendment to the 9975 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) content table. This paper will address the challenges associated with demonstrating the neptunium oxide produced from the additional feed solution was equivalent to the original neptunium oxide and within the content description of the Letter of Amendment.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated With the Technical Challenges of the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology Project

This analysis was conducted to support the Vehicle Systems Safety Technology (VSST) Project of the Aviation Safety Program (AVsP) milestone VSST4.2.1.01, "Identification of VSST-Related Trends." In particular, this is a review of incident data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). The following three VSST-related technical challenges (TCs) were the focus of the incidents searched in the ASRS database: (1) Vechicle health assurance, (2) Effective crew-system interactions and decisions in all conditions; and (3) Aircraft loss of control prevention, mitigation, and recovery.

Withrow, Colleen A.↗

REFSafE: A RAG-Enabled Framework for Predictive Risk Analysis and Automated Safety Report Generation in Mission-Critical Environments

Operational safety in mission-critical environments requires AI systems that are accurate, interpretable, and resistant to hallucination. We present an agentic Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) framework, REFSafe, for grounded hazard analysis and automated safety report generation. The system integrates Large Language Models (LLMs) with structured operational data, historical incident repositories, policy documents, and external authoritative sources. Through iterative agentic reasoning, the framework retrieves, verifies, and synthesizes evidence prior to generation, enforcing citation-backed outputs with explicit source attribution (documents, links, and prior events) to ensure traceability and trust. To mitigate hallucinations and unsupported claims, all risk assessments and forecasts are constrained to retrieved evidence, with confidence signals derived from retrieval relevance and source consistency. A transparent pipeline enables subject matter experts (SMEs) to validate predictions, and provide structured feedback, forming a continuous performance calibration loop. Preliminary deployment demonstrates improved reliability in hazard detection and safety/vulnerability report generation. This work advances trustworthy, evidence-grounded AI for predictive safety intelligence in mission-critical operations.

Das, Sanjay [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000542591915)↗

Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated with the Technical Challenges of the System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies Project

The Aviation Safety Program (AvSP) System-Wide Safety and Assurance Technologies (SSAT) Project asked the AvSP Systems and Portfolio Analysis Team to identify SSAT-related trends. SSAT had four technical challenges: advance safety assurance to enable deployment of NextGen systems; automated discovery of precursors to aviation safety incidents; increasing safety of human-automation interaction by incorporating human performance, and prognostic algorithm design for safety assurance. This report reviews incident data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) for system-component-failure- or-malfunction- (SCFM-) related and human-factor-related incidents for commercial or cargo air carriers (Part 121), commuter airlines (Part 135), and general aviation (Part 91). The data was analyzed by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) part, phase of flight, SCFM category, human factor category, and a variety of anomalies and results. There were 38 894 SCFM-related incidents and 83 478 human-factorrelated incidents analyzed between January 1993 and April 2011.

Withrow, Colleen A.↗

CIAE-ANL CRADA for SFR SAFETY ANALYSIS: Final CRADA Report

The purpose of this project is joint verification and validation of system analysis code capabilities for Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor (SFR) design and licensing. As the researchers and code developers at the Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) and China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) independently build their own SFR system analysis capabilities, this collaboration facilitated exchange of information on, and evaluation of alternative approaches for, modeling the key phenomena (such as decay heat removal and natural circulation) and the safety-related components (such as pumps, heat exchangers, and outlet plenum) common in SFR systems. The analysis at ANL and CIAE also applied their respective computational capabilities and methods (in SAS4A/SASSYS-1 computer code at ANL and FR-Sdaso computer code at CIAE) on jointly identified benchmark problems for verification, and publicly available integral tests for validation, of their results. ANL team also shared the expertise on the established software quality assurance practices and the techniques for component reliability estimates to support probabilistic risk assessments.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Analysis of Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Data Associated with the Technical Challenges of the Atmospheric Environment Safety Technology Project

This study analyzed aircraft incidents in the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) that apply to two of the three technical challenges (TCs) in NASA's Aviation Safety Program's Atmospheric Environment Safety Technology Project. The aircraft incidents are related to airframe icing and atmospheric hazards TCs. The study reviewed incidents that listed their primary problem as weather or environment-nonweather between 1994 and 2011 for aircraft defined by Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) Parts 121, 135, and 91. The study investigated the phases of flight, a variety of anomalies, flight conditions, and incidents by FAR part, along with other categories. The first part of the analysis focused on airframe-icing-related incidents and found 275 incidents out of 3526 weather-related incidents over the 18-yr period. The second portion of the study focused on atmospheric hazards and found 4647 incidents over the same time period. Atmospheric hazards-related incidents included a range of conditions from clear air turbulence and wake vortex, to controlled flight toward terrain, ground encounters, and incursions.

Withrow, Colleen A.↗

Criticality Safety Analysis for NuCycle (Final CRADA Report)

A series of criticality safety analyses was performed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory to assess the CURIO NuCycle process based on information provided in late 2023 and early 2024. Each of the segments of the NuCycle process is considered separately, although some interface considerations are necessary. A separate detailed final report that includes proprietary analysis details has been provided to Curio; this report provides a high-level summary to document the closure of this cooperative research and development agreement (CRADA), identified as NFE-23-09571.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗