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Mock Nuclear Processing Facility-Safeguards Training Requirements

This document outlines specific training requirements in the topical areas of Material Control and Accounting (MC&A) and Physical Protection(PP) which are to be used as technical input for designing a mock Integrated Security Facility (ISF) at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The overall project objective for these requirements is to enhance the ability to deliver training on Material Protection Control and Accounting (MC&A) concepts regarding hazardous material such as irradiated materials with respect to bulk processing facilities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Trial Operations of the Tamper Indicating Devices at the Krasnoyarsk Electrochemical Plant (ECP)

As a result of the US-Russian Tamper Indicating Device (TID) Working Group s accelerated efforts to facilitate the modernization of Tamper Indicating Device Programs at State Corporation Rosatom nuclear facilities, the Electrochemical Plant (ECP) was one of several sites selected to conduct a trial operation of an upgraded TID Program. This paper discusses the joint Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Electrochemical Plant (ECP) trial operation activities in the area of Material Control and Accounting System enhancement at ECP to ensure safeguards with respect to highly enriched uranium handling. The six month trial operation involved modernized TID design development, manufacture and implementation at the HEU-LEU process. The TID is customized to ECP technical conditions of operation including its application in the Computer-Based Material Control and Accounting System. TID bar coding allows automation of all operations performed with TIDs, starting from its manufacture up to disposal. This paper describes the various stages and results of the TID trial operation, recommendations on application and design modification.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Physical Security Model Development of an Electrochemical Facility.

Nuclear facilities in the U.S. and around the world face increasing challenges in meeting evolving physical security requirements while keeping costs reasonable. The addition of security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization (the approach of the past) can easily lead to cost overruns. Instead, security should be considered at the beginning of the design process in order to provide robust, yet efficient physical security designs. The purpose of this work is to demonstrate how modeling and simulation can be used to optimize the design of physical protection systems. A suite of tools, including Scribe3D and Blender, were used to model up a generic electrochemical reprocessing facility. Physical protection elements such as sensors, portal monitors, barriers, and guard forces were added to the model based on best practices for physical security. One outsider theft scenario was examined with 4-8 adversaries to determine security metrics. This work fits into a larger Virtual Test Bed 2020 Milestone in the Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program through the Department of Energy (DOE). The purpose of the milestone is to demonstrate how a series of experimental and modeling capabilities across the DOE complex provide the capabilities to demonstrate complete Safeguards and Security by Design (SSBD) for nuclear facilities. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.

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Audit Report on "The Department's Management of Nuclear Materials Provided to Domestic Licensees"

The objective if to determine whether the Department of Energy (Department) was adequately managing its nuclear materials provided to domestic licensees. The audit was performed from February 2007 to September 2008 at Department Headquarters in Washington, DC, and Germantown, MD; the Oak Ridge Office and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN. In addition, we visited or obtained data from 40 different non-Departmental facilities in various states. To accomplish the audit objective, we: (1) Reviewed Departmental and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements for the control and accountability of nuclear materials; (2) Analyzed a Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) report with ending inventory balances for Department-owned nuclear materials dated September 30, 2007, to determine the amount and types of nuclear materials located at non-Department domestic facilities; (3) Held discussions with Department and NRC personnel that used NMMSS information to determine their roles and responsibilities related to the control and accountability over nuclear materials; (4) Selected a judgmental sample of 40 non-Department domestic facilities; (5) Met with licensee officials and sent confirmations to determine whether their actual inventories of Department-owned nuclear materials were consistent with inventories reported in the NMMSS; and, (6) Analyzed historical information related to the 2004 NMMSS inventory rebaselining initiative to determine the quantity of Department-owned nuclear materials that were written off from the domestic licensees inventory balances. This performance audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit included tests of controls and compliance with laws and regulations related to managing the Department-owned nuclear materials provided to non-Departmental domestic licensees. Because our review was limited it would not necessarily have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of our audit. We examined the establishment of performance measures in accordance with Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as they related to the audit objective. We found that the Department had established performance measures related to removing or disposing of nuclear materials and radiological sources around the world. We utilized computer generated data during our audit and performed procedures to validate the reliability of the information as necessary to satisfy our audit objective. As noted in the report, we questioned the reliability of the NMMSS data.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Diversion Path Analysis: A Proposed Methodology to Develop an MC&A Approach for Liquid-Fueled Molten Salt Reactors

Nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A) is a critical element of both the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and US Department of Energy (DOE)’s domestic safeguards and security requirements. NRC licensees are required, under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74 to establish and maintain an MC&A program that captures and records the quantities and locations of special nuclear material (SNM) at the facility. Along with physical protection, MC&A is a key element of domestic nuclear material safeguards that enables the NRC to ensure that SNM is controlled and accounted for. SNM, per 10 CFR Part 74, refers to plutonium, 233 U, and uranium enriched in the isotope 233 U or 235 U, but does not include source material. Periodic physical inventories, coupled with material balance evaluations, are effective and demonstrated tools to account for and detect theft or diversion of SNM in facilities containing SNM in bulk material form (i.e., not in discrete, countable items). Historically in the United States, these types of facilities have included fuel fabrication, conversion, and enrichment facilities. In comparison, reactors have relied on item counting of assemblies and control of SNM while in containment (e.g., a sealed reactor pressure vessel) because, to date, reactor fuel has been in item form. In liquid-fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs), unlike traditional light water reactors (LWRs) or bulk facilities, bulk SNM quantities can change significantly during operation as a result of depletion and transmutation. This introduces challenges to the use of traditional periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations to detect theft or diversion of SNM in reactors that use SNM in bulk material form. Liquid-fueled (i.e., salt-fueled) MSR facilities are MSRs that use SNM within a salt eutectic as the fuel. The SNM is in a bulk material form any time it is outside of fresh or spent fuel storage containers. Some examples of when SNM will be in bulk form in the facility are during addition of fuel to the reactor system, while fuel is circulating in operation, and while fuel is in a drain tank. Periodic physical inventories and material balance evaluations can likely be effectively applied to many portions of an MSR facility, including all areas where depletion and transmutation are not significantly changing the quantities of SNM within the control area. Within an MSR facility, this would include fresh fuel receipt and loading, waste streams that may contain SNM, irradiated fuel storage outside of the reactor core, and any irradiated fuel processing that may happen after SNM has been removed from the reactor. All of these process steps could rely on measurements of SNM quantities compared with documented inventories. Any discrepancies from predicted (i.e., book) inventories and measured inventories could be quantified as inventory differences, consistent with traditional MC&A guidance from the NRC (e.g., in NUREG-1065 Revision 2, NUREG-2159 Revision 1, and RG 5.29 Revision 2). Within the reactor system, additions and removals to the book inventory include depletion of the SNM (e.g., fission of 235 U), which complicates the use of physical inventories. SNM control, however, can also likely be effectively applied to detect theft of SNM throughout a liquid-fueled MSR facility. To complement these approaches, prior technical reports have identified that a diversion path analysis may be a useful, risk-informed, and performance-based tool to determine suitable elements of an MC&A approach for the reactor system within a liquid-fueled MSR facility.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Nuclear Security Objectives of an NMAC System

After completing this module, you should be able to: Describe the role of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) in comprehensive nuclear security at a facility; Describe purpose of NMAC; Identify differences between the use of NMAC for IAEA safeguards and for facility nuclear security; List NMAC elements and measures; and Describe process for resolution of irregularities

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Developing standard performance testing procedures for MC&A components at a site

The condition of a nuclear material control and accountability system (MC&A) and its individual components, as with any system combining technical elements, documentation and the human factor, may be characterized through an aggregate of values for the various parameters that determine the system's ability to perform. The MC&A system's status may be functioning effectively, marginally or not functioning based on a summary of the values of the individual parameters. This work included a review of the following elements and subsystems or components for a material control and accountability system: (1) MC&A Elements: Information subsystem, Measurement subsystem, NM access subsystem, including a tamper-indicating device (TID) program, and Automated information-gathering subsystem; and (2) Detecting NM Loses Elements: Inventory differences, Shipper/receiver differences, Confirmatory measurements and differences with accounting data, and TID or seal violations. In order to detect the absence or loss of nuclear material there must be appropriate interactions among the elements and their respective subsystems (from the list above). Additionally this work includes a review of the status of regulatory requirements for the MC&A system components and potential criteria that support the evaluation of the performance of the listed components. The listed components had performance testing algorithms and procedures developed that took into consideration the regulatory criteria. The developed MC&A performance-testing procedures were the basis for a pilot Guide for MC&A Performance Testing at the MBAs of SSC RF IPPE.

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The MPC&A Questionnaire

The questionnaire is the instrument used for recording performance data on the nuclear material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) system at a nuclear facility. The performance information provides a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the MPC&A system. The goal for the questionnaire is to provide an accurate representation of the performance of the MPC&A system as it currently exists in the facility. Performance grades for all basic MPC&A functions should realistically reflect the actual level of performance at the time the survey is conducted. The questionnaire was developed after testing and benchmarking the material control and accountability (MC&A) system effectiveness tool (MSET) in the United States. The benchmarking exercise at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) proved extremely valuable for improving the content and quality of the early versions of the questionnaire. Members of the INL benchmark team identified many areas of the questionnaire where questions should be clarified and areas where additional questions should be incorporated. The questionnaire addresses all elements of the MC&A system. Specific parts pertain to the foundation for the facility's overall MPC&A system, and other parts pertain to the specific functions of the operational MPC&A system. The questionnaire includes performance metrics for each of the basic functions or tasks performed in the operational MPC&A system. All of those basic functions or tasks are represented as basic events in the MPC&A fault tree. Performance metrics are to be used during completion of the questionnaire to report what is actually being done in relation to what should be done in the performance of MPC&A functions.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Monitoring Aqueous Reprocessing Systems for Detection of Facility Misuse

Traditional approaches to material control and accounting at used nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities relies in large part on laboratory-based destructive assay of periodic samples taken from key stages. These techniques are highly accurate, but limited inspection frequency may limit the size and operation of a reprocessing facility. Online monitoring techniques using inline detectors can be applied to fuel reprocessing systems to improve the situational awareness as the facility is operating to provide additional indicators of the evolving state of the facility between normal inspection periods, potentially alerting regulators to the need for additional inspection. The Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor combines medium-resolution gamma detectors with statistical data analysis techniques to monitor reprocessing systems for anomalous conditions resulting from process control issues or malfeasance. Gamma spectra collected from the H-Canyon reprocessing facility were modeled using principal component analysis to demonstrate the efficacy of the MIP Monitor for detecting notional diversion scenarios.

safeguards, nuclear fuel reprocessing, gamma spect↗

Conversion of Questionnaire Data

During the survey, respondents are asked to provide qualitative answers (well, adequate, needs improvement) on how well material control and accountability (MC&A) functions are being performed. These responses can be used to develop failure probabilities for basic events performed during routine operation of the MC&A systems. The failure frequencies for individual events may be used to estimate total system effectiveness using a fault tree in a probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). Numeric risk values are required for the PRA fault tree calculations that are performed to evaluate system effectiveness. So, the performance ratings in the questionnaire must be converted to relative risk values for all of the basic MC&A tasks performed in the facility. If a specific material protection, control, and accountability (MPC&A) task is being performed at the 'perfect' level, the task is considered to have a near zero risk of failure. If the task is performed at a less than perfect level, the deficiency in performance represents some risk of failure for the event. As the degree of deficiency in performance increases, the risk of failure increases. If a task that should be performed is not being performed, that task is in a state of failure. The failure probabilities of all basic events contribute to the total system risk. Conversion of questionnaire MPC&A system performance data to numeric values is a separate function from the process of completing the questionnaire. When specific questions in the questionnaire are answered, the focus is on correctly assessing and reporting, in an adjectival manner, the actual performance of the related MC&A function. Prior to conversion, consideration should not be given to the numeric value that will be assigned during the conversion process. In the conversion process, adjectival responses to questions on system performance are quantified based on a log normal scale typically used in human error analysis (see A.D. Swain and H.E. Guttmann, 'Handbook of Human Reliability Analysis with Emphasis on Nuclear Power Plant Applications,' NUREG/CR-1278). This conversion produces the basic event risk of failure values required for the fault tree calculations. The fault tree is a deductive logic structure that corresponds to the operational nuclear MC&A system at a nuclear facility. The conventional Delphi process is a time-honored approach commonly used in the risk assessment field to extract numerical values for the failure rates of actions or activities when statistically significant data is absent.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Considerations of Radiation-Hardened Electronics for Alpha Detectors in Molten Salt Reactors

Along with advanced generations of reactors quickly becoming reality, the need for instrumentation to provide reliable information for their safety and operation is also becoming relevant. Instrumentation-wise, molten salt reactors (MSRs) represent an especially challenging case in which detectors must survive extreme temperatures, high amounts of radiation, and a highly corrosive coolant. Adding to the complexity, tight material control and accounting must be maintained with any special nuclear material (SNM), a practice made more difficult by the nature of a loop of flowing fuel. Alpha spectroscopy offers a unique window into investigating the isotopic concentrations of actinides within just such a molten salt environment. The characteristic α emissions of specific actinide isotopes in the salt enable quantification of their concentrations. Semiconductor devices based on wide bandgap materials such as silicon carbide and gallium oxide can withstand the extreme temperatures within MSRs and offer good chemical stability with the corrosive salt. Collaborators at The Ohio State University are fabricating and testing a β gallium oxide α particle sensor that could identify actinide concentrations within the fuel salt to help improve the material control and accounting required for complicated system inherent to MSRs.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Final Electrochemical Safeguards Model for the MPACT 2020 Milestone.

The Material Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) program is working toward a 2020 demonstration of Safeguards and Security by Design for advanced fuel cycle facilities. This milestone ties together modeling and experimental work and will initially demonstrate the concept for electrochemical processing facilities. The safeguards modeling tool used is the Separation and Safeguards Performance Model (SSPM). This report outlines the baseline model design that will be used for the 2020 milestone analysis, which was updated to represent a new baseline flowsheet developed for the MPACT program. The model was also used to generate simulation data for other labs to use as part of their safeguards analysis. Finally, this report describes how the 2020 milestone will be met. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This work was funded by the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) working group as part of the Nuclear Technology Research and Development Program under the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Nuclear Energy.

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Molten Salt Reactor Signatures and Modeling Study

Molten salt reactor (MSR) technologies, either liquid fueled and cooled or only liquid cooled, pose specific, unique challenges for safeguards of the special nuclear material during the operation, fueling, and maintenance of the reactor. MSRs are one type of Generation IV technologies being invested in and considered for U.S. domestic fabrication primarily for electricity and process heat production. These designs have generated growing commercial interest for several reasons, including high (≈40%) thermal efficiency, ease of fueling, improved use of uranium fuel, potential utilization of thorium fuel, and proposed inherent safety features. U.S. companies have several planned designs that differ in fuel, cooling, and neutron energy spectrum. Driven by commercial interest and the intent of licensing MSRs, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has developed a vision and strategy to accommodate non-light water reactors (LWR), which include MSRs (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2019). In addition, the Department of Energy (DOE) through the Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Office of Advanced Reactor Technologies (ART), …sponsors research, development and deployment (RD&D) activities through its Next Generation Nuclear Plant (NGNP), Advanced Reactor Concepts (ARC), and Advanced Small Modular Reactor (aSMR) programs to promote safety, technical, economical, and environmental advancements of innovative Generation IV nuclear energy technologies. Reactor types considering the use of salts, liquid metals, or gases for coolant fall under both ARC and aSMR. Therefore, Research Design & Development is being pursued by DOE-NE through national laboratories, universities, and international and industrial collaborations. Additionally, the U.S. is a member of the Gen IV International Forum (GIF). The GIF is a cooperative, multinational organization to guide and carry out research and development needed for the GEN IV reactor systems (Forum 2018). GIF evaluated numerous reactor concepts and down-selected to the six most feasible advanced reactor technologies: gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR), lead-cooled fast reactor (LFR), MSR, supercritical watercooled reactor (SCWR), sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR), and very high temperature reactor (VHTR). In support of the growing interest domestically and internationally, the Materials Protection, Accounting, and Control Technologies (MPACT) campaign, under the DOE-NE Fuel Cycle Technologies (FCT) program, engages in R&D activities by developing advanced instrumentation and analysis for safeguards and security of modern, advanced nuclear fuel cycle (non-LWR) facilities. Because of the historic experience in the operation of the Aircraft Reactor Experiment (ARE) and the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE) (Robertson, MSRE Design and Operations Report Part I 1965), Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) is heavily engaged in the various R&D activities through the DOE complex related to MSRs including national technical leadership of the DOE-NE MSR campaign. This report discusses and presents the outcomes of the FY19 MPACT MSR Safeguards task. The challenges presented by MSRs for nuclear material accountancy and control (NMAC) and associated safeguards will be investigated. The objective of this research is to explore and compile the safeguards requirements and identify measurement signatures through an initial high-level MSR design and develop complementary advanced simulation and modeling capabilities. A high-level ORNL-developed MSR design called the Molten Salt Demonstration Reactor (MSDR) (Bettis, Alexander and Watts 1972) was used as the target reactor design for this research. The MSDR model incorporates technology from the MSRE and the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (Robertson, Conceptual Design of a Single-Fluid Molten-Salt Breeder Reactor 1971). But the MSDR is a 750 MWth graphite moderated liquid fueled (low-enriched uranium) MSR compared to the MSRE’s of 7.5 MWth. The focus of this report is to discuss the evaluation of novel signatures, correlations, and indicators to understand the applicability of current safeguards instrumentation to MSRs using the modeling results from the MSDR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

An In Situ Feed Monitoring System for Molten Salt Reactors with Fast Neutron Energy Spectrum Molten Salt Reactor Applications

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are one of the six promising advanced reactor technologies selected for further research and development by the Generation IV International Forum. More than twenty MSR designs are actively being developed around the world. Several of these designs are liquid-fueled and intended for operation within the fast neutron energy spectrum.1 National regulations will require liquid-fueled MSRs to control and account for nuclear material within licensed facilities. Additionally, states with comprehensive safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are obligated to declare nuclear material quantities within facilities. In return, the IAEA Department of Safeguards independently verifies these quantities and provides assurance that the nuclear material and facility are being used only for peaceful purposes. One key distinction of liquid-fueled MSRs compared with other types of reactors is that in portions of the facility, the nuclear material is in bulk form rather than discrete items. Traditional nuclear material accounting techniques such as physical item counting and verification of serial numbers on fresh fuel assemblies do not translate directly to all process streams within liquid-fueled reactors. Liquid-fueled MSRs are typically designed with low excess reactivity. This feature provides safety benefits but also means that most MSRs require the addition of makeup fuel salt while a reactor is operational. The nuclear material in the initial fuel salt and in any makeup fuel salt must be quantified. Additionally, distinct nuclear material diversion and reactor misuse scenarios form the basis of the detection methods and monitoring systems developed for liquid-fueled MSRs. For example, the IAEA provides assurance that fuel salt containing nuclear material is not being diverted from the system, that the feed salt matches the reported actinide concentrations and uranium enrichment, and that no additional fertile material is being introduced into the system. Measurement systems currently used for nuclear material control and accounting are not directly applicable to achieving MSR safeguards goals. This paper concerns a system being designed to account for the nuclear material added to liquid-fueled MSRs and monitor for diversion and misuse scenarios related to MSR feed systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Load planning in the dark: RH-TRU waste container load planning at Sandia National Laboratories/New Mexico - 15116

Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) performed several sets of experiments during the 1970's and 1980's with fresh and irradiated mixed oxide (MOX) and uranium oxide (UO{sub 2}) materials designed to simulate various fuel responses under varying reactor conditions. These research materials were from light water and breeder mixed oxide reactors. The experimental vessels and extraneous piece parts resulting from the experiments were identified as eligible for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) as remote-handled (RH) transuranic (TRU) waste. Once Sandia received the approval to dispose at WIPP, discussions began with the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) and Nuclear Waste Partnerships, LLC (NWP) to provide Central Characterization Program (CCP) support for certified acceptable knowledge, visual examination, and dose-to-curie for the repackaging effort. In addition to the WIPP support, Sandia was required to prepare a load plan describing the configuration of the parent containers and how they could be repackaged to meet WIPP and other regulatory requirements. However, all of these containers were packaged as material twenty (20) or thirty (30) years ago and the records of the packaging process and configuration were not documented as waste. Therefore, it seemed that the load plans were prepared with limited information regarding parent container configuration, hence in the dark. The design of the Auxiliary Hot Cell Facility (AHCF) in technical area (TA) V, where the repackaging was to take place, along with the shipping requirements for the RH 72-B cask, limited the options for repackaging. This configuration required that 0.114 m{sup 3} (30-gallon) containers be packaged in the hot cell, removed and placed into 0.208 m{sup 3} (55-gallon) containers to mitigate contamination issues. The material had been tracked as accountable nuclear material and Sandia had verified Material Control and Accountability (MC and A) data on each parent container. Based on the MC and A data, scaling factors could be determined and sampling and analysis was not required. However, it meant that parent containers could not be split into two daughter containers, though two or more parent containers could be combined into one daughter. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Advanced Process Monitoring Techniques for Safeguarding Reprocessing Facilities

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established international safeguards standards for fissionable material at spent fuel reprocessing plants to ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted from these facilities. For large throughput nuclear facilities, it is difficult to satisfy the IAEA safeguards accountancy goal for detection of abrupt diversion. Currently, methods to verify material control and accountancy (MC&A) at these facilities require time-consuming and resource-intensive destructive assay (DA). Leveraging new on-line non destructive assay (NDA) process monitoring techniques in conjunction with the traditional and highly precise DA methods may provide an additional measure to nuclear material accountancy which would potentially result in a more timely, cost-effective and resource efficient means for safeguards verification at such facilities. By monitoring process control measurements (e.g. flowrates, temperatures, or concentrations of reagents, products or wastes), abnormal plant operations can be detected. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing on-line NDA process monitoring technologies, including both the Multi-Isotope Process (MIP) Monitor and a spectroscopy-based monitoring system, to potentially reduce the time and resource burden associated with current techniques. The MIP Monitor uses gamma spectroscopy and multivariate analysis to identify off-normal conditions in process streams. The spectroscopic monitor continuously measures chemical compositions of the process streams including actinide metal ions (U, Pu, Np), selected fission products, and major cold flowsheet chemicals using UV-Vis, Near IR and Raman spectroscopy. This paper will provide an overview of our methods and report our on-going efforts to develop and demonstrate the technologies.

process monitoring↗

Demonstration of INCC6 for advanced list-mode data acquisition and analysis using ALMM

The International Neutron Coincidence Counting (INCC) software plays an important role in nuclear safeguards and nuclear material control and accounting (NMC&A) measurements. While the current version, INCC5, represents the traditional standard utilized by inspectorates as well as facilities and practitioners alongside shift register hardware, LANL has recently developed an upgraded version of the software, INCC6. INCC6 offers the same analysis tools as INCC5 while adding new capabilities including acquisition and analysis of list-mode data, recording and storage of list-mode data files, and an expanded set of advanced analysis tools that make use of the additional information available from list-mode data. Here, this paper presents the first demonstration of data acquisition and analysis using INCC6 and the Advanced List Mode Multiplicity Module (ALMM). The capability of INCC6 to perform live list-mode data acquisition and analysis is demonstrated for a variety of neutron sources with a range of neutron emission rates relevant for practical applications and validated against the results obtained with INCC5 and traditional shift register hardware. Advanced list-mode analysis tools introduced by INCC6, such as time-interval and coincidence matrix analysis, are also demonstrated. Finally, the capability of INCC6 to analyze list-mode data files is tested and validated against traditional shift register results using INCC5.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

A Better Method to Calculate Fuel Burnup in Pebble Bed Reactors Using Machine Learning

Burnup measurement is an important step in material control and accountancy (MC&A) at nuclear reactors, and may be done by examining gamma spectra of fuel samples. Traditional approaches rely on known correlations to specific photopeaks (e.g. 137 Cs) and operate via a standard linear regression method. However, the quality of these regression methods is limited even in the best case, and is significantly poorer at short fuel cool-down times, due to the elevated radiation background by short life-time isotopes, and self-shielding effect of the fuel. For practical operation of pebble bed reactors (PBRs), quick measurements (in minutes) and short cooling times (in hours) are required from a safety and security perspective. We investigated the efficacy and performance of machine learning (ML) methods to predict the burnup of the pebble fuel from full gamma spectra (rather than specific discrete photopeaks) and found a full-spectrum ML approach to far outperform baseline regression predictions in all measurement and cooling conditions - including in operational-like measurement conditions. We also performed model and data ablation experiments to determine the relative performance impact of our ML methods' capacity to model data nonlinearities and the inherent additional information in full spectra. Applying our ML methods, we found a number of surprising results, including improved accuracy at shorter fuel cooling times (the opposite of the norm), remarkable robustness to spectrum compression (via rebinning), and competitive burnup predictions even when using background signal only (i.e. explicitly omitting known isotope photopeaks).

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