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At least 163 records · Page 9

Implementation of atomic layer etching of silicon: Scaling parameters, feasibility, and profile control

Atomic or layer by layer etching of silicon exploits temporally segregated self-limiting adsorption and material removal steps to mitigate the problems associated with continuous or quasicontinuous (pulsed) plasma processes: selectivity loss, damage, and profile control. Successful implementation of atomic layer etching requires careful choice of the plasma parameters for adsorption and desorption steps. This paper illustrates how process parameters can be arrived at through basic scaling exercises, modeling and simulation, and fundamental experimental tests of their predictions. Using chlorine and argon plasma in a radial line slot antenna plasma source as a platform, the authors illustrate how cycle time, ion energy, and radical to ion ratio can be manipulated to manage the deviation from ideality when cycle times are shortened or purges are incomplete. Cell based Monte Carlo feature scale modeling is used to illustrate profile outcomes. Experimental results of atomic layer etching processes are illustrated on silicon line and space structures such that iso-dense bias and aspect ratio dependent free profiles are produced. Experimental results also illustrate the profile control margin as processes move from atomic layer to multilayer by layer etching. The consequence of not controlling contamination (e.g., oxygen) is shown to result in deposition and roughness generation.

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Sensing and Sampling of Trace Contaminations by a Dexterous Hexrotor UAV at Nuclear Facilities - 18600

Safe and efficient cleanups are a priority for decontamination and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. The contaminations of byproducts and wastes in such nuclear facilities pose a serious problems while decommissioning, to both the operators and public. Sensing these contaminations and cleaning them is an essential part of the safety procedures. The contaminations might range from low-energy to high-energy byproducts. Sensing these byproducts would require contact based or non-contact based sensing, based on its energy levels. Byproducts such as americium, are low-energy which makes it difficult to sense and sample without contact. Therefore, the workers need to physically swab the surfaces to collect the samples of these contaminations. These tasks pose a great danger for the safety of the human workers which includes the risk to reach greater heights, exposure to the radiation and sampling the entire building. A robotic solution is much more desirable in these cases, where the worker can safely handle the contaminations from a safe area. Use of robotic technologies inside these hazardous environments ensures the safety and enhances the performance. The more suitable robotic solution for reaching great heights and covering large areas of nuclear facilities, are aerial vehicles. Multi-rotor unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) are chosen for their ability to hover at a position and also fly around in confined spaces. Quadrotors are a common choice of multi-rotor UAVs both research and industry because of its ease to fly and commercial availability. For the applications during the cleanups we need the UAV to not only hover and fly in confined spaces, but also interact with the physical world. Despite of quadrotor's advantages, they are not a best suit as they can't interact with the physical world. The tasks involving physical interactions would require the UAV to apply arbitrary forces and torques in all six degrees of freedom (DOF). As quadrotors are under-actuated and non-holonomic in motion, they cannot exert all the required forces. At Collaborative Robotics Lab, Purdue University, we developed a novel multi-rotor UAV solution, Dexterous Hexrotor, which can exert arbitrary forces and torques in all six DOF, independently and instantaneously. This enables the UAV platform to quickly respond to the external disturbances and precisely hold its position during the mission. The Dexterous Hexrotor serves as a robotic tool for the workers to perform sensing and sampling during the cleanups. Workers can operate Dexterous Hexrotor manually and/or semi-autonomously with human intervention. Manual control requires the worker to fly the Dexterous Hexrotor using a remote control. So the workers should possess knowledge on flying the UAV and to perform physical interaction. A semiautonomous Dexterous Hexrotor requires human input to some extent and requires very less knowledge of flying. The autonomy is designed to operate in flight mode and sampling mode. In flight mode, Dexterous Hexrotor takes off from a 'safe' area, reaches the desired altitude, and fly autonomously towards a sampling point. This sampling point is the target position specified on the 2D reference map. This mode also includes navigation towards the sampling point, avoiding the obstacles in the constrained environment. After reaching a stopping point, Dexterous Hexrotor waits for the human input for a target location to swab and collect samples. The Dexterous Hexrotor is now in sampling mode and waits for the human input. The human operator selects the swabbing location through the live streaming video from onboard camera. Through visual servoing, aided by the map, the UAV will move closer towards the target position. It then transitions to the impact control scheme to perform physical interaction with the wall and collects samples. Once the sample is collected, it autonomously returns back to the takeoff position in 'safe' area for the analysis by mass spectrometry. In this paper, we majorly focus on the physical interaction strategy and the required components which enables the autonomy. Decommissioning of nuclear facilities requires decontamination inside the entire buildings. Decontamination of nuclear facilities involves sensing and sampling the huge buildings, long shafts, etc. Sampling the entire facility is not possible due to the limitation in Dexterous Hexrotor's flight time. But this can be achieved by using a swarm of Dexterous Hexrotors to cover larger areas. The onboard robotic arm can be designed based on the applications such as cleaning, applying sealants, etc. The modularity of the design allows us to switch components as per the requirements of the task. These kind of robotic solutions functioning as tools for the workers, aims to make the work environment safer and playful. (authors)

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WIPP Space Faces TRU Waste Disposal Limits; The Volume Reducing Solution - 18365

Transuranic (TRU) waste packaging for removal from a glovebox has for many years involved the use of bags as the primary containment. In many cases, many hydrogenous layers of bags, yards of tape, and multiple filters are added to the waste stream in order to get the TRU waste into the final 55 gallon drum package to be shipped and buried at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The WIPP is currently limited to a total finite disposed volume of Contact Handled (CH) and Remote Handled (RH) TRU waste. As of early 2014 over half of the allotted WIPP volume had been filled with mainly CH-TRU waste. Based on current bag operation packaging methods used, the Department of Energy's (DOE) remaining CH and RH waste will not fit in the remaining limited WIPP space. Bag operations, can be performed safely by good operators following tedious repetitive processes and many Administrative Safety Controls. Since the bag is the only confinement layer between the contamination and the operator, contamination incidents can occur. Bag-out operations require close proximity to the waste to perform the process. With some waste streams, this close to waste proximity increases operator radiation dose. Central Research Laboratories (CRL), based in Red Wing Minnesota, who for many decades has developed proven engineered material transfer solutions based around their Rapid Transfer Port (RTP) technology, has worked with DOE sites to develop a TRU Waste Management Solution. The solution is a single filtered large Polyethylene (PE) or Stainless Steel (SST) Rapid Transfer Port container in a standard Department of Transportation (DOT) 7A, Type A drum, which allows for loading of TRU waste directly from the operational glovebox without the use of bags, sleeves or tapes to provide leak tight containment. All operator interventions to connect and disconnect a drum to and from the glovebox are achieved in an upright ergonomic position by one (1) operator in less than three (3) minutes. Minimal As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) levels are achieved during connect and disconnect of the drum, due to the engineered safety controls of the RTP. The CRL RTP solution allows glovebox or re-packaged TRU waste to be safely transferred to the final 55 Gallon drum container without additional bags or tape. The high diffusion coefficient filter on the CRL RTP 55G container and elimination of added hydrogenous packaging, improves the Decay Heat Limit (DHL) per drum for most TRU waste types compared with bagged drums, and in most cases allows more TRU waste to be loaded per drum. Inorganic TRU waste materials can be packaged directly into the CRL RTP SST drum container to the maximum DHL and Fissile Gram Equivalent (FGE) allowable for a drum. This paper will show how highly efficient TRAMPAC approved TRU waste packaging of CH and RH TRU waste can be accomplished in a safer, cost effective manner without adding any additional packaging materials to the waste stream, thus increasing the chance of placing all DOE's legacy and to be generated TRU waste in the remaining WIPP space. (authors)

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Microtextured metals for stray-light suppression in the Clementine startracker

Anodized blacks for suppressing stray light in optical systems can now be replaced by microscopically textured metal surfaces. An application of these black surfaces to the Clementine star-tracker navigational system, which will be launched in early 1994 to examine the Moon, en route to intercept an asteroid, is detailed. Rugged black surfaces with Lambertian BRDF less than 10(exp -2) srad(sup -1) are critical for suppressing stray light in the star-tracker optical train. Previously available materials spall under launch vibrations to contaminate mirrors and lenses. Microtextured aluminum is nearly as dark, but much less fragile. It is made by differential ion beam sputtering, which generates light-trapping pores and cones slightly smaller than the wavelength to be absorbed. This leaves a sturdy but light-absorbing surface that can survive challenging conditions without generating debris or contaminants. Both seeded ion beams and plasma immersion (from ECR plasmas) extraction can produce these microscopic textures without fragile interfaces. Process parameters control feature size, spacing, and optical effects (THR, BRDF). Both broad and narrow absorption bands can be engineered with tuning for specific wavelengths and applications. Examples are presented characterized by FTIR in reflection librators (0.95 normal emissivity), heat rejection, and enhanced nucleate boiling.

Johnson, E. A.↗

ATS-6 engineering performance report. Volume:Program and systems summaries: Mechanical and thermal details

The overall mission and spacecraft systems, testing, and operations are summarized. The mechanical subsystems are reviewed, encompassing mechanical design requirements; separation and deployment mechanisms; design and performance evaluation; and the television camera reflector monitor. Thermal control and contamination are discussed in terms of thermal control subsystems, design validation, subsystems performance, the advanced flight experiment, and the quartz-crystal microbalance contamination monitor.

Wales, R. O.↗

Control of imaging assembly with interchangeable radiation shielding

Disclosed herein are an imaging assembly and a method of controlling the imaging assembly. The assembly includes a housing having a sensor configured to detect radiation impinging on the sensor from a plurality of directions. The assembly may employ one or more shields, including a first internal shield having a first annular body between a first inner surface and a first outer surface. The first internal shield is configured to be placed in the housing such that the first inner surface at least partially surrounds the sensor. When the first internal shield is placed in the housing, the sensor is configured to receive a first central zone radiation through a first field of view, and a first peripheral zone radiation through a first peripheral view. The assembly is configured to provide at least one of a controllable field of view and reduced background contamination in an image domain.

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Manganese in drinking-water reservoirs: a multi-disciplinary review of current issues, biogeochemical controls, and oxygenation-based management

Decreased water quality and increased treatment costs due to excess manganese (Mn) in drinking-water supplies are critical issues globally. To combat on-going and emerging taste and odour issues with Mn and other contaminants (e.g., algal toxins), many utilities are using engineered oxygenation or aeration (EOA) systems to improve water quality in lakes and reservoirs. Resultant shifts in key biogeochemical and physical processes are still poorly understood, often leading to inefficiently managed systems. Paired with knowledge gaps regarding environmental drivers of Mn and the complexity of Mn redox kinetics, Mn problems persist. This review presents the state of current research in areas critical to optimisation of EOA mitigation of Mn, with focus on i) Mn biogeochemical cycling within drinking-water reservoirs; ii) influences of local catchment geology, hydrology, and land use on Mn dynamics; and iii) Mn management using different EOA approaches. The importance of considering the combined implications of these factors for successful Mn management in reservoirs is highlighted by an evaluation of relevant field-based studies; a wide range in EOA performance is observed, from a 97 % decrease in soluble Mn up to a ∼400 % increase in total Mn. Despite the breadth of studies that consider Mn in water-supply systems, there are still several areas of research which warrant further investigation, including: the influence of natural sources and anthropogenic activities on Mn within a given catchment, Mn speciation and transport in stratified and destratified lakes and reservoirs, and optimal site-specific EOA strategies for Mn mitigation.

Aeration↗

Discovery: Under the Microscope at Kennedy Space Center

The National Aeronautics & Space Administration (NASA) is known for discovery, exploration, and advancement of knowledge. Since the days of Leeuwenhoek, microscopy has been at the forefront of discovery and knowledge. No truer is that statement than today at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), where microscopy plays a major role in contamination identification and is an integral part of failure analysis. Space exploration involves flight hardware undergoing rigorous "visually clean" inspections at every step of processing. The unknown contaminants that are discovered on these inspections can directly impact the mission by decreasing performance of sensors and scientific detectors on spacecraft and satellites, acting as micrometeorites, damaging critical sealing surfaces, and causing hazards to the crew of manned missions. This talk will discuss how microscopy has played a major role in all aspects of space port operations at KSC. Case studies will highlight years of analysis at the Materials Science Division including facility and payload contamination for the Navigation Signal Timing and Ranging Global Positioning Satellites (NA VST AR GPS) missions, quality control monitoring of monomethyl hydrazine fuel procurement for launch vehicle operations, Shuttle Solids Rocket Booster (SRB) foam processing failure analysis, and Space Shuttle Main Engine Cut-off (ECO) flight sensor anomaly analysis. What I hope to share with my fellow microscopists is some of the excitement of microscopy and how its discoveries has led to hardware processing, that has helped enable the successful launch of vehicles and space flight missions here at Kennedy Space Center.

Howard, Philip M.↗

Decommissioning of the Reactor Pressure Vessels by Remote Controlled Thermal Cutting Segmentation Facilities of the ZION Nuclear Power Plant at ZION, USA - 16599

This paper presents the experiences for the segmentation of both reactor pressure vessels (RV) Units 1 and 2 at the ZION nuclear power plant. The Zion Station project was the first to use the large-scale application of thermal cutting (oxy-propane) technology in the USA. The elaborate planning and engineering was the basis for a quick, safe and flawless project execution without any aerosol migration or release of contamination. The used segmentation technology based on industry-tested methods with its big advantage of availability and spare parts inventory. For safeguarding Simulation (interfering edge analysis), animations and Trials with mock-ups dummies were executed prior. Also risk assessments and rescue concepts are part of the planning. Lean project organization for decommissioning and the flexibility, creativity, willingness to cooperate and willing for uninterrupted decisions of client and contractor are the essential basis for a successful project execution and a short project duration. The remote controlled segmentation of the RV of Unit 2 was performed in 3 month an in Unit 1 in less than 2 month.

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Dry Cask Shipments of ATR Spent Nuclear Fuel at INL

The High Load Charger (HLC) cask will be replacing the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) spent fuel transfer cask that has been used at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to wet-transfer spent ATR fuel elements from ATR to Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) in order to support future plans at both facilities. INTEC intends to discontinue use of the CPP-666 storage pools in compliance with the Idaho Settlement Agreement and the basins will no longer be available to store spent ATR fuel elements. In order to support the core-internals change out in 2021 for ATR, spent ATR fuel elements must be removed from the canal and shipped to INTEC. INL contractors will use the HLC cask for safe, dry transfer of spent Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) fuel elements between the ATR Complex managed by Battelle Energy Alliance, LLC and the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) managed by Fluor Idaho, LLC. The HLC cask (also known as the High Load Charging Cask or High Load Charger) is a lead-shielded, stainless steel transfer container originally designed in 1954 by the Idaho Nuclear Corporation to meet the radiation and contamination controls requirements of the time for shipment of spent nuclear fuel. The cask has been modified over the years and is currently used for wet-to-dry transfers at INTEC. It is approved only for out-of-commerce transfers. The cask will arrive at the ATR where eight spent ATR fuel elements will be loaded into two, newly-designed buckets. Each bucket is a quarter section, right-cylinder shape that has four compartments. The cask will be lifted out of the ATR canal allowing most of the water to drain from the cask. Processing the 12,500 kg cask will be completed in ATR and then transported on a tractor trailer to INTEC where the loaded buckets will be removed from the cask. The loaded buckets will undergo a drying process before placing the four buckets into a canister for long-term storage in the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility (IFSF) at INTEC. A new transportation plan that was submitted to, and approved by, the U.S. Department of Energy to provide the cask safety basis, which describes the hazard analysis and accident analysis for the cask during transport. Supporting accident analysis include criticality, thermal, dose, and drop analyses. Of particular interest for this cask was the drop analysis from which was derived the speed limit for the transport. The drop analysis addressed drops in air onto an unyielding surface and in water onto an energy-absorbing pad for the cask in the ATR facility. These analyses are typically applied as the bounding drop scenarios during transport; however, this resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 12.9 kph. In order to more accurately represent the in-transit accident scenario, LS-DYNA software was procured and the model was updated to more closely represent the potential drop heights and impact surfaces of asphalt and soil for the cask while in transit. This analysis resulted in a safety basis speed limit of 48 kph. This safety basis speed limit is more practical to implement and control.

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N-Butane To Replace Trichlorotrifluoroethane

According to proposal, trichlorotrifluoroethane replaced by n-butane as solvent for removal of oils, greases, hydraulic fluids, and other oily surface contaminants. N-butane candidate is replacement fluid because physical and chemical properties relevant to use as solvent similar to corresponding properties of trichlorotrifluoroethane. Considerably less expensive. Major disadvantage is flammability. As in cases of other hydrocarbon fluids, flammability hazard minimized by engineering controls.

Biesinger, Paul H.↗

Chapter 9: MEMS Applications in Spacecraft Thermal Control and Chapter 13: Handling and Contamination Control Considerations for Critical Space Applications

Thermal control systems (TCS) are an integral part of all spacecraft and instruments. To operate properly all spacecraft components must be maintained within a specified temperature band, which in some instances can be quite tight (less than 1 degree C). Traditionally this is accomplished by "passive" designs, but with modem spacecraft and instruments it is increasingly necessary to use active thermal control technologies. Microelectromechanical System (MEMS) can be useful in developing an active TCS, and may be especially useful for small spacecraft. As the MEMS knowledge matures, the applications of MEMS in spacecraft thermal control emerges as a viable technology for thermal engineers. Potential applications include specialized thermal control coatings, thermal switches, and specialized filters for instruments. Although MEMS technology demonstrates benefits, it also poses challenges for thermal en,oineers due to the lack of in-flight MEMS data. As a consequence, in order to design a MEMS thermal control device and receive the full advantage, it is important to understand the potential impact of the space environment on MEMS devices and the design/operational constraints imposed in their use. An entire chapter is devoted to handling and contamination controls for Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) in space applications due to the importance of the topic area to final mission success. Handling and contamination control is discussed relative to the full life cycle from the very basic wafer level processing up through on orbit deployment. MEMS packaging will drive the need to tailor the Handling and Contamination Control Plan in order to assure adequacy of the overall program on a program by program basis. Plan elements are discussed at length to assist the user in preparing and implementing effective plans for both handling and contamination control to prevent deleterious effects.

Osiander, Robert↗

The Contaminant Footprint of Landed Spacecraft: Toward an Inventory and Modelling Framework

All spacecraft generate and carry contaminants, i.e., unwanted and potentially harmful material. When a spacecraft lands and operates in near-vacuum, as onto Earth’s Moon, it introduces contaminants into its environment that may compromise mission science objectives and engineering performance. Contamination of solar system bodies may irrevocably degrade targets of unique value to planetary scientists, for instance, as lunar landed spacecraft introduce propellant effluents into the otherwise pristine ice of the Moon’s permanently shadowed regions. NASA’s planetary protection discipline seeks to ensure that solar system bodies are not contaminated, for scientific purposes, by terrestrial material (i.e., forward contamination). This interest aligns with planetary science interest in mitigating the transport of terrestrial contaminants onto solar system bodies and in controlling types of contamination that could compromise the scientific value of samples or measurements. NASA, and other entities that practice planetary science, have compelling and multidisciplinary interests in the preservation of special regions and sampling sites of high scientific value – including lunar permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) – from inadvertent contamination by any spacecraft, and in understanding the contamination of such regions by all spacecraft. Organic molecular contamination here represents a primary threat. Organic molecules will be introduced to solar system bodies by nominal landed spacecraft and crew processes – including by the action of descent and ascent engines; natural materials outgassing; and crew environmental and life support system sources. Molecular contaminants can also travel in the free-molecular sense at global scale across near-vacuum bodies, including into regions where they may be permanently trapped. This presentation will address a high-level study to identify sources of contaminants – in particular, organic material – generated by landed spacecraft along with the transport vectors by which these contaminants can reach sites of scientific interest on bodies like the Moon. A vision for an integrated modeling framework for the organic contamination footprint of spacecraft missions, individually and collectively, will also be described and presented along with initial conclusions related to organic molecular transport.

Gas Dynamics↗

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗

STS-55 pad abort: Engine 2011 oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter check valve leak

The STS-55 initial launch attempt of Columbia (OV102) was terminated on KSC launch pad A March 22, 1993 at 9:51 AM E.S.T. due to violation of an ME-3 (Engine 2011) Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) limit exceedance. The event description and timeline are summarized. Propellant loading was initiated on 22 March, 1993 at 1:15 AM EST. All SSME chill parameters and launch commit criteria (LCC) were nominal. At engine start plus 1.44 seconds, a Failure Identification (FID) was posted against Engine 2011 for exceeding the 50 psia Oxidizer Preburner (OPB) purge pressure redline. The engine was shut down at 1.50 seconds followed by Engines 2034 and 2030. All shut down sequences were nominal and the mission was safely aborted. The OPB purge pressure redline violation and the abort profile/overlay for all three engines are depicted. SSME Avionics hardware and software performed nominally during the incident. A review of vehicle data table (VDT) data and controller software logic revealed no failure indications other than the single FID 013-414, OPB purge pressure redline exceeded. Software logic was executed according to requirements and there was no anomalous controller software operation. Immediately following the abort, a Rocketdyne/NASA failure investigation team was assembled. The team successfully isolated the failure cause to the oxidizer preburner augmented spark igniter purge check valve not being fully closed due to contamination. The source of the contaminant was traced to a cut segment from a rubber O-ring which was used in a fine clean tool during valve production prior to 1992. The valve was apparently contaminated during its fabrication in 1985. The valve had performed acceptably on four previous flights of the engine, and SSME flight history shows 780 combined check valve flights without failure. The failure of an Engine 3 (SSME No. 2011) check valve to close was sensed by onboard engine instruments even though all other engine operations were normal. This resulted in an engine shutdown and safe sequential shutdown of all three engines prior to ignition of the solid boosters.

Source record↗

Monticello Mill Tailings Site Operable Unit III Annual Groundwater Report May 2014 Through April 2015, October 2015

This report provides the annual analysis of water quality restoration progress, cumulative through April 2015, for Operable Unit (OU) III, surface water and groundwater, of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Legacy Management Monticello Mill Tailings Site (MMTS). The MMTS is a Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act National Priorities List site located in and near the city of Monticello, San Juan County, Utah. MMTS comprises the 110-acre site of a former uranium- and vanadium-ore-processing mill (mill site) and 1,700 acres of surrounding private and municipal property. Milling operations generated 2.5 million cubic yards of waste (tailings) from 1942 to 1960. The tailings were impounded at four locations on the mill site. Inorganic constituents in the tailings drained from the impoundments to contaminate local surface water (Montezuma Creek) and groundwater in the underlying alluvial aquifer. Mill tailings dispersed by wind and water also contaminated properties surrounding and downstream of the mill site. Remedial actions to remove and isolate radiologically contaminated soil, sediment, and debris from the former mill site (OU I) and surrounding properties (OU II) were completed in 1999 with the encapsulation of the wastes in an engineered repository located on DOE property 1 mile south of the former mill site. Contamination of groundwater and surface water remains within OU III at levels that exceed water quality protection standards. Uranium is the primary contaminant of concern. LM implemented monitored natural attenuation with institutional controls as the OU III remedy in 2004. Because groundwater restoration proceeded more slowly than expected and did not meet performance criteria established in the OU III Record of Decision (June 2004), LM implemented a contingency action in 2009 by an Explanation of Significant Difference to include a pump-and-treat system using a single extraction well and treatment by zero-valent iron (ex-situ treatment system). The contingency action was optimized in 2015 with the installation of 8 extraction wells and 16 monitoring wells in a focused area of the aquifer (area of attainment). Contaminated water is treated by solar evaporation at an existing onsite LM facility. Environmental monitoring at OU III consists of twice-yearly (April and October) collection and analysis of hydrologic and water-quality data from an established network of observation wells, seeps, and surface water locations. The scope of monitoring was expanded in 2009 for the ex situ treatment system and in 2015 for the remedy optimization system. Operation and monitoring of the ex situ treatment system was discontinued in 2014 with the start-up of the remedy optimization system. No data anomalies for OU III water quality trending or restoration progress are identified for the May 2014 through April 2015 reporting period. Although some regions of the aquifer demonstrate decreasing concentration trends, such trending is not evident for the bulk of the aquifer and a prolonged restoration period is indicated. The groundwater contingency remedy optimization system captures significant contaminant mass (primarily uranium) from the area of attainment; however, because that system only became operational in 2015, a long-term forecast of restoration progress is premature.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Development and Implementation of a Bag Degradation Predictive Tool at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Nuclear material packaging involves many complex variables derived from the stored material's properties, the storage environment, and the synergistic interaction of said material and its environment on the containment boundary. In the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) the typical containment boundary found, starting from the stored material itself to the outermost containment layer, consists of the material contained within a stainless steel (typically 304) slip-lid (or other equivalent stainless steel packaging layer) wrapped in an sPVC bag-out bag contained within a facility approved outer container stored within the boundaries of an approved facility (i.e., a building designed and approved to store nuclear material). This packaging configuration, though occasionally deviated from in the past, represents the current procedurally enforced, expected containment structure for all interim nuclear material containment outside of an engineered control barrier (e.g., a glovebox). Over the life of containerization research at LANL, packaging engineers have become increasingly concerned with the degradation of the sPVC bag-out bag, which can cause corrosion to the outermost packaging layer as well as possible exposure to alpha contamination if the bag-out bag layer is degraded to the point of containment failure. A bag-out bag degradation predictive tool (BDT) is therefore needed to assess the current and future nuclear material inventory for possible bag degradation in order to continue to ensure safe operations for the facility and its workers to deliver on the vital national security mission of 30 PPY.

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