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We use a couple of cavemen to explain the concept of deterrence, which has been with humans from the beginning. The interaction between the two cavemen will demonstrate how deterrence can discourage violence by instilling doubt and fear of the consequences escalating such violence further.
Ridesharing has become an increasingly prevalent form of transportation. Although transportation network companies such as Uber and Lyft initially started as a personal rideshare service where individuals ride alone or with people they know, rideshare services have been expanded to pooled rideshare—a dynamic rideshare system where an individual rides with passengers they do not know. Despite the growth in rideshare services worldwide, the use of pooled rideshare in the U.S.A. is relatively low compared to other forms of transportation. A national U.S. survey (N = 5385) was conducted to investigate reasons why individuals are willing or unwilling to consider pooled rideshare. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses were performed, where the exploratory factor analysis suggests five factors, specifically,service experience,time/cost,traffic/environment,privacy, andsafety. Model fit indices of the confirmatory factor analysis verified that these five factors can represent the factors behind riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare. Furthermore, a binomial logistic regression was conducted to explore how the five factors influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare. The three factors that influence riders’ willingness to consider pooled rideshare wereservice experience(B = 1.05),traffic/environment(B = .38), andtime/cost(B = .26), while a lack ofprivacy(B = −1.46) can be a deterrent for pooled rideshare.Safetyis important for those who are both willing and unwilling to consider the use of pooled rideshare. Understanding these factors is important for the future of pooled rideshare services in the U.S.A.
The purpose of this project was to develop new physical simulation capabilities in order to support the science-based qualification of nonnuclear weapon components in hostile radiation environments. The project contributes directly to the goals of maintaining a safe, secure, and effective US nuclear stockpile, maintaining strategic deterrence at lower nuclear force levels, extending the life of the nuclear deterrent capability, and to be ready for technological surprise.
With Lewis Dunn’s paper on nuclear disarmament diplomacy, we are inaugurating a new monograph series under the auspices of the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The series will explore complex emerging challenges in the emerging security environment as they bear on issues of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. Our goal is to explore these issues deeply enough to provide significant new understanding that is technically informed and policy relevant. Our premise is that thoughtful students of international security affairs continue to value such in-depth analysis as a way to help make sense of the large flow of data and opinion that reaches all of us on a daily basis. Our ambition is to generate four to six such papers per year on especially salient topics. The views expressed in these papers are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Center, the Laboratory, or the U.S. government. This inaugural paper addresses one of the key questions facing national leadership seven to eight years after President Obama’s April 2009 remarks in Prague and his commitment to take practical steps towards the long-term goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons. In the interim, some important steps have been taken. But there have also been many disappointments. The new presidential administration will face a security landscape quite different from that of eight years ago and must reassess U.S. priorities and approaches. As Lewis Dunn argues, some will be tempted to walk away entirely from the disarmament agenda, while others will advocate even more forcefully for unilateral U.S. steps to further reduce the role and number of nuclear weapons in its posture. Dr. Dunn sets out his own vision of how to adapt and carry forward the disarmament agenda, in a manner informed by developments in the security environment that point to a continuing role for nuclear deterrence. The result is both fresh and compelling.
This 11th annual event focused on changes in the security environment and their implications for the U.S. approach to deterrence, with special attention to extended deterrence in Europe and East Asia.
Mutual vulnerability to strategic forces seems to remain the de facto foundation for strategic stability across the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyadic relationships; This work has suggested the bomber force tasked with delivering the LRSO is characterized by relatively long flight times and rich signature sets which make its use inconsistent with the requirements for a disarming first-strike. Therefore, the LRSO would not be expected to disrupt mutual vulnerability by making a disarming strike more possible or attractive; Even if a stealthy air-launched cruise missile is paired with a stealth bomber aircraft, the signatures associated with bomber generation and aerial refueling from non-stealth tanker aircraft make it unlikely the LRSO could be launched against a peer or near-peer nation-state without advance warning; To the extent a nuclear armed air-launched cruise missile deters would-be U.S. adversaries from nuclear use, maintaining a survivable weapon system is crucial for maintaining that stable deterrent effect. A modern stand-off weapon and stealth delivery platform increase the probability this capability will be maintained in the future against other nations' increasingly capable A2/AD systems; The LRSO has been touted as a flexible option to deter, or conduct should deterrence fail, limited nuclear strikes pursuant to Russia's reported "escalate-to-deescalate" doctrine. The concept of limited nuclear use is still intensely debated, and there is no guarantee that escalation could be controlled even with tailored LRSO employment; The challenge of warhead discrimination has not historically led to a nuclear response to a cruise missile launch, but there is no guarantee that cannot change. Having accurate military intelligence coupled with discerning analysis of the context in which cruise missiles are employed (e.g., how escalated is the conflict, how many missiles have been launched, have there been signatures of strategic force mobilization, or has the nuclear threshold been crossed?) will likely be essential for reducing the danger of misperception. Developing norms and/or communication channels in the aforementioned dyadic relationships may also further these ends. In sum, this work has identified and analyzed many of the major arguments in the debate regarding the LRSO's impact on strategic stability. During this study and survey of other nation's conceptions of strategic stability, it became clear that the LRSO is neither inherently stabilizing or destabilizing; rather, it is one instrument in addition to unambiguous U.S. policy, clear messaging, and signaling of intent that may promote stability by reducing the risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation.
Notwithstanding concerns to the contrary, strategic nuclear deterrence, as understood in the context of mutually-assured destruction (MAD), is highly unlikely to be upset by advances in artificial intelligence (AI) in the foreseeable future. AI will improve the processes and systems that enable MAD and modern C 4 ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), but advances in the field are unlikely to reach the sophistication, accuracy, and resilience required to disrupt nuclear deterrence as understood and practiced since the end of World War II.
This co-op was performed at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) within the Weapon Surety Engineering 11 Department (9435), which is a customer-focused organization that provides engineering and system analysis expertise to ensure a safe deterrent throughout the entire weapon lifecycle. Engineers in 9435 develop a deep knowledge in both component and system function to support rigorous evaluation and mitigation of potential failure modes. They operate across multiple engineering disciplines (mechanical, electrical, computer, materials and systems engineering) with opportunities to develop crossdisciplinary capability. The team supports a variety of stockpile systems and is part of the product teams during development, design and production, as well as advanced concept and exploratory efforts. 9435 engineers use their extensive component and system knowledge, as well as experimental data and modeling, to ensure products function as intended with assured safety. Members of the department learn the function of multiple components, how those components integrate within the system and apply surety principles and processes to ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent.
In a geopolitical environment once again dominated by Great Power competition, the stakes of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent also returned to the forefront of national security. Yet, as nearly thirty years have passed without the United States conducting a nuclear test, there exists considerable uncertainty on how quickly, or even if, the United States could resume nuclear testing—a key component of a credible deterrent. However, there remains a legal requirement, with origins in hard-earned Cold War lessons, for the nation to return to underground nuclear testing if called upon to do so. This paper provides an overview of nuclear testing, the nation’s current state of preparedness, and offers recommendations on how to improve its test readiness posture.
On 11 August 1995, President Clinton announced that the United States intended to enter negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. To address concerns that the cessation of nuclear testing would introduce uncertainty about the efficacy of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, he also announced the concurrent establishment of six Safeguards as conditions of entry. Safeguard A prescribed “. . . a Science Based Stockpile Stewardship program to ensure a high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of nuclear weapons in the active stockpile.” Safeguard B required “The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and ensure . . . human scientific resources.” These two Safeguards led to the establishment of the physical and intellectual capabilities to sustain the Nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing.
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL, or the Lab) is one of the United States’ (U.S.) weapons complex nuclear security laboratories; it is owned by the Department of Energy (DOE) and operated by Triad National Security, LLC. LANL’s mission is to solve national security challenges through scientific excellence, which includes nuclear deterrence and stockpile stewardship. Such activities generate a variety of radioactive waste types, including transuranic (TRU) waste. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) is under a congressional mandate to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030 to meet Department of Defense requirements and support the nuclear deterrent. LANL is responsible for producing at least 30 pits per year by 2026, while the Savannah River Site will produce 50 pits per year by 2030. As of August 2018, the NNSA TRU waste inventory at LANL was at 53% capacity. In order to ensure the nuclear material missions are able to continue uninterrupted, the storage of TRU waste needs to remain below 60% of total capacity. As LANL increases production and prepares to meet the 30 pits per year goal, waste generation will increase substantially. Thus, there is a need to rejuvenate current infrastructure and implement TRU waste reduction methods in the coming years.
One overarching objective of this program of study was the accumulation of objective, scientifically valid information relating to auditory performance of bald and golden eagles that may be used to guide the development of acoustic alerting/deterrence technologies intended to discourage encroachment into wind energy air spaces. To that end, analyses aimed at the characterization of sensitivity to sound in bald and golden eagles, along with findings in the supra-threshold, dynamic frequency spaces related to response latencies and amplitudes, leads us to conclude that bald, and golden eagles navigate the same basic working auditory space, as in other known and thus far characterized members of the diurnal raptor family. Specifically, bald and golden eagles, along with other raptor species within the group, operate in an auditory space characterized by a frequency band at least four octaves wide and centered on 2 kHz, with an upper frequency limit between 6 and 10 kHz at 80 dB SPL and a lower frequency limit that almost certainly extends below 0.2 kHz. Consequently, we recommend that signal designers use these data as a guideline in efforts to design effective and efficient acoustic alerting/deterrent systems. It is important to note that signal energy broadcast outside of this frequency band at moderate levels will not contribute to the efficacy of a deterrent but will add an unnecessary fraction to the overall acoustic pollution budget. The importance of this consideration is heightened by contemporaneous concerns related to the transmission of noise broadcast by wind energy farms. In addition, based on analyses of data acquired from red-tailed hawks using the same experimental paradigm and data acquisition system, we conclude that auditory function in the red-tailed hawk is sufficiently like that observed in bald and golden eagles to permit its use as a surrogate species. Response waveforms, threshold-frequency curves, and input-output characteristics match those of eagles closely. It should be noted however, that differences in sensitivity and slightly extended high-frequency limits of hearing should be taken into account when extrapolating findings from one species to the others. Although the inclusion of behavioral tests of red-tailed hawks to acoustic stimuli was beyond the scope of this investigation, future efforts to assess response parameters like signal-type preference and habituation rate will further elucidate their suitability to serve as eagle surrogates in behavioral studies; nonetheless, the species in question are well matched with respect to basic auditory performance. A second essential objective of this program of study was the acoustic characterization of a subset of calls comprising the vocal repertoires of bald and golden eagles that may be used to supplement auditory performance findings in the effort to guide the development of acoustic alerting signals. With regard to that objective, the vocal repertoires of both bald and golden eagle species are rich and varied. While similar in spectrographic structure, distinctive differences are also clear. Generally, golden eagles produce some calls with shorter durations, and similar “sounding” calls exhibit distinctively different spectrographic patterns than those of bald eagles. Both species produce calls that contain a wide variety of nonlinear elements that operate to enhance the rich and varied nature of commonly observed vocal products. Comparison of the average power spectra of commonly observed bald and golden eagle calls with threshold-frequency curves leads to the conclusion that call energies fall within the frequency bounds of hearing. Further, the acoustic energy of calls considered in this report tend to fall into overlapping, but different frequency ranges of the acoustic sensitivity curve. This condition may encourage signal designers to vary the frequency content of acoustic deterrence signals in the field. Finally, preliminary observations relating to the tendencies and proclivities of bald eagles to attend to the acoustic landscape lead to the conclusion that eagles monitor their immediate sound environment assiduously. Individuals respond to a variety of natural and synthetic sound signals reliably and, perhaps most relevant in the context of the engineering of acoustic alerting/deterrence technologies, habituation to most sounds considered in this effort was minimal. These preliminary results, while calling for extended behavioral testing, are promising and set the stage for the exportation of behavioral studies into real world scenarios.
Mission drivers at the national level are evolving to accommodate a broadening landscape. The U.S. faces a rapidly evolving, threat-based environment with an associated expansion of national-level priorities. Priorities continue to include all aspects of sustaining the existing, aging stockpile. Now, however, we must also include consideration of options for a future deterrent, including efficacy of the deterrent against new threats (threat assessment and response), capability needs associated with new materials and modern manufacturing and production processes, and efficiency requirements for a modern workflow for weapons design. Executing this complex strategy will come with challenges. We must execute our current mission, while we prepare for future missions and an increasingly uncertain future.
We are modernizing our 1980s nuclear deterrent, and moving beyond life extensions (W76, B61, W88) to systems that have more newly (differently) manufactured components (W80, W87). For the first time since the 1980s, we are doing truly new designs (W93) and there will likely be more to respond to emerging deterrence gaps.
What is the impact of damage limitation capabilities like counterforce and missile defenses on deterrence, when their efficacy in stopping an adversary nuclear attack is uncertain? This is a key unanswered question to understand “how much is enough” for the United States to deter China and Russia in future nuclear crises. In this paper we extend an established, single move game theory model to capture the dynamics of two players in a nuclear crisis having varying damage limitation capabilities with uncertain effectiveness. Our model formalizes the logic of the “delicate balance” school of deterrence, which states that leverage in a crisis is driven by the risk each player can take with their combined strategic forces, and that those risks carry uncertainty as nuclear forces are hard to deliver against technologically advanced adversaries. Our model shows that damage limitation capabilities—even those with significant uncertainty around them like cyber or electronic warfare—can drive bargaining outcomes in an array of nuclear crises. We then apply these bargaining outcomes to the expected U.S.-China strategic balance as China builds out its nuclear force through 2035. We apply published force exchange models to determine the expected damage each side will be able to deliver, and we use these values to determine the likelihood that the U.S. can prevail in crises of varying stakes. Last, we show that U.S. policymakers have an array of options to improve future bargaining outcomes, evaluating how additional nuclear forces trade against improvements in damage limitation.
Compared to land-based applications, offshore wind imposes challenges for the development of next generation wind turbine generator technology. Direct-drive generators are believed to offer high availability, efficiency, and reduced operation and maintenance requirements; however, previous research suggests difficulties in scaling to several megawatts or more in size. The resulting designs are excessively large and/or massive, which are major impediments to transportation logistics, especially for offshore applications. At the same time, geared wind turbines continue to sustain offshore market growth through relatively cheaper and lightweight generators. However, reliability issues associated with mechanical components in a geared system create significant operation and maintenance costs, and these costs make up a large portion of overall system costs offshore. Thus, direct-drive turbines are likely to outnumber their gear-driven counterparts for this market, and there is a need to review the costs or opportunities of building machines with different types of generators and examining their competitiveness at the sizes necessary for the next generation of offshore wind turbines. In this paper, we use GeneratorSE, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's newly developed systems engineering generator sizing tool to estimate mass, efficiency, and the costs of different generator technologies satisfying the electromagnetic, structural, and basic thermal design requirements for application in a very large-scale offshore wind turbine such as the Technical University of Denmark's (DTU) 10-MW reference wind turbine. For the DTU reference wind turbine, we use the previously mentioned criteria to optimize a direct-drive, radial flux, permanent-magnet synchronous generator; a direct-drive electrically excited synchronous generator; a medium-speed permanent-magnet generator; and a high-speed, doubly-fed induction generator. Preliminary analysis of leveled costs of energy indicate that for large turbines, the cost of permanent magnets and reliability issues associated with brushes in electrically excited machines are the biggest deterrents for building direct-drive systems. The advantage of medium-speed permanent-magnet machines over doubly-fed induction generators is evident, yet, variability in magnet prices and solutions to address reliability issues associated with gearing and brushes can change this outlook. This suggests the need to potentially pursue fundamentally new innovations in generator designs that help avoid high capital costs but still have significant reliability related to performance.
There have been two main deterrents to the development of semiportable nuclear reactors. One is the high development costs; the other is the inability to satisfy with assurance the questions of operational safety. This report shows how a split-core, heat-pipe cooled reactor could conceptually eliminate these deterrents, and examines and summarizes recent work on split-core, heat-pipe reactors. A concept for a small reactor that could be developed at a comparatively low cost is presented. The concept would extend the technology of subcritical radioisotope thermoelectric generators using 238 PuO2 to the evolution of critical space power reactors using 239 PuO2.
Based on unclassified sources, a general review is presented of the perceived U.S.S.R. doctrine, force balances, production ratios, inventory growth, inventory items, and current actions. The extent to which the Soviets appear to be attempting to increase their sphere of influence through economic and political control as well as possible military control of land, sea, air, and space is considered. To offset such possibilities, certain areas of deterrent needs that the Western world might pursue are suggested. Particular emphasis is placed on the role of missiles as part of the deterrent needs.