Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “INSPECTOR”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 163 records · Page 9

Application of Noise Cancelling and Damage Detection Algorithms in NDE of Concrete Bridge Decks Using Impact Signals

Delamination is a commonly observed distress in concrete bridge decks. Among all the delamination detection methods, acoustic methods have the advantages of being fast and inexpensive. In traditional acoustic inspection methods, the inspector drags a chain along or hammers on the bridge deck and detects delamination from the 'hollowness' of the sounds. The signals are often contaminated by ambient traffic noise and the detection of delamination is highly subjective. This paper describes the performance of an impact-bases acoustic NDE method where the traffic noise was filtered by employing a noise cancelling algorithm and where subjectivity was eliminated by introducing feature extraction and pattern recognition algorithms. Different algorithms were compared and the best one was selected in each category. The comparison showed that the modified independent component analysis (ICA) algorithm was most effective in cancelling the traffic noise and features consisting of mel-frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) had the best performance in terms of repeatability and separabillty. The condition of the bridge deck was then detected by a radial basis function (RBF) neural network. The performance of the system was evaluated using both experimental and field data. The results show that the selected algorithms increase the noise robustness of acoustic methods and perform satisfactorily if the training data is representative.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Monte Carlo characterization of the cosmic ray muon flux in shallow subsurface geological repositories intended for disposal of radioactive materials

Recent challenges in monitoring subsurface geological repositories intended for disposal of radioactive materials such as spent nuclear fuel call for new, innovative concepts that are facility independent, cost-effective, passive, and reliable. Once nuclear material is in place at these facilities, reverifying the inventory may no longer be feasible if continuity of knowledge is lost or unavailable to the inspectors. Using cosmic ray muons may present several potential advantages over conventional photon/neutron signatures, and their use in safeguards applications have only received attention in the past decade. However, there have been limited efforts to explore the integration of cosmic ray muons into repository safeguards and study potential gains, risks, and costs. This paper presents a Monte Carlo-based methodology to characterize the cosmic ray muon flux, including muon angular and energy differential distributions at depths representative of subsurface geological repositories. Since there have been limited measurements at these sites and a measurement made in one site is not always transferable to another site, the objective is to develop an efficient simulation method and useful parametrizations to provide a convenient tool for enabling muon simulations at any geological repository site. It is expected these results will provide a better understanding of how muons can be integrated into an existing geological repository safeguards framework.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Automated Nondestructive Assay of UF6 Cylinders: Detector Characterization and Initial Measurements

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors currently perform periodic inspections at uranium enrichment plants to verify UF6 cylinder enrichment declarations. Measurements are typically performed with handheld high-resolution sensors on a sampling of cylinders assumed to be representative of the facility's entire cylinder inventory. These measurements are time-consuming and assay only a small fraction of the total cylinder volume. An automated nondestructive assay system capable of providing enrichment measurements over the full volume of the cylinder could improve upon current verification practices in terms of manpower and assay accuracy. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory is developing an Integrated Cylinder Verification System (ICVS) intended for this purpose and has developed a field prototype of the nondestructive assay (NDA) components of an ICVS. The nondestructive assay methods would combine the 'traditional' enrichment-meter signature (i.e. 186-keV emission from 235U) as well as 'non-traditional' high-energy photon signatures derived from neutrons produced primarily by 19F({alpha},n) reactions. This paper describes the design, calibration and characterization of the NaI(Tl) and LaBr3(Ce) spectrometers utilized in the field prototype. An overview of a recent field measurement campaign is then provided, supported by example gamma-ray pulse-height spectra collected on cylinders of known enrichment.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

Determining initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of pressurized-water reactor spent fuel assemblies by analyzing passive gamma spectra measured at the Clab interim-fuel storage facility in Sweden

The purpose of the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI)–Spent Fuel (SF) project is to strengthen the technical toolkit of safeguards inspectors and/or other interested parties. The NGSI–SF team is working to achieve the following technical goals more easily and efficiently than in the past using nondestructive assay measurements of spent fuel assemblies: (1) verify the initial enrichment, burnup, and cooling time of facility declaration; (2) detect the diversion or replacement of pins; (3) estimate the plutonium mass [which is also a function of the variables in (1)]; (4) estimate the decay heat; and (5) determine the reactivity of spent fuel assemblies. Since August 2013, a set of measurement campaigns has been conducted at the Central Interim Storage Facility for Spent Nuclear Fuel (Clab), in collaboration with Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB). One purpose of the measurement campaigns was to acquire passive gamma spectra with high-purity germanium and lanthanum bromide scintillation detectors from Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor spent fuel assemblies. The absolute 137 Cs count rate and the 154 Eu/ 137 Cs, 134 Cs/ 137 Cs, 106 Ru/ 137 Cs, and 144 Ce/ 137 Cs isotopic ratios were extracted; these values were used to construct corresponding model functions (which describe each measured quantity’s behavior over various combinations of burnup, cooling time, and initial enrichment) and then were used to determine those same quantities in each measured spent fuel assembly. Furthermore, the results obtained in comparison with the operator declared values, as well as the methodology developed, are discussed in detail in the paper.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Standoff enrichment analysis of UF 6 cylinders

We investigate a new safeguards approach for verification of uranium processing operations via standoff measurement of UF 6 cylinder transports entering and leaving a facility. Current safeguards verification at facilities with UF 6 cylinders includes attended enrichment measurements of several randomly-selected cylinders using handheld instruments with inspection of all the cylinders typically only once a year. This approach requires significant inspector effort and can only be performed intermittently. Here we explore an unattended, multi-sensor enrichment measurement system that can operate continuously on cylinders in motion. Such an approach could be used to enhance continuity of knowledge by verifying that all shipments entering and leaving a facility are consistent with declared operations. The challenges in developing a standoff enrichment technique include limited statistical significance of the collected data, and interpreting the complex signatures from a shipment of UF 6 cylinders. These signatures vary with cylinder properties (e.g. the fuel cycle history, cylinder history, material distribution, material age, etc.) and measurement conditions (e.g. speed and distance of vehicle, detector response, cylinder orientation, attenuation from overpack and vehicle, etc.). We demonstrate that we can extract useful enrichment signatures from standoff measurements of UF 6 cylinders entering and leaving a facility. Our initial analysis demonstrates a measurable difference in enrichment-related signatures from a cylinder in motion, measured with modest detection efficiency from several meters away. We also demonstrate that the inclusion of vehicle tracking increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of our radiation signatures, and decreases uncertainty of parameters needed for enrichment analysis, e.g. distance and velocity.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

The specific ( α ,n) production rate for 234 U in UF 6

Natural, depleted, and low enriched uranium hexafluoride is manufactured and transported on an industrial scale to support commercial nuclear power plant operation. One-way material production and flow is verified by nuclear safeguards inspectorates is by neutron counting. The dominant neutron source term is ( α ,n) production due to 234 U which gets enriched/depleted along with 235 U. We describe recent efforts to accurately determine the ( α ,n)/s/g of 234 U in UF 6 . This piece of nuclear data is of direct value to the nuclear safeguards community in the science-based verification and assay of bulk uranium hexafluoride. It also provides a benchmark on codes that calculate yield curves for various compounds from cross section data, and hence, provides a scale or normalization constraint on evaluated basic cross section data. Finally, in turn, evaluated basic data allows the yield from other materials to be calculated; for instance, moist uranyl fluoride, which is of interest in holdup measurements.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A new generation of uranium coincidence fast neutron collars for assay of LWR fresh fuel assemblies

The active uranium neutron coincidence collar provides a means of non-destructively assaying the fissile linear density of Light Water Reactor fresh fuel assemblies containing low enriched uranium. These neutron collars can operate in two modes: a thermal and a fast mode. In fast mode, a neutron collar has an added cadmium (Cd) liner in the sample cavity of the detector to reduce the impact of the burnable poison (thermal neutron absorber) on the detector signal (doubles). The main advantage for operating in fast mode is a detected signal that is less dependent of the burnable neutron poison content and thus less dependent on facility operator declarations. The drawback is that operating in fast mode requires a longer measurement time (~hour vs tens of minutes for thermal mode) to achieve the statistically needed precision in the measurements. The trend in the modern reactor fuel assemblies is moving to higher burnup by using higher initial enrichment and, consequently, a higher number of burnable poison rods to compensate the initial neutron reactivity. The increase of the burnable poison loading has motivated the development of a new generation of high efficiency fast neutron collars to allow practical measurements in-field by nuclear inspectors. This paper describes the development and performance evaluation of a new generation of neutron collars, for both boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels, jointly developed between the US Department of Energy, through Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Euratom Safeguards Directorate of the European Commission. In this work, we present here calibrations with reference fuel assemblies at Los Alamos National Laboratory as well as the results of in-field measurement campaigns in fuel fabrication plants with modern commercial fuel assemblies. The experimental results show that a typical PWR verification can be made in a total time of 30 min with an uncertainty in the measured mass of 2% at one standard deviation (1σ). A BWR verification can be made in 47 min with an uncertainty in the measured mass of 1.9% at 1σ, or a total time of 20 min with 1σ uncertainty in the measured mass of 2.5%.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Demonstration of INCC6 for advanced list-mode data acquisition and analysis using ALMM

The International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC) software plays an important role in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material control and accounting (NMC&A) measurements. While the current version, INCC5, represents the traditional standard utilized by inspectorates as well as facilities and practitioners alongside shift register hardware, LANL has recently developed an upgraded version of the software, INCC6. INCC6 offers the same analysis tools as INCC5 while adding new capabilities including acquisition and analysis of list-mode data, recording and storage of list-mode data files, and an expanded set of advanced analysis tools that make use of the additional information available from list-mode data. Here, this paper presents the first demonstration of data acquisition and analysis using INCC6 and the Advanced List Mode Multiplicity Module (ALMM). The capability of INCC6 to perform live list-mode data acquisition and analysis is demonstrated for a variety of neutron sources with a range of neutron emission rates relevant for practical applications and validated against the results obtained with INCC5 and traditional shift register hardware. Advanced list-mode analysis tools introduced by INCC6, such as time-interval and coincidence matrix analysis, are also demonstrated. Finally, the capability of INCC6 to analyze list-mode data files is tested and validated against traditional shift register results using INCC5.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Assessing high fidelity multi-component models to facilitate safeguards at Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plants

We report that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors routinely carry out environmental sampling (ES) as a verification method. Collection of environmental swipe samples at various locations in Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Facilities (GCEPs) is an important process in detecting misuse of a declared facility and possibly the existence of undeclared nuclear material. These samples are measured for isotopic composition in uranium containing particles by Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometry (TIMS) or Inductively Coupled Plasma Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS). Even though ES is highly effective in detecting the absolute value of enrichments and their deviations from the declared values, it cannot explain the cause of those changes. Several potential explanations can serve as possibilities for particles detected above or other than the declared enrichment. These include normal and non-malicious events such as the design of the enrichment cascades, unintentional failures of the machines, or overshoot during startup of a cascade. It can also be the result of deliberate misuse by the facility operators. The primary objective of this work is to understand how these factors affect the enrichments produced by a cascade and quantify anticipated multi-isotopic concentrations for each case. The following methodology is employed to determine signatures at a particular facility. 1) Utilize a new two-dimensional multi-component diffusion code to obtain centrifuge performance data and use that information to design and perform cascade analysis. Compare and contrast the results with previous 1-D radially averaged solutions from the Pancake code. 2) Design a GCEP cascade with the production goal of 19.75% 235 U for each set of machine data above. Investigate two cascade scenarios that include enrichment of natural uranium (NU) feed to 19.75% 235U in a single cascade compared to a two-step process of NU to 5% and then 5% to 19.75%. 3) Simulate the intentional vs. unintentional off-normal scenarios in the cascades to assess the differences in isotopic concentrations. A non-ideal squared-off cascade model developed at the University of Virginia is used to calculate flow rates and isotopic concentrations of the process gas. The analysis is performed using the Rome machine model operated at 600 m/s rotor speed. The upper and lower bounds of normal and abnormal enrichments in a typical facility are used in conjunction with ES results to understand the root causes of such observations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Use of an ion mobility spectrometer for detecting uranium compounds

The safeguards community currently lacks a method to rapidly determine the chemical form of radioactive and non-radioactive compounds in real time during inspection activities. Chemical speciation identification can provide important information on both the types of materials that are collected during environmental sampling and can inform inspectors as to where to focus efforts during inspections or complementary access visits. Ion Mobility Spectrometry (IMS) is an established field technique for the detection of explosives, narcotics, and other organic compounds. More recently, electrospray ionization (ESI) has been used to introduce inorganic compounds to IMS instruments for analysis. These techniques have shown the ability to supply chemical information about the compounds being analyzed. Although these laboratory based instruments use a liquid-based injection system, there is evidence in the literature of unaltered and intact pharmaceutical tablets being volatilized and ionized in open atmosphere using heat and a Ni-63 source. Lastly, this work determined that a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) IMS could be used for the identification of solid uranium compounds directly after sampling using a COTS sample swipe.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A zero-knowledge protocol for nuclear warhead verification

The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control involves a paradox: international inspectors will have to gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Proposed inspection systems featuring ‘information barriers’, designed to hide measurements stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and snooping. Here we show the viability of a fundamentally new approach to nuclear warhead verification that incor-porates a zero-knowledge protocol, which is designed in such a way that sensitive information is never measured and so does not need to be hidden. We interrogate submitted items with energetic neutrons, making, in effect, differential measurements of both neutron transmission and emission. Calculations for scenarios in which material is diverted from a test object show that a high degree of discrimination can be achieved while revealing zero information. Our ideas for a physical zero-knowledge system could have applications beyond the context of nuclear disarmament. The proposed technique suggests a way to perform comparisons or computations on personal or confidential data without measuring the data in the first place.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Quantitative imaging and automated fuel pin identification for passive gamma emission tomography

Compliance of member States to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is monitored through nuclear safeguards. The Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) system is a novel instrument developed within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) project JNT 1510, which included the European Commission, Finland, Hungary and Sweden. The PGET is used for the verification of spent nuclear fuel stored in water pools. Advanced image reconstruction techniques are crucial for obtaining high-quality cross-sectional images of the spent-fuel bundle to allow inspectors of the IAEA to monitor nuclear material and promptly identify its diversion. In this work, we have developed a software suite to accurately reconstruct the spent-fuel cross sectional image, automatically identify present fuel rods, and estimate their activity. Unique image reconstruction challenges are posed by the measurement of spent fuel, due to its high activity and the self-attenuation. While the former is mitigated by detector physical collimation, we implemented a linear forward model to model the detector responses to the fuel rods inside the PGET, to account for the latter. The image reconstruction is performed by solving a regularized linear inverse problem using the fast-iterative shrinkage-thresholding algorithm. We have also implemented the traditional filtered back projection (FBP) method based on the inverse Radon transform for comparison and applied both methods to reconstruct images of simulated mockup fuel assemblies. Higher image resolution and fewer reconstruction artifacts were obtained with the inverse-problem approach, with the mean-square-error reduced by 50%, and the structural-similarity improved by 200%. We then used a convolutional neural network (CNN) to automatically identify the bundle type and extract the pin locations from the images; the estimated activity levels finally being compared with the ground truth. The proposed computational methods accurately estimated the activity levels of the present pins, with an associated uncertainty of approximately 5%.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Indoor And Outdoor Gamma Dose Measurements For Specific Counties of Trabzon-Turkey

In this study, it was determined environmental gamma radiation dose rate for some counties of Trabzon-Turkey. A detailed ambient gamma dose measurement has been performed in the seven counties of Trabzon, using a portable environmental survey meter (NaI detector, INSPECTOR 1000). The measurements were performed indoor and outdoor of buildings and also at each spot, a reading was taken at 1 m above ground level. The dose rates varied from 42.69 nGy/h and 140.91 nGy/h for indoor gamma dose and 27.84 nGy/h and 121.80 nGy/h for outdoor gamma dose . Average indoor and outdoor gamma dose rates were ascertained to be 71.05 nGy/h and 60.20 nGy/h, respectively. The annual effective doses were calculated from indoor and outdoor gamma doses to be 348.56 muSv/y and 73.83 muSv/y, respectively.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Detection of anomalous reactor activity using antineutrino count evolution over the course of a reactor cycle

This paper analyzes the sensitivity of antineutrino count rate measurements to changes in the fissile content of civil power reactors. Such measurements may be useful in IAEA reactor safeguards applications. We introduce a hypothesis testing procedure to identify statistically significant differences between the antineutrino count rate evolution of a standard 'baseline' fuel cycle and that of an anomalous cycle, in which plutonium is removed and replaced with an equivalent fissile worth of uranium. The test would allow an inspector to detect anomalous reactor activity, or to positively confirm that the reactor is operating in a manner consistent with its declared fuel inventory and power level. We show that with a reasonable choice of detector parameters, the test can detect replacement of 82 kg of plutonium in 90 days with 95% probability, while controlling the false positive rate at 5%. We show that some improvement on this level of sensitivity may be obtained by various means, including use of the method in conjunction with existing reactor safeguards methods. We also identify a necessary and sufficient minimum daily antineutrino count rate and a maximum tolerable background rate to achieve the quoted sensitivity, and list examples of detectors in which such rates have been attained.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Modeling of UF{sub 6} enrichment with gas centrifuges for nuclear safeguards activities

The physical modeling of uranium isotopes ({sup 235}U, {sup 238}U) separation process by centrifugation of is a key aspect for predicting the nuclear fuel enrichment plant performances under surveillance by the Nuclear Safeguards Authorities. In this paper are illustrated some aspects of the modeling of fast centrifuges for UF{sub 6} gas enrichment and of a typical cascade enrichment plant with the Theoretical Centrifuge and Cascade Simulator (TCCS). The background theory for reproducing the flow field characteristics of a centrifuge is derived from the work of Cohen where the separation parameters are calculated using the solution of a differential enrichment equation. In our case we chose to solve the hydrodynamic equations for the motion of a compressible fluid in a centrifugal field using the Berman - Olander vertical velocity radial distribution and the solution was obtained using the Matlab software tool. The importance of a correct estimation of the centrifuge separation parameters at different flow regimes, lies in the possibility to estimate in a reliable way the U enrichment plant performances, once the separation external parameters are set (feed flow rate and feed, product and tails assays). Using the separation parameters of a single centrifuge allow to determine the performances of an entire cascade and, for this purpose; the software Simulink was used. The outputs of the calculation are the concentrations (assays) and the flow rates of the enriched (product) and depleted (tails) gas mixture. These models represent a valid additional tool, in order to verify the compliance of the U enrichment plant operator declarations with the 'on site' inspectors' measurements.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

New International Program to Asses the Reliability of Emerging Nondestructive Techniques (PARENT)

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) established the Program to Assess the Reliability of Emerging Nondestructive Techniques (PARENT) to follow on from the successful Program for the Inspection of Nickel alloy Components (PINC). The goal of the PARENT is to conduct a confirmatory assessment of the reliability of nondestructive evaluation (NDE) techniques for detecting and sizing primary water stress corrosion cracks (PWSCC) and applying the lessons learned from PINC to a series of round-robin tests. These open and blind round-robin tests will comprise a new set of typical pressure boundary components including dissimilar metal welds (DMWs) and bottom-mounted instrumentation penetrations. Open round-robin tests will engage research and industry teams worldwide to investigate and demonstrate the reliability of emerging NDE techniques to detect and size flaws with a wide range of lengths, depths, orientations, and locations. Blind round-robin tests will utilize various testing organizations, whose inspectors and procedures are certified by the standards for the nuclear industry in their respective countries, to investigate the ability of established NDE techniques to detect and size flaws whose characteristics range from relatively easy to very difficult for detection and sizing. Blind and open round-robin testing started in late 2011 and early 2012, respectively. This paper will present the work scope with reports on progress, NDE methods evaluated, and project timeline for PARENT.

Bottom Mounted Instrumentation↗

Numerical simulations and experimental measurements of steel and ice impacts on concrete for acoustic interrogation of delaminations in bridge decks

Delaminations in bridge decks typically result from corrosion of the top mat of reinforcing steel, which leads to a localized separation of the concrete cover from the underlying concrete. Because delaminations cannot be detected using visual inspection, rapid, large-area interrogation methods are desired to characterize bridge decks without disruption to traffic, without the subjectivity inherent in existing methods, and with increased inspector safety. To this end, disposable impactors such as water droplets or ice chips can be dropped using automatic dispensers onto concrete surfaces to excite mechanical vibrations while acoustic responses can be recorded using air-coupled microphones. In this work, numerical simulations are used to characterize the flexural response of a model concrete bridge deck subject to both steel and ice impactors, and the results are compared with similar experiments performed in the laboratory on a partially delaminated concrete bridge deck slab. The simulations offer greater understanding of the kinetics of impacts and the responses of materials.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Technical solutions to nonproliferation challenges

The threat of nuclear terrorism is real and poses a significant challenge to both U.S. and global security. For terrorists, the challenge is not so much the actual design of an improvised nuclear device (IND) but more the acquisition of the special nuclear material (SNM), either highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, to make the fission weapon. This paper provides two examples of technical solutions that were developed in support of the nonproliferation objective of reducing the opportunity for acquisition of HEU. The first example reviews technologies used to monitor centrifuge enrichment plants to determine if there is any diversion of uranium materials or misuse of facilities to produce undeclared product. The discussion begins with a brief overview of the basics of uranium processing and enrichment. The role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its safeguard objectives and how the technology evolved to meet those objectives will be described. The second example focuses on technologies developed and deployed to monitor the blend down of 500 metric tons of HEU from Russia's dismantled nuclear weapons to reactor fuel or low enriched uranium (LEU) under the U.S.-Russia HEU Purchase Agreement. This reactor fuel was then purchased by U.S. fuel fabricators and provided about half the fuel for the domestic power reactors. The Department of Energy established the HEU Transparency Program to provide confidence that weapons usable HEU was being blended down and thus removed from any potential theft scenario. Two measurement technologies, an enrichment meter and a flow monitor, were combined into an automated blend down monitoring system (BDMS) and were deployed to four sites in Russia to provide 24/7 monitoring of the blend down. Data was downloaded and analyzed periodically by inspectors to provide the assurances required.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗