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At least 163 records · Page 9

Handling of Highly Radioactive Radiation Sources in a Hot Cell Using a Mechanically Driven Cell Crane - 13452

In 2010, Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH was awarded the contract for design and erection of a Hot Cell for handling and storage of highly radioactive radiation sources. This Hot Cell is part of a new hot cell laboratory, constructed for the NHZ (Neues Handhabungszentrum = New Handling Center) of the Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf GmbH (NES). All incurring radioactive materials from Austria are collected in the NHZ, where they are safely conditioned and stored temporarily until their final storage. The main tasks of the NES include, apart from the collection, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste, also the reprocessing and the decontamination of facilities and laboratories originating from 45 years of research and development at the Seibersdorf site as well as the operation of the Hot Cell Laboratory [1]. The new Hot Cell Laboratory inside the NHZ consists of the following room areas: - One hot cell, placed in the center, for remote controlled, radiation protected handling of radioactive materials, including an integrated floor storage for the long-term temporary storage of highly radioactive radiation sources; - An anteroom for the loading and unloading of the hot cell; - One control room for the remote controlling of the hot cell equipment; - One floor storage, placed laterally to the hot cell, for burial, interim storage and removal of fissionable radioactive material in leak-proof packed units in 100 l drums. The specific design activity of the hot cell of 1.85 Pbq relating to 1-Me-Radiator including the integrated floor storage influences realization and design of the components used in the cell significantly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Risk of theft and malicious use of radiation sources in transit

Remote radioactive source applications require frequent transportation of sources from storage locations to remote sites. This introduces risk of theft of a source during the transportation process, with the level of risk proportional to the radioactivity of the source. To that end, theft of smaller sources, such as microcurie-level moisture density gauges, are of minor concern, but larger sources, such as those used for radiography and well logging, present more risk. Radiography sources include 192 Ir, 75 Se, or 60 Co radionuclides with radioactivity amounts at or exceeding IAEA Category 2. Well-logging sources, primarily 241 Am/Be, are used for their neutron-emission properties. 137 Cs is also used in well-logging at lower activities than in radiography but at levels that still present some risk. The vulnerability for malicious use of such sources to cause contamination and associated economic effects is dependent on the elemental chemical and physical properties, especially melting point and bulk modulus. Theft of radiography sources is somewhat common, well-logging sources less so. Theft of sources commonly occurs in concert with theft of the vehicle, with the source subsequently abandoned. There have been some instances where a source appears to have been specifically targeted. There are a variety of security measures and protocols, available and under development, to mitigate the risk of theft and assist in source recovery.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Integrated treatment of detector arrays for source tracking.

Illicit radioactive sources can potentially appear in a wide range of public venues. One element in a plan for managing such sources involves searching for them in venues at risk and tracking them in real time when they are detected. A treatment of source tracking using multiple directional detectors in a probabilistic framework is given. The performance of a prototype directional detector based on these methods was characterized in the laboratory. Instances where the performance of a directional detector is not immune to the effects of shielding are identified.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Transitioning from Cobalt-60 to X-Ray or E-Beam for Medical Sterilization: Filling Data and Education Gaps

The Office of Radiological Security (ORS) within the U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is charged to “work with government, law enforcement, and businesses across the globe to protect radioactive sources used for medical, research, and commercial purposes; remove and dispose of disused radioactive sources; and reduce the global reliance on high activity radioactive sources through the promotion of viable non-radioisotopic alternative technologies.” In this effort, the NNSA/ORS, along with the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation R&D, has been working with government and private entities that utilize gamma-ray irradiators in areas that include blood irradiation, radiotherapy, biology research, well logging, and radiation processing to consider alternative technologies that do not depend upon radioactive materials. In the medical device industry, nearly 50% of products are sterilized with ethylene oxide, 40.5% with cobalt-60 gamma-rays, 4.5% with electron-beam (e-beam), and <1% with X-ray.(1,2) The cobalt-60 irradiation facilities use an estimated 150 MCi of isotope to sterilize approximately 200 million cubic feet of product annually.(3) Due to growing safety regulations governing cobalt-60 use, continued advancements in e-beam and X-ray accelerator technology, and the greater irradiation durations and costs for cobalt-60 irradiation compared to e-beam and X-ray, switching to these non-radionuclide modalities is increasingly economically competitive. However, this breakdown of 40.5% cobalt-60 and 5.5% accelerator for product sterilization illustrates the difficulty that market forces and industry players have had in overcoming barriers in transitioning to non-nuclide alternatives. Besides those associated with construction of new e-beam and X-ray facilities, significant financial and regulatory obstacles are also associated with the irradiation and comprehensive testing of product constituent polymers and elastomers. The standards associated with product material performance testing are the Association for the Advancement of Medical Instrumentation (AAMI) Technical Information Report 17 (TIR 17), and its referenced American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) polymer testing standards. In the study now underway, and the subject of this article, the NNSA/ORS provided R&D funding to the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in partnership with university researchers, leading medical product manufacturers, accelerator manufacturers, and contract sterilizers. The resulting Team Nablo (in memory of Sam Nablo) includes individuals representing PNNL, Becton Dickinson (BD), Johnson & Johnson, Stryker, Texas A&M University (TAMU), Steri-Tek, Mevex, Ion Beam Applications (IBA), and Sterigenics. The goals of this study are to 1) Identify specific polymer and/or elastomer-based medical products that are currently sterilized with gamma-rays, and for which there are data gaps and would be of greatest industry impact, 2) Work with relevant ASTM subcommittees for guidance and for potential standard revision, 3) Work with an appropriate Food & Drug Administration (FDA) office for potential collaboration on a guidance document for device manufacturers, 4) Measure the physical effects that product materials exhibit when they are given sterilization-level radiation doses from cobalt-60, e-beam or X-ray, and determine whether these effects would preclude the use of e-beam or X-ray for sterilization, 5) Communicate the resulting scientific datasets and findings via industry conferences, peer-reviewed journals, and relevant trade magazines, and 6) Post the resulting datasets on a publicly accessible website, which can be built on in future years. The end objective is to identify technical barriers preventing the adoption of X-ray and e-beam technologies, and share the results to encourage X-ray and e-beam adoption where feasible.

sterilization, alternate technologies, gamma, X-ra↗

Solution-grown crystals for neutron radiation detectors, and methods of solution growth

A method according to one embodiment includes growing an organic crystal from solution, the organic crystal exhibiting a signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source. A system according to one embodiment includes an organic crystal having physical characteristics of formation from solution, the organic crystal exhibiting a signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source; and a photodetector for detecting the signal response of the organic crystal. A method according to another embodiment includes growing an organic crystal from solution, the organic crystal being large enough to exhibit a detectable signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source. An organic crystal according to another embodiment includes an organic crystal having physical characteristics of formation from solution, the organic crystal exhibiting a signal response signature for neutrons from a radioactive source, wherein the organic crystal has a length of greater than about 1 mm in one dimension.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Regional Radiological Security Partnership in Southeast Asia – Increasing the Sustainability of Security Systems at the Site-Level by Using a Model Facility Approach

In 2004, Australia, through the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation (ANSTO), created the Regional Security of Radioactive Sources (RSRS) project and partnered with the U.S. Department of Energy’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to form the Southeast Asian Regional Radiological Security Partnership (RRSP). The intent of the RRSP is to cooperate with countries in Southeast Asia to improve the security of their radioactive sources. This Southeast Asian Partnership supports objectives to improve the security of high risk radioactive sources by raising awareness of the need and developing national programs to protect and control such materials, improve the security of such materials, and recover and condition the materials no longer in use. The RRSP has utilized many tools to meet those objectives including: provision of physical protection upgrades, awareness training, physical protection training, regulatory development, locating and recovering orphan sources, and most recently - development of model security procedures at a model facility. This paper discusses the benefits of establishing a model facility, the methods employed by the RRSP, and three of the expected outcomes of the Model Facility approach. The first expected outcome is to increase compliance with source security guidance materials and national regulations by adding context to those materials, and illustrating their impact on a facility. Second, the effectiveness of each of the tools above is increased by making them part of an integrated system. Third, the methods used to develop the model procedures establishes a sustainable process that can ultimately be transferred to all facilities beyond the model. Overall, the RRSP has utilized the Model Facility approach as an important tool to increase the security of radioactive sources, and to position facilities and countries for the long term secure management of those sources.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Microfocus x-ray imaging of traceable pointlike {sup 22}Na sources for quality control

Purpose: The purpose of this study is to propose a microfocus x-ray imaging technique for observing the internal structure of small radioactive sources and evaluating geometrical errors quantitatively, and to apply this technique to traceable pointlike {sup 22}Na sources, which were designed for positron emission tomography calibration, for the purpose of quality control of the pointlike sources. Methods: A microfocus x-ray imaging system with a focus size of 0.001 mm was used to obtain projection x-ray images and x-ray CT images of five pointlike source samples, which were manufactured during 2009-2012. The obtained projection and tomographic images were used to observe the internal structure and evaluate geometrical errors quantitatively. Monte Carlo simulation was used to evaluate the effect of possible geometrical errors on the intensity and uniformity of 0.511 MeV annihilation photon pairs emitted from the sources. Results: Geometrical errors were evaluated with sufficient precision using projection x-ray images. CT images were used for observing the internal structure intuitively. As a result, four of the five examined samples were within the tolerance to maintain the total uncertainty below {+-}0.5%, given the source radioactivity; however, one sample was found to be defective. Conclusions: This quality control procedure is crucial and offers an important basis for using the pointlike {sup 22}Na source as a basic calibration tool. The microfocus x-ray imaging approach is a promising technique for visual and quantitative evaluation of the internal geometry of small radioactive sources.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Design and validation of a fission-product source for radioactive beams

A neutron-generator-based source of fission products (nuCARIBU) is being developed to replace the existing source at Argonne National Laboratory. Neutrons generated by reaction are thermalized in a compact polyethylene [(moderator and impinge on a thin 235 U foil to produce fission products. Experiments have been conducted to verify the nuCARIBU concept and simulation results using a 4 MeV, 0.16 µ⁢A proton beam from the ATLAS accelerator irradiating a LiF neutron production target and two different simplified versions of the nuCARIBU (C 2 ⁢H 4 ) n moderator with thicknesses of 3.81 cm and 1.91 cm separating it from the enriched 235 U fission foil. Here, the emitted γ-ray peaks of 1383.93 keV ( 92 Sr), 358.0 keV ( 104 Tc), 565.992 keV ( 134 Te), and 258.411 keV ( 138 Xe) obtained from fission products are used to determine the neutron-induced fission rates in the fission foil. The measured fission rates are in good agreement with those simulated using the PHITS Monte Carlo code with user-defined neutron production cross sections based on well-known cross section data. These experimental results, consistent with the simulations, show that the current 252 Cf source (CARIBU) can be replaced by the neutron induced fission source (nuCARIBU).

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Ionization efficiency studies with charge breeder and conventional electron cyclotron resonance ion source

Radioactive Ion Beams play an increasingly important role in several European research facility programs such as SPES, SPIRAL1 Upgrade, and SPIRAL2, but even more for those such as EURISOL. Although remarkable advances of ECRIS charge breeders (CBs) have been achieved, further studies are needed to gain insight on the physics of the charge breeding process. The fundamental plasma processes of charge breeders are studied in the frame of the European collaboration project, EMILIE, for optimizing the charge breeding. Important information on the charge breeding can be obtained by conducting similar experiments using the gas mixing and 2-frequency heating techniques with a conventional JYFL 14 GHz ECRIS and the LPSC-PHOENIX charge breeder. The first experiments were carried out with noble gases and they revealed, for example, that the effects of the gas mixing and 2-frequency heating on the production of high charge states appear to be additive for the conventional ECRIS. The results also indicate that at least in the case of noble gases the differences between the conventional ECRIS and the charge breeder cause only minor impact on the production efficiency of ion beams.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

General Overview of Mobile Sources Used for Well Logging and Industrial Radiography Applications

Mobile sources is a term most commonly used to describe radioactive sources that are used in applications requiring frequent transportation. Such radioactive sources are in common use world-wide where typical applications include radiographic non-destructive evaluation (NDE) and oil and gas well logging, among others requiring lesser amounts of radioactivity. This report provides a general overview of mobile sources used for well logging and industrial radiography applications including radionuclides used, equipment, and alternative technologies. Information presented here has been extracted from a larger study on common mobile radiation sources and their use.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A singly charged ion source for radioactive {sup 11}C ion acceleration

A new singly charged ion source using electron impact ionization has been developed to realize an isotope separation on-line system for simultaneous positron emission tomography imaging and heavy-ion cancer therapy using radioactive {sup 11}C ion beams. Low-energy electron beams are used in the electron impact ion source to produce singly charged ions. Ionization efficiency was calculated in order to decide the geometric parameters of the ion source and to determine the required electron emission current for obtaining high ionization efficiency. Based on these considerations, the singly charged ion source was designed and fabricated. In testing, the fabricated ion source was found to have favorable performance as a singly charged ion source.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Comparison of Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) Historical Testing to Special Form Testing Requirements

This paper compares the Light-Weight Radioisotope Heater Unit (LWRHU) historical testing to Department of Transportation (DOT) Special Form criteria per 49 CFR Part 173, Shippers-General Requirements for Shipments and Packages, Section 469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials as specified in DOE-STD-1027, Hazard Categorization of DOE Nuclear Facilities. Compliance with the aforementioned criteria allows for the exclusion of radioactive sources from the facility’s nuclear material inventory. As part of a new program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), LWRHUs are planned to be moved into TA-55, PF-5 Power Source Assembly Area (PSAA) for assembly and testing activities. The PSAA Facility is categorized as a low hazard, non-nuclear facility per DOE STD-1027 and is described in TA55-PF-5-FHC-11-001, Facility Hazard Categorization of the PSAA at PF-5, TA-55. The Facility Hazard Categorization document states, there must be documentation that radioactive sources are engineered to pass the special form testing specified by DOT in 49 CFR 173.469, Tests for special form Class 7 (radioactive) materials or ANSI N43.6, Sealed Radioactive Sources - Classification. This paper documents the extensive historical environmental safety testing of the LWRHU and demonstrates its ability to survive potential launch safety accident scenarios. The testing results are used herein to demonstrate through a comparative analysis that the robust design of the LWRHU meets or exceeds the special form testing specifications in 49 CFR 173.469, enabling the LWRHU to be transported and handled in PF-5 in support of testing and assembly program.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Radioactive Waste Management and Nuclear Facility Decommissioning Progress in Iraq - 13216

Management of Iraq's radioactive wastes and decommissioning of Iraq's former nuclear facilities are the responsibility of Iraq's Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST). The majority of Iraq's former nuclear facilities are in the Al-Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center located a few kilometers from the edge of Baghdad. These facilities include bombed and partially destroyed research reactors, a fuel fabrication facility and radioisotope production facilities. Within these facilities are large numbers of silos, approximately 30 process or waste storage tanks and thousands of drums of uncharacterised radioactive waste. There are also former nuclear facilities/sites that are outside of Al-Tuwaitha and these include the former uranium processing and waste storage facility at Jesira, the dump site near Adaya, the former centrifuge facility at Rashdiya and the former enrichment plant at Tarmiya. In 2005, Iraq lacked the infrastructure needed to decommission its nuclear facilities and manage its radioactive wastes. The lack of infrastructure included: (1) the lack of an organization responsible for decommissioning and radioactive waste management, (2) the lack of a storage facility for radioactive wastes, (3) the lack of professionals with experience in decommissioning and modern waste management practices, (4) the lack of laws and regulations governing decommissioning or radioactive waste management, (5) ongoing security concerns, and (6) limited availability of electricity and internet. Since its creation eight years ago, the MoST has worked with the international community and developed an organizational structure, trained staff, and made great progress in managing radioactive wastes and decommissioning Iraq's former nuclear facilities. This progress has been made, despite the very difficult implementing conditions in Iraq. Within MoST, the Radioactive Waste Treatment and Management Directorate (RWTMD) is responsible for waste management and the Iraqi Decommissioning Directorate (IDD) is responsible for decommissioning activities. The IDD and the RWTMD work together on decommissioning projects. The IDD has developed plans and has completed decommissioning of the GeoPilot Facility in Baghdad and the Active Metallurgical Testing Laboratory (LAMA) in Al-Tuwaitha. Given this experience, the IDD has initiated work on more dangerous facilities. Plans are being developed to characterize, decontaminate and decommission the Tamuz II Research Reactor. The Tammuz Reactor was destroyed by an Israeli air-strike in 1981 and the Tammuz II Reactor was destroyed during the First Gulf War in 1991. In addition to being responsible for managing the decommissioning wastes, the RWTMD is responsible for more than 950 disused sealed radioactive sources, contaminated debris from the first Gulf War and (approximately 900 tons) of naturally-occurring radioactive materials wastes from oil production in Iraq. The RWTMD has trained staff, rehabilitated the Building 39 Radioactive Waste Storage building, rehabilitated portions of the French-built Radioactive Waste Treatment Station, organized and secured thousands of drums of radioactive waste organized and secured the stores of disused sealed radioactive sources. Currently, the IDD and the RWTMD are finalizing plans for the decommissioning of the Tammuz II Research Reactor. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NCRP Program Area Committee 2: Operational Radiation Safety

Program Area Committee 2 of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements provides guidance for radiation safety in occupational settings in a variety of industries and activities. The committee completed three reports in recent years covering recommendations for the development and administration of radiation safety programs for smaller educational institutions, requirements for self-assessment programs that improve radiation safety and identify and correct deficiencies, and a comprehensive process for effective investigation of radiological incidents. Ongoing work includes a report on sealed radioactive source controls and oversight of a report on radioactive nanomaterials focusing on gaps within current radiation safety programs. Future efforts may deal with operational radiation safety programs in fields such as the safe use of handheld and portable X-Ray fluorescence analyzers, occupational airborne radioactive contamination, unsealed radioactive sources, or industrial accelerators.

Operational Radiation Safety↗

HOW MIGHT INDUSTRY GOVERNANCE BE BROADENED TO INCLUDE NONPROLIFERATION

Broadening industry governance to support nonproliferation could provide significant new leverage in preventing the spread/diversion of nuclear, radiological, or dual-use material or technology that could be used in making a nuclear or radiological weapon. Industry is defined broadly to include 1) the nuclear industry, 2) dual-use industries, and 3) radioactive source manufacturers and selected radioactive source-user industries worldwide. This paper describes how industry can be an important first line of defense in detecting and thwarting proliferation, such as an illicit trade network or an insider theft case, by complementing and strengthening existing governmental efforts. For example, the dual-use industry can play a critical role by providing export, import, or security control information that would allow a government or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to integrate this information with safeguards, export, import, and physical protection information it has to create a more complete picture of the potential for proliferation. Because industry is closest to users of the goods and technology that could be illicitly diverted throughout the supply chain, industry information can potentially be more timely and accurate than other sources of information. Industry is in an ideal position to help ensure that such illicit activities are detected. This role could be performed more effectively if companies worked together within a particular industry to promote nonproliferation by implementing an industry-wide self-regulation program. Performance measures could be used to ensure their materials and technologies are secure throughout the supply chain and that customers are legitimately using and/or maintaining oversight of these items. Nonproliferation is the overarching driver that industry needs to consider in adopting and implementing a self-regulation approach. A few foreign companies have begun such an approach to date; it is believed that, ultimately, broad engagement of global industry leaders in self regulation is needed to result in the greatest nonproliferation benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Flux Estimation of a PuBe source using Delayed Gamma Neutron Activation Analysis

For handling and storage of a highly radioactive source, it is necessary to have an accurate knowledge of the radioactive source as well as the neutron flux. Recently, due to radiation safety requirements, a PuBe alpha-neutron source at an activation facility at IIT-Kanpur had to be taken out of its original damaged howitzer and placed inside a new shielded container. While, this effort was successful in reducing the radiation dose, and making the setup safe for laboratory measurements, the new source moderator configuration left the new Pu-Be source spectrum unknown. Therefore, in this work we have used delayed gamma neutron activation analysis (DGNAA) of aluminum, copper, iron, manganese (found in iron), and silver for thermal neutron flux estimation of the Pu-Be neutron source. A series of DGNAA measurements with different samples were carried out to find the value of the average thermal neutron flux of a Pu-Be neutron source at Indian Institute of Technology-Kanpur. The order of the thermal neutron flux is found to be nearly 1.64 x 10{sup 5} excluding aluminum. Upon including aluminum, the value of thermal neutron flux decreases to 1.57x10{sup 5}. We have used common metals (like aluminum, silver, copper and iron) to calculate the thermal neutron flux. The calculated value of the thermal neutron flux is consistent for all the metals except for iron. Iron is giving a value almost four times larger than the average calculated value of the thermal neutron flux using other six samples. The reason is currently being investigated. The DGNAA technique came out to be a very useful technique. Now that we know the thermal neutron flux of the Pu-Be source, our future work will include improving the safety and shielding calculations for our activation facility at IIT-Kanpur. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

A high-speed one-dimensional detector for time-resolved small -angle X-ray scattering : design and characterization.

A high-speed one-dimensional detector for time-resolved small-angle x-ray scattering has been designed and built for experiments at the Advanced Photon Source of Argonne National Laboratory. This detector is made from a 500-?m thick by 150-mm diameter ultra-high-purity n-type silicon wafer. The electrodes, which are a series of concentric rings that are deposited in the wafer, integrate the scattered x-rays over the azimuthal angle and, thereby, produce a one-dimensional detector. This design yields 128 rings, which allows parallel processing of the signal from each ring. The readout electronics consist of transimpedance front-end amplifiers, one for each ring, followed by active pulse-shaping filters. The amplifier signals are digitized using 12-bit analog-to-digital converters, one per ring, which operate at 20 MHz. The frame rate of the system is 271 kHz. Up to 220 - 1 scattering profiles may be stored on a random access memory chip and transferred to a data file at a rate of 16 x 103 profiles/sec. For X-ray energies between 3.5 and 13.2 keV the efficiency exceeds 80%. The resolving time of the electronics is 300 ns, which is sufficient to isolate electronically a single pulse of scattered x-rays when the synchrotron is operated in a hybrid or asymmetric fill pattern. Therefore, laser-pump/x-ray-probe experiments can be performed without a mechanical shutter. Examples of time-resolved speckle and the kinetics of the formation of sodium chloride particles are presented. This detector is capable of acquiring small-angle x-ray scattering profiles over multiple time scales, which are needed to characterize many chemical, physical, and biological processes. In addition, this detector may be tested and calibrated before experimental runs, without access to an intense beam of x-rays, with alpha particles from a radioactive source such as 241Am.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Workshop introduction

The Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) has three subprograms that directly reduce the nuclear/radiological threat; Convert (Highly Enriched Uranium), Protect (Facilities), and Remove (Materials). The primary mission of the Off-Site Source Recovery Project (OSRP) falls under the 'Remove' subset. The purpose of this workshop is to provide a venue for joint-technical collaboration between the OSRP and the Nuclear Radiation Safety Service (NRSS). Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative and the Soviet equivalent both promoted the spread of the paradoxical (peaceful and harmful) properties of the atom. The focus of nonproliferation efforts has been rightly dedicated to fissile materials and the threat they pose. Continued emphasis on radioactive materials must also be encouraged. An unquantifiable threat still exists in the prolific quantity of sealed radioactive sources (sources) spread worldwide. It does not appear that the momentum of the evolution in the numerous beneficial applications of radioactive sources will subside in the near future. Numerous expert studies have demonstrated the potentially devastating economic and psychological impacts of terrorist use of a radiological dispersal or emitting device. The development of such a weapon, from the acquisition of the material to the technical knowledge needed to develop and use it, is straightforward. There are many documented accounts worldwide of accidental and purposeful diversions of radioactive materials from regulatory control. The burden of securing sealed sources often falls upon the source owner, who may not have a disposal pathway once the source reaches the end of its useful life. This disposal problem is exacerbated by some source owners not having the resources to safely and compliantly store them. US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) data suggests that, in the US alone, there are tens of thousands of high-activity (IAEA Category I and II) sources in thousands of devices; and there are many more tens of thousands of smaller sources scattered among thousands of other NRC licensees. As a result of the ubiquitous nature and undeterminable number of current and legacy sources, even in developed countries they can be abandoned, disposed of in a haphazard manner, lost, stolen, and/or otherwise fallout of regulatory control. Supply and demand of sources, being market based, is more or less fluid. Normative security of radioactive sources exists, but varies in each country, and is loosely implemented through non-legally binding recommendations and standards provided by International Atomic Energy Agency technical documents and cooperation and through bilateral efforts such as this workshop where we share best-practices with one another. Much of the reason for the difficulty in securing sealed sources rests in the enormous need for their beneficial applications in the medical, industrial, and agricultural sectors. Alternative technologies to replace high-risk sources continue to be explored, but very few of these alternative solutions have reached the development stage for common usage and distribution. The beneficial uses of sources must be allowed to continue; however, to minimize the potential for their misuse, current controls and regulating mechanisms must be constantly evaluated to ensure the benefits gained outweigh potential risks. From a global perspective, an evaluation and modification of requirements over the entire life cycle of sources from their manufacture to their final disposition is required. The proper removal and disposal of vulnerable disused or orphan sources is essential to maintaining a safe operating environment. One of our goals in this workshop is to share our methodologies for recovering sources and learn how they differ or are similar to the challenges faced in recovering, storing, and disposing of sources in the Republic of Georgia . The suggestions we will make are flexible in allowing for the imperfect situations and capabilities we have all encountered in source recovery efforts. We have designed a table-top exercise specifically to address your concerns about the prevention and mitigation of contaminated facilities, soil, containers, and sources. Our discussion begins with an overview and video of the OSRP along with a brief on our projects ongoing international cooperation and activities. A presentation will be given by the NRSS illustrating the successes and challenges of source management in Georgia. A brief overview will be given of selected significant cases of the intentional misuse of sources. This will be followed by two comprehensive discussions focusing on the decontamination from the facility perspective down to the issues of container and source leakage. The second day will begin with the abovementioned table-top exercise on contamination control. On the third day, a second presentation from the NRSS will open up the session.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗