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At least 163 records · Page 9

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DOE OSTI2018

Material Stream Strategy for Lithium and Inorganics (U)

Design Agency Responsibilities: Manufacturing Support to meet Stockpile Stewardship goals for maintaining the nuclear stockpile through experimental and predictive modeling capability. Development and maintenance of Manufacturing Science expertise to assess material specifications and performance boundaries, and their relationship to processing parameters. Production Engineering Evaluations with competence in design requirements, material specifications, and manufacturing controls. Maintenance and enhancement of Aging Science expertise to support Stockpile Stewardship predictive science capability.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2018

Pre-Event Recovery Sampling and Analysis Framework for Blue Grass CSEPP Community

Congress created the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP) in 1985 (U.S. Department of Defense [DOD] Authorization Act, 1986, Public Law 99-145) to provide emergency preparedness assistance and resources to communities surrounding Army chemical warfare agent stockpiles. CSEPP is a partnership between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the U.S. Department of the Army (Army), and includes elements of the federal, state, and local government at each of the stockpile sites.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗

DOE OSTI2022

HEMM Workshop EMRTC [Slides]

Los Alamos is responsible for the NATO deterrent, is critical to the UK at-sea deterrent, and has designed over 90% of the current US stockpile. Los Alamos MUST lead the stockpile into the next phase of nuclear deterrence. To succeed, we need to leverage across several funding sources and sites to both answer the tactical needs of the current stockpile and to develop capabilities and personnel to meet future challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2022

Associate Laboratory Directorate for Weapon Physics (ALDX) [Slides]

ALDX is one of seven technical Directorates at the Laboratory and resides within the Weapons Program. The Weapons Physics Directorate stewards a number of critical capabilities to meet its mission. Our mission is to sustain the resilience of the US nuclear stockpile and help shape a globalized nuclear world. Sustaining the aging stockpile poses scientific challenges to assess and certify the stockpile without testing. We are helping to solve major technical challenges in the nuclear global security regime. Geopolitical realities demand the Laboratory’s excellence in providing solutions to national security problems. High Performance Computing at Los Alamos opens the doors to many sophisticated modeling techniques. We use many experimental facilities to probe weapons physics. The diverse skill set required to execute ALDX’s mission has benefited greatly from the Postdoc program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2024

Surveillance Workload Divinator (SWORD)

The LANL Surveillance Workload Divinator (SWORD) is a high-level decision support tool that reproduces and predicts the annual values for stockpile and production disassembly and inspections (D&I) and rebuilds. SWORD, a spreadsheet-based tool, can be used to assess the surveillance workload under various planning scenarios. Results are shown graphically and updated dynamically for each weapon system or for the entire stockpile. Surveillance workload is calculated from stockpile surveillance guidance1 and from Production and Planning Directive (P&PD) data.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2025

From Stewardship to Transformation: Toward a Nuclear Enterprise for the 21st Century

The erosion of the global security environment over the last two decades has been rapid and dramatic. It appears also to be accelerating. There are deep and widening concerns in the United States and among its allies and partners that deterrence too has eroded at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The Strategic Posture Commission captured the essence of the problem in its October 2023 report—the United States seeks to meet the challenges of complex multipolar nuclear rivalry in the 21 st century with a slimmed down version of a nuclear deterrent designed in the middle of the 20 th century. With great urgency, the Commission recommended that something more and/or different is needed than simply the replacement of legacy systems with modern variants. But the U.S. nuclear security enterprise was reshaped after the Cold War to support the stockpile stewardship mission—not renewed designed, engineering, and production at scale. It has long fallen short of the agility, flexibility, and adaptiveness periodically asked of it by national leaders. In recent years, however, the message of urgency has been clearly received in the enterprise. Its culture has begun to shift. It has also been received by those in Washington D.C. responsible for funding and guiding the enterprise. The result is an enterprise in transition. Stockpile stewardship has given way to stockpile transformation. Risk aversion is giving way to risk management. Innovation and adaptation have been embraced. Experience to date has yielded some important lessons about what works and what doesn’t in terms of accelerating and delivering the needed innovation and adaptation. It has revealed the enduring character of some challenges. But it has also revealed that a much more agile and effective enterprise is within the national reach—something that will pay important dividends for deterrence, assurance, strategic stability, and peace.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2014

Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Achieving nuclear disarmament, stopping nuclear proliferation, and preventing nuclear terrorism are among the most critical challenges facing the world today. Unmaking the Bomb proposes a new approach to reaching these long-held goals. Rather than considering them as separate issues, the authors—physicists and experts on nuclear security—argue that all three of these goals can be understood and realized together if we focus on the production, stockpiling, and disposal of plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the fissile materials that are the key ingredients used to make nuclear weapons. The authors describe the history, production, national stockpiles, and current military and civilian uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and propose policies aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating these fissile materials worldwide. These include an end to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, an end to their use as reactor fuels, and the verified elimination of all national stockpiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2024

Laboratory for Laser Energetics Targets Inertial Confinement Fusion

The University of Rochester’s Laboratory for Laser Energetics is targeting laser-driven inertial confinement fusion, as part of National Nuclear Security Administration’s Stockpile Stewardship Program and in the quest for clean sources of energy. The Laboratory for Laser Energetics (LLE) is home to two extremely powerful lasers—OMEGA and OMEGA EP—and researchers are using them to explore laser-driven inertial confinement fusion (ICF). ICF involves compressing a small amount of fuel consisting of hydrogen isotopes, deuterium (D), and tritium (T), and heating it to temperatures greater than the center of stars. “When these conditions are reached, the fuel undergoes fusion—releasing enormous energy that can be used for research relevant to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) and to drive carbon-free power plants,” explains Valeri Goncharov, distinguished scientist and director of the Theory Division at LLE. LLE was established at the University of Rochester in 1970 and is the largest U.S. Department of Energy university-based research program in the nation, supported by the National Nuclear Security Administration as part of its Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). “As a center for exploring the interaction of intense radiation with matter, LLE is a unique national resource for research and education in science and technology,” says Goncharov. “Our current research includes exploring fusion for the SSP program and as a future source of energy, developing new laser and materials technologies, and pursuing a better understanding of high-energy-density phenomena.”

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2014

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the relationship

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the most important international security arrangement that we have that is protecting the world community and this has been true for many years. But it did not happen by accident, it is a strategic bargain in which 184 states gave up the right forever to acquire the most powerful weapon ever created in exchange for a commitment from the five states allowed to keep nuclear weapons under the NPT (U.S., U.K., Russia, France and China), to share peaceful nuclear technology and to engage in disarmament negotiations aimed at the ultimate elimination of their nuclear stockpiles. The most important part of this is the comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTBT); the thinking by the 184 NPT non-nuclear weapon states was and is that they understand that the elimination of nuclear weapon stockpiles is a long way off, but at least the NPT nuclear weapon states could stop testing the weapons. The CTBT has been ratified by 161 states but by its terms it can only come into force if 44 nuclear potential states ratify; 36 have of the 44 have ratified it, the remaining eight include the United States and seven others, most of whom are in effect waiting for the United States. No state has tested a nuclear weapon-except for complete outlier North Korea-in 15 years. There appears to be no chance that the U.S. Senate will approve the CTBT for ratification in the foreseeable future, but the NPT may not survive without it. Perhaps it is time to consider an interim measure, for the UN Security Council to declare that any future nuclear weapon test any time, anywhere is a 'threat to peace and security', in effect a violation of international law, which in today's world it clearly would be.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2011

Towards Reliable Cross Sections for National Security Applications

Stockpile stewardship requires the description of weapons performance without resorting to underground nuclear testing. In the earlier tests, selected isotopes were used as detectors, and recovered after irradiation. Aspects of nuclear device performance were inferred by comparing the measured isotopic ratios to those predicted from simulations. The reaction flows that produce the final isotopic distributions proceed through regions of the nuclear chart that include unstable nuclei. Presently, improved nuclear data input is required to reanalyze prior tests and to certify the stockpile's reliability and safety. Many important cross sections are unknown, as is shown in the example of the Yttrium reaction network (Figure 1). The relevant reactions include (n,2n), (n,n'), (n,gamma), (n,p) and other charged-particle emitting reactions. The cross sections have to be calculated or inferred from indirect measurements. In both cases, reliable optical models that are valid a few nucleons away from stability are needed. The UNEDF Nuclear Reaction activities address this need by combining nuclear-structure input from UNEDF structure calculations with modern reaction theory and large-scale computational capabilities to develop microscopic nucleon-nucleus optical potentials that can be extrapolated to unstable nuclei. In addition, the reaction calculation tools and optical models developed in this context are proving valuable for planning and interpreting indirect (surrogate) measurements of the required cross sections.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

DOE OSTI2011

Surveillance metrics sensitivity study.

In September of 2009, a Tri-Lab team was formed to develop a set of metrics relating to the NNSA nuclear weapon surveillance program. The purpose of the metrics was to develop a more quantitative and/or qualitative metric(s) describing the results of realized or non-realized surveillance activities on our confidence in reporting reliability and assessing the stockpile. As a part of this effort, a statistical sub-team investigated various techniques and developed a complementary set of statistical metrics that could serve as a foundation for characterizing aspects of meeting the surveillance program objectives. The metrics are a combination of tolerance limit calculations and power calculations, intending to answer level-of-confidence type questions with respect to the ability to detect certain undesirable behaviors (catastrophic defects, margin insufficiency defects, and deviations from a model). Note that the metrics are not intended to gauge product performance but instead the adequacy of surveillance. This report gives a short description of four metrics types that were explored and the results of a sensitivity study conducted to investigate their behavior for various inputs. The results of the sensitivity study can be used to set the risk parameters that specify the level of stockpile problem that the surveillance program should be addressing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2011

Surveillance Metrics Sensitivity Study

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2010

Chemistry Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Public Meeting, October 6, 2010

The Chemistry Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project seeks to relocate and consolidate mission-critical CMR capabilities at LANL to ensure continuous support of NNSA stockpile stewardship and management strategic objectives; these capabilities are necessary to support the current and directed stockpile work and campaign activities at LANL beyond 2010.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2010

Quality assurance and reliability sub-committee W88-0/Mk5 weapon assessment NSA lab test results (u)

The purpose of this report is to gather appropriate level of relevant stockpile surveillance data to assess trends in the NEP quality, reliability, performance, and safety over the life of the system. The objectives are to gather relevant stockpile data to assess NEP quality and trends and to develop metrics to assess the suitability of the surveillance sampling regime to meet assessment process requirements.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2019

Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (sUAS) on the NNSS White Paper

The Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) prides itself on being the premier outdoor, indoor, and underground national laboratory. It is the preferred location for experiments supporting the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship Programs, national defense programs, and national security research, development, and training programs, as well as vital programs of other federal agencies. Work at the NNSS supports the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Global and Homeland Security programs, and Environmental Management. The NNSS looks to incorporate safer work practices and continuous improvements. Unmanned Aerial Surveys (UAS) have already been implemented in areas off the NNSS for multiple uses. Using these best practices with systems catered to the NNSS would allow integration of new technology and would allow work at the NNSS to maintain the high level of quality already exhibited. The Management and Operating Contractor (M&O) has shown experience in multiple UAS platforms. Through the coordination and experience developed through these projects, the M&O can further improve the quality and cost effectiveness of services currently rendered and offer new services not currently available today. Several NNSS departments that could implement UAS technology are Emergency Response, Facility Management, Environmental Management, and Training. These departments would be able to improve their capabilities and expand personnel effectiveness with the inclusion of UASs and the information they provide.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2019

Treatment of Foreign Radioactive Waste at the BELGOPROCESS Plant - 19345

Belgium has used a large number of nuclear technologies during the last 60 years. Power generation, reprocessing, fuel fabrication, isotope production and research activities have produced a large variety of radioactive waste streams. BELGOPROCESS is the operator of the centralised waste treatment facilities located in the Campine region in Flanders. Over the years BELGOPROCESS has developed the know-how and facilities to treat each one of these waste streams. BELGOPROCESS is a subsidiary of NIRAS, the governmental institution responsible for the safe management of radioactive waste and enriched fissile materials in Belgium. A number of these waste streams are only produced during a short period of time. After processing the existing stockpile the treatment facility is put into operational standby and eventually prepared for decommissioning. In order to treat the stockpile of some types of legacy waste within an acceptable time frame, the treatment facilities needed to be designed at a certain treatment capacity. Since the majority of the legacy waste is processed nowadays, a significant amount of treatment capacity becomes available. In June 2006 the Belgian government decided that this know-how and facilities should become available to foreign waste producers. This would allow BELGOPROCESS to fill up the available capacity of its facilities and consequently lower the cost for the Belgian waste producers. Nowadays two facilities are open to accept foreign radioactive waste. The CILVA-facility can be used for sorting, cutting, incineration, precompaction, supercompaction and cementation of low level solid waste. The PAMELA-facility - a former vitrification plant - can be used for the treatment of medium level and alpha-bearing waste. In this paper we will discuss the technical characteristics of the CILVA-incinerator and a showcase for the treatment of foreign waste at our facilities. In 2016 BELGOPROCESS started a cooperation with MATE-FIN for the incineration of low level burnable waste from the Cernavoda NPP in Romania. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

The TRANSCEND University Consortium: Theme 4: Nuclear Materials - 20431

The safe and secure management of Pu is a matter of international concern, with ∼250 t of separated Pu currently stockpiled worldwide. The UK's civil inventory of nuclear materials contains significant stocks of separated Pu from the reprocessing of Magnox and AGR spent fuels. The preferred option for the 138.5 tonnes of Pu is re-use as mixed oxide (MOx) fuel, although 5% is not suitable for re-use and is recommended for direct disposal. However, it will take more than 15 years to implement re-use, requiring that the Pu be kept in interim storage in its current state for that period, i.e. as PuO{sub 2} powder within inert steel storage cans at Sellafield. The focus of the work presented here is thus plutonium storage and the direct disposal of plutonium. The Research and Development needs of both are now pressing: in the case of storage due to it being the current default; in the case of immobilization and disposal because of a comparative lack of Research and Development on Pu conditioning and packaging due to policy uncertainty as to whether it would be disposed of in a Geologic Disposal Facility (GDF). Addressing these needs is complicated by Pu's high radioactivity, decay heat and radiotoxicity, criticality, nuclear safeguard requirements and, for some UK Pu contaminated materials targeted for disposal, poor inventory. Thus, there is also a critical requirement for underpinning research on Pu bearing materials in these two contexts. In response to these needs, the TRANSCEND Consortium (Transformative Science and Engineering for Nuclear Decommissioning, a multi-disciplinary collaboration of 11 universities and 8 key industry partners from across the UK's civil nuclear sector) is seeking to provide technical underpinning to ongoing option development for the UK's civil Pu stockpile. Whilst understanding the behaviour of plutonium during its re-use as MOx is beyond the scope of the TRANSCEND Consortium work plan, the main objectives of the work are: (1) For interim storage: to understand how the surface structure and properties of pristine and radiation damaged PuO{sub 2} change with time in the absence and presence of water; and (2) For immobilization and disposal: to understand the mechanisms of incorporation of Pu into ceramic and glass-ceramic waste-forms, as well as the effect on these of self-induced radiation damage. Each objective is being addressed through separate work packages, the details of which are discussed in this paper. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2014

Structure for Storing Properties of Particles (PoP)

Evaluated nuclear databases are critical for applications such as nuclear energy, nuclear medicine, homeland security, and stockpile stewardship. Particle masses, nuclear excitation levels, and other “Properties of Particles” are essential for making evaluated nuclear databases. Currently, these properties are obtained from various databases that are stored in outdated formats. A “Properties of Particles” (PoP) structure is being designed that will allow storing all information for one or more particles in a single place, so that each evaluation, simulation, model calculation, etc. can link to the same data. Information provided in PoP will include properties of nuclei, gammas and electrons (along with other particles such as pions, as evaluations extend to higher energies). Presently, PoP includes masses from the Atomic Mass Evaluation version 2003 (AME2003), and level schemes and gamma decays from the Reference Input Parameter Library (RIPL-3). The data are stored in a hierarchical structure. An example of how PoP stores nuclear masses and energy levels will be presented here.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗