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At least 163 records · Page 9

Characterizing Fractures Across the Astronaut Corps: Preliminary Findings from Population-Level Analysis

Despite evidence of bone loss during spaceflight and operational countermeasures to mitigate this loss, the subsequent risk of fracture among astronauts is not known. The physiologic process of diminished bone density and bone recovery during or following spaceflight is multifactorial. Such factors as age, sex, fracture history, and others may combine to increase fracture risk among astronauts. As part of the 2016 Bone Research and Clinical Advisory Panel (RCAP), the authors analyzed data collected on 338 NASA astronauts to describe the demographics, bone-relevant characteristics, and fracture history of the astronaut population. The majority of the population are male (n=286, 84.6%), have flown at least one mission (n=306, 90.5%), and were between the ages of 30 and 49 at first mission (n=296, 96.7% of those with at least one mission). Of the 338 astronauts, 241 (71.3%) experienced a fracture over the course of their lifetime. One hundred and five (43.5%) of these 241 astronauts only experienced a fracture prior to being selected into the Astronaut Corps, whereas 53 (22.0%) only experienced a fracture after selection as an astronaut. An additional 80 astronauts (33.2%) had both pre- and post-selection fractures. The remaining 3 astronauts had a fracture of unknown date, which could not be categorized as pre- or post-selection. Among the 133 astronauts with at least one post-selection fracture, males comprised 90.2% (n=120) compared to 84.5% of the entire Corps, and females accounted for 9.8% (n=13) compared to 15.4% of the Corps. Ninety-seven of the 133 astronauts with post-selection fractures (72.9%) had one fracture event, 22 (16.5%) had two fractures, and 14 (10.5%) had three or more fractures. Some astronauts with multiple fractures suffered these in a single event, such as an automobile accident. The 133 astronauts with a post-selection fracture accounted for a total of 188 fracture events. One hundred and four (78.2%) of astronauts with post-selection fractures experienced those fractures following their first mission (mean 12.7 +/- 11.1 years following first mission; range 14.0 days - 50.6 years). Additional analyses are ongoing and include examination of fracture history, skeletal site, mechanism, and type of fracture, age at time of fracture, time from spaceflight to fracture, as well as multivariable analysis comparing fracture events to non-events. The results of such analyses may reveal trends in risk factors for fracture among the astronaut corps that have yet to be systematically described through a corps-wide approach.

Rossi, Meredith M.↗

Integrating risk assessment methods for carbon storage: A case study for the quest carbon capture and storage facility

This paper documents how tools developed by the National Risk Assessment Partnership (NRAP) complement the Bowtie risk assessment approach through the demonstration of a risk-based Area of Review (AoR) determination for the Quest Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) facility near Edmonton, Alberta with the NRAP Open-Source Integrated Assessment Model (NRAP Open-IAM). The Bowtie risk assessment for the Quest CCS site was developed by Shell Canada Ltd., who operates the asset on behalf of the Athabasca Oil Sand Project — a joint venture, owned by Canadian Natural Resources Ltd, Chevron Canada and Shell Canada Ltd. The Quest Bowtie treats site risk comprehensively – considering a large set of technical and project risks (e.g., operational risks, above ground infrastructure, public perception, etc.). NRAP tools, methods, and analyses are focused on quantitative assessment of subsurface technical risks. NRAP-Open-IAM was used to evaluate potential groundwater impacts at the Quest site, i.e., a sufficient change above background groundwater quality levels to be measurable, should CO 2 and/or brine leak from the reservoir via a faulty and/or compromised wellbore. Our results show there is a low potential for groundwater impact and support a further reduction (from ~460 to 100 km 2 ) to the established AoR for the Quest site. Integrating both approaches early in the site characterization period could significantly benefit commercial-scale projects by drastically reducing the region over which leakage risks (e.g., legacy wells) need to be evaluated, i.e., the AoR. This is especially true for brownfield sites, which could contain hundreds to thousands of legacy wells. Further, basing monitoring network design on those regions where impacts are most likely to occur has the potential to facilitate more efficient deployment of monitoring technologies and improve the likelihood of detecting a leak should one occur.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

LandCast Mosaic: Reconstructing Global Population Distributions, 1975-2025

LandCast Mosaic (LCM) provides a global, high-resolution gridded population dataset spanning 1975–2025, representing annual, scenario-consistent estimates of daytime, nighttime, and ambient population distributions. LCM builds on the 2025 LandScan Mosaic (LSM) population data by backcasting to earlier years using historical changes in built-surface area derived from the Global Human Settlement Layer (GHSL) and authoritative population counts from international datasets. The workflow scales 2025 building-informed gridded population estimates according to observed changes in built surface, applies linear interpolation for intermediate years, and normalizes estimates to match administrative- and country-level totals. The resulting dataset offers consistent, globally gridded population estimates over fifty years, suitable for temporal analyses of population dynamics, disaster risk modeling, and urban planning applications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Space Station Freedom Environmental Health Care Program

The paper discusses the environmental planning and monitoring aspects of the Space Station Freedom (SSF) Environmental Health Care Program, which encompasses all phases of the SSF assembly and operation from the first element entry at MB-6 through the Permanent Manned Capability and beyond. Environmental planning involves the definition of acceptability limits and monitoring requirements for the radiation dose barothermal parameters and potential contaminants in the SSF air and water and on internal surfaces. Inflight monitoring will be implemented through the Environmental Health System, which consists of five subsystems: Microbiology, Toxicology, Water Quality, Radiation, and Barothermal Physiology. In addition to the environmental data interpretation and analysis conducted after each mission, the new data will be compared to archived data for statistical and long-term trend analysis and determination of risk exposures. Results of these analyses will be used to modify the acceptability limits and monitoring requirements for the future.

Richard, Elizabeth E.↗

NASA Space Flight Vehicle Fault Isolation Challenges

The Space Launch System (SLS) is the new NASA heavy lift launch vehicle in development and is scheduled for its first mission in 2018.SLS has many of the same logistics challenges as any other large scale program. However, SLS also faces unique challenges related to testability. This presentation will address the SLS challenges for diagnostics and fault isolation, along with the analyses and decisions to mitigate risk..

Neeley, James R.↗

NASA Space Flight Vehicle Fault Isolation Challenges

The Space Launch System (SLS) is the new NASA heavy lift launch vehicle in development and is scheduled for its first mission in 2018. SLS has many of the same logistics challenges as any other large scale program. However, SLS also faces unique challenges related to testability. This presentation will address the SLS challenges for diagnostics and fault isolation, along with the analyses and decisions to mitigate risk.

Bramon, Chris↗

Reliability and Probabilistic Risk Assessment - How They Play Together

Since the Space Shuttle Challenger accident in 1986, NASA has extensively used probabilistic analysis methods to assess, understand, and communicate the risk of space launch vehicles. Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), used in the nuclear industry, is one of the probabilistic analysis methods NASA utilizes to assess Loss of Mission (LOM) and Loss of Crew (LOC) risk for launch vehicles. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment that uses a combination of fault trees, event trees, event sequence diagrams, and probability distributions to analyze the risk of a system, a process, or an activity. It is a process designed to answer three basic questions: 1) what can go wrong that would lead to loss or degraded performance (i.e., scenarios involving undesired consequences of interest), 2) how likely is it (probabilities), and 3) what is the severity of the degradation (consequences). Since the Challenger accident, PRA has been used in supporting decisions regarding safety upgrades for launch vehicles. Another area that was given a lot of emphasis at NASA after the Challenger accident is reliability engineering. Reliability engineering has been a critical design function at NASA since the early Apollo days. However, after the Challenger accident, quantitative reliability analysis and reliability predictions were given more scrutiny because of their importance in understanding failure mechanism and quantifying the probability of failure, which are key elements in resolving technical issues, performing design trades, and implementing design improvements. Although PRA and reliability are both probabilistic in nature and, in some cases, use the same tools, they are two different activities. Specifically, reliability engineering is a broad design discipline that deals with loss of function and helps understand failure mechanism and improve component and system design. PRA is a system scenario based risk assessment process intended to assess the risk scenarios that could lead to a major/top undesirable system event, and to identify those scenarios that are high-risk drivers. PRA output is critical to support risk informed decisions concerning system design. This paper describes the PRA process and the reliability engineering discipline in detail. It discusses their differences and similarities and how they work together as complementary analyses to support the design and risk assessment processes. Lessons learned, applications, and case studies in both areas are also discussed in the paper to demonstrate and explain these differences and similarities.

Safie, Fayssal↗

Ares I-X Separation and Reentry Trajectory Analyses

The Ares I-X Flight Test Vehicle was launched on October 28, 2009 and was the first and only test flight of NASA s two-stage Ares I launch vehicle design. The launch was successful and the flight test met all of its primary and secondary objectives. This paper discusses the stage separation and reentry trajectory analysis that was performed in support of the Ares I-X test flight. Pre-flight analyses were conducted to assess the risk of stage recontact during separation, to evaluate the first stage flight dynamics during reentry, and to define the range safety impact ellipses of both stages. The results of these pre-flight analyses were compared with available flight data. On-board video taken during flight showed that the flight test vehicle successfully separated without any recontact. Reconstructed trajectory data also showed that first stage flight dynamics were well characterized by pre-flight Monte Carlo results. In addition, comparisons with flight data indicated that the complex interference aerodynamic models employed in the reentry simulation were effective in capturing the flight dynamics during separation. Finally, the splash-down locations of both stages were well within predicted impact ellipses.

Tartabini, Paul V.↗

Dietary B group vitamin intake and the bladder cancer risk: a pooled analysis of prospective cohort studies

Abstract Purpose Diet may play an essential role in the aetiology of bladder cancer (BC). The B group complex vitamins involve diverse biological functions that could be influential in cancer prevention. The aim of the present study was to investigate the association between various components of the B group vitamin complex and BC risk. Methods Dietary data were pooled from four cohort studies. Food item intake was converted to daily intakes of B group vitamins and pooled multivariate hazard ratios (HRs), with corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs), were obtained using Cox-regression models. Dose–response relationships were examined using a nonparametric test for trend. Results In total, 2915 BC cases and 530,012 non-cases were included in the analyses. The present study showed an increased BC risk for moderate intake of vitamin B1 (HR B1 : 1.13, 95% CI: 1.00–1.20). In men, moderate intake of the vitamins B1, B2, energy-related vitamins and high intake of vitamin B1 were associated with an increased BC risk (HR (95% CI): 1.13 (1.02–1.26), 1.14 (1.02–1.26), 1.13 (1.02–1.26; 1.13 (1.02–1.26), respectively). In women, high intake of all vitamins and vitamin combinations, except for the entire complex, showed an inverse association (HR (95% CI): 0.80 (0.67–0.97), 0.83 (0.70–1.00); 0.77 (0.63–0.93), 0.73 (0.61–0.88), 0.82 (0.68–0.99), 0.79 (0.66–0.95), 0.80 (0.66–0.96), 0.74 (0.62–0.89), 0.76 (0.63–0.92), respectively). Dose–response analyses showed an increased BC risk for higher intake of vitamin B1 and B12. Conclusion Our findings highlight the importance of future research on the food sources of B group vitamins in the context of the overall and sex-stratified diet.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Orbital Debris Shape and Orientation Effects on Impact Damage to Shuttle Tiles

Taking the damage results from a previous paper as a guide, and using a tile model created for the STS-107 accident investigation, we used the SPHC hydrodynamic code to evaluate the probable worst-case impact effects of flat, rectangular, "flake-shaped," orbital debris particles on Space Shuttle thermal tiles. We compared the damage from flakes with that produced by spheres. The flakes and spheres were sized according to a "characteristic length" (Lc) derived from radar cross-section measurements, and embodied in the NASA Standard Breakup Model (SBM). Impacts were simulated at near-normal obliquity, at 12 km/sec. We modeled the worst-case flake orientation: a corner-on impact, an orientation we term a "Face A-B" impact. Results of our simulations indicate that flake impactors are less damaging than spheres of the same Lc. Since spherical impactors have been assumed in analyses of shuttle orbital debris impact risk, we find that these risks may have been overestimated. This work represents a preliminary second step, i.e., a follow-on to [1], in developing a sensitivity analysis for the expected range of effects on damage considering spherical vs. non-spherical impactors, as recommended by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) report to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

Evans, Steven W.↗

Understanding the compound flood risk along the coast of the contiguous United States

Abstract. Compound flooding is a type of flood event caused by multiple flood drivers. The associated risk has usually been assessed using statistics-based analyses or hydrodynamics-based numerical models. This study proposes a compound flood (CF) risk assessment (CFRA) framework for coastal regions in the contiguous United States (CONUS). In this framework, a large-scale river model is coupled with a global ocean reanalysis dataset to (a) evaluate the CF exposure related to the coastal backwater effects on river basins, and (b) generate spatially distributed data for analyzing the CF hazard using a bivariate statistical model of river discharge and storm surge. The two kinds of risk are also combined to achieve a holistic understanding of the continental-scale CF risk. The estimated CF risk shows remarkable inter- and intra-basin variabilities along the CONUS coast with more variabilities in the CF hazard over the US west and Gulf coastal basins. Different risk assessment methods present significantly different patterns in a few key regions such as the San Francisco Bay area, the lower Mississippi River, and Puget Sound. Our results highlight the need to weigh different CF risk measures and avoid using single statistics-based or hydrodynamics-based CFRAs. Uncertainty sources in these CFRAs include the use of gauge observations, which cannot account for the flow physics or resolve the spatial variability of risks, and underestimations of the flood extremes and the dependence of CF drivers in large-scale models, highlighting the importance of understanding the CF risks for developing a more robust CFRA.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Commercial fishery bycatch risk for large juvenile and adult smalltooth sawfish (Pristis pectinata) in Florida waters

1.Incidental catch of marine species can create ecological and economic issues, particularly for endangered species. The smalltooth sawfish (Pristis pectinata) is endemic to the Atlantic Ocean and listed as Endangered in the US Endangered Species Act. One of its major threats is bycatch mortality in commercial fisheries. 2.Despite the protection afforded by the US Endangered Species Act, smalltooth sawfish are still captured as bycatch in commercial fisheries. Acoustic and satellite tag data collected on 59 sawfish between 2011 and 2019 were analysed to assess commercial fishery bycatch risk for large juveniles and adults off Florida. This study focused on shrimp trawl, south-east coastal gillnet, and shark bottom longline fisheries, as these were identified in the recovery plan as having the greatest potential threats to recovery. 3.Bycatch risk associated with the shrimp trawl fishery was significantly higher than the other fisheries, indicating that this fishery currently poses the greatest threat to recovery. 4.Bycatch risk was concentrated in all seasons in the Gulf of Mexico adjacent to the lower Florida Keys for the shrimp trawl fishery, off Cape Canaveral in the south-east coastal gillnet fishery, and in the Atlantic Ocean adjacent to the Florida Keys in the shark bottom longline fishery. 5.Tagging location and sex were predictors of bycatch risk. Individuals tagged in Charlotte Harbor had the highest shrimp trawl bycatch risk. Females tagged in south Florida tended to reside in the deepest water, which is where shrimp trawl effort is highest. Therefore, females may be at more risk in these deeper waters. 6.Results from this study indicate a year-round closure of waters off south-west Florida to the shrimp trawl fishery between Charlotte Harbor and the western Florida Keys would reduce sawfish bycatch, and thus mortality, which is in line with recovery plan goals.

acoustic monitoring, bycatch, commercial fisheries↗

Fragility Functions Resource Report: Documented Sources for Electricity and Water Resilience Valuation

Fragility curves provide the vulnerability between hazard intensity and an asset. Federal installations may include many different electricity and water infrastructure types (or assets) such as generators, wind turbines, solar PV, switch yards, substations and power lines as well as water distribution systems that could be affected by different hazards. The vulnerability of each asset is a function of its age, type of materials and maintenance. In addition, the vulnerability changes with the hazards intensity and has a probability distribution function associated with it. The fragility functions are used in conjunction with hazard probability and consequence valuations to determine the values at risk for examination of investment grade analyses of alternative mitigation strategies. This document provides examples of fragility functions and links to their sources for different electricity and water infrastructure assets by hazard type.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Electromagnetic Compatibility Test and Analysis Campaign of NASA's Mars 2020 Rover Final Submission

NASA's Mars 2020 Perseverance Rover—with a launch window opening July 2020, and landing expected February 2021—has mission objectives to look for evidence of habitability, seek biosignatures of past life, collect and cache samples for possible future return to Earth, and prepare for future human missions to Mars. The Rover platform is similar to the previous Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) “Curiosity” rover that landed in 2012 but contains a new suite of scientific instruments and upgrades to existing functionality: seven new and/or upgraded scientific payloads, an upgraded arm and sampling system, and a Helicopter demonstration. These changes—along with new efficiency goals to operate more Rover subsystems concurrently and thus collect more science—presented new electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) challenges. In this paper, we will describe the campaign to ensure Mars 2020 mission success from an electromagnetic environment perspective: 1) confirming existing MSL heritage subsystems and EMC requirements were compatible with the new Mars 2020 mission objectives, 2) engaging with engineers and scientists early in the project to identify and evaluate risks before hardware assembly and performing ambitious risk reduction tests, 3) undertaking a comprehensive subsystem qualification test program based on tailored MIL-STD-461F requirements, occasionally leading to redesign, 4) synthesizing the data collected to perform detailed analyses toward the goal of making risk-informed decisions at a system level. The spacecraft successfully completed all three planned system level tests, demonstrating self-compatibility with minimal impact to operations from electromagn

Gonzales, Edward C↗

Electromagnetic Compatibility Test and Analysis Campaign of NASA's Mars 2020 Rover

NASA's Mars 2020 Rover—with a launch window opening July 2020, and landing expected February 2021—has mission objectives to look for evidence of habitability, seek biosignatures of past life, collect and cache samples for possible future return to Earth, and prepare for future human missions. The Rover platform is similar to the previous Mars Science Laboratory (MSL) “Curiosity” rover that landed in 2012 but contains a new suite of scientific instruments and upgrades to existing functionality. The scientific payload includes a trio of chemical analysis tools (PIXL, SHERLOC, SuperCam), a ground penetrating radar (RIMFAX), an upgraded weather station (MEDA), upgraded high resolution camera (MastCam-Z), and an oxygen-producing experiment (MOXIE). These changes—along with new efficiency goals to operate more Rover subsystems concurrently and thus collect more science—presented new electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) challenges. In this paper, we will describe the campaign to ensure Mars 2020 mission success from an electromagnetic environment perspective: 1) confirming existing MSL heritage subsystems and EMC requirements were compatible with the new Mars 2020 mission objectives, 2) engaging with engineers and scientists early in the project to identify and evaluate risks before hardware assembly and performing ambitious risk reduction tests, 3) undertaking a comprehensive subsystem qualification test program based on tailored MIL-STD-461F requirements, occasionally leading to redesign, 4) synthesizing the data collected to perform detailed analyses toward the goal of making risk-informed decisions at a system level. The spacecraft has successfully completed all three planned system level tests, demonstrating self-compatibility with minimal impact to operations from electromagnetic interference in all mission phases.

Gonzales, Edward C↗

Cybersecurity Considerations for Hydrogen Infrastructure in Airport Environments

This report explores key cybersecurity concerns and best practices within environments that serve as reference points for the development of hydrogen fueling infrastructure for aviation. This cybersecurity analysis leverages prior NREL studies: 1) hydrogen fueling station component validation to identify vulnerabilities and failure events documented in physical equipment, and 2) electric aircraft charging infrastructure analysis to explore primary cybersecurity vulnerabilities. It reviews the criticality of digitized technologies in sustaining hydrogen fuel production, storage, and fueling systems, noting cybersecurity concerns that are universal to power systems and industrial control systems in general. In considering cybersecurity vulnerabilities within a future landscape of hydrogen energy for aviation applications, a reference architecture was intended to reveal the points of connection between assets and the potential sensors that are vulnerable to manipulation in the event of compromised access or communication within a SCADA system. A generalized reference architecture can help stakeholders, engineers, or strategists understand connections, criticalities, and standard practices when it comes to designing and planning for new systems. There are several gaps to account for in assessing the future of hydrogen production, storage, and fueling for aviation. Engaging stakeholders, including aircraft manufacturers, electric utilities, site property owners, and local communities, will inform decision-making around site structure, operations, and resources for future hydrogen fueling infrastructure to understand operational needs and cybersecurity awareness. Cybersecurity mitigation strategy must consider physical attack vectors that emerge with the integration of hydrogen systems into existing airport security requirements. The cybersecurity risk assessment contained in this report is an entry point into potential future granular-level analyses to be conducted as part of hazard and risk assessments for safe aviation hydrogen infrastructure, determining how the scale of hydrogen fuel infrastructure for aviation impacts the volume of cyber attack vectors, and what, if any, are the vulnerabilities associated with different types of on-board hydrogen systems. In this nascent development phase, assessing how best to integrate cybersecurity practices into an evolving U.S. aviation landscape provides critical insights into building increased awareness and stakeholder engagement to support a cyber-resilient infrastructure.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Risk Informed, Performance-Based, Technology-Inclusive Regulatory Infrastructure: Technology-Inclusive Determination of Mechanistic Source Terms for Offsite Dose-Related Assessments for Advanced Nuclear Reactor Facilities

This report summarizes a risk informed, performance-based and technology-inclusive approach to determine source terms for dose related assessments at advanced nuclear facilities. This approach uses a graded process which allows both the non-mechanistic source terms calculation methods, which adopt conservative approaches and assumptions based on known physical and chemical principles, and more importantly the mechanistic source term calculation methods, which consider design-specific scenarios and use best estimate models with uncertainty quantification for a range of licensing basis events (LBEs), to be used for the design and licensing of advanced nuclear technologies. The source terms developed with this graded approach, and radionuclide inventories elsewhere in the facility that are determined during source term analysis, can be used to address licensing issues to support the application processes of 10 CFR Part 50 for a construction permit and operating license or 10 CFR Part 52 for a Combined Operating License (COL), Standard Design Certification, Early Site Permit, Standard Design Approval or Manufacturing License. They can also be used for other purposes including equipment environmental qualification, control room habitability analyses, and assessments of severe accident risks in environmental impact statements. There are many advanced reactor concepts being developed including high temperature gas-cooled reactor (HGTR), sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR), lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR), molten salt reactor (MSR), micro-reactor, etc. The graded approach presented in this report for source terms determination is, to the extent possible, generic to any of these reactor designs and to future reactor designs. This report provides information on the review of the regulatory foundation for use of conservative bounding source terms as well as event-specific mechanistic source terms for advanced nuclear reactor designs.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗