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This fact sheet addresses cybersecurity for distributed energy resources (DERs) and identifies best practices in cybersecurity governance, technical management of cyber-physical systems, and physical security.
The Sandia National Laboratories Physical Security Center of Excellence (PSCOE) has been tasked by the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Diplomatic Security Research and Development branch to investigate the potential anti-climb benefits of newly developed skid-resistant paint coatings - one light base and one dark base. DOS is interested in studying the application of the coatings on passive barriers commonly used at diplomatic facilities. The purpose of the anti-climb coating in this context is to deter and delay adversaries from climbing onto the passive barriers. PSCOE was tasked to perform delay testing that focused on the effectiveness of the coatings on the two DOS perimeter passive barriers - the DS-41 anti-ram fence and a 9 foot high by 1 foot thick reinforced concrete wall intended to mimic the DS-30 anti-ram perimeter wall. PSCOE was also tasked in performing skid-resistance testing using a British Pendulum skid-resistance tester. Delay testing and skid-resistance testing were also performed on two different passive barriers without any anti-climb coating to determine a baseline.
On June 22nd and 23rd, a representative from Savannah River National Lab (SRNL) traveled to the Fork Union substation in Fork Union, Virginia (owned and operated by Dominion Energy) to observe the installation, calibration, and commissioning of three Electric Phenomena Cluster (EPC) sensors. The installation in its entirety included the physical securing of the EPC sensors by Dominion Energy, fiber optic cable (furnished by SmartSenseComm) being run in conduits and cable trays from the EPC sensor to the Optical Processing Unit (OPU) located in the substation switch house. The location of the EPC sensors, OPU, and cable routing can be seen in the figures included.
Cybersecurity for industrial control systems is an important consideration that advance reactor designers will need to consider. How cyber risk is managed is the subject of on-going research and debate in the nuclear industry. This report seeks to identify potential cyber risks for advance reactors. Identified risks are divided into absorbed risk and licensee managed risk to clearly show how cyber risks for advance reactors can potentially be transferred. Absorbed risks are risks that originate external to the licensee but may unknowingly propagate into the plant. Insights include (1) the need for unification of safety, physical security, and cybersecurity risk assessment frameworks to ensure optimal coordination of risk, (2) a quantitative risk assessment methodology in conjunction with qualitative assessments may be useful in efficiently and sufficiently managing cyber risks, and (3) cyber risk management techniques should align with a risked informed regulatory framework for advance reactors.
Analysts develop a “no threat” bias with high false alarms. If only shown alarms for actual attacks, may never actually see an alarm. We see this in the laboratory, but not often studied in applied environments. (TSA is an exception.) In this work, near-operational paradigms are useful, but difficult to construct well. Pilot testing is critical before engaging time-limited professionals. Experimental control is difficult to balance with operational realism. Grounding near-operational experiments in basic research paradigms has both advantages and disadvantages. Despite shortcomings in our second experiment, we now have a platform for experimental investigations into the human element of physical security systems.
To help federal energy managers assess, monitor, and manage cybersecurity while achieving decarbonization, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) offers a comprehensive, web-based assessment tool focusing on cyber governance or policies, technical management, and physical security. The DER-CF currently presents users with a series of pertinent cybersecurity questions, which are used to generate a site-specific report and recommendations. This paper outlines a technical approach to integrate the DER-CF with another key asset—NREL's Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems (ARIES) Cyber Range—to visualize cybersecurity resilience and compliance and to enhance the usability and accessibility of the DER-CF. The result is a new tool called the Distributed Energy Resource Visual Emulator (DER-VE). Its development will include regular conversations with stakeholders to assess the effectiveness of these efforts, refine the visualization capability, and ensure its value to our partners. Phase 0 of the integration project was concluded in 2021. Phase 1, completed in 2022, has two components: The first is developing a working visualization of system compliance using the DER-CF, and the second is planning the design of a server application that takes input data from the DER-CF and creates a personal emulated environment of the user's system or a selected reference architect. Major components that were addressed in this phase are the DER-CF output, compliance visualization, data model, and compliance server design.
The shift to high levels of renewable deployment will entail a significant re-engineering of the grid. As investors, utilities, customers, and others prepare for clean energy transitions, there is need to understand how restructuring the grid to accommodate renewables will change the attack surface of the grid and accompanying cyber risk. However, today the cyber-physical risks associated with electric grids incorporating high levels of renewable deployment remain largely unknown. The Cyber100 Compass proof-of-concept application attempts to quantify future cyber-physical security risks by combining risk data gathered from subject matter experts (SMEs) with input from system planners about conditions they expect to be true about their electric systems in the future. Users provide data about their organization’s tolerance for risk; the value they place on avoiding the consequences of different cyber events; and conditions that they expect to be true on their systems at some point in the future. The SMEs provide baseline probabilities for different cyber events; the probability that an event will be low-, moderate-, or high-impact; and the amount by which user-identified conditions on their systems will change the likelihood of the cyber events. The application takes both the user and SME input and performs a series of Monte Carlo simulations to arrive at a quantification of risk.
For the last several years and in collaboration with CARILEC, USAID and NREL have been working to support cyber resilience at power sector utilities in Latin America and the Caribbean. Direct technical assistance with regional utilities has been a key component of USAID-NREL Partnership activities, and technical assistance has typically included a foundational cybersecurity assessment using NREL's Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) tool. The DER-CF allows organizations to benchmark and evaluate their cybersecurity posture across the areas of Governance, Technical Management, and Physical Security. To complement the activities of the newly created CAREC IT/OT and Cybersecurity Team, this webinar on cybersecurity assessment tools includes an overview of the DER-CF tool and a discussion with regional stakeholders and NREL experts on the DER-CF assessment process and other resources for cybersecurity assessments.
An examination has been made of the physical security of the Space Station Program at the Kennedy Space Center in a peacetime environment, in order to furnish facility personnel with threat/vulnerability information. A risk-management approach is used to prioritize threat-target combinations that are characterized in terms of 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Potential targets were identified and analyzed with a view to their attractiveness to an adversary, as well as to the consequentiality of the resulting damage.
NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) is adapting current data networking technologies to fly on future spaceflight missions. The benefits of using commercially based networking standards and protocols have been widely discussed and are expected to include reduction in overall mission cost, shortened integration and test (I&T) schedules, increased operations flexibility, and hardware and software upgradeability/scalability with developments ongoing in the commercial world. The networking effort is a comprehensive one encompassing missions ranging from small University Explorer (UNEX) class spacecraft to large observatories such as the Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST). Mission aspects such as flight hardware and software, ground station hardware and software, operations, RF communications, and security (physical and electronic) are all being addressed to ensure a complete end-to-end system solution. One of the current networking development efforts at GSFC is the SpaceLAN (Spacecraft Local Area Network) project, development of a space-qualifiable Ethernet network. To this end we have purchased an IEEE 802.3-compatible 10/100/1000 Media Access Control (MAC) layer Intellectual Property (IP) core and are designing a network node interface (NNI) and associated network components such as a switch. These systems will ultimately allow the replacement of the typical MIL-STD-1553/1773 and custom interfaces that inhabit most spacecraft. In this paper we will describe our current Ethernet NNI development along with a novel new space qualified physical layer that will be used in place of the standard interfaces. We will outline our plans for development of space qualified network components that will allow future spacecraft to operate in significant radiation environments while using a single onboard network for reliable commanding and data transfer. There will be a brief discussion of some issues surrounding system implications of a flight Ethernet. Finally, we will show an onboard network architecture for a proposed new mission using Ethernet for science data transport.
In 2000, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Environmental Office at the John C. Stennis Space Center (SSC) developed an Environmental Geographic Information Systems (EGIS) database. NASA had previously developed a GIS database at SSC to assist in the NASA Environmental Office's management of the Center. This GIS became the basis for the NASA-wide EGIS project, which was proposed after the applicability of the SSC database was demonstrated. Since its completion, the SSC EGIS has aided the Environmental Office with noise pollution modeling, land cover assessment, wetlands delineation, environmental hazards mapping, and critical habitat delineation for protected species. At SSC, facility management and safety officers are responsible for ensuring the physical security of the facilities, staff, and equipment as well as for responding to environmental emergencies, such as accidental releases of hazardous materials. All phases of emergency management (planning, mitigation, preparedness, and response) depend on data reliability and system interoperability from a variety of sources to determine the size and scope of the emergency operation. Because geospatial data are now available for all NASA facilities, it was suggested that this data could be incorporated into a computerized management information program to assist facility managers. The idea was that the information system could improve both the effectiveness and the efficiency of managing and controlling actions associated with disaster, homeland security, and other activities. It was decided to use SSC as a pilot site to demonstrate the efficacy of having a baseline, computerized management information system that ultimately was referred to as the Emergency Environmental Response Tool (EERT).
A Modular Autonomous Robotic System (MARS), consisting of a modular autonomous vehicle control system that can be retrofit on to any vehicle to convert it to autonomous control and support a modular payload for multiple applications is being developed. The MARS design is scalable, reconfigurable, and cost effective due to the use of modern open system architecture design methodologies, including serial control bus technology to simplify system wiring and enhance scalability. The design is augmented with modular, object oriented (C++) software implementing a hierarchy of five levels of control including teleoperated, continuous guidepath following, periodic guidepath following, absolute position autonomous navigation, and relative position autonomous navigation. The present effort is focused on producing a system that is commercially viable for routine autonomous patrolling of known, semistructured environments, like environmental monitoring of chemical and petroleum refineries, exterior physical security and surveillance, perimeter patrolling, and intrafacility transport applications.
Innovative inspection technology was developed to inspect the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) wing panels on the vehicle, thus eliminating need to remove/reinstall all 44 RCC panels for inspections per processing flow. Manually holding inspection tools up to the RCC panels was a 3-person job with high risk of personnel injury and flight hardware damage. To further enhance ergonomics, reduce personnel/flight hardware risks, and improve repeatability, an inspection cart and fixture were constructed to physically secure the instruments for Inspectors during 652 inspection points per flow. The electric lift used to handle RCCs was also utilized to raise the heavy, bulky inspection equipment up to the wing leading edge.
This fact sheet addresses cybersecurity for distributed energy resources (DERs) and identifies best practices in cybersecurity governance, technical management of cyber-physical systems, and physical security.
A Sentry Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS) is a stand-alone security system that provides detection, assessment, and communication of priority alarms as an additional means of thwarting internal and external threats to sites that maintain radiological material. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform is an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS that relays priority alarm information to the identified response stakeholders. Sentry-SECURE is hosted in a cloud environment that abstracts the data owner’s and data consumer’s platforms to allow for greater information sharing. This promotes situational awareness amongst authorized users and enables future innovation among modern response platforms. When securely architecting a cloud solution such as this, the use of design paradigms can be an effective tool to increase the accuracy and reliability of cyber- and information-security-related decisions made throughout the development process. This approach also supports the categorization of design considerations into three levels: industry concepts, project approaches, and data protections for digital processes. Industry concepts consist of the notional underpinnings that guide or motivate a security process, system, or design but often lack any tangible attributes. Project approaches represent decisions made during the design and development process to prioritize a solution, method, or practice above another that may provide a comparable functional output but lacks a desired security benefit. Data protections for digital processes represent the selection, integration, and implementation of specific controls for a given asset. This paper will explore specific examples of how Sentry-SECURE has been designed to account for considerations at each of these three levels, while balancing the operational intent of the platform with the security enhancements necessary to maintain data integrity, availability, and confidentiality.
In July, NERC, the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) will host a joint informational webinar to highlight areas focused on integrating cyber and physical security with conventional engineering practices (security integration). NERC's work on these topics represents one of the first focused applications of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE). INL is leading the development of philosophy and practices to identify and mitigate the inherent risks of digital technology by including cybersecurity as a core element of engineering risk management. This presentation will provide an overview of CIE, a discussion of how NERC's work represents one of the first new discipline-specific applications of CIE, and an update on significant milestones and resources from the CIE program.
This article provides guidelines (not requirements) for the testing, operation, and maintenance of radiation portal monitors used to scan pedestrian and vehicular traffic entering or exiting nuclear facilities to prevent unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The intended audience is facility managers, supervisors, and operators who are responsible for establishing and maintaining radiation detection systems, who are likely well acquainted with physical security procedures, but may not have a familiarity with the operation of radiation detection.
This is a threat brief of cyber incidents and trends affecting the global energy sector over the last 12 months and resources for threat sharing, targeting an audience of utility cyber and physical security stakeholders.