Results for “SEE Action” — Page 9

DOE OSTI2015

TU-CD-BRD-01: Making Incident Learning Practical and Useful: Challenges and Previous Experiences

It has long been standard practice in radiation oncology to report internally when a patient’s treatment has not gone as planned and to report events to regulatory agencies when legally required. Most potential errors are caught early and never affect the patient. Quality assurance steps routinely prevent errors from reaching the patient, and these “near misses” are much more frequent than treatment errors. A growing number of radiation oncology facilities have implemented incident learning systems to report and analyze both errors and near misses. Using the term “incident learning” instead of “event reporting” emphasizes the need to use these experiences to change the practice and make future errors less likely and promote an educational, non-punitive environment. There are challenges in making such a system practical and effective. Speakers from institutions of different sizes and practice environments will share their experiences on how to make such a system work and what benefits their clinics have accrued. Questions that will be addressed include: How to create a system that is easy for front line staff to access How to motivate staff to report How to promote the system as positive and educational and not punitive or demeaning How to organize the team for reviewing and responding to reports How to prioritize which reports to discuss in depth How not to dismiss the rest How to identify underlying causes How to design corrective actions and implement change How to develop useful statistics and analysis tools How to coordinate a departmental system with a larger risk management system How to do this without a dedicated quality manager Some speakers’ experience is with in-house systems and some will share experience with the AAPM/ASTRO national Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS). Reports intended to be of value nationally need to be comprehensible to outsiders; examples of useful reports will be shown. There will be ample time set aside for audience members to contribute to the discussion. Learning Objectives: Learn how to promote the use of an incident learning system in a clinic. Learn how to convert “event reporting” into “incident learning”. See examples of practice changes that have come out of learning systems. Learn how the RO-ILS system can be used as a primary internal learning system. Learn how to create succinct, meaningful reports useful to outside readers. Gary Ezzell chairs the AAPM committee overseeing RO-ILS and has received an honorarium from ASTRO for working on the committee reviewing RO-ILS reports. Derek Brown is a director of http://TreatSafely.org . Brett Miller has previously received travel expenses and an honorarium from Varian. Phillip Beron has nothing to report.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2015

TU-CD-BRD-02: Henry Ford Hospital System Experience, with Focus On Motivating and Reviewing

It has long been standard practice in radiation oncology to report internally when a patient’s treatment has not gone as planned and to report events to regulatory agencies when legally required. Most potential errors are caught early and never affect the patient. Quality assurance steps routinely prevent errors from reaching the patient, and these “near misses” are much more frequent than treatment errors. A growing number of radiation oncology facilities have implemented incident learning systems to report and analyze both errors and near misses. Using the term “incident learning” instead of “event reporting” emphasizes the need to use these experiences to change the practice and make future errors less likely and promote an educational, non-punitive environment. There are challenges in making such a system practical and effective. Speakers from institutions of different sizes and practice environments will share their experiences on how to make such a system work and what benefits their clinics have accrued. Questions that will be addressed include: How to create a system that is easy for front line staff to access How to motivate staff to report How to promote the system as positive and educational and not punitive or demeaning How to organize the team for reviewing and responding to reports How to prioritize which reports to discuss in depth How not to dismiss the rest How to identify underlying causes How to design corrective actions and implement change How to develop useful statistics and analysis tools How to coordinate a departmental system with a larger risk management system How to do this without a dedicated quality manager Some speakers’ experience is with in-house systems and some will share experience with the AAPM/ASTRO national Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS). Reports intended to be of value nationally need to be comprehensible to outsiders; examples of useful reports will be shown. There will be ample time set aside for audience members to contribute to the discussion. Learning Objectives: Learn how to promote the use of an incident learning system in a clinic. Learn how to convert “event reporting” into “incident learning”. See examples of practice changes that have come out of learning systems. Learn how the RO-ILS system can be used as a primary internal learning system. Learn how to create succinct, meaningful reports useful to outside readers. Gary Ezzell chairs the AAPM committee overseeing RO-ILS and has received an honorarium from ASTRO for working on the committee reviewing RO-ILS reports. Derek Brown is a director of http://TreatSafely.org . Brett Miller has previously received travel expenses and an honorarium from Varian. Phillip Beron has nothing to report.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2015

TU-CD-BRD-03: UCSD Experience, with Focus On Implementing Change

It has long been standard practice in radiation oncology to report internally when a patient’s treatment has not gone as planned and to report events to regulatory agencies when legally required. Most potential errors are caught early and never affect the patient. Quality assurance steps routinely prevent errors from reaching the patient, and these “near misses” are much more frequent than treatment errors. A growing number of radiation oncology facilities have implemented incident learning systems to report and analyze both errors and near misses. Using the term “incident learning” instead of “event reporting” emphasizes the need to use these experiences to change the practice and make future errors less likely and promote an educational, non-punitive environment. There are challenges in making such a system practical and effective. Speakers from institutions of different sizes and practice environments will share their experiences on how to make such a system work and what benefits their clinics have accrued. Questions that will be addressed include: How to create a system that is easy for front line staff to access How to motivate staff to report How to promote the system as positive and educational and not punitive or demeaning How to organize the team for reviewing and responding to reports How to prioritize which reports to discuss in depth How not to dismiss the rest How to identify underlying causes How to design corrective actions and implement change How to develop useful statistics and analysis tools How to coordinate a departmental system with a larger risk management system How to do this without a dedicated quality manager Some speakers’ experience is with in-house systems and some will share experience with the AAPM/ASTRO national Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS). Reports intended to be of value nationally need to be comprehensible to outsiders; examples of useful reports will be shown. There will be ample time set aside for audience members to contribute to the discussion. Learning Objectives: Learn how to promote the use of an incident learning system in a clinic. Learn how to convert “event reporting” into “incident learning”. See examples of practice changes that have come out of learning systems. Learn how the RO-ILS system can be used as a primary internal learning system. Learn how to create succinct, meaningful reports useful to outside readers. Gary Ezzell chairs the AAPM committee overseeing RO-ILS and has received an honorarium from ASTRO for working on the committee reviewing RO-ILS reports. Derek Brown is a director of http://TreatSafely.org . Brett Miller has previously received travel expenses and an honorarium from Varian. Phillip Beron has nothing to report.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2015

TU-CD-BRD-04: UCLA Experience, with Focus On Developing Metrics and Using RO-ILS

It has long been standard practice in radiation oncology to report internally when a patient’s treatment has not gone as planned and to report events to regulatory agencies when legally required. Most potential errors are caught early and never affect the patient. Quality assurance steps routinely prevent errors from reaching the patient, and these “near misses” are much more frequent than treatment errors. A growing number of radiation oncology facilities have implemented incident learning systems to report and analyze both errors and near misses. Using the term “incident learning” instead of “event reporting” emphasizes the need to use these experiences to change the practice and make future errors less likely and promote an educational, non-punitive environment. There are challenges in making such a system practical and effective. Speakers from institutions of different sizes and practice environments will share their experiences on how to make such a system work and what benefits their clinics have accrued. Questions that will be addressed include: How to create a system that is easy for front line staff to access How to motivate staff to report How to promote the system as positive and educational and not punitive or demeaning How to organize the team for reviewing and responding to reports How to prioritize which reports to discuss in depth How not to dismiss the rest How to identify underlying causes How to design corrective actions and implement change How to develop useful statistics and analysis tools How to coordinate a departmental system with a larger risk management system How to do this without a dedicated quality manager Some speakers’ experience is with in-house systems and some will share experience with the AAPM/ASTRO national Radiation Oncology Incident Learning System (RO-ILS). Reports intended to be of value nationally need to be comprehensible to outsiders; examples of useful reports will be shown. There will be ample time set aside for audience members to contribute to the discussion. Learning Objectives: Learn how to promote the use of an incident learning system in a clinic. Learn how to convert “event reporting” into “incident learning”. See examples of practice changes that have come out of learning systems. Learn how the RO-ILS system can be used as a primary internal learning system. Learn how to create succinct, meaningful reports useful to outside readers. Gary Ezzell chairs the AAPM committee overseeing RO-ILS and has received an honorarium from ASTRO for working on the committee reviewing RO-ILS reports. Derek Brown is a director of http://TreatSafely.org . Brett Miller has previously received travel expenses and an honorarium from Varian. Phillip Beron has nothing to report.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2012

Evaluation of NASA SPoRT's Pseudo-Geostationary Lightning Mapper Products in the 2011 Spring Program

NASA's Short-term Prediction Research and Transition (SPoRT) program is a contributing partner with the GOES-R Proving Ground (PG) preparing forecasters to understand and utilize the unique products that will be available in the GOES-R era. This presentation emphasizes SPoRT s actions to prepare the end user community for the Geostationary Lightning Mapper (GLM). This preparation is a collaborative effort with SPoRT's National Weather Service partners, the National Severe Storms Laboratory (NSSL), and the Hazardous Weather Testbed s Spring Program. SPoRT continues to use its effective paradigm of matching capabilities to forecast problems through collaborations with our end users and working with the developers at NSSL to create effective evaluations and visualizations. Furthermore, SPoRT continues to develop software plug-ins so that these products will be available to forecasters in their own decision support system, AWIPS and eventually AWIPS II. In 2009, the SPoRT program developed the original pseudo geostationary lightning mapper (PGLM) flash extent product to demonstrate what forecasters may see with GLM. The PGLM replaced the previous GLM product and serves as a stepping-stone until the AWG s official GLM proxy is ready. The PGLM algorithm is simple and can be applied to any ground-based total lightning network. For 2011, the PGLM used observations from four ground-based networks (North Alabama, Kennedy Space Center, Oklahoma, and Washington D.C.). While the PGLM is not a true proxy product, it is intended as a tool to train forecasters about total lightning as well as foster discussions on product visualizations and incorporating GLM-resolution data into forecast operations. The PGLM has been used in 2010 and 2011 and is likely to remain the primary lightning training tool for the GOES-R program for the near future. This presentation will emphasize the feedback received during the 2011 Spring Program. This will discuss several topics. Based on feedback from the 2010 Spring Program, SPoRT created two variant PGLM products, which NSSL produced locally and provided in real-time within AWIPS for 2011. The first is the flash initiation density (FID) product, which creates a gridded display showing the number of flashes that originated in each 8 8 km grid box. The second product is the maximum flash density (MFD). This shows the highest PGLM value for each grid point over a specific period of time, ranging from 30 to 120 minutes. In addition to the evaluation of these two new products, the evaluation of the PGLM itself will be covered. The presentation will conclude with forecaster feedback for additional improvements requested for future evaluations, such as within the 2012 Spring Program.

Stano, Geoffrey T.↗

DOE OSTI2026

In Search of Strategic Advantage: Understanding the Landscape of Technology Competition

In an era of seemingly ever-increasing global tensions, technology competition is often mentioned as a pathway for U.S. and allied success. The opening arguments are often very simple. “This is the most important struggle of the 21st century.” “We cannot afford to lose this competition.” “The United States must not fall behind in this race.” “We must be faster, more agile, more committed, more thoughtful than our competitors.” Competition around a particular technology is described as a once in a generational struggle with immense stakes. “This is a Sputnik moment” is a common analogy. The solutions proposed are fairly straightforward – more of everything. We should spend more money. We should build more widgets or more factories. We should innovate more. We should focus more. We should attract more talent. We should file more patents. We should produce more PhDs. If we do more of everything, we will have more technology than our opponents, they will see our technological advantage, they will not challenge us, and therefore we will win. If we fail to do these things, we will lose. To paraphrase Homer Simpson, in national security policy discussions technology competition has become the cause of, and solution to, all of life’s problems. And yet, beyond doing more across the board technology competition is not at all simple. First, it is a concept increasingly muddled together with other big issues such as innovation policy, national defense strategy, great power competition, allied cooperation, public-private partnerships, and a host of other issues. Certain policies, systems, coalitions, and so on may be excellent for tackling one challenge, but far less optional for others. Second, it is inherently dynamic, an action-reaction cycle between multiple players. A brilliant opening move can be squandered or successfully countered in subsequent moves. Third, there are limits to what you can do - limited time, limited financial resources, limited human capital, and limited knowledge of what lies ahead. One is forced to choose.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2016

A new framework for integrated climate finance and inclusive responses to sustainable development in Malaysia

With Malaysia's commitment to both mitigation and adaptation, the 21st Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change in Paris, 2015, will be both an opportunity to showcase best practices and a forum to promote international ownership of climate challenge before it becomes a catastrophe. Our experience with weather extremes is that the best time to intervene is at the risk level via prevention and preparedness, compared to any wait-and-see approach. As the Honourable Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dato' Sri Mohd Najib Abdul Razak, elaborated during the recent 11th Malaysia Plan presentation to the parliament, ‘such an approach has to be seen as part of adopting green growth and increasing our commitment to long-term sustainability’. Malaysia is also aware that this requires policy support, technological interventions and financial commitment. It is for this reason the Malaysia's pledge at the Copenhagen COP-15 was to reduce its carbon emission by 40% from 2005 levels by 2020, subject to technology transfer and financial support by developed countries. Having achieved a 33% reduction in the last five years, Malaysia is convinced that it can reach the 40% target following an inclusive partnership framework for action.

Climate Change↗

NASA NTRS1988

Solutions to time variant problems of real-time expert systems

Real-time expert systems for monitoring and control are driven by input data which changes with time. One of the subtle problems of this field is the propagation of time variant problems from rule to rule. This propagation problem is even complicated under a multiprogramming environment where the expert system may issue test commands to the system to get data and to access time consuming devices to retrieve data for concurrent reasoning. Two approaches are used to handle the flood of input data. Snapshots can be taken to freeze the system from time to time. The expert system treats the system as a stationary one and traces changes by comparing consecutive snapshots. In the other approach, when an input is available, the rules associated with it are evaluated. For both approaches, if the premise condition of a fired rule is changed to being false, the downstream rules should be deactivated. If the status change is due to disappearance of a transient problem, actions taken by the fired downstream rules which are no longer true may need to be undone. If a downstream rule is being evaluated, it should not be fired. Three mechanisms for solving this problem are discussed: tracing, backward checking, and censor setting. In the forward tracing mechanism, when the premise conditions of a fired rule become false, the premise conditions of downstream rules which have been fired or are being evaluated due to the firing of that rule are reevaluated. A tree with its root at the rule being deactivated is traversed. In the backward checking mechanism, when a rule is being fired, the expert system checks back on the premise conditions of the upstream rules that result in evaluation of the rule to see whether it should be fired. The root of the tree being traversed is the rule being fired. In the censor setting mechanism, when a rule is to be evaluated, a censor is constructed based on the premise conditions of the upstream rules and the censor is evaluated just before the rule is fired. Unlike the backward checking mechanism, this one does not search the upstream rules. This paper explores the details of implementation of the three mechanisms.

Yeh, Show-Way↗

DOE OSTI2021

Sea ice evolution along the Northern Sea Route and implications for trans-Arctic shipping from 2021 through 2060

Arctic surface temperatures warmed at twice the global average in the second half of the 20 th century due to Arctic amplification (AA), a phenomenon predominantly caused by regional polar changes, like the melting of perennial sea ice and reduced sea ice extent (leading to more solar radiation being absorbed by the ocean surface as opposed to being reflected back to space by the ice surface). AA is projected to reach a factor of three even if the climate is stabilized by the mid 21 st century by reduced greenhouse gas emissions. In all emissions scenarios, AA is projected to lead to temperature changes at least 2.4 times larger than global mean surface temperature changes occurring between 2070 and 2100. The ice-albedo feedback, which occurs when the polar-marine surface absorbs more radiation as highly reflective sea ice melts, is reversible such that the premise of a runaway process is no longer accepted as a realistic possibility. No matter what actions are taken to reduce CO 2 concentrations in the atmosphere from now on, two different methods of predicting an ice-free Arctic suggest that perennial sea ice will mostly disappear in September by the year 2050. If there is no reduction in anthropogenic CO 2 and methane emissions, that scenario could occur sooner than 2030. Defining Arctic navigability as safe and economic passage of Polar Class 7 cargo ships without need of an escorting icebreaker, no single trans Arctic ship route will be navigable year-round in the first half of the 21 st century, including in the strong emission scenarios. However, seasonal trans-Arctic navigability will increase this century. An estimate on the number of days per year that the Northern See Route (NSR) will be navigable in the future is beyond the scope of this report. Along Northern Sea Routes 5 and 6, which run close to the Russian coast and Yamal LNG plant, an ARC 7 ice class LNG tanker, the equivalent of a Polar Class 3 (PC3) vessel, will be at low risk in December through April at some point during the current decade. May will continue to entail some risk (more than April) along relatively short segments of these routes through the end of the next decade (2030-2039). Come June, snow rapidly melts away, and thereafter the underlying sea ice begins becomes thinner and less concentrated, greatly reducing risk. However, neither path is desirable for ARC 7 tankers due to shallow bathymetry in Sannikov Strait, and a more desirable path for these ships passes to the north of the New Siberian Islands (route 20, discussed further below). Conventional LNG tankers (i.e., non-ice-strengthened vessels according to the IMO classification), without icebreaker escorts, will continue to encounter dangerous or impassable conditions along many sections of the NSR through the end of this decade for many months of the year. Through 2039, these conventional tankers will be able to operate safely along NSR 6 from August through October. By 2040-2049, the span of safe operation increases to August through November, and by 2050-2059 it increases to July through November, assuming a northward deviation to avoid the Sannikov Strait.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

NASA NTRS2014

Launch Control System Master Console Event Message Reduction

System monitoring and control (SMC) message browsers receive so many messages daily that operators do not need to see. Important messages are often mixed up among the less important ones. My job is to reduce the messages displayed in the message browser so that warning and emergency messages can be seen easily and therefore, responded promptly. There are multiple methods to achieve this. Firstly, duplicate messages should not appear many times in the message browser. Instead, the message should appear only once but with a number that counts the times that it appears. This method is called duplicate message suppression. Secondly, messages that update the most recent state (e.g. up/down) of a component should replace the old-state messages. This method is called state based message correlation. Thirdly, messages that display "normal" alarm level should be suppressed unless it's a response to an operator action. In addition to message reduction, I also work on correcting the severity level and text formats on messages.

messages↗

NASA NTRS2006

Look Sharp While Seeing Sharp

The two scientists James B. Stephens and Dr. Charles G. Miller were tasked with studying the harmful properties of light in space, as well as the artificial radiation produced during laser and welding work, for the purpose of creating an enhanced means of eye protection in industrial welding applications. While working to apply their space research to these terrestrial applications, Stephens and Miller became engrossed with previously discovered research showing evidence that the eyes of hawks, eagles, and other birds of prey contain unique oil droplets that actually protect them from intensely radiated light rays (blue, violet, ultraviolet) while allowing vision-enhancing light rays (red, orange, green) to pass through. These oil droplets absorb short wavelength light rays which, in turn, reduce glare and provide heightened color contrast and definition for optimal visual acuity. Accordingly, birds of prey possess the ability to distinguish their targeted prey in natural surroundings and from great distances. Pairing the findings from their initial studies with what they learned from the bird studies, the scientists devised a methodology to incorporate the light-filtering/vision-enhancing dual-action benefits into a filtering system, using light-filtering dyes and tiny particles of zinc oxide. (Zinc oxide, which absorbs ultraviolet light, is also found in sunscreen lotions that protect the skin from sunburn.)

Source record↗

DOE OSTI2012

French Atomic Energy Commission Decommissioning Programme and Feedback Experience - 12230

Since the French Atomic and Alternatives Energy Commission (CEA) was founded in 1945 to carry out research programmes on use of nuclear, and its application France has set up and run various types of installations: research or prototypes reactors, process study or examination laboratories, pilot installations, accelerators, nuclear power plants and processing facilities. Some of these are currently being dismantled or must be dismantled soon so that the DEN, the Nuclear Energy Division, can construct new equipment and thus have available a range of R and D facilities in line with the issues of the nuclear industry of the future. Since the 1960's and 1970's in all its centres, the CEA has acquired experience and know-how through dismantling various nuclear facilities. The dismantling techniques are nowadays operational, even if sometimes certain specific developments are necessary to reduce the cost of operations. Thanks to availability of techniques and guarantees of dismantling programme financing now from two dedicated funds, close to euro 15,000 M for the next thirty years, for current or projected dismantling operations, the CEA's Nuclear Energy Division has been able to develop, when necessary, its immediate dismantling strategy. Currently, nearly thirty facilities are being dismantled by the CEA's Nuclear Energy Division operational units with industrial partners. Thus the next decade will see completion of the dismantling and radioactive clean-up of the Grenoble site and of the facilities on the Fontenay-aux-Roses site. By 2016, the dismantling of the UP1 plant at Marcoule, the largest dismantling work in France, will be well advanced, with all the process equipment dismantled. After an overview of the French regulatory framework, the paper will describe the DD and R (Decontamination Decommissioning and Remediation) strategy, programme and feedback experience inside the CEA's Nuclear Energy Division. A special feature of dismantling operations at the CEA comes from the diversity of facilities to be dismantled, which are predominantly research facilities and therefore have no series advantage. There is tremendous operating feedback, however. For more than twenty years in all its centres, the CEA has acquired experience and know-how through dismantling research reactors or critical models and laboratories or plants. The dismantling techniques are nowadays operational, even if sometimes certain specific developments are necessary to reduce the cost of operations. Thanks to availability of techniques and guarantees of dismantling programme financing from two dedicated funds, close to euro 15,000 Millions for the next thirty years, for current or projected dismantling operations, the Nuclear Energy Division has been able to develop, when necessary, its immediate dismantling strategy. Currently, nearly thirty facilities are being dismantled by the CEA's Nuclear Energy Division operational units with industrial partners. Thus the next decade will see completion of the dismantling and radioactive clean-up of the Grenoble site and of the facilities on the Fontenay-aux-Roses site. By 2020, the dismantling of the UP1 plant at Marcoule, one of the largest dismantling works in the world, will be well advanced, with all the process equipment dismantled. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Glovebox Handling of High-Consequence Materials with Super Baxter and Gesture-Based Programming - 18598

The handling of high-consequence materials is a difficult task requiring safe object manipulation while avoiding the risk of contamination or spillage. Specific operations including opening containers, segregating the wastes, and repackaging are required to be safely executed inside contained spaces such as gloveboxes. However, the workers' ability and dexterity to manipulate objects through thick protective gloves are compromised in many aspects. The fixed position of the glovebox arm ports restricts the movements of the workers' arms, which also makes it hard to lift heavy objects. Further, the operational workspace inside the glovebox is restricted by the gloves' reachability. Safety of workers is the paramount concern in glovebox operations and the very reason for their existence. Sharp edges and tools increases the risk of glove punctures, which may expose the operator to chemicals and radiation and risks contamination in the vicinity outside the glovebox. The operators are also affected by ergonomic stressors due to prolonged and repetitive operations. To achieve a high degree of human safety, robotic solutions to handle high-consequence materials inside the glovebox are desirable, as they remove the operators from the hazards listed above. However, robots, in general, lack the degree of adaptability necessary for most high-consequence material handling tasks as these tasks are often unstructured or highly variable. Likewise, most human operators, while highly skilled in the tasks at hand (task expertise), lack the robot programming skills necessary to adapt the robot's motions to the variations (programming expertise). A way to bridge this divide is to make robot programming more intuitive to human operators. Since humans naturally teach one another through demonstration and learning, robotic 'programming by demonstration' paradigms have begun to appear to reduce the burden of robot reprogramming. Gesture-Based Programming attempts to achieve that by enabling a robot to observe the normal actions and affordances of a human performing a task to learn to map those onto the skills of the robot. In the end, this approach permits benefits from both the human and the robot: the human's adaptive decision making and the robot's resilience to high-consequence material. Robotic solutions assuringly provide protection for the operators, however their autonomy brings about other potential risks. Artificial Intelligence is not perfect; it is a black box, which can produce results, but the full extent of those results may not be known precisely. In self-driving cars, a hypothetical AI problem is the 'green man detector'. Since self-driving cars have presumably never seen a green man, how can we know it won't veer toward him the first time it sees a green man? Likewise, even though GbP provides an open method for safe task execution replicating a human, incorrect task inferences can lead to potential collisions or unintended operations. Thus, a hardware safety measure is proposed to provide reliable operation inside the glovebox, and true safe operations are achieved by mechanically limiting the operational range of each arm link. The operational range is computed and validated through exhaustive offline simulations, which can be streamlined by affordable computing power. Super Baxter is one such robot which incorporates these capabilities. It is a human-like, bimanual robot, being developed at the Collaborative Robotics Lab (CRL) in conjunction with the Dept. of Energy/Environmental Management, Rethink Robotics, Barrett Technology, and the NSF Center for Robots and Sensors for the Human Well-Being (RoSe-HUB). Super Baxter is envisioned to represent the next generation of collaborative robots that will be intrinsically human-safe, as well as exceptionally human-intuitive. In summary, Super Baxter will enable safe glovebox operations through low-shot Gesture based Programming incorporated with hardware safety measures. Two aspects of safety will be discussed in the paper. First, the safety of the operator achieved by allowing him to program Super Baxter remotely through Gesture based Programming. Second, the safety of the glovebox, achieved by incorporating hardware safety measures using joint limits. Further, the capability of Super Baxter on Gesture based Programming is demonstrated through typical object manipulation tasks in glovebox operations. (authors)

42 ENGINEERING↗

NASA NTRS2010

Magnetostrictive Brake

A magnetostrictive brake has been designed as a more energy-efficient alternative to a magnetic fail-safe brake in a robot. (In the specific application, failsafe signifies that the brake is normally engaged; that is, power must be supplied to allow free rotation.) The magnetic failsafe brake must be supplied with about 8 W of electric power to initiate and maintain disengagement. In contrast, the magnetostrictive brake, which would have about the same dimensions and the same torque rating as those of the magnetic fail-safe brake, would demand only about 2 W of power for disengagement. The brake (see figure) would include a stationary base plate and a hub mounted on the base plate. Two solenoid assemblies would be mounted in diametrically opposed recesses in the hub. The cores of the solenoids would be made of the magnetostrictive alloy Terfenol-D or equivalent. The rotating part of the brake would be a ring-and spring- disk subassembly. By means of leaf springs not shown in the figure, this subassembly would be coupled with the shaft that the brake is meant to restrain. With no power supplied to the solenoids, a permanent magnet would pull axially on a stepped disk and on a shelf in the hub, causing the ring to be squeezed axially between the stepped disk and the hub. The friction associated with this axial squeeze would effect the braking action. Supplying electric power to the solenoids would cause the magnetostrictive cylinders to push radially inward against a set of wedges that would be in axial contact with the stepped disk. The wedges would convert the radial magnetostrictive strain to a multiplied axial displacement of the stepped disk. This axial displacement would be just large enough to lift the stepped disk, against the permanent magnetic force, out of contact with the ring. The ring would then be free to turn because it would no longer be squeezed axially between the stepped disk and the hub.

Diftler, Myron A.↗

NASA NTRS1933

Flight Tests on the Lateral Control of an Airplane having a Split Flap which Retracts Ahead of Conventional Ailerons, Special Report

Since the recent more or less extensive adoption of high-lift flaps on airplane wings, the problem of providing satisfactory lateral control without sacrificing a part of the span of the flaps has become one of some importance. The difficulties have been largely a matter of obtaining satisfactory rolling moments with a smoothly graduated action, together with sufficiently small control forces throughout the entire speed range. As part of an investigation including several different lateral-control arrangements to be used with split flaps, the tests reported in this paper were made on one arrangement in which conventional ailerons of narrow chord are used, and a split flap is retracted into the under surface of th wing forward of th ailerons. When the flap is retracted, the arrangement is as sketched in figure 1(a). If a simple form of split flap were used, hinged at its forward edge, the appearance when deflected would be as shown in figure 1(b). The flap if deflected with its leading edge remaining in this forward position would give somewhat less than three fourths of the lift increase of the same flap in the usual rear position. (See reference 1.). If, as shown in figure 1(c), the split flap ahead of th aileron is moved to the rear as the trailing=edge portion is deflected downward, a double advantage is obtained. The deflected flap can be located in the most effective region for high lift (reference 1), and the force required to deflect the flap is reduced. This is the arrangement used in the present tests.

Weick, Fred E.↗

DOE OSTI2016

Port Hope Area Initiative - Community Based Concepts Become Reality - 16538

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) involves the cleanup of historic low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) resulting from radium and uranium processing by the former Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear Limited, and its predecessor companies, during the period between 1932 and 1988. The PHAI, which is based on a legal agreement between the Government of Canada and the adjacent municipalities of Port Hope and Clarington in Ontario, Canada, comprises two separate community-initiated projects for the long-term management of the historic LLRW located in each of these municipalities. The Port Hope Project involves the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic LLRW from various sites within the urban area of Port Hope, the construction and operation of an engineered aboveground mound where the waste will be safely contained, and the long-term maintenance and monitoring of the new waste management facility. The waste is currently located in 13 large-scale sites and an estimated 375 small-scale sites within the community. In contrast, the Port Granby Project involves the relocation of approximately 450,000 cubic metres of historic LLRW from the existing waste site on the north shore of Lake Ontario in rural Clarington, to a new engineered aboveground mound to be built 700 metres north of the shoreline. The work also involves the restoration of the existing site and long-term maintenance and monitoring the new facility. The PHAI entered Phase 2 (construction) of a three-phase program in early 2012, when $1.28 billion (Canadian) in federal funding was announced by the Minister of Natural Resources Canada. The funding, together with regulatory approval from the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC), which granted 10-year waste management licences to both projects, have permitted the PHAI to move forward with construction and remediation. Waste water treatment plants based on best-available technologies have been constructed for each project to remove a wide range of contaminants from groundwater, surface water and leachate collected during construction and operation of the aboveground mounds. Each treatment process has been designed to ensure the quality of treated water being discharged into Lake Ontario meets or exceeds stringent regulatory requirements, resulting in the enhanced protection of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem. In 2015, the contract to build the Port Granby long-term waste management facility and remediate the existing waste site was awarded, and the long-awaited facility development will soon begin. The use of a dedicated internal waste transportation route along, which the LLRW will be trucked from the existing site to the new facility, is a key component of the design to minimize the impact on the local, rural community. In Port Hope, the removal of contaminated soil within the site for the new long-term management facility commenced in the fall of 2015. Over the next several years, multiple contracts will be awarded for construction and operation of the new waste management facility and remediation of the large and small-scale sites. In short, the Port Hope and Port Granby community-based concepts have matured into tangible projects with appropriate regulatory approvals and federal funding in place. Ongoing communications with the two communities have resulted in a well-informed public that understands the work to be done and is eager to see their projects take shape and become reality. As Canada's largest environmental remediation and restoration undertaking, the PHAI has never been closer to fulfilling its vision - working with the local communities to fulfil Canada's commitment for the cleanup of historic waste in Port Hope and Port Granby to leave an honourable legacy for future generations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NASA NTRS2001

Learning Sequences of Actions in Collectives of Autonomous Agents

In this paper we focus on the problem of designing a collective of autonomous agents that individually learn sequences of actions such that the resultant sequence of joint actions achieves a predetermined global objective. We are particularly interested in instances of this problem where centralized control is either impossible or impractical. For single agent systems in similar domains, machine learning methods (e.g., reinforcement learners) have been successfully used. However, applying such solutions directly to multi-agent systems often proves problematic, as agents may work at cross-purposes, or have difficulty in evaluating their contribution to achievement of the global objective, or both. Accordingly, the crucial design step in multiagent systems centers on determining the private objectives of each agent so that as the agents strive for those objectives, the system reaches a good global solution. In this work we consider a version of this problem involving multiple autonomous agents in a grid world. We use concepts from collective intelligence to design goals for the agents that are 'aligned' with the global goal, and are 'learnable' in that agents can readily see how their behavior affects their utility. We show that reinforcement learning agents using those goals outperform both 'natural' extensions of single agent algorithms and global reinforcement, learning solutions based on 'team games'.

Turner, Kagan↗

NASA NTRS2010

Systems Maintenance Automated Repair Tasks (SMART)

SMART is a uniform automated discrepancy analysis and repair-authoring platform that improves technical accuracy and timely delivery of repair procedures for a given discrepancy (see figure a). SMART will minimize data errors, create uniform repair processes, and enhance the existing knowledge base of engineering repair processes. This innovation is the first tool developed that links the hardware specification requirements with the actual repair methods, sequences, and required equipment. SMART is flexibly designed to be useable by multiple engineering groups requiring decision analysis, and by any work authorization and disposition platform (see figure b). The organizational logic creates the link between specification requirements of the hardware, and specific procedures required to repair discrepancies. The first segment in the SMART process uses a decision analysis tree to define all the permutations between component/ subcomponent/discrepancy/repair on the hardware. The second segment uses a repair matrix to define what the steps and sequences are for any repair defined in the decision tree. This segment also allows for the selection of specific steps from multivariable steps. SMART will also be able to interface with outside databases and to store information from them to be inserted into the repair-procedure document. Some of the steps will be identified as optional, and would only be used based on the location and the current configuration of the hardware. The output from this analysis would be sent to a work authoring system in the form of a predefined sequence of steps containing required actions, tools, parts, materials, certifications, and specific requirements controlling quality, functional requirements, and limitations.

Schuh, Joseph↗