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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

BAZAAR DIPLOMACY: Examining Iran's Nuclear Bargaining Tactics

Since undeclared elements of Iran’s nuclear program were revealed in 2002, Tehran has engaged in a decade of efforts to justify and advance its nuclear program. Unlike North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has maximized advantage and minimized backlash by maneuvering near the borders of the NPT system. Iran has embraced a three-pronged approach to bargain with the international community: (1) divide international opposition, (2) delay international monitoring, negotiations, and sanctions, (3) and defy international monitoring, commitments, and pressure. Iran’s nuclear bargaining can be divided into several time periods, and Iran used divide, delay, and defy tactics in each period. During the first phase from 2003 to 2005, Iranian reformist leader Mohammad Khatami was more willing to negotiate with the international community, but his ability to negotiate was constrained domestically and particularly during his last year of leadership. Tehran mainly negotiated with the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom – the European 3 (EU-3) – to drive a wedge between European and U.S. pressures on Iran and to delay outside monitoring and prevent international sanctions. It is in this early period that Iran developed its range of divide, delay, and defy tactics. For divide, Iran negotiated with the EU-3 because Europe had a close and influential relationship with the United States, whereas other international actors such as Russia and China were powerful but could not form an united bloc against the U.S. Iran began to delay international monitoring of its nuclear program by creating hurdles for international inspectors, stalling requests for information, and not volunteering information but providing updates only when Iranian nuclear developments were exposed by other parties. Iranian diplomats also delayed negotiations and sanctions by framing talks, negotiating and responding slowly to offers, providing false hopes and the appearance of concessions before key international events and resolutions, and adopting temporary and shifting negotiating positions. To defy, Iran modified and razed nuclear sites to prevent detection, used legalistic and minimal interpretations to subvert commitments, argued for an international right to enrich uranium, and proclaimed a fatwa against nuclear weapons. After President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, Iran took a tougher stance internationally. Ahmadinejad and his cabinet did not provide major concessions to facilitate international negotiations, were less willing to seriously consider proposals to curb Iran’s nuclear program, and linked Iran’s nuclear program to sovereignty and national pride. Realizing that Europe was less optimistic about negotiations, Ahmadinejad leveraged Russia and China to Iran’s advantage. Both countries helped delay and dilute United Nations Security Council resolutions against Iran. Ahmadinejad employed more tactics to defy international monitoring and pressure. These tactics involved demonstrating Iran’s nuclear progress even as Tehran engaged in negotiations over its program. Iran also increased the cost of failed negotiations by sustaining and escalating regional and global tensions to coincide with international events and resolutions that criticized or condemned Iran’s nuclear program. The third and present phase of Iranian nuclear bargaining began during Ahmadinejad’s second term as president (2009-2012). During this period, Ahmadinejad’s power significant weakened and domestic turf wars made Iranian nuclear negotiations unpredictable and at times contradictory. Due to the domestic situation and the exhausting of successful divide and delay tactics, Iran began using more defy tactics. Iran, for example, considered enriching uranium to a higher percentage for naval reactors, warned of closing the Straits of Hormuz, and engaged in terrorist acts against the West and its allies. Currently, Iran’s range of bargaining options has narrowed, with many divide and delay tactics less useful since the international community has become more aware of Iranian efforts to stall and buy time. While Iran leaders have employed more acts of defiance, Iran’s ability to sustain its defy tactics are waning and it is still possible to prevent greater confrontation between Iran and the West.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Procurement of 100 kg of Enriched Xenon for the EXO Prototype and for its Installation at WIPP

This grant supported the enriched xenon procurement, detector construction and initial operation of the EXO-200 double beta decay experiment at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The period of performance was Aug 15, 2002 to Dec 31, 2014. The primary goal of the experiment is to search for the very rare (and to date not observed) neutrino-less double beta decay. Such decay, if observed, would shed the light of the quantum-mechanical structure of neutrinos, and the origins of elementary particle masses. Another goal of the detector is to serve as prototype of a larger neutrino-less double beta decay experiment, currently being considered by DOE-OS. EXO-200 has already been extremely successful in both areas and is, in fact, leading the way world-wide in this area of fundamental physics. In the initial part of the grant the EXO-200 collaboration acquired 200kg of xenon enriched to 80% in the isotope 136 that is a candidate for double beta decay. At the time this was the largest isotope separation program carried out for fundamental science. The enrichment was done in Russia, providing a rare and valuable opportunity for US scientists to work alongside Russian colleagues, in some cases from the former closed cities of their military complex. By now the EXO-200 collaboration include institutions from the US, Canada, South Korea, China, Germany, Switzerland and Russia. Many collaborating scientists from these countries have taken shifts at WIPP or at the various remote monitoring sites world-wide. EXO-200 detector construction was completed in early 2010, with the time projection chamber (TPC) installation in the cleanrooms already placed in NeXA. Detector commissioning at WIPP followed, with the last phase, the filling of the TPC with liquid Xenon, occurring in the spring 2011. EXO-200 is described in [1]. Low background data taking started on Jun 1, 2011 and within the first month of data the 2-neutrino double beta decay of 136Xe was discovered, as reported in [2]. More data provided the best half-life measurement of any 2-neutrino double-beta decay modes [3]. Until Feb 2014 the detector ran continuously producing some of the world leading results in the field and, in particular, two of the most sensitive searches for neutrinoless double beta decay [4,5]. These measurements show that the half life of this decay is longer than 1015 times the age of the universe. This is one of the leading results in this field world-wide and succeeded to put the DOE-funded research on the world stage in a very cost-effective way. Other results from EXO-200 include a search for exotic double-beta decay modes [6], a detailed report on the state of the art background levels achieved in the detector [7], the study of rare ion and neutral atom motion and neutralization rates in liquid Xenon [8], a study of the cosmogenic backgrounds in the detector at WIPP’s depth [9], a search for Lorentz and CPT symmetries violation [10] and a search for double-beta decay to excited states [11]. In Feb 2014 the EXO-200 detector was severely disrupted by the accidents in the WIPP underground (unrelated to EXO-200). The EXO-200 operations team was able to recover the unique stockpile of enriched Xenon to high pressure cylinders and warm-up the detector to room temperature without damaging the very delicate equipment. This was a very impressive achievement as no plan had been made to complete these operations entirely from remote. This validates the robustness of well-designed liquid xenon detectors for this and other measurements in particle and nuclear astrophysics. The operations team re-gained almost regular access to the WIPP underground and the EXO-200 detector in Jan 2015 and spent calendar 2015 cleaning up the soot from the WIPP fire, assessing the damage to the EXO-200 infrastructure, correcting such damage and restarting the detector. This process was successfully carried out and culminated in the re-filling of the detector with liquid xenon, in Jan 2016. As of late Jan 2016 EXO-200 is taking data again. The collaboration is in the process of upgrading the readout electronics and restarting a radon abatement system that had been commissioned just before the Feb 2014 events. The upgraded electronics will provide lower readout noise and, in turn, better signal to background discrimination. The radon abatement system will further reduce the radon in a small air-gap between the EXO-200 cryostat and the lead shielding. In a review in Jun 2015 DOE-OS approved EXO-200 for 2.5 more years of running at the end of which we expect to improve the sensitivity to the neutrino-less double-beta decay by a factor two or three. For the last 5 years the EXO-200 detector, located in the WIPP underground, has been at the center of the hunt for new physics beyond the Standard Model of particle physics!

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2017

Space and the Third Offset Symposium - Summary Report

The Third Offset Workshop explored the nature of the challenges and opportunities facing the United States as it is increasingly forced to integrate space into defense strategy as well as deterrence and strategic stability frameworks. Participants broadly agreed that Washington’s deep ties to allies and partners, as well as its history of leveraging an innovative U.S private sector, will be enduring competitive advantages against potential rivals into the foreseeable future. Yet panelists also highlighted key challenges from Russia and China’s rapid integration of space capabilities into conventional and nuclear warfighting, the pronounced growth in Chinese and Russian counterspace capabilities, and tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

Standoff Over the LRSO: Assessing the long-range stand-off missile's impact on strategic stability.

Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Crisis and Collapse or Crossroads? Workshop Summary August 2018

In this context, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to assessing the incentives and disincentives the United States and Russia face in pursuing further arms control agreements as well as the role of arms control in the two countries’ foreign policies and security strategies.On the second day, the workshop participants explored four pathways for a renewal of U.S.-Russian arms control, including:New START extension or a New START follow-on agreement; an agreement which meets Russia at least half way in the strategic space; an agreement addressing challenges to European nuclear stability; and unusual mix-and-match approaches that might be taken. The discussions and their results are summarized here.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

The Russian Model of Internet Control and Its Significance

Russia has emerged as an exemplar of an innovative and experimental – though not always completely consistent or successful – alternative approach to information manipulation and control that differs significantly from the more-often discussed Chinese “Great Firewall” system and other approaches with an emphasis on systemic technical censorship. The Russian model relies on a mix of less overt, more plausibly deniable, legalistic, and often non-technical mechanisms to manipulate online information flows, narratives, and framings, to affect and shape public opinion without resort to universal censorship. The government uses surveillance, a panoply of vague laws, the prosecution or censorship of exemplars, proxy actors and hard to track extra-legal pressures, hacking and leaks, and a heavy emphasis on content production and manipulation to influence narratives and shape public opinion. This model for the domestic control of information not only fits with Russia’s own political system, but is likely to prove more resonant and easier to emulate across many other countries in which a systematic-censorship approach is not technologically or politically feasible. The learning and experimentation involved in this type of domestic information manipulation also has direct applicability to the use of information operations in international political and military competition. The future of this model will likely depend on continuing innovation, not least on the leveraging of advances in artificial intelligence and big data analysis. If successful, however, this might look very different from the future of information control in China – and have significantly different repercussions for democracies and the international system.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Structures of Cyber Competition in an Era of Major Power Rivalry

Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2018

Space in 21st Century Conflict: Calibrating Risks, Tailoring Strategies (Workshop Summary)

U.S. strategic thinking on outer space security has been slow to evolve since the 1990s and the DoD finds itself struggling to develop an adaptive and cohesive strategy for the domain. Russia and China, however, have been thinking about space in a holistic and integrated way for some time. Both countries recognize that U.S. conventional strength relies heavily on technologies and systems enabled by space-based assets. Thus, holding those assets at risk represents an opportunity to asymmetrically counter America’s ability to project power. China and Russia been developing a suite of anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities to accomplish this, to include direct-ascent weapons, space-based weapons, jammers, and cyber capabilities; both countries have also incorporated these systems into their respective tactical and strategic planning. This represents a serious threat to U.S. power projection and assurance of our regional allies and partners. Assuring the U.S.’s ability to operate in space is paramount for supporting regional security missions in both Europe and East Asia. Assuring DoD operations and capabilities in outer space, however, remains a challenge for the defense community. One solution offered by strategists is to enhance U.S. resiliency in space to turn the domain from offense dominant to defense dominant. This, they argue, can be achieved by improving space situational awareness (SSA), protecting space assets with active and passive countermeasures, disaggregating assets and leveraging new commercial space capabilities, and integrating allied space capabilities. However, many barriers remain to accomplishing these objectives. For example, some think that the classified nature of many U.S. space activities is an obstacle to deepening cooperation with commercial partners and allies. Others acknowledge the lack of a working model for incorporating cheaper, diverse, and scalable commercial space systems. Identifying where space fits into broader U.S. deterrence strategies is a subject of contention. While discussions over the past few years have focused on the practicability of deterring attacks on space assets via cross-domain threats, this line of thinking has yielded few useful insights. Consequently, defense practitioners have more recently shifted to thinking of space as part of an integrated deterrence concept, one that envisions building resiliency and defenses into our space architecture while simultaneously holding an adversary’s space-based assets at risk to enhance deterrence more broadly. However, both approaches illuminate a larger problem in the discussion of the relationship between space and deterrence: there is a lack of consensus on what it is we are trying to deter, how space fits into broader deterrence and strategic constructs, and the role of space in extended deterrence and assurance of allies. For example, is the United States’ priority to discourage attacks in space, to ensure regional power projection and alliance support capabilities, to deter broader global conflict or all of the above? Answering such questions will be an important step toward integrating space into a comprehensive defense strategy.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2022

Modeling Needs to Support the Reconstruction Strategy of Ukraine

Ukraine has been facing difficult times. Russia started a full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, and has caused huge human and infrastructure losses. As a result of the invasion, more than 8 million people left their homes. The Russian army has targeted Ukrainian energy sources, destroying or damaging over 50% of thermal power generation capacity (coal and gas), 30% of solar generation, and 90% of wind generation. The Russians are also threatening Ukrainian energy security, as they currently control the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – Europe’s largest. In addition, Russia has destroyed 121,000 buildings, including 5,300 multistory buildings - more buildings than Ukraine built during the past five years. The occupiers destroyed or damaged 343 district heat boiler stations (destroyed 12 / damaged 331) and 8 CHPs (destroyed 4/ damaged 4). There is no doubt that Ukraine will be able to protect its sovereignty and restore its territorial integrity; however, this will be a long process. The Government of Ukraine needs to simultaneously focus on many issues, from waging war to the restoration of electricity, water, and heat supply in the territories close to the front line. In addition to these time-sensitive issues, the government also needs to plan a long term multi-sector strategy for the reconstruction of Ukraine’s economy. Ukraine initiated a broad-based political process for recovery at the International Ukraine Recovery Conference (URC 2022) in Lugano, Switzerland. Prior to URC 2022, Ukraine applied for EU membership on February 28 and was granted the status of candidate country by the European Council on June 23, 2022. More than 40 nations are fully committed to supporting Ukraine throughout its path from early to long-term recovery. In addition, these countries link a successful recovery to Ukraine’s European future (URC, 2022a). The reconstruction process will be long. The government also recognizes that it is not enough to build energy infrastructure back – it should be built back better. The government is committed to building a more sustainable and cleaner energy sector. Energy modeling can provide important insights into paths to decarbonize Ukraine’s economy while rebuilding it after the war. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Institute for Economics and Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (IEF) work on modeling decarbonization scenarios in the energy sector of Ukraine. The teams focus on the heat sector, which includes district heat, autonomous and individual heating, and energy consumption by final energy consumption sectors, including buildings. Since the teams use world-class integrated assessment models, other sectors will be analyzed as well. The purpose of the document is to describe the needs of key Ukrainian ministries in modeling the reconstruction process. The scope of this document is limited to modeling energy consumption by the power and heat sectors, final energy consumption by buildings, and GHG emissions from these two sectors. The rest of this policy memo is organized as follows. After this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses key provisions of the reconstruction strategy with a focus on energy, buildings, heat supply, environment, and European integration aspirations. Section 3 provides an overview of recent developments and key decisions of the Government of Ukraine in the area of energy efficiency and decarbonization. Finally, Section 4 provides key suggestions on how PNNL and IEF can help the Government of Ukraine in developing strategic documents.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2024

US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

On Theories of Change: Rethinking the Ban Treaty and Disarmament Strategies

A week before Israel bombed Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi had lunch with the Financial Times. In the interview, Grossi expressed both optimism and pessimism about the nuclear landscape: he was hopeful about prospects for diplomacy, including with Iran. But he also expressed longer-term concerns about a proliferation cascade and rising nuclear risks, in particular, Russia’s nuclear threats amidst the war in Ukraine. “In the past, this was quite taboo,” he said, “but now people talk about tactical nuclear weapons like something which could be contained or permissible.” Given subsequent events in Iran, along with the expiration of New START in 2026 and expanding nuclear arsenals in Russia and China, pessimism would seem to trump hope for prospects for nuclear disarmament.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

History of and Aftermath from the Withdrawal of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty

On February 1, 2019, the United States and Russia withdrew from the three-decades old Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. Events precipitating the withdrawal were allegations by both the United States and Russia of a variety of treaty violations. Until that point, the treaty had been a centerpiece of arms control and a key agreement of the global security architecture. The absence of such a pillar has the potential destabilize the status quo of arms control, creating significant uncertainty in global nuclear stability and security. In this paper, we present a historical review as overture to an analysis on the impacts of this development on force structure. This analysis examines the changes in U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear forces which may occur as a result of the treaty's demise. The article concludes with commentary on potential actions to preserve stability in a post-INF world.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2015

Black carbon emissions from Russian diesel sources. Case study of Murmansk

Black carbon (BC) is a potent pollutant because of its effects on climate change, ecosystems and human health. Black carbon has a particularly pronounced impact as a climate forcer in the Arctic because of its effect on snow albedo and cloud formation. We have estimated BC emissions from diesel sources in the Murmansk Region and Murmansk City, the largest city in the world above the Arctic Circle. In this study we developed a detailed inventory of diesel sources including on-road vehicles, off-road transport (mining, locomotives, construction and agriculture), ships and diesel generators. For on-road transport, we conducted several surveys to understand the vehicle fleet and driving patterns, and, for all sources, we also relied on publicly available local data sets and analysis. We calculated that BC emissions in the Murmansk Region were 0.40 Gg in 2012. The mining industry is the largest source of BC emissions in the region, emitting 69 % of all BC emissions because of its large diesel consumption and absence of emissions controls. On-road vehicles are the second largest source, emitting about 13 % of emissions. Old heavy duty trucks are the major source of emissions. Emission controls on new vehicles limit total emissions from on-road transportation. Vehicle traffic and fleet surveys show that many of the older cars on the registry are lightly or never used. We also estimated that total BC emissions from diesel sources in Russia were 50.8 Gg in 2010, and on-road transport contributed 49 % of diesel BC emissions. Agricultural machinery is also a significant source Russia-wide, in part because of the lack of controls on off-road vehicles.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Trends and source apportionment of aerosols in Europe during 1980-2018

Aerosols have significantly affected health, environment, and climate in Europe. Aerosol concentrations have been declining since the 1980s in Europe,mainly owing to a reduction of local aerosol and precursor emissions.Emissions from other source regions of the world, which have been changing rapidly as well, may also perturb the historical and future trends of aerosols and change their radiative impact in Europe. This study examines trends of aerosols in Europe during 1980–2018 and quantifies contributions from 16 source regions using the Community Atmosphere Model version 5 with Explicit Aerosol Source Tagging (CAM5-EAST). The simulated near-surface total mass concentration of sulfate, black carbon, and primary organic carbon had a 62 % decrease during 1980–2018. The majority of which was contributed to reductions of local emissions in Europe, and 8 %–9 % was induced by a decrease in emissions from Russia–Belarus–Ukraine. With the decreases in the fractional contribution of local emissions, aerosols transported from other source regions are increasingly important for air quality in Europe. During 1980–2018, the decrease in sulfate loading led to a warming effect of 2.0 W m –2 in Europe, with 12 % coming from changes in non-European sources, especially from North America and Russia–Belarus–Ukraine. According to the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) scenarios, contributions to the sulfate radiative forcing over Europe from both local European emissions and non-European emissions should decrease at a comparable rate in the next 3 decades, suggesting that future changes in non-European emissions are as important as European emissions for causing possible regional climate change associated with aerosols in Europe.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
NASA NTRS1993

Results from the US/Russian Meteor-3/Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer

The development of Meteor-3/TOMS (Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer) was a joint project of the United States and Russia to fly a U.S. ozone measuring instrument (TOMS) onboard a Russian spacecraft (Meteor-3) and rocket (Cyclone), launched from Plesetsk, Russia. The Meteor-3/TOMS (M3TOMS) was launched into a 1202-km-high, near-polar orbit on 15 Aug. 1991, where it can obtain complete global coverage for most of each year. Both the U.S. and Russian sides have successfully received and processed data into ozone amounts from 25 Aug. 1991 to 1 Jun. 1992, and expect to continue for the life of the instrument and spacecraft. The successful development of the instrument hardware, spacecraft interface, data memory, telemetry systems, and software are described. Descriptions are given of the U.S. and Russian ground stations for receiving M3TOMS data. In addition, the data reduction software was independently developed by the U.S. and by the Russians, and is shown to agree to better than the precision of the measurements.

Herman, Jay R.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Biophysical characterization and surface radiation balance

The Kursk 1991 Experiment (KUREX-91) was conducted as one of a suite of international studies to develop capabilities to monitor global change. The studies were designed specifically to understand the earth's land-surface vegetation and atmospheric boundary layer interaction. An intensive field campaign was conducted at a site near Kursk, Russia during the month of July in 1991 by a team of international scientists to aid in the understanding of land-surface-atmosphere interactions in an agricultural/grassland setting. We were one of several teams of scientists participating at KUREX-91 at the Streletskaya Steppe Researve near Kursk, Russia. The main goals of our research were to: (1) characterize biophysical properties of the prairie vegetation; and (2) to characterize radiation regime through measurements and from estimates derived from canopy bidirectional reflectance data. Four objectives were defined to achieve these goals: (1) determine dependence of leaf optical properties on leaf water potential of some dominant species in discrete wavebands in the visible, near-infrared, and mid-infrared (spanning 0.4-2.3 microns range); (2) characterize the effective leaf area index (LAI) and leaf angle distribution of prairie vegetation; (3) characterize the radiation regime of the prairie vegetation through measures of the radiation balance components; and (4) examine, develop, and test methods for estimating albedo, APAR, and LAI from canopy bidirectional reflectance data. Papers which were the result of the research efforts are included.

Walter-Shea, Elizabeth A.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Satellite communications systems and technology. Executive Summary

NASA and the National Science Foundation (NSF) commissioned a panel of US experts to study the international status of satellite communications systems and technology. The study covers emerging systems concepts, applications, services, and the attendant technologies. The panel members travelled to Europe, Japan, and Russia to gather information first-hand. They visited 17 sites in Europe, 20 sites in Japan, and four in Russia. These included major manufacturers, government organizations, service providers, and associated R&D facilities. The panel's report was reviewed by the sites visited, by the panel, and by representatives of US industry. The report details the information collected and compares it to US activities.

Edelson, Burton I.↗