SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
This chapter discusses risks from unintentional or illicit movement of nuclear and radioactive material out of regulatory control through international border crossing points, summarizes international efforts to build capacity and support border security, and discusses how detection equipment can be used to screen for penetrating radiation at traditional border crossing points.
IAEA Facility-Level Safeguards and Implementation - This presentation is intended to introduce the audience to the application of international safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency at nuclear facilities around the world. It covers the State Level Approach, random statistical sampling processes, material balance area structure, non-destructive assay techniques, and inspection areas. Addition of advanced verification technologies for the IAEA
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Here, this work presents a comprehensive and critical evaluation of experimental nuclear spectroscopic data from reactions and decays for all 11 known nuclides with mass number A=220 (Pb, Bi, Po, At, Rn, Fr, Ra, Ac, Th, Pa, and Np). Recommended values are produced for level energies, spins and parities, half-lives, and radiation properties including energies, branching ratios, and multipolarities of γ rays, as well as characteristics of β and α radiation decays, based on all available experimental data. This work supersedes previous A=220 evaluations: 2011Br05, 1997Ar04, 1986Ma45, 1976El04.
Gamma-gamma coincidence spectrometers have the potential to significantly enhance detection sensitivity for ultra-trace radionuclide measurements. The implementation of these spectrometers, however, is limited by the complexity of acquisition hardware, data processing and quantification. This work reports development of a novel radionuclide quantification software for γ-γ coincidence measurements. For any radionuclide, the software parses the Evaluated Nuclear Structure Data File (ENSDF) database, recursively simulating all possible γ-γ coincidence signatures and their respective emission and detection probabilities. Implemented using Python programming language, the software employs several strategies to boost overall computational performance. Since coincidence-based spectrometers are of notable interest in monitoring compliance for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the software’s execution was tested for 84 CTBT-relevant radionuclides. To date, the software has been experimentally validated for 15 radionuclides using the Advanced Radionuclide Gamma spectrOmeter (ARGO) at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, USA (PNNL). Notably, the software can be operated in convergence mode, whereby coincidence detection efficiency’s convergence behavior can help avoid unreliable radionuclide activity estimates. With growing number of coincidence spectrometers worldwide, this paper aims to assist the radiation metrology community in developing similar software for their system.
Radiation portal monitors (RPMs) are widely used at border security checkpoints to detect the presence of radioactive materials in people, vehicles, and cargo. Typically, RPM detection systems consist of two pillars equipped with gamma and neutron detectors. To improve detection efficiency, RPMs employ techniques such as a limited energy window, dynamic alarm thresholds, and lead shielding. However, without continuous monitoring of background radiation, signal interpretation can be compromised, because environmental factors and mechanical failures can cause fluctuations. Here, we introduce a daily file format that logs gamma background and neutron background radiation levels continuously over a 24 h period; this format is different from traditional formats that record data only when the RPM is active or occupied. The approach enables RPM operators and analysts to (1) identify and diagnose malfunctioning components, (2) adjust system settings to account for dynamic environmental factors, and (3) use the recorded data to characterize outer space phenomena. Continuous background reporting is essential for identifying issues such as faulty connections, voltage divider failures, and errors in background updates. Continuous background reporting also enables the detection of external influences, including nearby X-ray scanners, temperature fluctuations, rainfall, cosmic radiation, and lunar phase changes. These data files are designed to be easily evaluated and parsed using common tools, and a quick review by an expert is often sufficient for problem diagnosis. We anticipate that continuous background radiation monitoring and these new strategies will significantly improve the accuracy and reliability of RPM systems, reducing the rate of false alarms and enhancing overall system performance.
The r-process abundance peaks, particularly near mass number A ∼ 130, reflect underlying nuclear structure effects such as closed neutron shells, yet modeling the nucleosynthesis in this region remains hindered by uncertain neutron-capture rates. These rates are especially sensitive to nuclear level densities (NLDs) and γ-ray strength functions of neutron-rich nuclei, where experimental data are scarce. We present the first experimental constraint on the NLD of 141 Cs using the β-Oslo method, extending sensitivity to the neutron-rich regime near the N = 82 closed shell. Our data allow for critical calibration of microscopic NLD models and reveal that 141 Cs lies near the limit of statistical model applicability. Using this experimental input, we evaluate radiative neutron-capture rates across neighboring isotones using both Hauser–Feshbach (HF) and High Fidelity Resonance (HFR) models. Our results show order-of-magnitude rate increases for nuclei along the N = 86 line, signaling a transition to resonance-dominated capture in this region. These findings underscore the importance of constraining NLDs to improve r-process reaction network predictions, particularly in environments where the validity of statistical models breaks down.
The prompt fission neutron spectrum (PFNS) of spontaneously fissioning 252 Cf is a Neutron Data Standards observable. Nearly all fission spectra of actinides were measured relative to it, using efficiencies derived from it, or analyzed with simulations validated by it. The current Standards evaluation was published by W. Mannhart in 1987. It could not be updated because the evaluation input, experimental mean values and covariances, were lost. First, we attempt to reproduce it. However, Mannhart’s evaluation can only be reproduced within its one-σ uncertainties as some of its aspects (e.g., experimental covariances, rejected data points) remain unknown. Therefore, a new evaluation is presented: We revisit all existing experimental 252 Cf(sf) PFNS data, including those published after the release of the current Standards evaluation, and re-estimate associated covariances. The newly evaluated 252 Cf(sf) PFNS differs distinctly from Mannhart’s below 300 keV and extends it to lower and higher outgoing neutron energies (500 eV–25 MeV). The new evaluated uncertainties are larger from 3–9 MeV and smaller otherwise. Spectrum averaged cross sections of importance to the International Reactor Dosimetry and Fusion File community calculated with the new spectrum are close to those calculated with Mannhart’s evaluation and agree with experimental values well within their uncertainties.
The ENDF/B library, which is developed, maintained, and distributed by the Cross Section Evaluation Working Group, is the main source of nuclear data for analyses and computational simulations in nuclear applications, like different nuclear reactors concepts, radiation shielding, medical applications, astrophysics, etc. The library is constantly being improved and updated, with each release bringing an optimal representation of nuclear interactions as they are understood in their time. The most recent release, ENDF/B-VIII.1, represents a significant improvement in terms of the performance and consistency of the measured differential data relative to previous versions, as it combines the most recent experimental differential data and advanced theoretical nuclear models. As one of the many highlights, ENDF/B-VIII.1 restores a high-burnup depletion performance, comparable to ENDF/B-VII.1, that had been degraded in ENDF/B-VIII.0, while further improving the performance in criticality benchmarks, such as those in the Mosteller’s suite. Additionally noteworthy is the improved performance of ENDF/B-VIII.1 in radiation shielding and thick-target leakage spectrum integral experiments, which are also important for fusion and reactor applications. In this work we present in a very summarized way the main updates implemented in the ENDF/B-VIII.1 release and its main impacts, and also begin to delineate the path forward as to what to expect in the future for the next ENDF/B release, which, based on the timeline of the past few releases, is estimated to happen around 5 years from now. We emphasize that the ENDF/B-VIII.1 release was the product of an enormous collaborative effort among many authors and that for a complete detailed picture, the reader is strongly encouraged to refer to the article accompanying the release, which is currently in the publication process, but available as preprint [G. P. A. Nobre et al. arXiv Preprint arXiv: 2511.03564 (2025)].
Here, we present an imaging system that employs zero-knowledge protocols to protect sensitive geometrical information, along with procedures to increase confidence in the result. The goal of this work is to enable the inclusion of warhead confirmation measurements in future arms control treaties. We present a demonstration of both true positive and true negative measurements that validate models and establish authenticating procedures toward meeting acceptance requirements for use in nuclear facilities. We use a two-dimensional time-encoded fast neutron imaging system with an anti-symmetric mask pattern; the fast neutron count values exceeding minimum or maximum thresholds indicate that two measured items are not identical. Laboratory measurements over twenty trials show that alarm rates for negative confirmation measurements are within uncertainties of model predictions. Positive confirmation measurements indicate that alarm rates are large enough to encourage treaty compliance.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards Analytical Services (IAEA-SGAS) oversees coordinating the second Controlled Potential Coulometry Quality Control Interlaboratory Comparison (CPC QC ILC) on behalf of the Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML). The purpose of the exercise is to: (1) verify the ability of participating laboratories to measure the Pu concentration in the sample solutions, and (2) estimate the method performance (repeatability and intermediate reproducibility). Sample shipping coordination was performed by IAEA-SGAS. The test sample is a plutonium nitrate solution (estimated molarity of 3-5 M), delivered in two PTFE screw-capped quartz ampoules. Each participating laboratory is to receive two ampoules. Each ampoule holds approximately 8 mL of solution containing approximately 10 mg Pu/g. The gross weights of the ampoules were provided. The test sample is assumed to have an iron content below the level of significance for the CPC. The isotopic composition of the plutonium test sample was provided; however, no analysis date was provided. In addition, IAEA-SGAS provided analytical instructions to participants. On September 20, 2022, SRNL received the samples sent by IAEA-SGAS.
Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).
The Second Research Coordination Meeting of the IAEA Coordinated Research Project (CRP) on Updating Fission Yield Data for Applications was held in Vienna at the IAEA headquarters from 19 to 23 December 2022, with 23 international experts attending the meeting. The CRP is devoted to evaluation efforts of cumulative and independent fission yields for incident energies from the thermal point up to 14 MeV on actinide targets. Produced fission yield evaluations should include full uncertainty quantification and are expected to combine available experimental data and state-of-the-art model information. The activities undertaken within this CRP were reviewed including the assessment of newly measured data and ongoing evaluation efforts. Technical discussions and the resulting further work plan of this CRP are summarized in this report. The meeting presentations are available at: https://www-nds.iaea.org/index-meeting-crp/2RCM_FY/index.htm.
As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.
This document outlines a set of requirements for gamma sensitive systems applied to three different applications: (1) homeland security (search and identification); (2) in-situ quantification; and (3) quantification in a material characterization laboratory. These three applications represent a range of activities that a country might use for locating, identifying, and quantifying radioactive material. These applications require increasing accuracy and system advancements, and skill levels. This document considers systems with various detector types and are characterized by their energy resolution: (1) low resolution (e.g., NaI(Tl) scintillation) and (2) higher resolution (e.g., high-purity germanium [HPGe] solid state) systems. The higher resolution systems also include cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and only mechanically cooled HPGe systems are considered. These detectors and their associated acquisition hardware and analysis software afford a broad range of capabilities with corresponding ranges of complexity, maintainability, and cost. Ultimately, the equipment must meet the measurement goals of the application, and compliance with a given list of hardware specifications does not in itself guarantee meeting those goals. Examples of typical performance objectives for international safeguards applications are documented in International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials (IAEA, STR-368, November 2010). Selection of the detector type best suited to a specific application is often a compromise between “state of the art” or best available option and what is practical.
One purpose in presenting this material is to bring to the attention of engineers background material which they would not normally encounter in the course of routine development work. An excellent and timely reference is as follows: Seminar on Methods of Detection, Measurement and Monitoring of Pollutants in the Marine Environment. The international seminar was organized by FAO with the support of UNESCO, IAEA, SCOR and WMO, and was held in Rome, Italy, 4-10 December 1970. The final report, the title of which was given, is a very thoroughgoing document and certainly a must reference for anyone seriously considering the development of sensors for pollution measurement. Perhaps it would be appropriate to present some exact quotations selected from the referenced document. The quotations follow: 1) "The pressures to develop sensitive and reliable methods come about when those responsible for the management of our environment need an objective evaluation of existing or potential perils." 2) "Nearly all of the Panels concerned with the contaminants identified specific examples of man's waste products which may be leaking to the environment in substantial quantities and for which as yet there are no analytical techniques available ". 3) "Very few analyses for organochlorine pesticides appear to have been carried out on sea water and the panel considered that the present methodology was not capable of detecting, on a routine basis, the quantities of these compounds in open sea waters." and 4) "This corresponds essentially to the ratio of useful data produced to the labour expended, since instrumentation costs in the long run become negligible."