RECOVERY ACT: SRF-Nb Thin-Films Grown Using Energetic Condensation for Nb-on-Cu SRF Cavities
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This research project aims to develop and validate an advanced computer model that can be used in the planning and design of stimulation techniques to create engineered reservoirs for Enhanced Geothermal Systems. The specific objectives of the proposal are to; Develop a true three-dimensional hydro-thermal fracturing simulator that is particularly suited for EGS reservoir creation; Perform laboratory scale model tests of hydraulic fracturing and proppant flow/transport using a polyaxial loading device, and use the laboratory results to test and validate the 3D simulator; Perform discrete element/particulate modeling of proppant transport in hydraulic fractures, and use the results to improve understand of proppant flow and transport; Test and validate the 3D hydro-thermal fracturing simulator against case histories of EGS energy production; and Develop a plan to commercialize the 3D fracturing and proppant flow/transport simulator. The project is expected to yield several specific results and benefits. Major technical products from the proposal include; A true-3D hydro-thermal fracturing computer code that is particularly suited to EGS; Documented results of scale model tests on hydro-thermal fracturing and fracture propping in an analogue crystalline rock; Documented procedures and results of discrete element/particulate modeling of flow and transport of proppants for EGS applications; and Database of monitoring data, with focus of Acoustic Emissions (AE) from lab scale modeling and field case histories of EGS reservoir creation.
The research project aims to develop and validate an advanced computer model that can be used in the planning and design of stimulation techniques to create engineered reservoirs for Enhanced Geothermal Systems. The specific objectives of the proposal are to: 1) Develop a true three-dimensional hydro-thermal fracturing simulator that is particularly suited for EGS reservoir creation. 2) Perform laboratory scale model tests of hydraulic fracturing and proppant flow/transport using a polyaxial loading device, and use the laboratory results to test and validate the 3D simulator. 3) Perform discrete element/particulate modeling of proppant transport in hydraulic fractures, and use the results to improve understand of proppant flow and transport. 4) Test and validate the 3D hydro-thermal fracturing simulator against case histories of EGS energy production. 5) Develop a plan to commercialize the 3D fracturing and proppant flow/transport simulator. The project is expected to yield several specific results and benefits. Major technical products from the proposal include: 1) A true-3D hydro-thermal fracturing computer code that is particularly suited to EGS, 2) Documented results of scale model tests on hydro-thermal fracturing and fracture propping in an analogue crystalline rock, 3) Documented procedures and results of discrete element/particulate modeling of flow and transport of proppants for EGS applications, and 4) Database of monitoring data, with focus of Acoustic Emissions (AE) from lab scale modeling and field case histories of EGS reservoir creation.
DOE EE002875 Technical Report Public Release. The objective was to leverage ICM’s pre-existing corn to ethanol pilot plant to build and to commission a fully functional pilot integrated cellulosic biorefinery. ICM’s Integrated Biorefinery (IBR) project was designed to achieve four major objectives. These primary goals were achieved during the performance period from December 2009 – August 2015. The design and construction phase took place from December 2009 until August 2011, with an increase in budget of nearly 4 million dollars. This increased cost was offset by operational changes, so the amount spent for the overall project increased by less than $500,000. There were three 1,000-hour performance test conducted, which produced cellulosic feedstock.
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The Savannah River Site, which is owned and administered by the US Department of Energy, covers approximately 900 square kilometers. The General Separation Area is located in the center of the site and includes: radioactive material chemical separations facilities, radioactive waste tank farms, radioactive seepage basins, and the radioactive waste burial grounds. Radioactive wastes were disposed in the General Separation Area from the mid-1950's through the mid-1990's. Operations at the F Canyon began in 1954 and at H Canyon began in 1955. Waste water disposition to the F and H Seepage Basins began soon after operations started in the canyons. The Old Radioactive Waste Burial Ground began operations in 1952 to manage solid waste that could be radioactive from all the site operations, and ceased receiving waste in 1972. The Mixed Waste Management Facility and Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility received radioactive solid waste from 1969 until 1995. Environmental legislation enacted in the 1970's through 1990's led to changes in waste management and environmental cleanup practices. The US Congress passed the Clean Air Act in 1970 and the Clean Water Act in 1972; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act was enacted in 1976; the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation, and Liability Act was enacted by Congress in 1980; and the Federal Facilities Compliance Act was signed into law in 1992. Environmental remediation at the Savannah River Site essentially began with a 1987 Settlement Agreement between the Savannah River Site and the State of South Carolina. The site manages several of the larger groundwater remedial activities under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act for facilities recognized early on as environmental problems. All subsequent remediation projects are managed under a tri-party agreement (Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control) through the Federal Facilities Agreement. Environmental remediation activities during the past 25 years have stabilized and capped seepage basins as well as consolidated and capped waste units and burial grounds in the General Separation Area. Groundwater activities include: pump and treat systems in the groundwater, installation of deep subsurface barrier systems to manage groundwater flow, in situ chemical treatments in the groundwater, and captured contaminated groundwater discharges at the surface for management in a forest irrigation system. Concentrations of contaminants in the aquifers beneath the General Separation Area and in surface water streams in the General Separation Area have decreased over the past 25 years. Closure of 65 waste sites and 4 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act facilities has been successfully accomplished. Environmental clean-up has progressed to the stage where most of the work involves monitoring, optimization, and maintenance of existing remedial systems. Many lessons have been learned in the process of remediating the General Separations Area. Geo-textile covers outperform low permeability clay caps, especially with respect to the amount of repairs required to upkeep the drainage layers as the caps age. Passive and enhanced natural processes to address contamination are much more cost effective than pump and treat systems. Forest irrigation can be very effective in water management situations with non-accumulative contaminants such as tritium and volatile organic contaminants. (authors)
Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (the Recovery Act or ARRA), the United States Department of Energy (DOE) funded several projects to deploy polymer electrolyte membrane (PEM) fuel cells in forklift and backup power applications. DOE invested $\$$9.7 million to deploy fuel cells in forklifts and an additional $\$$11.8 million was contributed through industry cost shares, for a total investment of $\$$21.5 million in forklift projects. DOE invested $\$$18.5 million to deploy fuel cells in backup power projects and an additional $\$$30.8 million was contributed through industry cost shares, for a total investment of $\$$49.3 million in backup power projects.
This field sampling plan describes sampling of the soil/liner of Lagoon 3 at the Central Facilities Area Sewage Treatment Plant. The lagoon is to be closed, and samples obtained from the soil/liner will provide information to determine if Lagoon 3 and the land application area can be closed in a manner that renders it safe to human health and the environment. Samples collected under this field sampling plan will be compared to Idaho National Laboratory background soil concentrations. If the concentrations of constituents of concern exceed the background level, they will be compared to Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act preliminary remediation goals and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act levels. If the concentrations of constituents of concern are lower than the background levels, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act levels, or the preliminary remediation goals, then Lagoon 3 and the land application area will be closed. If the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act levels and/or the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act preliminary remediation goals are exceeded, additional sampling and action may be required.
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) was established to jumpstart the U.S. economy, create or save millions of jobs, and invest in the Nation's energy future. The Department of Energy received approximately $37 billion through the Recovery Act to support a variety of science, energy and environmental initiatives. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued guidance for carrying out stimulus-related activities which requires, among other things, that recipients ensure funds provided by the Recovery Act are clearly distinguishable from non-Recovery Act funds in all reporting systems and that recipients' actions are transparent to the public. To meet these requirements, the Department's recipients must clearly and accurately track and report on 18 separate data elements. In addition, the Department was to develop and implement a process to ensure that recipient information reported to the public was free from material omissions and significant reporting errors. Our recent report (OAS-RA-10-01, October 2009) noted that the Department had developed a quality assurance process to facilitate the quarterly reviews of recipient data and planned to test it during the first quarterly reporting cycle. To determine whether the Department's quality assurance process was effective, we examined information reported by recipients of Departmental funding as of September 30, 2009. We also sought to determine whether the Department's prime contractors were prepared to track and report on Recovery Act activities. The Department had taken a number of actions designed to ensure the accuracy and transparency of reported Recovery Act results. This process identified potential anomalies with information reported by 1,113 of 2,038, or 55 percent of recipients. We view the Department's data quality assurance efforts as both timely and significant. As noted by our audit testing, however, opportunities exist to strengthen the process. In particular: (1) Site officials did not always ensure that anomalies, once identified during the quality assurance process, were actually resolved. For example, the Department's process identified that about 740 of the approximately 10,000 jobs reported in the first quarter of Fiscal Year 2010 as created/retained were for projects reported as having no funds spent. Although these problems were referred to site officials for follow-up and/or correction, the information was never actually changed; (2) The Department did not always utilize the correct basis when evaluating the accuracy of 'funds provided' data submitted by grant recipients. For example, in its analysis process, the Department used data reflecting 'funds obligated' rather than the correct amount of 'total grant awards'. This generated a number of potential false positives; and, (3) Duplicate reports by certain recipients, resulting in overstatements of as much as $137 million of the more than $18 billion obligated, were not corrected. We observed that the Department had taken prompt action to ensure that its prime facility management contractors could properly report Recovery Act information. Notably, the seven contractors in this category included in our review had modified their accounting systems, as necessary, to ensure that they could accurately track and report on Recovery Act activities. The systems at each of these entities had been restructured so that they: (i) could separate Recovery Act and non-Recovery Act funds; and, (ii) had adequate processing capacity to handle the projected increase in transactions. We found the Department's decision to limit its reviews to the four elements that it considered to be critical (award amount, invoiced amount, jobs created/retained, and project status) to be reasonable. We concluded, however, other elements or dependent relationships should not be completely excluded from review. Beyond its initial development and implementation of its quality assurance process, the Department had taken steps to improve its ability to ensure that Recovery Act information was both accurate and transparent to the public. Specifically, officials changed the quality assurance plan based on initial data reviews. Department officials also informed us that they are in the process of updating their quality assurance process to meet new OMB requirements. For example, recent guidance directed agencies to focus on certain data elements, such as award number and recipient name, during their quality assurance reviews. In addition, subsequent to our review, the Department added two more data elements and comparisons to its quarterly assurance process, including an analysis of costs/expenditures and a comparison of the recipient reported project status to the Department's data contained in its financial system.
The Department of Energy's (Department) Weatherization Assistance Program received $5 billion under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) to improve the energy efficiency of homes, multi-family rental units and mobile homes owned or occupied by low-income persons. Subsequently, the Department awarded a three-year Weatherization Assistance Program grant for $94 million to the Commonwealth of Virginia (Virginia). This grant provided more than a ten-fold increase in funds available to Virginia for weatherization over that authorized in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009. Corresponding to the increase in funding, the Recovery Act increased the limit on the average amount spent to weatherize a home (unit) from $2,500 to $6,500. Virginia's Department of Housing and Community Development (DHCD) administers the Recovery Act grant through 22 local community action agencies. These agencies (sub-grantees) are responsible for determining applicant eligibility, weatherizing homes, and conducting home assessments and inspections. Typical weatherization services include installing insulation; sealing ducts; tuning and repairing furnaces; and, mitigating heat loss through windows, doors and other infiltration points. Virginia plans to use its Recovery Act Weatherization funding to weatherize about 9,193 units over the life of the grant - a significant increase over the 1,475 housing units that were planned to be completed in FY 2009. Given the significant increase in funding and the demands associated with weatherizing thousands of homes, we initiated this audit to determine if Virginia had adequate safeguards in place to ensure that the Weatherization Program was managed efficiently and effectively. The State of Virginia's DHCD had not implemented financial and reporting controls needed to ensure Weatherization Program funds are spent effectively and efficiently. Specifically, DHCD had not: (1) Performed on-site financial monitoring of any of its sub-grantees under the Recovery Act; (2) Reviewed documentation supporting sub-grantee requests for reimbursements to verify the accuracy of amounts charged; (3) Periodically reconciled amounts paid to sub-grantees to the actual cost to weatherize units; (4) Maintained vehicle and equipment inventories as required by Federal regulations and state and Federal program directives; and (5) Accurately reported Weatherization Program results to the Department. Exacerbating weaknesses in DHCD's financial controls, the Department's most recent program monitoring visit to Virginia, made in 2008 before passage of the Recovery Act, did not include a required financial review. Hence, the financial control weaknesses discussed above were not detected and had not been addressed. As described in this report, these control and reporting weaknesses increase the risk that Recovery Act objectives may not be achieved and that fraud, waste or abuse can occur and not be detected in this critically important program.
The Department of Energy's Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) provides grants to states, territories, and the District of Columbia to support their energy priorities through the State Energy Program (SEP). The SEP provides Federal financial assistance to carry out energy efficiency and renewable energy projects that meet each state's unique energy needs while also addressing national goals such as energy security. Federal funding is based on a grant formula that takes into account population and energy consumption. The SEP emphasizes the state's role as the decision maker and administrator for the program. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) expanded the SEP, authorizing $3.1 billion in grants. Based on existing grant formulas and after reviewing state-level plans, EERE made awards to states. The State of Florida's Energy Office (Florida) was allocated $126 million - a 90-fold increase over Florida's average annual SEP grant of $1.4 million. Per the Recovery Act, this funding must be obligated by September 30, 2010, and spent by April 30, 2012. As of March 10, 2010, Florida had expended $13.2 million of the SEP Recovery Act funds. Florida planned to use its grant funds to undertake activities that would preserve and create jobs; save energy; increase renewable energy sources; and, reduce greenhouse gas emissions. To accomplish Recovery Act objectives, states could either fund new or expand existing projects. As a condition of the awards, EERE required states to develop and implement sound internal controls over the use of Recovery Act funds. Based on the significant increase in funding from the Recovery Act, we initiated this review to determine whether Florida had internal controls in place to provide assurance that the goals of the SEP and Recovery Act will be met and accomplished efficiently and effectively. We identified weaknesses in the implementation of SEP Recovery Act projects that have adversely impacted Florida's ability to meet the goals of the SEP and the Recovery Act. Specifically: (1) Florida used about $8.3 million to pay for activities that did not meet the intent of the Recovery Act to create new or save existing jobs. With the approval of the Department, Florida used these funds to pay for rebates related to solar energy projects that had been completed prior to passage of the Recovery Act; (2) State officials did not meet Florida's program goals to obligate all Recovery Act funds by January 1, 2010, thus delaying projects and preventing them from achieving the desired stimulative economic impact. Obligations were delayed because Florida officials selected a number of projects that either required a lengthy review and approval process or were specifically prohibited. In June 2009, the Department notified Florida that a number of projects would not be approved; however, as of April 1, 2010, the State had not acted to name replacement projects or move funds to other projects; (3) Florida officials had not ensured that 7 of the 18 award requirements for Recovery Act funding promulgated by the Department had been passed down to sub-recipients of the award, as required; and, (4) Certain internal control weaknesses that could jeopardize the program and increase the risk of fraud, waste and abuse were identified in the Solar Energy System Incentives Program during our September 2009 visit to Florida. These included a lack of separation of duties related to the processing of rebates and deficiencies in the written procedures for grant managers to review and approve rebates. From a forward looking perspective, absent aggressive corrective action, these weaknesses threaten Florida's efforts to meet future Recovery Act goals. In response to our review, Florida took corrective action to incorporate the additional award requirements in sub-recipient documents. It also instituted additional controls to correct the internal control weaknesses we identified. More, however, needs to be done with respect to Department oversight. This report details the circumstances surrounding these program issues and outlines actions that, in our opinion, will help Florida achieve its SEP Recovery Act-funded goals.