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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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153 records · Page 9
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

VERIFICATION OF TRISO FUEL BURNUP USING MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHMS

Pebble Bed Reactors are fueled with fuel pebbles that are circulated multiple times through the reactor vessel before discharge. During the normal operation of a PBR, ejected pebbles are returned to the reactor or discharged depending on the fuel burnup and physical condition of the pebbles. The burnup measurement is usually based on detected radiation signatures of fission products accumulated in the pebble fuel over burnup. Previous research has shown that height of photopeaks of fission products, such as 134Cs, 137Cs, 154Eu, etc., can be used independently or in combination to infer or predict the level of burnup in the fuel. However, it remains challenging to measure such complex sources due to self-shielding effects, strong radiation background and intervening materials. Another operational challenge is the required high throughput of burnup measurement, which necessitates limited measurement time and thus impacts quality of measured gamma-ray spectra. Hence, advanced spectral analysis methods are needed to analyze the noisy gamma spectra and predict the burnup values. We propose to use machine learning (ML) method to interpret gamma-ray spectra and predict the burnup values of the pebbles. ML has achieved widespread success and adoption across a few domains that require pattern recognition and analysis in varied data types. In this work, we apply three proven ML approaches - multilayer perceptrons, convolutional neural networks, and transformers - to the task of predicting fuel burnup from measured gamma spectra, and compile a dataset of simulated spectra for training and validation of the ML models. In this paper, we will discuss the network architecture of these three ML approaches and compare the performance of the simplest of these (MLP) to a standard linear regression.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

MSR Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection White Paper

This document represents the status of Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) characteristics for the Molten Salt Reactor designs selected by the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) provisional System Steering Committee (pSSC) as representatives of three broad classes of MSRs. The three classes of MSRs are: (1) Liquid-fueled with integrated salt processing, (2) Liquid-fueled without integrated salt processing, (3) Solid-fueled with salt coolant. The intent is to generate preliminary information about the PR&PP merits of the MSR Reactor Technology and to provide insights for optimizing their PR&PP performance for the benefit of MSR system designers. It updates the MSR analysis published in the 2011 report “Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection of the Six Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems”, prepared Jointly by the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Working Group (PRPPWG) and the System Steering Committees of the Generation IV International Forum, taking into account the evolution of both the systems and the GIF R&D activities since its publication. The document, prepared jointly by the GIF PRPPWG and the GIF MSR pSSC, follows the high-level paradigm of the GIF Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection Evaluation Methodology to investigate the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection features of the GIF MSR representative designs. For PR, the document analyses and discusses the proliferation resistance aspects in terms of robustness against State-based threats associated with diversion of materials, misuse of facilities, breakout scenarios, and production in clandestine facilities. Similarly, for physical protection, the document discusses the robustness against theft of material and sabotage by non-State actors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗