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At least 163 records · Page 9

HEMM Workshop EMRTC [Slides]

Los Alamos is responsible for the NATO deterrent, is critical to the UK at-sea deterrent, and has designed over 90% of the current US stockpile. Los Alamos MUST lead the stockpile into the next phase of nuclear deterrence. To succeed, we need to leverage across several funding sources and sites to both answer the tactical needs of the current stockpile and to develop capabilities and personnel to meet future challenges.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Eight Levers of Coercive Conflict: No More, No Less

Few concepts are more important to our nation than the principle of deterrence. It is at the very core of our national security strategy. Despite its lasting import to our nation, and the rest of the world, we still lack a complete and explicit formulation of the calculus of deterrence. This has, at times, resulted in failed policies costing the Nation lives and wealth. With the ultimate objective of making the Nation more secure, we establish a complete and explicit formulation of deterrence calculus, which consists of eight levers. As it turns out this formulation also applies to the calculus of compellence, and is thus a unifying model of coercive conflict.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

From Stewardship to Transformation: Toward a Nuclear Enterprise for the 21st Century

The erosion of the global security environment over the last two decades has been rapid and dramatic. It appears also to be accelerating. There are deep and widening concerns in the United States and among its allies and partners that deterrence too has eroded at both the conventional and nuclear levels. The Strategic Posture Commission captured the essence of the problem in its October 2023 report—the United States seeks to meet the challenges of complex multipolar nuclear rivalry in the 21 st century with a slimmed down version of a nuclear deterrent designed in the middle of the 20 th century. With great urgency, the Commission recommended that something more and/or different is needed than simply the replacement of legacy systems with modern variants. But the U.S. nuclear security enterprise was reshaped after the Cold War to support the stockpile stewardship mission—not renewed designed, engineering, and production at scale. It has long fallen short of the agility, flexibility, and adaptiveness periodically asked of it by national leaders. In recent years, however, the message of urgency has been clearly received in the enterprise. Its culture has begun to shift. It has also been received by those in Washington D.C. responsible for funding and guiding the enterprise. The result is an enterprise in transition. Stockpile stewardship has given way to stockpile transformation. Risk aversion is giving way to risk management. Innovation and adaptation have been embraced. Experience to date has yielded some important lessons about what works and what doesn’t in terms of accelerating and delivering the needed innovation and adaptation. It has revealed the enduring character of some challenges. But it has also revealed that a much more agile and effective enterprise is within the national reach—something that will pay important dividends for deterrence, assurance, strategic stability, and peace.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Determining critical overlap concentration of polyethylene oxide to support excipient safety assessment of opioid products

Intravenous administration of abuse-deterrent opioid products poses high safety risks, in part due to the presence of high molecular weight polymeric excipients. Previous in vivo studies in animal models have shown that the higher molecular weight (Mw) polymeric excipients like polyethylene oxide (PEO) were directly linked to such adverse responses as intravenous hemolysis and kidney damage. PEO polymers have been widely used in abuse-deterrent formulations (ADF) of opioid products, adding to concerns over the general safety of the opioid category due to the unknown safety risk from abuse via unintended routes. Here, the current study focused on the determination of the critical overlap concentration (c*) at various PEO molecular weights to aid in explaining differences in observed adverse responses from previous animal studies on the intravenous administration of PEO solutions. Adverse in vivo responses may be related to the viscoelastic regime of the polymer solution, which depends not only on Mw but also on concentration. Having a localized polymer concentration in the blood above the c*, i.e., the transition from the dilute to semi-dilute entangled viscoelastic regime, may influence the flow behavior and interactions of cells in the blood. The relationship of c* to this combination of physical, chemical, and rheological effects is a possible driving force behind adverse in vivo responses.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Cavemen Animations for Nuclear Weapons Exhibit: Templates for VISIBLE Team

We use a couple of cavemen to explain the concept of deterrence, which has been with humans from the beginning. The interaction between the two cavemen will demonstrate how deterrence can discourage violence by instilling doubt and fear of the consequences escalating such violence further.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Safeguards design strategies: designing and constructing new uranium and plutonium processing facilities in the United States

In the United States, the Department of Energy (DOE) is transforming its outdated and oversized complex of aging nuclear material facilities into a smaller, safer, and more secure National Security Enterprise (NSE). Environmental concerns, worker health and safety risks, material security, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy while maintaining the capability for an effective nuclear deterrence by the United States, are influencing this transformation. As part of the nation's Uranium Center of Excellence (UCE), the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, will advance the U.S.'s capability to meet all concerns when processing uranium and is located adjacent to the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF), designed for consolidated storage of enriched uranium. The HEUMF became operational in March 2010, and the UPF is currently entering its final design phase. The designs of both facilities are for meeting anticipated security challenges for the 21st century. For plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) building at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in Los Alamos, New Mexico is now under construction. The first phase of the CMRR Project is the design and construction of a Radiological Laboratory/Utility/Office Building. The second phase consists of the design and construction of the Nuclear Facility (NF). The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) selected these two sites as part of the national plan to consolidate nuclear materials, provide for nuclear deterrence, and nonproliferation mission requirements. This work examines these two projects independent approaches to design requirements, and objectives for safeguards, security, and safety (3S) systems as well as the subsequent construction of these modern processing facilities. Emphasis is on the use of Safeguards-by-Design (SBD), incorporating Systems Engineering (SE) principles for these two projects.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Niche of harmful alga Aureococcus anophagefferens revealed through ecogenomics

Harmful algal blooms (HABs) cause significant economic and ecological damage worldwide. Despite considerable efforts, a comprehensive understanding of the factors that promote these blooms has been lacking because the biochemical pathways that facilitate their dominance relative to other phytoplankton within specific environments have not been identified. Here, biogeochemical measurements demonstrated that the harmful alga Aureococcus anophagefferens outcompeted co-occurring phytoplankton in estuaries with elevated levels of dissolved organic matter and turbidity and low levels of dissolved inorganic nitrogen. We subsequently sequenced the first HAB genome (A. anophagefferens) and compared its gene complement to those of six competing phytoplankton species identified via metaproteomics. Using an ecogenomic approach, we specifically focused on the gene sets that may facilitate dominance within the environmental conditions present during blooms. A. anophagefferens possesses a larger genome (56 mbp) and more genes involved in light harvesting, organic carbon and nitrogen utilization, and encoding selenium- and metal-requiring enzymes than competing phytoplankton. Genes for the synthesis of microbial deterrents likely permit the proliferation of this species with reduced mortality losses during blooms. Collectively, these findings suggest that anthropogenic activities resulting in elevated levels of turbidity, organic matter, and metals have opened a niche within coastal ecosystems that ideally suits the unique genetic capacity of A. anophagefferens and thus has facilitated the proliferation of this and potentially other HABs.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Exploration of Factors That Influence Willingness to Consider Pooled Rideshare

Ridesharing has become an increasingly prevalent form of transportation. Although transportation network companies such as Uber and Lyft initially started as a personal rideshare service where individuals ride alone or with people they know, rideshare services have been expanded to pooled rideshare—a dynamic rideshare system where an individual rides with passengers they do not know. Despite the growth in rideshare services worldwide, the use of pooled rideshare in the U.S.A. is relatively low compared to other forms of transportation. A national U.S. survey (N = 5385) was conducted to investigate reasons why individuals are willing or unwilling to consider pooled rideshare. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were performed, where the exploratory factor analysis suggests five factors, specifically,service experience,time/cost,traffic/environment,privacy, andsafety. Model fit indices of the confirmatory factor analysis verified that these five factors can represent the factors behind riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare. Furthermore, a binomial logistic regression was conducted to explore how the five factors influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare. The three factors that influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare wereservice experience(B = 1.05),traffic/environment(B = .38), andtime/cost(B = .26), while a lack ofprivacy(B = −1.46) can be a deterrent for pooled rideshare.Safetyis important for those who are both willing and unwilling to consider the use of pooled rideshare. Understanding these factors is important for the future of pooled rideshare services in the U.S.A.

Engineering↗

The Need for a Strong Science and Technology Program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex for the 21st Century

In this paper I argue for the need for a strong Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons Complex as the basis for maintaining a credible deterrence capability. The current Nuclear Posture Review establishes a New Triad as the basis for the United States deterrence strategy in a changing security environment. A predictive science capability is at the core of a credible National Nuclear Weapons program in the 21st Century. In absence of nuclear testing, the certification of our current Nuclear Weapons relies on predictive simulations and quantification of the associated simulation uncertainties. In addition, a robust nuclear infrastructure needs an active research and development program that considers all the required nuclear scenarios, including new configurations for which there is no nuclear test data. This paper also considers alternative positions to the need for a Science and Technology program in the Nuclear Weapons complex.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Progammatic mission transformation - chemistry and metallurgy research replacement (CMRR) project

Nuclear posture and policy objectives are: (1) Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; (2) Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in US national security strategy; (3) Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels; (4) Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring US allies and partners; and (5) Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

New Capabilities for Hostile Environments on Z Grand Challenge LDRD - Final Status

The purpose of this project was to develop new physical simulation capabilities in order to support the science-based qualification of nonnuclear weapon components in hostile radiation environments. The project contributes directly to the goals of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective US nuclear stockpile, maintaining strategic deterrence at lower nuclear force levels, extending the life of the nuclear deterrent capability, and to be ready for technological surprise.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Redefining the U.S. Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament, Analysis and Reflections

With Lewis Dunn’s paper on nuclear disarmament diplomacy, we are inaugurating a new monograph series under the auspices of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The series will explore complex emerging challenges in the emerging security environment as they bear on issues of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. Our goal is to explore these issues deeply enough to provide significant new understanding that is technically informed and policy relevant. Our premise is that thoughtful students of international security affairs continue to value such in-depth analysis as a way to help make sense of the large flow of data and opinion that reaches all of us on a daily basis. Our ambition is to generate four to six such papers per year on especially salient topics. The views expressed in these papers are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Center, the Laboratory, or the U.S. government. This inaugural paper addresses one of the key questions facing national leadership seven to eight years after President Obama’s April 2009 remarks in Prague and his commitment to take practical steps towards the long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the interim, some important steps have been taken. But there have also been many disappointments. The new presidential administration will face a security landscape quite different from that of eight years ago and must reassess U.S. priorities and approaches. As Lewis Dunn argues, some will be tempted to walk away entirely from the disarmament agenda, while others will advocate even more forcefully for unilateral U.S. steps to further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its posture. Dr. Dunn sets out his own vision of how to adapt and carry forward the disarmament agenda, in a manner informed by developments in the security environment that point to a continuing role for nuclear deterrence. The result is both fresh and compelling.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Standoff Over the LRSO: Assessing the long-range stand-off missile's impact on strategic stability.

Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

MAD in an AI Future?

Notwithstanding concerns to the contrary, strategic nuclear deterrence, as understood in the context of mutually-assured destruction (MAD), is highly unlikely to be upset by advances in artificial intelligence (AI) in the foreseeable future. AI will improve the processes and systems that enable MAD and modern C 4 ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), but advances in the field are unlikely to reach the sophistication, accuracy, and resilience required to disrupt nuclear deterrence as understood and practiced since the end of World War II.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Co-op at Sandia National Laboratories (July - December 2019, Final Report)

This co-op was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) within the Weapon Surety Engineering 11 Department (9435), which is a customer-focused organization that provides engineering and system analysis expertise to ensure a safe deterrent throughout the entire weapon lifecycle. Engineers in 9435 develop a deep knowledge in both component and system function to support rigorous evaluation and mitigation of potential failure modes. They operate across multiple engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, computer, materials and systems engineering) with opportunities to develop crossdisciplinary capability. The team supports a variety of stockpile systems and is part of the product teams during development, design and production, as well as advanced concept and exploratory efforts. 9435 engineers use their extensive component and system knowledge, as well as experimental data and modeling, to ensure products function as intended with assured safety. Members of the department learn the function of multiple components, how those components integrate within the system and apply surety principles and processes to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Ready, Set, Getting to Go: America's Nuclear Test Readiness Posture

In a geopolitical environment once again dominated by Great Power competition, the stakes of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent also returned to the forefront of national security. Yet, as nearly thirty years have passed without the United States conducting a nuclear test, there exists considerable uncertainty on how quickly, or even if, the United States could resume nuclear testing—a key component of a credible deterrent. However, there remains a legal requirement, with origins in hard-earned Cold War lessons, for the nation to return to underground nuclear testing if called upon to do so. This paper provides an overview of nuclear testing, the nation’s current state of preparedness, and offers recommendations on how to improve its test readiness posture.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Annual Assessment Reporting Process

On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States intended to enter negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To address concerns that the cessation of nuclear testing would introduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he also announced the concurrent establishment of six Safeguards as conditions of entry. Safeguard A prescribed “. . . a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile.” Safeguard B required “The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure . . . human scientific resources.” These two Safeguards led to the establishment of the physical and intellectual capabilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗