SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
What is NCERC?: General-purpose critical assembly facility; Located within the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site; Operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory
The purpose of this report is to describe two non-trivial MCNP models and execution configurations that are suitable to characterizing computational performance. To that end, this report uses a constructive solid geometry (CSG) representation of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Pool Critical Assembly (PCA) [1–3] to perform a k-eigenvalue calculation and an unstructured mesh (UM) representation of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) publication 145 (ICRP145) male human phantom [4, 5] to perform a fixed-source calculation assuming that a 1 MeV photon source is distributed throughout the phantom’s liver.
The National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) is a general-purpose critical assembly facility located within the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site. The NCERC is operated by Los Alamos National Laboratory.
In 2016, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) led, in support of and under sponsorship of the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M3), the removal and transfer of the plutonium based Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel from the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Tokai facility to the Savannah River Site (SRS). The team also included JAEA, multiple organizations in Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS), International Nuclear Services, and many other entities. The FCA fuel removal project completion was a key deliverable for M3 to the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and constituted the largest inventory of weapons-usable plutonium removed under the nonproliferation program. The FCA materials consist of thousands of stainless steel (SS) clad plates and hundreds of SS clad rods. The FCA fuel elements were packaged in a carrier can and stored at SRS pending disposition of the fuel. Following an assessment of candidate disposition options, SRNS identified electrolytic dissolution (ED) as the most promising disposition option for the FCA plates and their preferred option was endorsed by DOE. This option entails electrochemically dissolving the entire FCA carrier can with fuel elements and was based on bench-scale laboratory testing and historical work on processing SS-clad and zirconium-clad uranium-based fuel in the H-Canyon electrolytic dissolver (last operated in 1980). The FCA plate consists of a plutonium-aluminum metal alloy core hermitically sealed in SS cladding.
Under IER-305, critical experiments were done with and without molybdenum sleeves on 7uPCX fuel rods. The experiments were done in new critical assembly hardware designed to support the 7uPCX fuel in a 1.55 cm triangular-pitched array.
The 239 Pu Jezebel critical assembly of 1954-55 was modeled in great detail and reevaluated using ENDF/B-VII.1 cross sections, and a new simplified (homogeneous one-dimensional spherical) benchmark was derived. The new simplified model was similar to that derived by Hansen and Paxton in 1969, but its radius was modified so that its k eff was the average of the C/E’s (where C is the calculated k eff and E is the inferred experimental k eff ) of the four detailed models. When ENDF/B-VIII.0 data were released, a mismatch between the detailed and simplified models was introduced due to changes in the nickel cross sections, because the detailed models contain nickel but the simplified model does not. A revision of the simplified model realigned the detailed and simplified models. ENDF/B-VIII.1 data have now been released. The simplified and detailed Jezebel models have been run using preliminary ENDF/B-VIII.1 ACE files. In Sec. II, it is shown that the detailed and simplified models are still aligned. No revision of the simplified model is called for. These results were computed using MCNP6.3.
There were many improvements and additions to ENDF/B-VIII.1. We tested four key moderator materials: Be, HF, FLiBe, and graphite. Be-metal moderated critical assemblies of HEU only see 26 pcm difference. Sd library adds new physics to the TSL which improves the agreement with the benchmark. Other changes besides the TSL impact the benchmark: 235U and 9Be. Free gas change affects library heavily, hundreds of pcm in wrong way – need to look at FG libraries. F and Cl TSLs added to 8.1. A 3k pcm disagreement was seen without new TSL. Adding 8.1 + TSL reduces pcm disagreement A LOT.
The Savannah River Site (SRS) has designed the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) disposition mission. Similarly, the H-Canyon facility at SRS is reestablishing the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver for dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel (SS) clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel. In both discard types (ABD and FCA), plutonium is present and its complex solubility when composited to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) sludge is being investigated as it may have downstream impacts to the liquid waste (LW) organization. This literature review aims to highlight and compile the existing literature on plutonium solubility in waste streams relevant to ABD and FCA discards, as well as discuss some considerations in analyzing solubility data of plutonium. This review serves to help define the analysis methods for future experiments involving plutonium (and other actinides) and in designing appropriate testing conditions surrounding these studies. This review is broken up into five parts and will discuss: (i) The possible effects of testing hold time and temperature on plutonium solubility, (ii) the influence of neutralization rate and particle size of freshly precipitated discards, (iii) the coprecipitation of plutonium with iron and uranium, (iv) predictive solubility modeling and the influence of supernate anions on solubility, and (v) the speciation of plutonium in solutionas a result of supernate anions.
Under IER-441, critical experiments were done with and without tantalum test rods within a central test region surrounded by 7uPCX fuel rods. The experiments were done in new critical assembly hardware designed to support the 7uPCX fuel in a 1.02 cm triangular-pitched array. Appendix I is a draft of section 1 of the ICSBEP benchmark evaluation of the experiments.
Under IER-441, critical experiments were done with and without tantalum test rods within a central test region surrounded by 7uPCX fuel rods. The experiments were done in new critical assembly hardware designed to support the 7uPCX fuel in a 1.02 cm triangular-pitched array
Stainless-steel clad Pu from Japan’s Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) reactor is currently being dispositioned at the Savannah River Site. The electrolytic dissolver, operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions in H-Canyon, is being utilized to dissolve the material. The resulting solutions are transferred to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities, operated by Savannah River Mission Completion (SRMC), for subsequent vitrification at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). In support of the FCA mission startup, a preliminary evaluation was conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory to assess the impact of the FCA discards on the liquid waste system.
The Material Management and Minimization (M3) Program’s primary objective within the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration is to achieve permanent threat reduction by minimizing and when possible, eliminating weapon-usable nuclear material around the world. Under M3’s Office of Conversion, the U.S. High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) Project, is pursuing a fuel qualification and licensing effort focused on converting high-performance research reactors in the United States from using highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to using low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel. The body of this document is focused on defining the activities required for generic qualification of high density, LEU fuel that then allows reactor conversions to proceed for the four high-performance research reactors and the critical assembly that will operate using the U-10Mo monolithic fuel design (see Subsection 1.3): MITR, MURR, NBSR, ATR, and ATRC. Fuel qualification in this report means generic fuel acceptance of the U-10Mo monolithic fuel form by the NRC for use in reactor conversions in the United States, which allows the fuel to be used in subsequent reactor specific licensing requests. The U 10Mo Monolithic Fuel Research, Development, and Qualification Plan utilizes the functions and requirements of the USHPRR Project that was established in the Functions and Requirements Document (F&RD) [1] and expands on these requirements to ensure that planned tests have traceable results that will ensure the requirement has been met. The methods by which data will be collected to show that these requirements have been met are described in this document.
The United State High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) program aims to eliminate more than 200kg of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) from commerce annually by converting five U.S. high-performance research reactors and one associated critical assembly to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel using a high-density alloy of uranium-10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo). Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) is one of five research reactors selected for this program. The objective of this report is to provide preliminary thermal-hydraulic and mechanical analyses of the hydrodynamic effects in the MITR Design Demonstration Element (DDE) under conservative approximations for the plate power distribution. This report provides details on the modeling approach and the simulation results obtained, including pressure, flow velocity, temperature, and oxide layer over the design demonstration experiment for the irradiation cycles in the Belgian Reactor (BR)-2.
The United State High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) program aims to eliminate more than 200kg of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) from commerce annually by converting five U.S. high-performance research reactors and one associated critical assembly to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel using a high-density alloy of uranium-10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo). The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Reactor (MITR) and the National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) are two of five research reactors selected for this program. Previous studies have addressed the thermal-hydraulics performance of the fuel Design Demonstration Elements (DDE) for these reactors under conservative assumptions in the Belgian Reactor (BR)-2. This report extends these previous studies by analyzing the margins to Onset of Nucleate Boiling (ONB) for these two DDEs under the conservative conditions used in the previous thermal-hydraulics analyses
1.1 OBJECTIVE The United State High Performance Research Reactor (USHPRR) program aims to eliminate more than 200kg of High Enriched Uranium (HEU) from commerce annually by converting five U.S. high-performance research reactors and one associated critical assembly to Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel using a high-density alloy of uranium-10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo). The National Bureau of Standards Reactor (NBSR) is one of five research reactors selected for this program. The objective of this report is to provide preliminary thermal-hydraulic and mechanical analyses of the hydrodynamic effects in the NBSR Design Demonstration Element (DDE) under conservative approximations for the plate power distribution. This report provides details on the modeling approach and the simulation results obtained, including pressure, flow velocity, temperature, and oxide layer over the design demonstration experiment for the irradiation cycles in the Belgian Reactor (BR)-2.
Criticality safety analyses are completed on a transportation cask used for microreactor assembly shipment to provide an example of model and analysis to industry for reproducing this type of study on their microreactor fuel shipment. The fuel assembly considered is based on a gas-cooled microreactor (GC-MR), which utilizes HALEU fuel in the form of TRISO particles and utilizes various design options considered in industry designs. Various versions of this GC-MR assembly were studied, with and without YH 2 moderator, providing similar conclusions. The shipment cask design is revised based on an existing ES-3100 design, developed by Y-12 for the transport of highly enriched uranium (HEU), but is enlarged to hold the GC-MR fuel assembly. Criticality safety analysis for the cask/GC-MR fuel assembly package was performed using the CSAS6 sequence of SCALE6.3.2, utilizing the ENDF/B-VII.1 based continuous energy neutron library, and the analysis strictly follows the guideline from NRC reference reports. Different scenarios, e.g. normal operation, undamaged cask with water flooded, damaged cask with optimal water moderation, have been analyzed and it could be concluded the package would always have a large margin of subcriticality even packed in an infinite array. Sensitivity and similarity analyses are also performed using the TSUNAMI sequence of SCALE6.3.2, and the similarity analysis uses all the experiments from the ICSBEP Handbook with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), Intermediate and Mixed Enriched Uranium (IEU) and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) systems, together with additional ones that are sponsored by the DNCSH program, and selected IRPhEP experiments using TRISO fuel and graphite moderator. These similarity analyses indicate that the dry nominal design has no similar benchmark experiments (ck values greater than 0.8), which may become problematic if more assemblies are shipped together (or a fully loaded core is shipped) and margin to criticality is reduced. However, the cask models with flooded assemblies exhibited similarities to many experiments with c k values greater than 0.8.
Criticality safety analyses are completed on a transportation cask used for microreactor assembly shipment to provide an example of model and analysis to industry for reproducing this type of study on their microreactor fuel shipment. The fuel assembly considered is based on a gas-cooled microreactor (GC-MR), which utilizes HALEU fuel in the form of TRISO particles and utilizes various design options considered in industry designs. Various versions of this GC-MR assembly were studied, with and without YH2 moderator, providing similar conclusions. The shipment cask design is revised based on an existing design ES-3100, developed by Y-12 for the transport of highly enriched uranium (HEU), but is enlarged to hold the GC-MR fuel assembly. Criticality safety analysis for the cask/GC-MR fuel assembly package was performed using the CSAS6 sequence of SCALE6.3.2, utilizing the ENDF/B-VII.1 based continuous energy neutron library, and the analysis strictly follows the guideline from NRC reference reports. Different scenarios, e.g. normal operation, undamaged cask with water flooded, damaged cask with optimal water moderation, have been analyzed and it could be concluded the package would always have a large margin of subcriticality even packed in an infinite array. Sensitivity and similarity analyses are also performed using the TSUNAMI sequence of SCALE6.3.2, and the similarity analysis uses all the experiments from the ICSBEP Handbook with Intermediate and Mixed Enriched Uranium (IEU) and Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) systems together with additional ones that are sponsored by the DNCSH program. These similarity analyses indicate that dry cases have no similar benchmark experiments (ck values greater than 0.8), which may become problematic if more assemblies are shipped together (or a fully loaded core is shipped) and margin to criticality is reduced. However, the damaged cask models with flooded assemblies exhibited similarities to many experiments with ck values greater than 0.8.
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) personnel operate a low power research reactor (the Annular Core Research Reactor, or ACRR), and a zero-power critical experiment assembly referred to as CX. In accordance with 10 CFR 830, Subpart B, Appendix A, the acceptable methodology for developing a Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) for DOE nuclear reactors is the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Regulatory Guide 1.70 (RG 1.70). RG 1.70 does not address certain areas required by 10 CFR 830 and expected by DOE (e.g., full facility hazard analysis).Thus, the current DSAs for SNL’s reactor nuclear facilities are based on RG 1.70, but also of necessity supplemented by DOE-STD-3009-94 methods. SNL personnel, in consultation with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Sandia Field Office (SFO), have concluded that an alternate methodology is preferred to RG 1.70. The details of the proposal, and the reasons motivating its development, are discussed in the order described below. The proposed alternate methodology will be applicable to the ACRR and the CX (i.e., it will be applicable to nuclear facilities in which a reactor and/or a critical assembly will be operated).