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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Carbon Storage Technical Viability Approach (CS TVA) Database

The Carbon Storage Technical Viability Approach (CS TVA) database was developed to support the implementation of the CS TVA Matrix to a national data availability assessment for technically viable carbon storage. This database leverages the efforts of multiple adjacent and overlapping databases by non-redundantly combining the databases into a single database along with additionally providing tags facilitating the CS TVA. The non-redundant aspect of the database permits an accurate assessment of the concentration of available data, aiding in spatial and categorical data gaps analysis relative to the individual CS TVA Matrix Components. Version 2.0 of the database is an expansion of Version 1.0. Version 2.0 was created to include additional data gathered to fill gaps in the existing data set. Downloading the CS TVA v2.0 database will result in two separate databases, the version 1.0 original .gdb, and a second addendum .gdb with the new data gathered, together these two databases make up v2.0. Please see the ReadMe file below for full details, metadata information, use disclaimer, and attributions.

Coal↗
DOE OSTI2022

Exotic Carbonate Mineralization Recovered from a Deep Basalt Carbon Storage Demonstration

Mitigating climate change require transformational advances for carbon dioxide removal, including geologic carbon sequestration in reactive subsurface environments. The Wallula Basalt Carbon Storage Pilot Project demonstrated that CO 2 injected into >800 m deep Columbia River Basalt Group flow top reservoirs mineralizes on month-year timescales. Herein, we present new optical petrography, micro-computed X-ray tomography, and electron microscopy results sidewall cores collected two years after CO 2 injection. As no other anthropogenic carbonates from geologic carbon storage field studies have been recovered, this world-unique sample suite provides unparalleled insight for subsurface carbon mineralization products and paragenesis. Chemically-zoned nodules with Ca/Mn-rich cores and Fe-dominant outer rims are prominent examples of the neoformed carbonate assemblages with ankerite-siderite compositions and exotic divalent cation correlations. Further, paragenetic insights for the timing of aragonite, silica, and fibrous zeolites are clarified based on mineral texture and spatial relationships, along with time-resolved downhole fluid sampling. Collectively, these results clarify the mineralogy, chemistry, and paragenesis of carbon mineralization, providing insight into the ultimate fate and transport of CO 2 in reactive mafic-ultramafic reservoirs

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Enhanced Recovery of Critical Minerals and Geological Hydrogen in The Mine of the Future

invited perspective article: The rapid demand for critical minerals (CMs) and hydrogen (H2) necessitates innovative solutions beyond conventional mining. This study explores enhanced mineral recovery (EMR) and geological hydrogen production (GeoH2) by leveraging the Earth’s subsurface as a reactive platform. Using ultramafic rocks and engineered fluids, the approach simultaneously mobilizes critical resources and produces H2 through natural processes like serpentinization. This paradigm offers a transformative pathway to secure essential materials and diversify energy resources, setting a foundation for the Terrestrial Mine of the Future

Yan, Keju↗
DOE OSTI2026

Chelation-Driven Chemistry Controls Dissolution Pathways for Facile Critical Mineral Recovery from Ultramafic Resources

The efficient recovery of critical minerals, such as nickel (Ni) and manganese (Mn) from the subsurface is of vital importance, given their role in modern technologies ranging from batteries to advanced alloys. This study explores an approach that employs chelation to enhance critical mineral recovery from ultramafic rocks using chelating ligands under ambient pressures and systematically evaluates the extraction process for the first time. Experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of EDTA and PrDTA in achieving high extraction efficiencies for both Ni and Mn. To further highlight the ability for optimization, the fluid exchange and variation of fluid-to-rock ratio experiments were conducted, revealing tunable controls for engineering recovery. We show that under optimized conditions, a Ni extraction efficiency of ?82% and a Mn extraction efficiency of ~60% is achieved at ambient pressures, which is equivalent to over 23 times the current global Ni production, and 2 million metric tonnes (MMT) greater than the current global Mn production. From both in-situ and ex-situ mining perspectives, the results highlight the potential of chelation to advance sustainable mineral processing. Overall, this work highlights the environmental benefits of innovative ligand-assisted recovery methods, addressing the critical need for the efficient utilization of olivine resources.

Krishnan, Keerthana↗
DOE OSTI2020

Understanding Structures of Cyber Competition in an Era of Major Power Rivalry

Over the past two decades, the cyber domain has emerged and evolved into a key strategic domain for nations across the globe. Security strategies are espoused by heads of state that focus on how to manage the increasingly enormous, crosscutting impact that the cyber domain has on national security across economic, military, intelligence, intellectual property, and countless other facets. These strategies frequently evolve, and even change entirely, as leaders adapt to new technologies and administrations change. Even if these strategies did not change at all, they would take inordinate amounts of time to effectively implement within the organizational structures of government. The time required to go from setting department and agency-level goals, to the time small teams have well-oiled processes and expertise to accomplish tactical objectives that meet the strategic vision is lengthy. With near certainty, by the time objectives and vision are implemented, the landscape, strategy, or both has changed entirely. While this churn will likely never cease due to the rapidly changing nature of the cyber domain, this problem raises an important question: can governmental structures be organized to rapidly adapt to changing cyber strategies? As offices responsible for particular missions in cyberspace shuffle about within the bureaucracy, are technical capabilities enabled or enhanced? No matter how advanced a particular technical capability is or how adept the staff is at solving problems, they will be ineffective if placed haphazardly within the organization: the right authorities may not exist for their office, the correct lines of interpersonal communication may not be established properly, or insufficient resources have not been allocated to effectively deploy a brilliant technical solution. This concept of organizational agility in the context of national cyber capabilities is important when taking into account the National Defense Strategy’s emphasis on cyber capability and the ability of the United States to compete and rapidly adapt to new challenges posed by rivals. As a nation, we are at a point where technology evolves rapidly enough to warrant thoughtful and nimble changes to the bureaucratic structures that support how cyber operations are carried out. Taking these questions and cross-comparing them to the organizational structures across China, Russia, and the United States provides for an interesting thought experiment. As non-democratic regimes, China and Russia have differing priorities and internal power dynamics than the United States and thus organize their governments differently. By combining known and broadcasted strategies of these nations with the observed technical capabilities demonstrated in the public domain, we can begin to see how organizational structures map to strategic goals and directly enable technical capabilities. Insight can be gained by introducing organizational structures into traditional analysis focusing solely around strategies and capabilities; additionally, otherwise unknown capabilities or intents might be discovered or inferred by analyzing organizational structures alone. Analyzing cyber operations from this oft-overlooked perspective could potentially provide useful insight and more concrete actions that can be undertaken to realize the National Defense Strategy’s goals.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

Space Strategy at a Crossroads: Opportunities and Challenges for 21st Century Competition

In its November 2018 report to Congress, the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission applauded the main themes of the Trump administration’s 2017 National Defense Strategy. But it was also deeply critical of the strategic thought so far done by the U.S. defense community about the requirements, operational and otherwise, of securing U.S. and allied interests in the types of conflicts we now face. Indeed, it assessed these shortfalls as crippling to the exercise of American power and as dangerous in crisis and war. Is the U.S. military space community exempt from such criticism? Should it be?

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Miscalculation, Misperception and Risk Reduction

In the current security environment, the most likely wars for which the US and its allies must be prepared are wars against nuclear-armed states. Such wars bring unique risks of both vertical and horizontal escalation. Some are “accepted risks;” for example, the US may choose to escalate a conflict to clarify its commitment to an issue and defend its interest. Other are “unacceptable risks;” especially, the risk of miscalculation by the U.S. or an adversary. The focus here is on this latter category. Miscalculation is an error of judgment—the failure to accurately assess a situation. Miscalculation can result from hidden, incomplete, or ambiguous information, or from inaccurate processing of available information because of bias, overconfidence, denial, delusion, etc. Miscalculation is related to misperception. For some, they are synonymous. This paper characterizes the risks of miscalculation and introduces a discussion of a risk mitigation strategy.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluating China's Road to Cyber Super Power

This report examines open source, non-classified qualitative analysis to evaluate China’s current cyber maturity. Evidence for this document draws on materials from academia, private cybersecurity companies, and national security research institutions. Private sector threat intelligence firms produce high quality analysis on Chinese APTs tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and investigation from companies such as FireEye illuminate China’s ability to wield cyber means for its security ends. None of the materials cited in this assessment originate from classified United States or foreign government sources. Any references to United States government sources are sourced entirely to unclassified information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear decisionmaking, complexity and emerging and disruptive technologies: A comprehensive assessment

The complex interactions of emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) could significantly impact nuclear decision-making, particular in an escalating regional conventional conflict. Such conflicts may present governments with a range of nuclear decisions: whether to introduce a nuclear dimension to a crisis, whether to cross the nuclear threshold through limited nuclear use, how to respond to a limited nuclear attack, whether to expand the scope and intensity of initial limited attacks, and whether to escalate to an all-out nuclear war. At each decision point, EDTs create potential risks as well as rewards. EDTs are likely to influence the context for nuclear decision-making and the choices between different courses of action. EDTs could impact the context of nuclear decision-making by improving or degrading situational assessment, the ability to deliberate, and the ability to manage one’s nuclear forces. EDTs could influence the choice between nuclear restraint or escalation by affecting the perceived strategic benefits, escalatory risks, and operational requirements associated with different courses of action. Even though particular combinations of EDTs could precipitate nuclear use in some scenarios, they could encourage restraint in others. The impact and relevance of the same combinations of EDTs might be different at various nuclear decision points. The availability of specific combinations of EDTs at different stages of a conflict would also vary because of the attrition and one-time-use nature of some capabilities. In later stages of a conflict, the decision maker’s confidence in different combinations of EDTs would depend on their previous experience in using them. While the interactions of EDTs are likely to bring additional complexity to a nuclear decision-making process, EDTs are also not the only source of complexity. Broader strategic, military, operational, legal, moral, and emotional factors are also likely to play an important role. These factors may dominate decision-making in a range of potential cases.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Eight Levers of Coercive Conflict: No More, No Less

Few concepts are more important to our nation than the principle of deterrence. It is at the very core of our national security strategy. Despite its lasting import to our nation, and the rest of the world, we still lack a complete and explicit formulation of the calculus of deterrence. This has, at times, resulted in failed policies costing the Nation lives and wealth. With the ultimate objective of making the Nation more secure, we establish a complete and explicit formulation of deterrence calculus, which consists of eight levers. As it turns out this formulation also applies to the calculus of compellence, and is thus a unifying model of coercive conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

US Nuclear Testing: Health Consequences and Policy Decisions

With the approval of President Franklin D. Roosevelt to begin the research on a nuclear bomb in 1941 to the last test conducted by the U.S. in 1992, the fifty-year history of the nuclear weapons testing program has been an expansive topic of research. The program's growth is credited to the race to build the first atomic weapon for war. The termination of the Soviet Union and many other factors, including concerns about the adverse health effects of radioactive fallout, influenced the decline of the need for the program. The discovery of the negative health effects caused by low-level radiation and the subsequent studies influenced sitting U.S. presidents in passing policies that significantly impacted the nuclear weapons testing program.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

US Perspectives on the Conventional/Nuclear Interactions and the Impacts on Nuclear Escalation Risks and Future Arms Control Prospects

This short paper is organized around a few discrete questions. How have U.S. perspectives on conventional and nuclear interactions evolved in recent years? How have these changing perspectives shaped U.S. thinking on perceived nuclear escalation risks with Russia, both long standing and newly emerged? And finally, what do these U.S. perceptions of interactions and risks mean for future potential arms control either in the conventional or nuclear arena? The answers to these questions appear to show some promise for future work in this area. Conventional and nuclear interactions are increasing, and thus the two domains cannot be kept as deliberately or artificially separated as in the past. There is a growing mutual recognition regarding the interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities in the strategic stability equation. There is also an increasingly shared recognition in the United States and Russia that nuclear escalation risks are likely to originate in conventional crises or conflict, placing an imperative on some form of conflict prevention procedures at the lower end of the spectrum. This requirement suggests some potential areas for risk reduction measures outside of those traditionally considered in conventional and nuclear arms control over the past several decades.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2024

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗