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At least 163 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2017

Failure Mechanisms of Ni-H2 and Li-Ion Batteries Under Hypervelocity Impacts

Lithium-Ion (Li-Ion) batteries have yielded significant performance advantages for many industries, including the aerospace industry, and have been selected to replace nickel hydrogen (Ni-H2) batteries for the International Space Station (ISS) program to meet the energy storage demands. As the ISS uses its vast solar arrays to generate its power, the solar arrays meet their sunlit power demands and supply excess power to battery packs for power delivery on the sun obscured phase of the approximate 90 minute low Earth orbit. These large battery packs are located on the exterior of the ISS, and as such, the battery packs are exposed to external environment threats like naturally occurring meteoroids and artificial orbital debris (MMOD). While the risks from these solid particle environments has been known and addressed to an acceptable risk of failure through shield design, it is not possible to completely eliminate the risk of loss of these assets on orbit due to MMOD, and as such, failure consequences to the ISS have been considered.

Miller, J. E.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Surveys of Returned ISS Hardware for MMMOD Impacts

Since February 2001, the Hypervelocity Impact Technology (HVIT) group at the Johnson Space Center (JSC) in Houston has performed 35 post-flight inspections on space exposed hardware returned from the International Space Station (ISS). Data on 1,188 observations of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) damage have been collected from these inspections. Survey documentation typically includes impact feature location and size measurements as well as microscopic photography (25-200x). Sampling of impacts sites for projectile residue was performed for the largest features. Results of energy dispersive X-ray spectroscopic analysis to discern impactor source are included in the database when available. This paper will focus on two inspections, the Pressurized Mating Adapter 2 (PMA-2) cover returned in 2015 after 1.6 years exposure with 26 observed impact features, and two Airlock shield panels returned in 2010 after 8.75 years exposure with 58 MMOD impacts. Feature sizes from the observed data are compared to predictions using the Bumper 3 risk assessment code.

Hyde, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Thermal Protection for Mars Sample Return Earth Entry Vehicle: A Grand Challenge for Design Methodology and Reliability Verification

Mars Sample Return is our Grand Challenge for the coming decade. TPS (Thermal Protection System) nominal performance is not the key challenge. The main difficulty for designers is the need to verify unprecedented reliability for the entry system: current guidelines for prevention of backward contamination require that the probability of spores larger than 1 micron diameter escaping into the Earth environment be lower than 1 million for the entire system, and the allocation to TPS would be more stringent than that. For reference, the reliability allocation for Orion TPS is closer to 11000, and the demonstrated reliability for previous human Earth return systems was closer to 1100. Improving reliability by more than 3 orders of magnitude is a grand challenge indeed. The TPS community must embrace the possibility of new architectures that are focused on reliability above thermal performance and mass efficiency. MSR (Mars Sample Return) EEV (Earth Entry Vehicle) will be hit with MMOD (Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris) prior to reentry. A chute-less aero-shell design which allows for self-righting shape was baselined in prior MSR studies, with the assumption that a passive system will maximize EEV robustness. Hence the aero-shell along with the TPS has to take ground impact and not break apart. System verification will require testing to establish ablative performance and thermal failure but also testing of damage from MMOD, and structural performance at ground impact. Mission requirements will demand analysis, testing and verification that are focused on establishing reliability of the design. In this proposed talk, we will focus on the grand challenge of MSR EEV TPS and the need for innovative approaches to address challenges in modeling, testing, manufacturing and verification.

Design and Verification for Reliability↗
NASA NTRS2019

Modular Damage Detection for Expandable and Inflatable Structures

NASA has identified potential damage from micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) impacts as a primary threat to Commercial Crew Program vehicles. The International Space Station (ISS) and extraterrestrial habitats also exhibit the risk of damage caused by MMODs. Currently no integrated in-situ or real-time health monitoring damage detection system is being used for expandable and inflatable structures. A novel, modular damage detection system design that incorporates interchangeable and replaceable sensory panels in a foldable architecture is described. The design implements technologies that provide for situational awareness, self-configuration, and damage detection and localization. The system is applicable for the new Gateway and surface and ground support infrastructure

Lewis, Mark E.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Residual Strength of Hypervelocity Impacted Silica

Windows in the International Space Station are subjected to on-going micrometeoroid and orbital debris damage (MMOD). The reliability of the windows is being ensured by monitoring of damage, life prediction, and measurement of the residual strength of man-made and natural hypervelocity impact damage. The residual strength of man-made craters and MMOD craters harvested from space shuttle windows were used to estimate strength as a function of damage dimensions and thereby derive design allowables for U.S. and Russian fused silicas used in the ISS. US and Russian silica exhibit similar mechanical properties. An effect of impact angle is apparent, with 0o impacts exhibiting the lowest strength for Russian quartz-derived silica. The crater morphology for fused silica consists of a central pit, crush zone, shallow rings and radial cracks dividing petaloids. Morphology of alkaline glass is different from than that of fused silica, with a more distinct pit and pulverized region, and bell and tail-like features below the pit.

Silicia↗
NASA NTRS2019

Micro-meteoroid and orbital debris radar from Goldstone Radar observations

Micro-meteoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) refers to millions of micrometeoroids and orbital debris orbiting the Earth, which can come from remaining parts of spacecraft from previous missions. These debris objects keep colliding and creating new pieces of debris, with very different sizes ranging from millimeters to meters. About 99.3% of the debris objects have a size < 1 cm. These debris objects, traveling at speeds of 10 km/s, can cause significant damage to spacecraft, satellites, and astronauts. Despite the historic use of shielding to protect vital spacecraft components, MMOD still present a potential hazard for future missions and operations involving humans in space. Goldstone’s orbital debris radar (ODR) enhances the NASA orbital debris model with radar observation data, providing vital information on orbital debris detections: size, Doppler, range, and orbit inclination angle. These observations currently provide the only access to information about this size class (2 mm to 10 mm) of orbital debris. Goldstone’s ODR experiments operate as a bistatic radar, with overlapping beams providing a wide distribution of ranges. From 2004 to early 2018, Goldstone’s ODR has been collecting orbital debris data from altitudes covering 280 km to 3000 km. Since the decommissioning of the receive antenna in early 2018, Goldstone’s range coverage is reduced to a 300 km window within a 600 km to 1000 km potential range coverage, depending on the pointing geometry and antenna station used. We are investigating alternative transmit receive configurations at Goldstone to recover our previous wide range coverage.

Rodriguez-Alvarez, Nereida↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Next Generation of Kevlar® Fiber for Improved Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Protection

The next generation of Kevlar® fiber for Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection demonstrates the potential to increase orbital debris protection while optimizing the overall weight of the MMOD system and reducing damage to the rear wall of the shield. The DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology process combines numerous woven layers by infusing staple fiber to strengthen the fabric and enables lightweight and flexible protective solutions compared to traditional woven structures. DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology is a step-change in debris protection that allows for the improvement of system-level performance while removing heavier portions of the system. This paper introduces this new technology that will be available from DuPont starting in late 2023 and compares the performance of CoreMatrix™ Technology to legacy solutions. NASA’s Hypervelocity Impact Technology team has conducted hypervelocity impact tests on a subset of DuPont supplied samples that incorporate this latest Kevlar® material. The paper will describe the hypervelocity impact testing parameters, results, and path forward.

Christopher W. Seay↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Next Generation of Kevlar Fiber for Improved Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Protection

The next generation of Kevlar® fiber for Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection demonstrates the potential to increase orbital debris protection while optimizing the overall weight of the MMOD system and reducing damage to the rear wall of the shield. The DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology process combines numerous woven layers by infusing staple fiber to strengthen the fabric and enables lightweight and flexible protective solutions compared to traditional woven structures. DuPont™ CoreMatrix™ Technology is a step-change in debris protection that allows for the improvement of system-level performance while removing heavier portions of the system. This paper introduces this new technology that will be available from DuPont starting in early 2024 and compares the performance of CoreMatrix™ Technology to legacy solutions. NASA’s Hypervelocity Impact Technology team has conducted hypervelocity impact tests on a subset of DuPont supplied samples that incorporate this latest Kevlar® material. The paper will describe the hypervelocity impact testing parameters, results, and path forward.

Orbital Debris↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Application of Artificial Intelligence and Deep Learning to Visually Identify Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Impacts

Recent advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI) have made Machine Learning (ML) techniques readily available for practical applications while using a fraction of time that was previously required. In particular, the use of Deep Learning (DL) algorithms has advanced the field of image and pattern recognition. With the use of Deep Learning algorithms, Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris(MMOD) penetrations can be identified with high accuracy and give possibilities to new understandings of hypervelocity impacts.

Deep Learning↗
NASA NTRS2006

Carbon Nanotube-enhanced Carbon-phenolic Ablator Material

Phenolic impregnated carbon ablator (PICA) is a thermal protection system (TPS) material developed at NASA Ames Research Center in the mid-90 s for Discovery missions. It was used on the Stardust return capsule heat shield which successfully executed the highest speed Earth entry to date on January 15, 2006. PICA is a porous fibrous carbon insulation infiltrated with phenolic resin, and is an excellent ablator that is effective for heating rates up to 1000 W/sq cm. It is one of several candidate TPS materials for the next generation of crewed spacecraft for Lunar and Mars missions. We will describe an ongoing research effort at NASA to improve mechanical properties of the phenolic matrix with carbon nanotubes. The aim is two-fold: to increase overall TPS strength during reentry and to improve Micrometeoroid/Orbital Debris (MMOD) protection in space. The former requires at least a good dispersion of nanotubes in phenolic, while the latter also requires covalent bonding between them to couple and transfer impact energy effectively from matrix to nanotubes. We will discuss the required chemical functionalization of nanotubes, processing issues and test results.

Nikolaev, P.↗
NASA NTRS2007

Space Environment's Effects on Seal Materials

A Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) is being developed by the NASA Johnson Space Center to support future missions of the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV). The LIDS is androgynous, such that each system half is identical, thus any two vehicles or modules with LIDS can be coupled. Since each system half is a replica, the main interface seals must seal against each other instead of a conventional flat metal surface. These sealing surfaces are also expected to be exposed to the space environment when vehicles are not docked. The NASA Glenn Research Center (NASA GRC) is supporting this project by developing the main interface seals for the LIDS and determining the durability of candidate seal materials in the space environment. In space, the seals will be exposed to temperatures of between 50 to 50 C, vacuum, atomic oxygen, particle and ultraviolet radiation, and micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD). NASA GRC is presently engaged in determining the effects of these environments on our candidate elastomers. Since silicone rubber is the only class of seal elastomer that functions across the expected temperature range, NASA GRC is focusing on three silicone elastomers: two provided by Parker Hannifin (S0-899-50 and S0-383-70) and one from Esterline Kirkhill (ELA-SA-401). Our results from compression set, elastomer to elastomer adhesion, and seal leakage tests before and after various simulated space exposures will be presented.

deGroh, Henry C., III↗
NASA NTRS2008

Leak Detection and Location Technology Assessment for Aerospace Applications

Micro Meteoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) and other impacts can cause leaks in the International Space Station and other aerospace vehicles. The early detection and location of leaks is paramount to astronaut safety. Therefore this document surveys the state of the art in leak detection and location technology for aerospace vehicles.

Wilson, William C.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Orbital Debris Quarterly News, Volume 13, No. 3

Inside - Congressional Hearing Held on Orbital Debris and Space Traffic - United Nations' COPUOS Receives Update on Iridium-Cosmos Collision - MMOD Inspection of the HST WFPC2 Radiator - Reentry Survivability Analysis of GPM Spacecraft - Update on Recent Major Breakup Fragments - Upcoming Meetings - Space Missions and Orbital Box Score

J.-C. Liou↗
NASA NTRS2010

Overview of EVA PRA for TPS Repair for Hubble Space Telescope Servicing Mission

Following the Columbia accident in 2003, NASA developed techniques to repair the Thermal Protection System (TPS) in the event of damage to the TPS as one of several actions to reduce the risk to future flights from ascent debris, micro-meteoroid and/or orbital debris (MMOD). Other actions to help reduce the risk include improved inspection techniques, reduced shedding of debris from the External Tank and ability to rescue the crew with a launch on need vehicle. For the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Servicing Mission the crew rescue capability was limited by the inability to safe haven on the International Space Station (ISS), resulting in a greater reliance on the repair capability. Therefore it was desirable to have an idea of the risk associated with conducting a repair, where the repair would have to be conducted using an Extra-Vehicular Activity (EVA). Previously, focused analyses had been conducted to quantify the risk associated with certain aspects of an EVA, for example the EVA Mobility Unit (EMU) or Space Suit; however, the analyses were somewhat limited in scope. A complete integrated model of an EVA which could quantify the risk associated with all of the major components of an EVA had never been done before. It was desired to have a complete integrated model to be able to assess the risks associated with an EVA to support the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) in making risk informed decisions. In the case of the HST Servicing Mission, this model was developed to assess specifically the risks associated with performing a TPS repair EVA. This paper provides an overview of the model that was developed to support the HST mission in the event of TPS damage. The HST Servicing Mission was successfully completed on May 24th 2009 with no critical TPS damage; therefore the model was not required for real-time mission support. However, it laid the foundation upon which future EVA quantitative risk assessments could be based.

Bigler, Mark↗
NASA NTRS2010

A Ballistic Limit Analysis Program for Shielding Against Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris

A software program has been developed that enables the user to quickly and simply perform ballistic limit calculations for common spacecraft structures that are subject to hypervelocity impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD) projectiles. This analysis program consists of two core modules: design, and; performance. The design module enables a user to calculate preliminary dimensions of a shield configuration (e.g., thicknesses/areal densities, spacing, etc.) for a ?design? particle (diameter, density, impact velocity, incidence). The performance module enables a more detailed shielding analysis, providing the performance of a user-defined shielding configuration over the range of relevant in-orbit impact conditions.

Ryan, Shannon↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Environment Effects on Silicone Seal Materials

A docking system is being developed by the NASA to support future space missions. It is expected to use redundant elastomer seals to help contain cabin air during dockings between two spacecraft. The sealing surfaces are exposed to the space environment when vehicles are not docked. In space, the seals will be exposed to temperatures between 125 to -75 C, vacuum, atomic oxygen, particle and ultraviolet radiation, and micrometeoroid and orbital debris (MMOD). Silicone rubber is the only class of space flight-qualified elastomeric seal material that functions across the expected temperature range. NASA Glenn has tested three silicone elastomers for such seal applications: two provided by Parker (S0899-50 and S0383-70) and one from Esterline (ELA-SA-401). The effects of atomic oxygen (AO), UV and electron particle radiation, and vacuum on the properties of these three elastomers were examined. Critical seal properties such as leakage, adhesion, and compression set were measured before and after simulated space exposures. The S0899-50 silicone was determined to be inadequate for extended space seal applications due to high adhesion and intolerance to UV, but both S0383-70 and ELA-SA-401 seals were adequate.

deGroh, Henry C., III↗
NASA NTRS2011

International Space Station (ISS) Risk Reduction Activities

As the assembly of the ISS nears completion, it is worthwhile to step back and review some of the actions pursued by the Program in recent years to reduce risk and enhance the safety and health of ISS crewmembers, visitors, and space flight participants. While the ISS requirements and initial design were intended to provide the best practicable levels of safety, it is always possible to reduce risk -- given the determination and commitment to do so. The following is a summary of some of the steps taken by the ISS Program Manager, by our International Partners, by hardware and software designers, by operational specialists, and by safety personnel to continuously enhance the safety of the ISS. While decades of work went into developing the ISS requirements, there are many things in a Program like the ISS that can only be learned through actual operational experience. These risk reduction activities can be divided into roughly three categories: (1) Areas that were initially noncompliant which have subsequently been brought into compliance or near compliance (i.e., Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris [MMOD] protection, acoustics) (2) Areas where initial design requirements were eventually considered inadequate and were subsequently augmented (i.e., Toxicity Level 4 materials, emergency hardware and procedures) (3) Areas where risks were initially underestimated, and have subsequently been addressed through additional mitigation (i.e., Extravehicular Activity [EVA] sharp edges, plasma shock hazards) Due to the hard work and cooperation of many parties working together across the span of nearly a decade, the ISS is now a safer and healthier environment for our crew, in many cases exceeding the risk reduction targets inherent in the intent of the original design. It will provide a safe and stable platform for utilization and discovery.

Fodroci, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2011

Long-Term International Space Station (ISS) Risk Reduction Activities

As the assembly of the ISS nears completion, it is worthwhile to step back and review some of the actions pursued by the Program in recent years to reduce risk and enhance the safety and health of ISS crewmembers, visitors, and space flight participants. While the initial ISS requirements and design were intended to provide the best practicable levels of safety, it is always possible to further reduce risk given the determination, commitment, and resources to do so. The following is a summary of some of the steps taken by the ISS Program Manager, by our International Partners, by hardware and software designers, by operational specialists, and by safety personnel to continuously enhance the safety of the ISS, and to reduce risk to all crewmembers. While years of work went into the development of ISS requirements, there are many things associated with risk reduction in a Program like the ISS that can only be learned through actual operational experience. These risk reduction activities can be divided into roughly three categories: Areas that were initially noncompliant which have subsequently been brought into compliance or near compliance (i.e., Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris [MMOD] protection, acoustics) Areas where initial design requirements were eventually considered inadequate and were subsequently augmented (i.e., Toxicity hazard level-4 materials, emergency procedures, emergency equipment, control of drag-throughs) Areas where risks were initially underestimated, and have subsequently been addressed through additional mitigation (i.e., Extravehicular Activity [EVA] sharp edges, plasma shock hazards). Due to the hard work and cooperation of many parties working together across the span of more than a decade, the ISS is now a safer and healthier environment for our crew, in many cases exceeding the risk reduction targets inherent in the intent of the original design. It will provide a safe and stable platform for utilization and discovery for years to come.

Forroci, Michael P.↗